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The Domain Of Gas: Energy Technologies And The Environment In Modern Iran,
1935–1995
Abstract
This dissertation examines the history of natural gas in twentieth-century Iran, foregrounding the
interactions between energy technologies, the natural environment, and the politics of national
development. In joining Iran-as-state, Iran-as-society, and Iran-as-geology, it argues that modern Iran has
been co-constituted with natural gas and its infrastructures of use, both reflecting the hopes of Iranians
and constraining what was possible with their physical and technological properties. Over the past
seventy years, Iranian society has become increasingly ordered around the consumption of gas energy, a
result of the decades-long efforts of both the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi monarchy and the post-1979
Islamic Republic to make the resource a pillar of Iranian society. Under these two regimes, gas
energy—seen as abundant, inexpensive, clean, and modern—became a crucial embodiment of official
commitments to national development and public welfare, both informing and being harnessed by a
developmental vision for Iran that remained remarkably stable across the violent revolutionary divide.
Drawing on analyses of internal correspondence and reports produced by officials working in Iranian
ministries, the National Iranian Oil and Gas Companies, and British Petroleum; scientific articles published
by Iranian experts; magazines, photographs, and promotional materials produced by the NIOC and the
Ministry of Petroleum for public audiences; and articles appearing in national dailies, this dissertation
brings together the political, technological, social, geologic, and climatic histories of Iran to chart in a
largely chronological manner the transformation of natural gas from a waste product into the centerpiece
of the industrialization, environmental, and legitimation strategies of two regimes. United by natural gas,
the enmeshing of these perspectives reflects the crucial role of nonhuman factors in this story, significant
but heretofore largely overlooked elements of Iranian history. Going beyond the questions of geopolitics
and religion that have largely dominated discussions of the country’s modern history, this dissertation
argues that factors like the volatility of natural gas, the fractured rock of limestone formations, the height
of mountain ranges, and the hot sun of a semi-arid climate all worked to push Iranian policymakers
toward identifying natural gas as the energy source around which to build a new society.
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ABSTRACT
THE DOMAIN OF GAS:
ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN MODERN IRAN,
1935-1995
Ciruce A. Movahedi-Lankarani
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet

This dissertation examines the history of natural gas in twentieth-century Iran,
foregrounding the interactions between energy technologies, the natural environment, and
the politics of national development. In joining Iran-as-state, Iran-as-society, and Iran-asgeology, it argues that modern Iran has been co-constituted with natural gas and its
infrastructures of use, both reflecting the hopes of Iranians and constraining what was
possible with their physical and technological properties. Over the past seventy years,
Iranian society has become increasingly ordered around the consumption of gas energy, a
result of the decades-long efforts of both the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi monarchy and the
post-1979 Islamic Republic to make the resource a pillar of Iranian society. Under these
two regimes, gas energy—seen as abundant, inexpensive, clean, and modern—became a
crucial embodiment of official commitments to national development and public welfare,
both informing and being harnessed by a developmental vision for Iran that remained
remarkably stable across the violent revolutionary divide. Drawing on analyses of
internal correspondence and reports produced by officials working in Iranian ministries,
the National Iranian Oil and Gas Companies, and British Petroleum; scientific articles
published by Iranian experts; magazines, photographs, and promotional materials
x

produced by the NIOC and the Ministry of Petroleum for public audiences; and articles
appearing in national dailies, this dissertation brings together the political, technological,
social, geologic, and climatic histories of Iran to chart in a largely chronological manner
the transformation of natural gas from a waste product into the centerpiece of the
industrialization, environmental, and legitimation strategies of two regimes. United by
natural gas, the enmeshing of these perspectives reflects the crucial role of nonhuman
factors in this story, significant but heretofore largely overlooked elements of Iranian
history. Going beyond the questions of geopolitics and religion that have largely
dominated discussions of the country’s modern history, this dissertation argues that
factors like the volatility of natural gas, the fractured rock of limestone formations, the
height of mountain ranges, and the hot sun of a semi-arid climate all worked to push
Iranian policymakers toward identifying natural gas as the energy source around which to
build a new society.
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Introduction

To walk through contemporary Tehran is to notice quickly the ubiquity of
neighborhood restaurants, large and small, proudly advertising kabāb-e zoghāli, or kabab
cooked over charcoal. Lunchtime crowds wait, watching while cooks, dressed in white
and sweating over long coal pits topped with skewered meat, tend to their fires with the
rhythmic waving of handheld fans. It is to open the trunks of passenger cars and see
canisters of compressed gas filling most of the available space, and to hear taxi drivers
bemoan their car’s feebleness when using compressed natural gas in Tehran’s famously
hilly terrain. It is to exit the Haft-e Tir Square subway station and see an enormous and
colorful banner hanging above multiple lanes of traffic celebrating the completion of yet
another stage of the South Pars gas field’s commercial development. It is to hear
persistent rumors that the citizens of the province of Sistān-Baluchestān had supported
the 2017 incumbent candidacy of President Hassan Rouhani because of their joy at
finally being connected to the national gas network. That the smoky aromas and glowing
1

embers of neighborhood eateries have become notable to city residents, that most motor
vehicles have been equipped to use both gasoline and CNG, that the Iranian state publicly
celebrates seemingly obscure happenings in the country’s gas industry, and that the
residents of one of Iran’s most restive regions would laud closer ties to central
government are all a result of one of the most significant developments of 20th-century
Iran: the rise of natural gas as the country’s keystone energy source. Over the second half
of the twentieth century, gas energy—at once abundant, volatile, cheap, clean, polluting,
and dangerous—became woven through nearly every facet of Iranian life, changing how
people heated their homes, fueled their vehicles, and cooked their food. The thorough
integration of gas into Iranian society was not happenstance; rather, it was the result of
sustained attention and effort by two ruling regimes over decades of time, both informing
and being harnessed by the competing social visions that swirled around Iran.

***
In joining Iran-as-state, Iran-as-society, and Iran-as-geology, natural gas and its
infrastructures, even more than oil, came to embody profound imaginings of Iran’s
future. This dissertation argues that natural gas energy was inextricably tied to the
transformations of Iranian society in the latter half of the twentieth century, both
reflecting the hopes of Iranians and constraining what was possible with its physical and
technological properties.1 It further argues that gas has been the crucial means by which
Pioneered with respect to the Middle East by Timothy Mitchell in his famous chapter “Can the Mosquito
Speak?,” in Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 2002), nonhuman actors have been increasingly recognized as significant forces within the history of
the region. This perspective, developed in Science and Technology Studies in contrast with purely social
constructionist viewpoints that privileged human social actors, emphasized the generalized symmetry
between human and nonhuman actors when describing social systems. Associated most strongly with the
1

2

two Iranian regimes have sought to simultaneously modernize their country, address
deteriorating urban air quality, and bolster their legitimacy. All the crucial differences
between the Iranian monarchy and the Islamic Republic notwithstanding, the
developmental policies that natural gas energy embodied remained remarkably similar
across the violent revolutionary divide. Shaping their policies were fundamental
topographic, geological, climatic, chemical, and technological realities, all-enveloping
and interpenetrating contexts that pushed Iranian policymakers toward identifying natural
gas as the energy source around which to build a new society. Between the 1950s and the
present day, Iranian society has become increasingly ordered around the consumption of

Actor-Network Theory of Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, building on the latter’s rejection of a priori
assumptions about the significance of various actors in the history of science in his book The
Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1988), the perspective has inspired numerous scholars across a wide variety of disciplines, in large part
because it is best understood as an intellectual orientation or strategy of analysis rather than as a rigorously
defined theory. For a simultaneous description and example of application of ANT see Latour’s Aramis, or
the Love of Technology, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, 2002).
Latour’s perspective has significant philosophical implications, particularly surrounding the destabilization
of traditional distinctions made between culture and nature and the resulting collapse of what Latour argues
is a central tenet of modernity (Latour was not the first to argue for this blurring of boundaries; in particular
see Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the Late
Twentieth Century,” Socialist Review, no. 80 (1985): 65-108). Latour explores this issue in his book We
Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
ANT is not without its critics, many of whom see in the perspective an abandonment of moral stakes in
favor of pure descriptivism and an unsupportable attribution of intentionality to nonhuman actors (for a
concise explication of many of the critiques of ANT see Langdon Winner’s “Upon Opening the Black Box
and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology,” Science, Technology, &
Human Values, vol. 18, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 362-378; for a critique of the symmetry of humans and
nonhumans in ANT see Andrew Pickering’s The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1995) in which he argues that human and nonhuman agency are
unequal, with the latter enveloped by that of humans). Nonetheless, Latour’s ideas, as shifting and subject
to revision as they have been over the last three decades, have begun to find broader purchase and by the
early- to mid-2010s, an increasing number of scholars of the Middle East had begun to employ such
analytical tools. Some of the earliest were On Barak, who focused on how railroads, undersea cables, and
marine life have helped make modern Egypt in his book On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern
Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013) and Ronen Shamir, who studied the
construction of electrical systems in Mandate-era Palestine in his book Current Flow: The Electrification of
Palestine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013). The influence of Latour’s ideas continues to
grow in the study of the Middle East and this author personally knows of several in-progress dissertation
and book projects that are employing these methods.

3

gas energy, the adoption of which reflected powerful and intertwined impulses toward
national independence, the creation of a sovereign technological modernity, and the
mitigation of certain forms of environmental violence. Iranians claimed the right and the
ability to exploit their gas resources from international energy firms in the 1950s, quickly
devising expansive schemes to make use of their gas reserves. By the 1970s they had
constructed massive refineries and country-spanning pipeline networks, in the process
imbuing gas with notions of independence and self-modernization. Far from a network of
pipes silently and invisibly operating in the background, gas energy and its systems were
deliberately made visible through celebrations of its ability to enable new “modern”
lifeways. Gas’s potential as a cleaner-burning fossil fuel was quickly linked to concerns
for Iran’s worsening urban air quality and its status as a cheap, abundant, and domestic
source of energy, thereby making it into a potential savior able to both arrest Iran’s
deteriorating environmental conditions and simultaneously intensify its drive for a fossil
fuel-based modernity.
The story of Iranian gas was one written in infrastructure. It was written with steel
and telex machines, inside London’s corporate boardrooms and the lungs of Tehran’s
residents, on the texture of the Earth’s crust and the shop floors of Iranian factories. It
combined webs of steel pipe, expert networks, financial flows, and the fractured matrices
of limestone rock.2 Far from neutral technological systems inertly shuffling gas from

2

In the past few decades, a dizzying corpus of literature addressing infrastructure and its social lives has
been produced. Brian Larkin, in “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Annual Review of
Anthropology, vol. 42 (2013): 327-343, defines infrastructures as “built networks that facilitate the flow of
goods, people, or ideas and allow for their exchange over space,” possessing physical forms that “shape the
nature of a network, the speed and direction of its movement, its temporalities, and its vulnerability to
breakdown,” and “literally providing the undergirding of modern societies” (p. 328). As Larkin himself
notes, infrastructures are more than technical systems; they also channel and inform social and cultural

4

place to place, these assemblages of steel, hydrocarbons, expertise, rock, and money were
co-constituted with a changing Iran, both the physical condensation of political and
technical choices as well as influential actants in their own right.3 Natural gas
infrastructures were an important part of Iranian efforts to industrialize their country, and
the planning, design, and construction processes embedded politically charged notions of

contexts in which they reside (p. 329). An infrastructural perspective is powerful, and scholars have used it
to address everything from water systems to international finance, but energy systems have nonetheless
been a significant focus. As a whole the field builds on the insights of Thomas P. Hughes in Networks of
Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press,1983). In his book, by comparing the development of the electrical grids in the United States and
Germany, Hughes emphasized the significant influence that the social and political contexts within which
infrastructures reside had on their design and functioning as technological systems. Akhil Gupta furthers
the point, asking us to remember that many live with only partial access to supposedly ubiquitous energy
infrastructures in his article “An Anthropology of Electricity from the Global South,” Cultural
Anthropology, vol. 30, no. 4 (2015): 555-568. Analyses of electricity have come to the Middle East as well
with Ronen Shamir’s Current Flow. Rather than examine a particular form of infrastructure, On Barak has
emphasized the overlapping infrastructural developments that have helped make modern Egypt in On Time.
Indeed, infrastructural systems rarely exist in isolation and the development of one can and frequently does
come at the expense of another, a crucial point made by Toby C. Jones with respect to the priority
American society has given energy infrastructures over those of water in Running Dry: Essays on Energy,
Water, and Environmental Crisis (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2015). Brian Larkin
focuses on interlocking infrastructures—particularly media technologies like cinema and electrical grids—
to explore how colonial regimes in Nigeria sought to create new African subjects through new forms of
media in his book Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2008). Ahmad Shokr has explored the connections between development politics
and the Aswan High Dam in his article “Hydropolitics, Economy, and the Aswan High Dam in MidCentury Egypt,” The Arab Studies Journal, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 9-31.
In using the term “assemblage” this dissertation follows in the footsteps of numerous scholars of
infrastructure who have been influenced by Jane Bennett’s seminal “The Agency of Assemblages and the
North American Blackout,” Public Culture, vol. 17, no. 3 (2005):445-465, in turn based on the work of
Gilles Deleuze. Bennett defines an assemblage as “first, an ad hoc grouping, a collectivity whose origins
are historical and circumstantial, though its contingent status says nothing about its efficacy, which can be
quite strong. An assemblage is, second, a living, throbbing grouping whose coherence coexists with
energies and countercultures that exceed and confound it. An assemblage is, third, a web with an uneven
topography: some of the points at which the trajectories of actants cross each other are more heavily
trafficked than others, and thus power is not equally distributed across the assemblage. An assemblage is,
fourth, not governed by a central power: no one member has sufficient competence to fully determine the
consequences of the activities of the assemblage. An assemblage, finally, is made up of many types of
actants: humans and nonhumans; animals, vegetables, and minerals; nature, culture, and technology” (p.
445, n. 2).
3
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Iran’s future in them.4 More than passive tools waiting to be deployed in pursuit of
political ends, the technologies available to Iranians shaped what was possible and what
was not through both their technical abilities and material properties.5 Infrastructural
systems like those for producing, transporting, and distributing Iran’s natural gas
reflected human ambition, material property, and natural context meeting in a blurry and
porous zone of interconnection and interpenetration. The shape of Iran’s natural gas
infrastructures were influenced not only by the political ambitions of Iranian
development planners and the capabilities of available technologies, but also the volatility
of natural gas, the varying compositions of natural gas reservoirs, the corrosive effects of
impurities, the height of mountain ranges, the depths of rivers, the local climates of urban
areas, and an almost countless number of other factors. Rather than a place where the
human and the natural worlds met, technologies of gas use were thus the distilled and
material manifestation of Iran as a singular entity combining both. Acknowledging the
central role that technology has played in Iran’s development is crucial to understanding
the country’s recent past, but this recognition goes much further than offering a new set
In his influential article “Do Artifacts Have Politics?,” Daedalus, vol. 109, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 121-136,
Langdon Winner has famously pointed to how politics can be and are embedded in technological systems.
Particularly notable is the deliberate racism of the Long Island highway network and its nine-foot
overpasses, freely allowing private automobiles, overwhelmingly owned by middle- and upper-class
whites, to use the new parkways while users of the city’s 12-foot public buses, predominantly lower class
and black, could not.
4
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The ability of infrastructural projects to reflect the political proclivities of their creators is not infinite, a
point Gabrielle Hecht makes in her exploration of the French nuclear power industry in the decades after
the Second World War. For France’s “technologists,” a term Hecht uses to refer to experts in the employ of
the French state, “debates about the nature of this relationship [between technology and politics] were
contests for the power to shape the future of France and its identity” (p. 5). But “engineers did not have
infinite choices,” as Hecht also writes, and thus while their choices were always political on at least some
level, they cannot be reduced solely to the province of politics (p. 15). Hecht terms this intersection of
technology and politics “technopolitics,” emphasizing the material grounding of the political formulations
embedded in technological systems. For more see Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear
Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998).
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of analytical tools for teasing apart the influences that have acted in the transformations
of Iranian society. At stake is a fundamental ability to think the human, the material, and
the natural together; to see nonhuman factors as important drivers of historical change in
their own right; and to understand that there is no human without the technological and
the natural in equal measure.
In Iran, pipeline systems and new refineries arose to link homes and petroleum
fields. In the heated dreams of state officials, natural gas and its systems of conveyance
would become an enormous web that would draw Iranians into a singular national
whole.6 But gas could drive apart too, and for long years those same officials, in their
concern for technical and economic efficiency, undermined their own unifying vision. In
the uneven spread of gas service across their country, in the precedence of urban over
rural and new neighborhoods over old, Iranians seemingly saw their own value as
national subjects reflected, a sight that displeased many in their seemingly unequal
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Nationalism and national unity have been potent forces in modern Iranian history, a reality wellrecognized by scholars. Afshin Marashi, in Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870-1940
(Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2008), studies how political legitimacy in Iran moved from
ideas of sacred kingship in the mid-19th century to Muhammad Rezā Shah’s invocation of nationalist
themes. He ultimately argues that the state, in the context of Iranian intellectuals engaging with notions of
Iran’s “authenticity,” intentionally constructed new national spectacles in an effort to bind state and society.
In The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Ali
M. Ansari also examines the relationship of the Iranian state with nationalist currents in Iran, arguing in
contrast to Marashi, that Rezā Shah’s use of monarchical legitimation strategies rooted in divine right was
strikingly similar to those used by Khomeini some fifty years later and ultimately paved the way for the
latter’s rise in the late 1970s. In her highly original Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 18041946 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet seeks to complicate
Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” and the dominant hold it has had on
understandings of nationalism. Examining the late-19th and early-20th centuries, Kashani-Sabet instead
roots the Iranian sense of nationhood in the concept of Irānzamin, the need of Iranians to defend their
country’s borders and the sense of homeland it engendered. Kashani-Sabet’s intervention underpins this
dissertation’s argument in its effort to move the focus of study of Iran’s communal identity away from form
and symbol to tangible and material bases. Natural gas energy and its infrastructure did not define Iran as a
nation, but it did provoke feelings of belonging and non-belonging in residents of the country.
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positions.7 The highly visible successes of Iran’s new natural gas infrastructure—
gleaming edifices of sophisticated technology, a clean and convenient fuel, new national
revenues—were thus from the system’s very beginnings stalked by its failures and
shortcomings. But Iran’s natural gas projects failed in other ways too: largely unmet were
expectations that the use of natural gas would be accompanied by significant
improvements in the air quality of Iran’s cities.8 Iran’s intensifying struggle with air
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Increasingly, scholars have begun to explore the ways in which infrastructures have served to segment
societies by marginalizing some communities and elevating others, highlighting not only the politics
embedded in such technical systems but also the ongoing and shifting uses of infrastructures and the
uneven access to the benefits they purport to provide. In Roads: An Anthropology of Infrastructure and
Expertise (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox explore road
construction in the Peruvian Andes and its social consequences, finding not only that roads have largely
failed to address existing inequalities but that those failures have in turn beget social longings for more and
newer roads. Antina von Schnitzler, in Democracy’s Infrastructure: Techno-Politics and Protest after
Apartheid (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), explores how conflicts over citizenship,
belonging, and payment in Soweto, South Africa are sited within water meters. Charlotte Lemanksi has
also studied the relationships between citizenship and infrastructure in South Africa, exploring in her paper
“Infrastructural Citizenship: The Everyday Citizenships of Adapting and/or Destroying Public
Infrastructure in Cape Town, South Africa,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers (2019)
how residents of Cape Town perform citizenship in practice in relation to the infrastructures they use in
their everyday lives. Lemanski expands upon her ideas regarding infrastructural citizenship in her paper
“Infrastructural Citizenship: (De)Constructing State-Society Relations,” International Development
Planning Review, vol. 42, no. 2 (2020): 115-125, arguing that infrastructures are crucial meeting points for
states and citizens and embody citizenship for both; for citizens infrastructure is the material representation
of the state whereas the state itself plans for citizens through infrastructure and its maintenance. Focusing
on access to water among the residents of Mumbai and the work of engineers and officials to provide it to
recognized customers and deny it to others, Nikhil Anand argues for a powerful notion of hydraulic
citizenship where service from the city water department serves as a marker of belonging and citizenship
able to be leveraged to make broader claims on the state. See Hydraulic City: Water and the Infrastructures
of Citizenship in Mumbai (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017). Rosalind Fredericks, through her
exploration of sanitation in Dakar, Senegal, adds to this emerging discussion by highlighting the crucial
component of labor in the functioning of urban infrastructures as well as the political formulations that
arise from them; see Garbage Citizenship: Vital Infrastructures of Labor in Dakar, Senegal (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2018).
8

Failure to meet environmental goals is a common feature of energy systems, as Cymene Howe explores
with respect to a large wind farm built in Mexico. As this dissertation also does, Howe argues that the
relationship between energy and the environment cannot be properly understood without acknowledging
the interactions between various human aspirations for energy and the material forces at play. See
Ecologics: Wind and Power in the Anthropocene (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019). Breakdown
and failure have been formative influences in the literature on infrastructure. In her article “The
Ethnography of Infrastructure,” American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 43, no. 3 (1999): 377-391, Susan Leigh
Star proposed an understanding of infrastructure as largely invisible until moments of breakdown reveal
their presence. In contrast to those who have built on this idea—represented by the contributors to Stephen

8

pollution in the postwar period sat at the intersection of social and natural phenomena, a
product of rising fossil fuel combustion, the folds of mountain chains, and the bright sun
of a semi-arid climate. What Iranian city residents experienced was not the human
pollution of an otherwise pristine natural world, but the alterations in the natural urban
environment as influential actants changed their behavior. Iranians and their cities were
the environment, and as populations rose and more motor vehicles plied the roadways, as
more factories were erected and people consumed more goods, and as more and more
byproducts of fossil fuel combustion were released into the air, that environment began to
change.9 Residents of the country’s capital saw that smoggy, smoky meshing of human

Graham’s edited volume Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails (New York: Routledge, 2010) and
Stephen Graham and Nigel Thrift in “Out of Order: Understanding Repair and Maintenance,” Theory,
Culture, and Society, vol. 24, no. 3 (2007): 1-25—other scholars have noted the particular visibility of
infrastructure in the cities of the Global South. In “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” Brian Larkin
reminds us that infrastructures, particularly those for energy and transport, are often intentionally built to be
visible demonstrations of state power. Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox in Roads also demonstrate this to
be true, as does Nikhil Anand in Hydraulic City and Christina Schwenkel in “Spectacular Infrastructure and
Its Breakdown in Socialist Vietnam,” American Ethnologist, vol. 42, no. 3 (2015): 520-534. Graeme
Macdonald, in his exploration of the ways that representations of oil infrastructures are always both deeply
local and inevitably global in “Containing Oil: The Pipeline in Petroculture,” in Petrocultures: Oil, Politics,
Culture, ed. Sheena Wilson, Adam Carlson, and Imre Szeman, 36-77 (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2017), also attends to the visibility of infrastructures. This dissertation too seeks to
highlight the almost extreme visibility of natural gas infrastructure in Iran, exploring how that visibility
reflected and shaped its influence in society.
9

William Cronon has famously led the way in understanding urban areas through an environmental
perspective. His seminal work, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1991), by focusing on the city of Chicago and its increasingly close relationships
with its hinterlands to the west, was instrumental in beginning the slow unraveling of human-nature
binaries that had strongly shaped understandings of the relationship between people and the natural world.
Focusing on the production of commodities—in both the literal and metaphorical sense—Cronon shows
how Chicago both produced the rural west and vice versa. Cronon’s partial dissolving of the boundaries
between human and nature have been fertile grounds for other scholars, and interest in such a perspective
has exploded in the past decade. Eduardo Kohn, in his book How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology
beyond the Human (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013), argues that all beings can think
via the production of and interpretation of signs, working to undermine notions of human exceptionalism
that posit our divorce from the natural world. In Beyond Nature and Culture, trans. Janet Lloyd (Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), Philippe Descola argues that the nature-culture dualism is a
peculiarly Western notion of relatively recent vintage. Building on the structuralist views of Claude LéviStrauss, Descola traces the history of nature-culture dualism and contrasts it with alternatives from around
the globe, seeking ultimately to describe a more fundamental schema that unifies human and nature. Jane
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and nonhuman factors with their eyes, felt it sear their throats, and contrasted it with
memories of old Tehran and its beautiful skies.10 Their laments were expressed in
photographs, air quality measurements, penned reminiscences, and the conversion of
factories and automobiles from oil to natural gas fuel.11 In contrast to existing literature
that has treated Iranian environmentalism as an entirely post-revolutionary phenomenon,
this dissertation shows that concern for the environment and attempts to mitigate air
pollution had their roots in the late-Pahlavi era.12 During that time, Iranian experts and
officials worked to understand the problem and fashion solutions for it, not merely

Bennett explores the implications of such a collapsed dualism, asking what it would mean if we seriously
treat all things as able to be influential in the world, theorizing a materiality that hums with life in the
relations between actants. See Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2010) for more.
10

In his book Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan (Seattle, WA: University of
Washington Press, 2010), Brett L. Walker, focusing on the intersection of toxic industrial pollution,
disease, and pain in Japan, argues that modernity has failed to free humans from the constraints of nature:
to harm nature is to fundamentally harm ourselves.
11

William Cronon has pointed to the centrality of culture in mediating understandings of the natural world.
In his article “The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” Environmental
History, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 1996): 7-28, Cronon explores how notions of nature as pristine wilderness
and human activity as a despoiler of it were built, ultimately arguing that the dichotomy is false and that
nature is visible even in areas where extensive human activity is present. Note that this is not the total
collapse of the human-nature binary that some other authors have attempted. Cronon is rather arguing
against the notion that only so-called wilderness wholly devoid of human presence counts as “nature.”
12

While legislative and legal aspects of environmental protection in the Pahlavi era are often
acknowledged, there has so far been little to no discussion of the actual policies and efforts undertaken to
manage Iran’s urban air quality. Even the start of air quality monitoring is often ignored, as the existing
literature dates its beginnings in Tehran to 1993 and the establishment of the Air Quality Control Company.
In contrast, this dissertation shows that air monitoring in the capital region was first undertaken by
academic researchers, government officials, and employees of the national petroleum companies at least
two decades prior. The literature includes Farhad Atash, “The Deterioration of Urban Environments in
Developing Countries: Mitigating the Air Pollution Crisis in Tehran, Iran,” Cities 24, no. 6 (2007), Vahid
Hosseini and Hossein Shahbazi, “Urban Air Pollution in Iran,” Iranian Studies 49, no. 6 (2016), and
Tahereh Saheb, “Air Pollution Governance in Iran: Inhibiting Factors,” PhD diss., Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute, 2015.
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channeling expertise produced elsewhere but working to generate original knowledge.13
Many looked at the polluted cities of the Global North and shuddered, in turn seeking a
modern way of life that could avoid such a fate. They sought to use natural gas as an
energetic foundation upon which Iranians could chart a new course for their country, one
where they drank deeply from their own natural resources to build a prosperous sovereign
nation free of the poisonous fumes and hacking coughs that marked the dark
environmental underbelly of the industrialized world. Many Iranian officials bet on gas as
a clean source of fuel, ultimately finding their hopes foundering on the inherent
insufficiency and brittleness of technical solutions to the problem.14
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Though scholars have been slow to recognize experts working in the Global South as doing more than
applying knowledge produced in the world’s wealthy nations, there is growing recognition of them as
important contributors to global knowledge networks. In her 2001 book of comparative historical
sociology, Managing Mexico: Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2001), Sarah Babb, by analyzing hundreds of undergraduate theses in competing Mexican
economics programs, has demonstrated the value in examining the disciplinary output of particular
academic fields. Going beyond an intellectual history of trends within the discipline of economics in
Mexican universities, Babb’s text also demonstrates the value of these forms of technical literature to
learning about both the broader social contexts within which experts were working as well as the paradigms
competing to address national challenges. Unlike Babb, who largely positions her economists as reacting to
international trends in thought, Omnia El Shakry, in her book The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of
Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), explores
Egyptian social scientists as not just consumers of knowledge and theory produced in Europe and North
America, but as full participants in the global production of social scientific knowledge and “actively
involved in the development and transformation of the social sciences” (p. 1-2). Iranian scientists and
engineers were likewise active participants in the creation of knowledge in fields like petroleum geology,
petroleum engineering, and the natural environment. Like the social scientists El Shakry and Babb focused
on, the publications and conference papers of such engineers and natural scientists are ripe for exploring
not only the intellectual questions they studied, but also the social contexts within which they worked and
the ends they saw their labors as furthering.
14

The Middle East has been notably underrepresented in the growing body of works of environmental
history. Alan Mikhail has been a notable presence, however, focusing on the environmental histories of the
Ottoman Empire in his books Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), The Animal in Ottoman Egypt (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2014), and Under Osman’s Tree: The Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Environmental
History (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017). Many works have contrasted water and the arid
environment of the region, perhaps most famously Karl Wittfogel’s Oriental Despotism: A Comparative
Study of Total Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957). Others include Paul Ward English’s
“Qanats and Lifeworlds in Iranian Plateau Villages,” in Transformations of Middle Eastern Natural
Environments: Legacies and Lessons, eds. Jeff Albert, Magnus Bernhardsson, and Roger Kenna (New

11

At stake for Iranians was not the idea of an energy transition. Natural gas as a
sociotechnical force did not spring into being fully formed. Nor was it developed in
isolation, siloed off from other sources of energy. Indeed, its roots lay in the great prize
of southern Iran: oil. Iran’s petroleum industry was founded in 1901 with the British
businessman William Knox D’Arcy’s receipt of a concession to find, produce, and
market petroleum—oil, asphalt, ozokerite, and natural gas—from Mozzafar ad-Din Shāh,
the fifth Qājār monarch. It was the Middle East’s earliest major foray into the world of
petroleum, and the first commercial-grade strike came in May 1908 at Masjid-e
Sulaymān, situated in the foothills of the Zagros Mountains in Iran’s Khuzestān province.
Within a year the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was established to exploit the resource and
by 1912 the company had completed the initial version of what would eventually become
the world’s largest oil refinery at Ābādān, soon thereafter beginning operations to refine
and export oil products. In 1914, with the Royal Navy’s decision to fully convert their
warships from coal to oil, the British government took a controlling 51 percent stake in

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); Faisal Husain’s “In the Bellies of the Marshes: Water and Power
in the Countryside of Ottoman Baghdad,” Environmental History, vol. 19, no. 4 (October 2014): 638-664;
Jennifer L. Derr’s The Lived Nile: Environment, Disease, and Material Colonial Economy in Egypt
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019); and Francesca De Chatel’s “The Role of Drought and
Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution,” Middle East Journal,
vol. 50, no. 4 (2014): 521-535. Environmental imaginaries have also been explored in Diana Davis and
Edmund Burke III’s edited volume Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2011) and Diana Davis’s “Potential Forests: Degradation Narratives,
Science, and Environmental Policy in Protectorate Morocco, 1912-1956,” Environmental History, vol. 10,
no. 2 (2005): 211-238. Big histories that embrace large expanses of time or planetary-scale climatic shifts
have also been used to examine Middle Eastern history, including Edmund Burke III’s “The Deep History
of the Middle Eastern Environment, 1500 BCE – 1500 CE,” in The Environment and World History, eds.
Edmund Burke III and Kenneth Pomeranz (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009) and Sam
White’s “The Little Ice Age Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: A Conjuncture in Middle East Environmental
History,” in Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Alan
Mikhail, 71-90 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). While not an exhaustive list of published
environmental histories, these works are representative of the concerns that have largely animated scholars
working in the field: most particularly water.
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the company, turning it into a de facto arm of British imperial administration. With
demand from the Royal Navy skyrocketing as the conversion process took hold, APOC
oil production steadily increased over the following years and prospecting was
undertaken to find new fields to support the growing appetite for Iranian oil. By the
1930s the Haft Kel fields were under full production alongside those at Masjid-e
Sulaymān, and the Ābādān refinery’s capacity had been expanded some fivefold.
In 1933, however, the original oil concession was voided after more than four
years of negotiations between the Iranian government and APOC. Rooted most
fundamentally in the dissatisfaction of the Iranian government with the original
agreement’s revenue sharing arrangements, something exacerbated by APOC’s creative
accounting practices, the new agreement reduced the size of the concession area and
guaranteed a minimum annual royalty payment to the Iranian government in return for a
new sixty-year term for the concession. Renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in
1935, the British company thus maintained nearly total control of Iran’s petroleum
resources, something explicitly defined as including any natural gas found in the
concession area. Far from an incidental inclusion, natural gas was already being produced
in significant quantities in Iran as a byproduct of oil extraction. With gas being
significantly harder to confine and transport, however, the AIOC largely treated it as a
non-economical waste product, either using it freely in their own operations or, as was
true for the majority of the volumes it extracted, flaring it in the oil fields. This deliberate
unseeing of Iran’s natural gas was a crucial part of the company’s efforts to maintain
their focus on furnishing cheap oil to foreign markets. AIOC managers fundamentally
saw natural gas and its potential utilization in Iran as a cost rather than an opportunity. In
13

response, they subordinated natural gas to the oil, focusing on their combined extraction
from the earth and former’s ostensibly unwanted nature as a byproduct.
In contrast to the AIOC’s combined corporate and imperial disregard of the
resource, Iranian efforts to make gas into an economical product would become a crucial
factor in the country’s development over the following fifty years. As part of that process,
the use of natural gas by Iranians and the construction of the infrastructures that made its
exploitation possible became important expressions of a deep current of economic
nationalism within Iranian politics. With roots in the sizeable concessions granted to
foreign enterprise in the late Qājār era, the ability for Iranians to control their own natural
resources was a significant driver of Iranian political developments throughout the
entirety of the twentieth century. The long refusal of the AIOC to find productive outlets
for Iran’s gas and the subsequent efforts of the Iranian government to make the
consumption of the fuel source a reality in the country, were thus seen as an expression of
a broader desire for Iranians to be masters of their own destiny, free of the foreign
influence understood as impoverishing and constraining Iran. Far from the AIOC’s
efforts to make gas invisible in service of their own goals, Iranian officials trumpeted its
presence and their work to make it useful, employing the resource in their efforts to build
not only a newly industrialized economy, but also a truly sovereign nation.
From its inception as both a material entity and as a force within Iranian society,
natural gas was deeply intertwined with oil. Beyond its formation via the same processes
and often in the very same deposits as crude oil, natural gas existed as a usable resource
in Iran because of the country’s oil industry. For most of the twentieth century, all of the
natural gas available in Iran was so-called associated gas, or gas produced as a byproduct
14

of oil extraction. Natural gas’s aboveground presence was almost wholly dependent on
the continued existence of global oil markets and their need to be fed with the product of
Iranian reservoirs. Rather than a replacement for an oil-based energy regime, natural gas
was layered upon it and thus, despite the claims of some contemporaneous actors, the
history of Iranian natural gas was not one of transition away from one form of energy to a
purportedly better and more modern one.15 Most Iranian officials never envisioned a
wholesale transition away from oil products within Iran itself, always seeing it as a way
to reduce but not eliminate petroleum consumption. Indeed, within Iran the consumption
of both fossil fuels increased in the second half of the twentieth century, with gas
lessening the but not eliminating the growth of oil use. The story of natural gas in Iran is
thus one that should not be understood as a tale of replacement, but as an additional and
heretofore unacknowledged chapter in the history of fossil fuel energy use in the country.
In charting the transformation of natural gas from a waste product into the
centerpiece of the industrialization, environmental, and legitimation strategies of both the
Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic, this project builds upon the intervention of
scholars working in the budding field of energy humanities. Such scholars have argued
that fossil fuels should be taken seriously as direct influences on human societies and
cultures and emphasized how accelerating energy consumption has been equated with
modernity itself, not only as a function of increased industrialization but as a concept
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On Barak has explored this point, using the simultaneous existence of animal, coal, and water regimes to
point to the fact that understandings of energy transitions are illusory and the product of post hoc
teleologies in his article “Three Watersheds in the History of Energy,” Comparative Studies in South Asia,
Africa and the Middle East, vol. 34, no. 3 (2014): 440-453.
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born of and shaping societies around the world.16 Often heavily focused on petroleum oil,
something reflective of the substance’s extreme salience within the history of the
twentieth century, these works stand in contrast to perspectives that have traditionally
emphasized narratives of private enterprise, wealth, and geopolitical power, often with an
arrow of causality running in that order.17 In contrast to the largely European and North
American perspectives that have long been privileged in discussions of oil and energy, in
recent decades scholars have produced highly influential works addressing the
governmental, racial, and environmental histories of oil in other parts of the world,
particularly the Middle East.18 Significantly for this dissertation, other scholars have
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For more on the historical roots of the concept of energy and its birth in the context of European empire,
the valorization of wage work, and the hierarchical ordering of humans and nonhumans, see Cara New
Daggett’s The Birth of Energy: Fossil Fuels, Thermodynamics, and the Politics of Work (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2019). Bob Johnson discusses the influence that fossil fuels have had on cultural
change in the United States in his book Carbon Nation: Fossil Fuels and the Making of American Culture
(Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2014). Though the energy humanities are still a young and
rather inchoate field, for years there had been slow drip of scholarship that would later come to be
understood as part of it. The collection of previously published essays in Imre Szeman and Dominic
Boyer’s Energy Humanities: An Anthology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017)
highlights the breadth of work that has begun to coalesce as the energy humanities—from excerpts of
David Nye’s 1990 Electrifying America: Social Meaning of a New Technology to Amitav Ghosh’s 2005
musings on the Oil Novel through his analysis of Abdelrahman Munif’s Cities of Salt to Dipesh
Chakrabarty’s 2009 exploration of the effects of the Anthropocene on historical thought in “The Climate of
History: Four Theses” to Dominic Boyer’s 2014 analysis of energy and its relationship to governance and
self-governance. The articles collected in Sheena Wilson, Adam Carlson, and Imre Szeman’s edited
volume Petrocultures: Oil, Politics, Culture (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017)
further highlight how oil and oil infrastructure have shaped cultures and aesthetics around the world.
Epitomized by Daniel Yergin’s The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Free
Press, 1990; Reprint 2009) and The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (New
York: The Penguin Press, 2011), such perspectives often emphasize the technical and capitalist ingenuity of
early oil entrepreneurs and the world-shaking giants that grew out of their efforts. Works like Valérie
Marcel’s Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Baltimore MD: Brookings Institution
Press, 2006) that are focused on national oil companies also tend to recreate this emphasis on economics
and business histories.
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Particularly influential has been Timothy Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of
Oil (London: Verso, 2011). In the book Mitchell argues that through their physical properties and the
global social and labor systems their exploitation prompted, coal and oil have had significant influence on
the types of governance experienced by people around the world. In his book America’s Kingdom:
Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), Robert Vitalis
18

16

explored the crucial role of oil in state building in the region as well as the technical and
infrastructural practices and perspectives that shaped both the oil industry itself and its
political significance.19
While coal too has received some measure of attention for its influence on Middle
Eastern and world history,20 in comparison to oil few scholars have explored the

explores the racialized social orders that American oil firms exported around the world as part of their
efforts to secure and extract oil as cheaply and reliably as possible. The contributors to Touraj Atabaki,
Elisabetta Bini, and Kaveh Ehsani’s edited volume Working for Oil: Comparative Social Histories of Labor
in the Global Oil Industry (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) continue that emphasis on oil’s
labor history by exploring topics as diverse as Indian migrant oil workers in the AIOC fields of Iran in the
early twentieth century, oil workers in Houston as part of larger labor movements, and the undermining of
civil-state relations in Colombia by the latter’s use of violence to protect American oil interests. Andrea
Grace Wright has studied labor and migration in oil industry to explore the Arabian Sea as place, linking
the politics and cultures of South Asia and the Arabic-speaking region of the Persian Gulf; see her
dissertation “Migratory Pipelines: Labor and Oil in the Arabian Sea” (PhD diss., University of Michigan,
2015). Though not focused on the Middle East, Myrna I. Santiago’s book The Ecology of Oil:
Environment, Labor, and the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1938 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2006) is significant for studying such themes as well, showing how oil production in the Veracruz
peninsula and the environmental damage and altered social structures it prompted turned the region into a
significant site of class conflict during the Mexican Revolution, ultimately arguing that Mexican oil
workers were crucial contributors to the political developments that would eventually prompt the
nationalization of Mexico’s oil industry.
19

The important role of oil, the wealth derived from its sale, and their interactions with the environment in
state building in the Middle East has been explored by Toby Craig Jones in his book Desert Kingdom: How
Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) as it was
expressed through the postwar Saudi state and its use of both oil expertise and oil wealth to build its own
authority in restive areas through significant environmental and hydrological engineering. In his book
Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press,
2019), Jim Krane has explored the tension between the need of Gulf states to export oil for its revenues and
the increasingly energy-hungry and energy-wasting societies over which they rule, arguing that energy
subsidies must be curtailed if these states are to survive. In her work Machineries of Oil: An Infrastructural
History of BP in Iran (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018), Katayoun Shafiee analyzes how disputes
between the AIOC and the Iranian government over control of the country’s oil, the labor needed for its
production, the proceeds of its sale, and the physical properties of oil as it was reflected through systems of
expertise prompted the company to develop many of the techno-economic techniques that would underlay
the global oil industry as well as shape the emerging national politics of oil-producing states. Mandana E.
Limbert, in In the Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2010), has explored how Oman’s newfound oil wealth transformed life in the country in
the late twentieth century by focusing on the arrival of new infrastructures like piped water and mass
schooling.
Perhaps most famous is Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of
the Modern World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) which argues that the
abundant and easily accessible coal deposits of northwestern Europe allowed the region to overcome the
Malthusian trap of population growth that other regions fell victim to. Significantly complicating that
20
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influence of natural gas on the petroleum-rich nations of the Middle East. Much of the
literature on gas has focused on energy exports, their economics, and their relationship to
geopolitics in both the Middle East and beyond,21 while the few histories of the industry
largely address countries like the United States and the Soviet Union.22 English-language
literature on the Iranian gas industry has predominantly been technical literature focused
on its implications for domestic energy and foreign export policies,23 while those
addressing the broader industrial and business history of the sector have largely confined
their analyses to the post-revolutionary period.24 Within Iran, a notable body of Persian-

narrative, On Barak, in his book Powering Empire: How Coal Made the Middle East and Sparked Global
Carbonization (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2020), argues that long before oil was
discovered in commercial quantities in the region, the use of coal by European states was sparked by the
demands of empire in the Middle East, eventually leading to the worldwide carbonization that now
threatens the globe.
Exemplars include the contributors to Jeronim Perovic’s edited volume Cold War Energy: A
Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); the
contributors to the edited volume of David G. Victor, Amy M. Jaffe, and Mark H. Hayes’s Natural Gas and
Geopolitics: From 1970 to 2040 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Agnia Grigas’s
The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). Paul Stevens in
“Pipelines or Pipe Dreams? Lessons from the History of Arab Transit Pipelines,” Middle East Journal vol.
54, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 224-241, analyzes at a very high level the historical viability of oil and gas transit
pipelines, underscoring the difficulties that rent-seeking policies and conflicts of interest have posed to
long-distance pipeline projects that crossed multiple countries. Interestingly, Stevens notes that oil
pipelines have historically had better prospects than gas lines owing to the former fossil fuel’s greater
energy density and multiple economical forms of transport.
21

Other than Daniel Yergin’s discussion as part of his book The Quest, examples include Christopher
James Castenada’s Regulated Enterprise: Natural Gas Pipelines and Northeastern Markets, 1938-1954
(Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1993) and Jonathan P. Stern’s Soviet Natural Gas
Development to 1990: The Implications for the CMEA and the West (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1980).
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Examples include Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani’s Energy Policy in Iran: Domestic Choices and
International Implications (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981) and Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani and Sharmin
Mossavar-Rahmani’s The OPEC Natural Gas Dilemma (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). More
recently, these topics were analyzed in Maximillian Kuhn’s dissertation “Enabling the Iranian Gas Export
Options: The Destiny of Iranian Energy Relations in a Tripolar Struggle over Energy Security and
Geopolitics” (PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2012).
Most significant among these is Elham Hassanzadeh’s Iran’s Natural Gas Industry in the PostRevolutionary Period: Optimism, Scepticism, and Potential (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).
Though still largely a book addressing the legal and business environments relating to natural gas in Iran,
24
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language material on the natural gas industry has been published. Often celebratory or
hagiographic in nature, the works are largely based on oral interviews with notable
industry figures and are primarily concerned with the major decisions and challenges the
industry faced as it was understood by high-level figures. While useful as collections of
oral histories, the perspectives most strongly articulated in these works are often heavily
weighted toward the political preoccupations of the Islamic Republic and the
development of the industry in the post-revolutionary period.25 What no previous work
has done, and what this dissertation does do, is shed light on the ways natural gas as both
a fossil fuel and as the sophisticated systems enabling its use shaped the social, cultural,
and political transformations of Middle Eastern societies. Natural gas was not seamlessly
interchangeable with other forms of fossilized carbon, instead possessing unique
characteristics that both shaped ideas of what kind of society might be built with it and
interacted in particular and contingent ways with communities of the region. Iran was at

Hassanzadeh’s work is nonetheless the most comprehensive treatment of the industry thus far published.
Her notable access to major decisionmakers both within government and industry circles has enabled
Hassanzadeh to weave together an analysis highlighting the political and economic tensions that have thus
far largely stymied efforts to turn Iran into a major natural gas exporter. Also largely unexplored is the
transformation of Iranian society into a major gas consumer in its own right.
Notable examples include Mohsen Shirāzi, San’at-e Gāz-e Iran: Az Āghāz tā Āstāneh-ye Enqelāb,
interview by Golāmrezā
25

Afkhami (Bethesda, MD: Foundation for Iranian Studies, 1999), available online at https://fisiran.org/fa/resources/development-series/gas; Hamid Rezā ‘Arāqi’s Bist Sāl bā Gāz (Tehran: Shāpikān,
1390); and Majid Bujārzādeh and ‘Ali Bahādar’s Gāz Enerzhi-ye Pāk bā Nim-e Qarn-e Talāsh:
Panjāhomin Sāl-e Tasis-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran (Tehran: Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran – Ravābate ‘Omumi, 1395). Though largely dependent on the same sort of oral histories and privileging the
perspectives of the Butane Gas Company, Seyyed Gholāmhusayn Hasantāsh and Mikāyil ‘Azimi’s Tārikhe San’at-e Gāz-e Māy’a-ye Iran (Tehran: Kavir, 1394) undertakes significantly more analysis and narrative
work to tell the story of Iran’s liquid gas industry. The oil and gas industry has been further discussed as
part of larger perspectives on Iran’s economy in Ibrāhim Razāqi’s Eqtesād-e Iran (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney,
1367) and industrialization in Husayn Mahbubi Ardekāni’s Tārikh-e Moassesāt-e Tamaddoni-ye Jadid dar
Iran (Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Dāneshgāh-e Tehran, 1376).
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the forefront of making extensive use of natural gas in the Middle East, but it is not alone
in owning significant deposits beneath its earth and territorial waters. Other countries like
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait all possess significant reserves as well. Much as
was the case in Iran, this gas has been exported in significant quantities, used to supply
domestic energy markets, and burned as waste. Natural gas thus crosses the region’s
boundaries in multiple ways, being transported by ship and pipeline from producers to
consumers and found in large-scale geologic formations above which national borders
twist and turn. Like Iran, many Middle Eastern societies, particularly those of the Persian
Gulf, have deep relationships to the natural gas found within their national borders,
relationships that go well beyond issues of commerce, economics, and geopolitics. The
history narrated in this dissertation is particular to Iran in the period between the mid1930s and the mid-1990s, but in its broader concerns, motivations, and methodologies it
is nonetheless relevant to countries across the region and the world. In doing so it begins
to fill a significant gap in our understanding of how human societies around the world
have been co-constituted with fossil fuels. Indeed, in order to fully understand how fossil
fuel energy influences the fate of humanity on a global scale, it is not sufficient to focus
on the world’s wealthy and most industrialized regions; particular attention must also be
given to the adoption and the sociotechnical force of fossilized carbon fuels in the selfconsciously developing societies of the Global South, studying how such resources take
on potent political, cultural, and social dimensions that are not easily set aside no matter
how pressing the need.
Crucial to undertaking such an effort is to attend to the particular stories of
societies in the Global South. The history related in this dissertation is rooted in the
20

particulars of Cold War-era Iran, for despite notable connections to and affinities with
stories of petroleum and development around the world, such broad perspectives are
insufficient for truly understanding the intersection of politics, the environment, and
petroleum in the country.26 Tracing the story’s beginnings to the operations of the AngloIranian Oil Company in the 1930s, this dissertation studies how natural gas shaped Iran’s
political, social, and economic development over the subsequent half century,
highlighting how natural gas energy and the environment were co-constituted with a selfconsciously modernizing society. Drawing from a wide variety of sources, including
Persian- and English-language periodicals; national and corporate archives in Iran, the
United Kingdom, and the United States; reports housed in the libraries of Iranian
ministries and the national petroleum companies; and academic and scientific
publications by Iranian experts, it argues that natural gas and its infrastructures were
deeply embedded in Iranian understandings of what a modern society could and should
be. While the idea of “modernity” is both unstable and deeply fraught—often doing more
to obscure than to illuminate historical relationships through its use by contemporary
actors and later scholars alike to implicitly deploy their own cultural and political
proclivities—it has nonetheless been deeply formative to the understanding of many
writing on the subject of recent Iranian history.27 The seeming paradox of a secularizing
26

Dominic Boyer has pointed to the necessity of avoiding overreliance on abstract concepts like the
Anthropocene and their attendant universalisms when discussing energy projects, urging instead for an
accounting of local particularities and the effects of local power relations as equally formative forces as
settler colonialism and transnational financial flows. For more see his work Energopolitics: Wind and
Power in the Anthropocene (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019).
The essays collected in Ramin Jahanbegloo’s edited volume Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004) are emblematic of several of the themes that have thus far proven
to be core to discussions of modernity in Iran: intellectual engagements, gender, and theology.
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and modernizing nation suddenly choosing theocracy has prompted an outpouring of
analysis on Iranians’ engagements with modern thought and the efforts of twentiethcentury Iranian intellectuals to localize the ideas and theories with which they engaged in
order to create a modernity that was congruent with Iranian culture and traditions.28
Others have argued that the Iranian experience of modernity was a fundamentally
historical one, an understanding that embraces the instabilities, contradictions, and altered
lifeways of Iran’s recent past. For these scholars, the most salient developments during
the period were often political or legal, and great attention is given to the secularizing and

In his numerous works, Ali Mirsepassi has explored how Iran’s decades-long movement for a nationally
authentic modernity has been formed in connection to the ideas and intellectuals of the European
Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, particularly in the thought of Martin Heidegger. See his book
Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2000) for more on Iranian engagements with European thinkers from Hegel
and Marx to Nietzsche and Heidegger. Mirsepassi further argues in Political Islam, Iran, and the
Enlightenment: Philosophies of Hope and Despair (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011)
that the love affair of Iranian revolutionary thinkers with the thought of Heidegger has trapped the
country’s politics in decaying and inflexible notions of national authenticity. Going beyond more famous
figures like Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Mirsepassi further uncovers the movement’s roots in the thought and
influence of the largely overlooked Ahmad Fardid in his work Iran’s Troubled Modernity: Debating
Ahmad Fardid’s Legacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019). Farzin Vahdat has also
explored this terrain with his book God and Juggernaut: Iran’s Intellectual Encounter with Modernity
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002) and its focus on clerical engagement with European
thought, ultimately arguing for the roots of revolution in different conceptions of human subjectivity: a
positivist and non-individualized one pursued by the Pahlavi monarchy and a divinely mediated
subjectivity espoused by revolutionary thinkers. Farhang Rajaee further explores the attempt of Iranian
thinkers to construct an Islam able to resist the attractions of modernity and secularism in his book
Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007),
in the end arguing that the failures of Iranian politics over the previous century were largely rooted in the
extreme embrace by various Iranians of either secular modernism or Islamist ideology. Though less focused
on the specific question of modernity, in his book Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 1998) Ali Gheissari studies Iranian intellectual engagement with questions of
nationalism and identity, arguing that the failure of the 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution prompted
Iranian intellectuals to give disproportionate attention to politics and political action and precluded a deeper
intellectual engagement that might have produced a more sustainable melding of Iranian culture and
modernity. Representing a different strain of thinking on Iran and in a departure from the previous authors,
Abbas Milani breezily argues in his work Lost Wisdom: Rethinking Modernity in Iran (Washington, D.C.:
Mage Publishers, 2004), by locating modernity in ideals like rationalism and rule of law, that Iran and its
people have been modern for hundreds of years and that the conflicts of the previous century have been
rooted in a clash between this deep well of native modernity and “religious obscurantism.”
28
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modernizing policies of figures like Rezā Shah Pahlavi.29 Rising to power in the 1910s as
the leader of the Persian Cossack Brigade, a military unit modeled after the Cossack
cavalry units of the Russian Imperial Army and one of the most effective forces in the
Qājār army, Rezā Khan took de facto control of Iran in a 1921 coup d’état. Initially
allowing Ahmad Shah to maintain his throne, in 1925 Rezā Khan formally deposed the
final Qājār monarch and proclaimed himself Shah and the first of the Pahlavi dynasty.
Until his removal by British and Soviet forces in 1941, Rezā Shah oversaw a broadspectrum effort aimed at Iran’s rapid modernization. Building on the scattered initiatives
of the Qājār kings, heavy investment was made in Iran’s system of transportation, notably
its road network and the Trans-Iranian Railway;30 educational institutions like the

Well known is the collection of essays in Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher’s Men of Order:
Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2004) that
explicitly compare and contrast the secularizing and modernizing policies of the two autocratic leaders,
touching on everything from party politics to military reforms to westernizing dress codes. Similar themes
are explored in essays collected in Stephanie Cronin’s The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under
Riza Shah, 1921-1941 (New York: Routledge, 2003), though with greater emphasis on Iranian tribal groups
during the period and the shifting place of women in Iranian society. The importance of Reza Shah’s
reforms has been a consistent perspective in the scholarship on Iran, finding expression as far back as the
1960s in Amin Banani’s The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1961). Like many of the authors concerned with Iranian intellectual engagements, Banani wonders whether
the increasing Westernization and modernization of Iran threatened a fundamental rupture with tradition.
29

While few in-depth studies have been undertaken of Iran’s infrastructural developments in the Rezā Shah
era, in his 1993 article “Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution, 1920-1940,” Iranian
Studies, vol. 26, no. 3-4 (Summer/Fall 1993): 235-250, Patrick Clawson evaluated Rezā Shah’s investment
in Iran’s transport network, ultimately finding that it was crucial to lowering transport costs and making
Iranian agricultural exports competitive in foreign markets and thereby earning the country the revenues
needed for the industrialization programs the Shah was pursuing. Eschewing such economic analyses in his
article “The Vernacular Journey: Railway Travelers in Early Pahlavi Iran, 1925-50,” International Journal
of Middle East Studies, vol. 47 (2015): 745-763, Mikiya Koyagi has explored the social space of the TransIranian Railway during the period in his article, ultimately showing how the railway traveler was
constructed to be an exemplar of Iran’s new modernity and how the deep heterogeneity of passenger trains
undermined notions of a unitary Iranian subject, ultimately contributing to the class consolidation of Iran’s
new middle classes. Koyagi has also explored in his article “Drivers across the Desert: Infrastructure and
Sikh Migrants in the Indo-Iranian Borderlands, 1919-31,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and
the Middle East, vol. 39, no. 3 (2019): 375-388, how the trans-Baluchistan railway infrastructure—and the
“complex coordination of the many political and sociotechnical components of the infrastructural system”
30
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University of Tehran as well as the education of some Iranians in Europe and the United
States; industrial plants; and military equipment. Far more controversial were Rezā
Shah’s efforts to Westernize and secularize Iranian society through measures like the
banning of the chador, the mandate of Western-style clothing for men, and the increasing
expectation that women work outside the home, go without hijab, and uphold
increasingly Euro-American styles of domestic femininity.31

(p. 376)—enabled and shaped the permeable social, cultural, and intellectual boundaries between Iran and
India that recent scholarship has begun to uncover.
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Gender and sexuality have been a central field where debates about modernity in Iran have played out.
Looking primarily at the Qājār nineteenth century, Afsaneh Najmabadi demonstrates both the extent to
which premodern Iranian gender was non-binary and the slow withering of Iranian society’s strong
homosocial and homoerotic spark as part of the encounter with modernity and the European gaze in her
book Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005). Camron Michael Amin focuses on Rezā Shah’s
Women’s Awakening Movement in the 1930s in his book The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman:
Gender, State Policy, and Popular Culture, 1865-1946 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2002),
showing how the early Pahlavi state’s interest in women was tied almost exclusively to their roles as wives
and mothers, subordinating their interests to those of the nation and ultimately doing much to reduce the
question of women’s emancipation in Iran to the question of the veil. In Sexual Politics in Modern Iran
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Janet Afary studies Iranian gender and sexual
politics over the past two hundred years. Afary again highlights the extensive homoeroticism of premodern
Iranian society as well as the process of re-domestication of Iranian women as part of Rezā Pahlavi’s
modernizing reforms, ultimately extending her analysis to show that the patriarchal attitudes and politics of
that era were wholly adopted by revolutionary thinkers, causing them to make common cause with more
religious and conservative thinkers, resulting in the extensive restrictions placed on women in the wake of
the 1979 revolution. In her article “Dressing Up (or Down): Veils, Hats, and Consumer Fashion in Iran,” in
Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress, edited by
Stephanie Cronin, 149-162 (New York: Routledge, 2014), Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet has shown how the
industrialization and secularization drives of the Rezā Shah period were intertwined. By the mid-1920s a
nascent fashion industry began to develop, not only prompting changes in dress and the use of images of
women for advertisements, but also providing for new economic opportunities for clothing and textile
production. Iran was of course not alone in the Middle East in gender being an important part of the
experience of modernity for people in the early twentieth century. Elizabeth Thompson’s Colonial Citizens:
Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2000) offers an excellent example of the utility of gender analysis in studying the region,
demonstrating how economic and social anxieties in the wake of World War I and under French colonial
rule prompted a “crisis of paternity”—who should carry the role of the national father—that ultimately
resulted in a re-subordination of women to patriarchal control during the countries’ move toward
independence from French rule as competing male groups resolved their differences at the expense of
women.
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Iran’s social transformations during the late Qājār and early Pahlavi eras have
been the subject of numerous studies by scholars of Iranian history. Modern scientific and
medical knowledge were crucial to many of these changes, helping to seed an emerging
middle class that valued technoscientific education and expertise.32 Combined with the
intense interest of Iranian leadership under Rezā Shah and later his son and heir
Muhammad Rezā Shah in modernizing their country, the groundwork was laid for many
of the Cold War-era developments explored in this dissertation.33 Distinguishing the
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Bridging explorations of gender and the influence of modern medical knowledge in Iran is Firoozeh
Kashani-Sabet’s Conceiving Citizens: Women and the Politics of Motherhood in Iran (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2011). In her book, Kashani-Sabet analyzes how women were at the center of the politics
of hygiene and reproduction and consequently how modern medical knowledge and social expectation
shaped broader debates on Iranian modernization. In his book Who is Knowledgeable is Strong: Science,
Class, and the Formation of Modern Iranian Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009),
Cyrus Schayegh explores how the emerging middle classes in Iran used modern scientific and medical
expertise as the means by which they could distinguish themselves from the rest of Iranian society and
engage with the state in their efforts to tackle perceived social problems. The intertwined nature of class
and modernity, and the latter’s expression as ideational, behavioral, and social performances was not
unique to Iran, something Keith David Watenpaugh has explored in Aleppine context in his book Being
Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). Marwa Elshakry in Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950 (Chicago,
IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2013) has also explored how scientific knowledge, specifically
Darwinist notions of evolution, interacted with social, civilization, and class anxieties across the Arab
Middle East to shape notions of what was possible and desirable with respect to political and social reform.
Scientific knowledge had significant interactions with religious knowledge in the Middle East as well,
something Alireza Doostdar explores in his book The Iranian Metaphysicals: Explorations in Science,
Islam, and the Uncanny (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018). Therein he studies how mystical
and occult practices and beliefs in Iran, stubbornly resistant to suppression from social and clerical elites
over the previous century, have interacted with modern scientific reason to shape both heterodox and
mainstream orthodox Shi’i beliefs and, in turn, the ideas underpinning the Islamic Republic. Though
addressing far more recent times, Mazyar Lotfalian has sought to explore how Muslims from Iran to
Malaysia have sought to understand science and technology in his book Islam, Technoscientific Identities,
and the Culture of Curiosity (Dallas, TX: University Press of America, Inc., 2004), ultimately showing how
practicing scientists in those regions sought to show both the non-universality of what they consider an
integrated Western value system and re-found science and technology in an Islamic rather than a secular
framework.
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Nearly forty years after its initial publication, in many ways the North Star of scholarship on modern Iran
prior to the 1980s continues to be Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran: Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1982), a grand fusion of the economic, social, and political history of the
country. Utilizing a neo-Marxist approach derived from the work of E.P. Thompson, Abrahamian sees the
fundamental drivers of 20th-century Iranian history as being ethnic groups—vertical groupings of people
bound by language, tribal affiliation, region, etc.—and social classes, or those people bound by a common
relationship to the means of production. While the politico-economic and Marxian outlook on Iranian
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modernization policies of Muhammad Rezā Shah from those of his father was the rise of
extensive five- and seven-year development plans. Beginning in the late 1940s with the
establishment of the Plan Organization, a government department tasked with creating
and overseeing the country’s modernization plans, Iranian officials began a decades-long
push to diversify and grow their country’s economy, improve living standards, boost
military might, and gain increased national independence. Particularly with the Third
Development Plan of 1962-1968, the first program to see any real success, nearly every
aspect of Iranian society became subject to technocratic improvement. Initiatives were
undertaken in areas as diverse as literacy programs, rural land reform, the promotion of
new industry, and the improvement of Iran’s systems of transportation and
communication, many aspects often in concert with foreign consultants and contractors.
While Iranian modernization plans were intertwined with foreign expertise and
the presence of the American Point Four—a U.S. program begun in 1949 with the aim of
aiding developing nations—and military aid missions, they must also be understood as an
expression of the ambitions of the Shah and an educated and technocratic class of Iranian
officials. Holding a strong affinity for modernization theory and thus often implicitly or
explicitly using the wealthy societies of North America and Western Europe as
aspirational ideals for Iran, these officials devised enormous and complicated plans aimed

history that Abrahamian adopts leads him emphasize material changes within Iranian society, particularly
as they relate to industrialization and altered living standards for people across the country, the fundamental
role of technology and infrastructure as accretions of material and social actors remains obscured, being
largely treated as black boxes notable only for their effects on other aspects of Iranian society. For a shorter
and more accessible version of Abrahamian’s discussion, see his book A History of Modern Iran
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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at catapulting their country and its people into a new era of power and prosperity.34
Fundamental to the Iranian government’s modernization plans were the country’s rising
oil revenues, a truth that has strongly shaped study of Iran’s Cold War-era development
programs. By and large such analyses have viewed Iran’s petroleum resources, when they
address them at all, as sources of revenue otherwise largely divorced from Iran’s

Ramin Nassehi, in his chapter “Domesticating Cold War Economic Ideas: The Rise of Iranian
Developmentalism in the 1950s and 1960s,” in The Age of Aryamehr: Late Pahlavi Iran and its Global
Entanglements, ed. Roham Alvandi, (London: Gingko Library, 2018), and in contrast to a body of literature
that has generally viewed Iran’s economic history as unique, has demonstrated just how strongly influenced
Iranian technocrats were by both modernization theory and Latin American economic protectionism during
the crucial Cold War period. Iranian officials were not unique in their use of the industrialized nations of
Europe and North America as exemplars nor in their embrace of top-down and state-directed models of
development. In Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 2012), Arturo Escobar recounts how developmental discourse took
root via systems of knowledge production and dissemination in crucial fields like economics, studying its
translation into power via a case study of Colombian rural development programs. Iran’s encounter with
development was shaped by the rise of modernization theory, the notion that there was a singular politicoeconomic pathway to modernity, described most famously by W.W. Rostow in his 1960 book The Stages of
Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960), and
that “underdeveloped” societies could be and should be hauled up the developmental ladder by hook or
crook. Rooted in the American experience with the Tennessee Valley Authority program, the totalizing
model of heavy infrastructure improvement, rural land reorganization, and social change strongly shaped
the foreign policy of the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, being exported around the world in an
effort to stave off communist revolution. There is a significant body of literature on modernization theory,
but the story’s broad contours are ably sketched by a trio of works. Nils Gilman explores the intellectual
history of modernization theory and its entry into the highest circles of American power in his book
Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2003). In his book Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation
Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Michael E.
Latham studies how modernization theory not only functioned as an ideological imperative among
American decision makers, but also channeled older notions of imperialism and Manifest Destiny. David
Ekbladh, in his work The Great American Mission: Modernization and Construction of an American World
Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), explores the roots of America’s modernization
efforts in New Deal programs like the TVA and how such programs became proof of American
liberalism’s ability to make the world a better place, impulses that continue to shape the foreign
interventions of the United States in the 21st century. The reshaping of Middle Eastern societies by the
combination of power and knowledge was not unique to the Cold War era, something that has been
explored in particular depth with respect to Egypt. Though a number of works have been written on the
subject, particularly influential has been Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1988), which uses a Foucauldian lens to study how modern Egypt was in part made via
British colonial control and the production of knowledge of its people and their disciplining. Also notable is
Khaled Fahmy’s All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cairo:
The American University in Cairo Press, 2003) for its crucial reminder that such historical processes were
not solely the product or the tools of European colonial empires.
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transformations during the period.35 In contrast to perspectives that have often
emphasized oil receipts and the programs they paid for, this dissertation challenges
notions that the influences of fossil fuel resources on energy-rich Middle Eastern
societies were rooted first and foremost in the revenues generated from their sale abroad.
It instead emphasizes that the material volatility of natural gas and the imposing physical
infrastructure used to harness it were instrumental in shaping the political, commercial,
and social effects of gas in Iran.36

Iran’s Cold War-era development programs have been a consistent subject of exploration over the past
half century. As far back as the late 1960s with George B. Baldwin’s Planning and Development in Iran
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), analysts have been taking stock of the country’s
economic and developmental fortunes. Six years later in his article “Development Planning in Iran: A
Historical Survey,” Iranian Studies, vol. 6, no. 4 (Autumn 1973): 176-228, Farhad Daftary published a
detailed look at the successes and failures of Iran’s first four development plans, paying careful heed to the
returns on investments made. In their book The Political Environment of Economic Planning in Iran, 19711983 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), Hossein Razavi and Firouz Vakil, both former employees of
the Plan Organization, offer a very useful view into the planning process in Iran, offering both descriptions
of how the Plan Organization undertook its work and evaluations of development planning’s interaction
with the broader political context both before and after the revolution. Frances Bostock and Geoffrey Jones
focus on the work of Abolhassan Ebtehaj as head of Iran’s central bank and the Plan Organization in their
book Planning and Power in Iran: Ebtehaj and Economic Development under the Shah (London: Frank
Cass and Company Limited, 1989), arguing that it was the Shah himself, his love of expensive arms, and
his tolerance for corruption that undermined Iranian development programs, something opposed by
technocratic officials like Ebtehaj. Afsaneh Najmabadi studies the 1962-1972 program of land reform in
Iran, emphasizing its effects on the rural populace through cooperatives and altered political orientations in
Land Reform and Social Change in Iran (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1987). In his book
Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and Ulama in Iran (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press,
2000), Mohamad Gholi Majd also addresses land ownership in Iran, focusing on how the resistance to land
reform united landowners and the clerical establishment in Iran, forging a potent alliance that would elevate
revolutionary figures like Ayatollah Khomeini. More recently, using the 1968 Tehran Comprehensive
Master Plan as a case study in her article “The 1968 Tehran Master Plan and the Politics of Planning
Development in Iran (1945-1979),” Planning Perspectives (2018), Azadeh Mashayekhi has written on the
Cold War context of Iranian development planning and the role of the Plan Organization in the emergence
of top-down master planning as the preferred model of urban planning in Iran.
35
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The effects of petroleum on urban communities and landscapes in Iran has been something explored by
scholars, notably Kaveh Ehsani in his article “Social Engineering and the Contradictions of Modernization
in Khuzestan’s Company Towns: A Look at Abadan and Masjed-Soleyman,” International Review of
Social History, vol. 28 (2003): 361-399. In his article Ehsani studies how the corporate authoritarian
structures of the company towns built by the APOC were unable to fully control the heterogeneous and
dynamic urban cultures fostered by the cities’ residents. In their article “Iran’s Global Petroleumscape: The
Role of Oil in Shaping Khuzestan and Tehran,” Architectural Theory Review, vol. 21, no. 3 (2017): 349374, Carola Hein and Mohamed Sedighi study how global flows of petroleum finance and American actors
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***
The history narrated in this dissertation is recounted in a largely chronological
fashion, from the first efforts of Iranians to find uses for natural gas in the 1930s to the
rise of new efforts to convert automobiles to gas fuel in the early 1990s. It is most
strongly rooted in the accounts of natural gas produced by Iranian officials working at all
levels of governance. Most of this material was collected within the National Library and
Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as the document centers and libraries of
various government ministries. The correspondence and written reports of Iranian
officials form a significant evidentiary column for the analysis undertaken in this
dissertation, significantly complicating and deepening the narrative that the public
relations departments of the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Gas
Company, and the Ministry of Petroleum produced for public consumption. That
narrative itself—expressed through industry periodicals, public speeches by high-ranking
figures, and books produced for public consumption—is a crucial aspect of the analysis
undertaken as well, particularly in the ways it did and did not change across the
revolutionary period of the late 1970s. Lacking in many of these accounts, however, are
the specific technical and geological details that underlay many of the decisions made by
officials with respect to the design of Iran’s natural gas infrastructure, something owing
to the fact that most of the material preserved came from within the managerial and
administrative levels of Iranian ministries and the national petroleum companies.
helped produce American-esque lifestyles and urban landscapes in Tehran between 1955 and 1978,
something they contrast with the more localized effects of APOC/AIOC effects in Khuzestān.
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Technical aspects are much better represented in the materials held by the British
Petroleum Archive, at least with regard to the era before the 1979 revolution, and as such
they also represent a crucial pillar for the analysis undertaken in this project.
Prior to the late 1960s, nearly all of the gas produced in Iran was burned as waste
in the country’s southern oil fields. Chapter 1, drawing largely on materials from the
archive of British Petroleum, explores the early efforts of Iranian officials and AIOC
managers to forestall that waste and find uses for the Iran’s natural gas between the mid1930s and the mid-1960s. During that time, the international firms that controlled the
fields, first the AIOC, and in the wake of the Oil Nationalization Crisis of the early
1950s, the so-called Seven Sisters of the Iranian Oil Consortium, had long resisted largescale utilization of Iran’s gas as unprofitable. Iran was far from the world’s existing
markets for gas energy and building systems to convey it to places like Western Europe
would be truly massive and complex undertakings. Proposals for various petrochemical
projects likewise foundered on an inability to compete in major markets once
transportation expenses were factored in. Murkier was the economic feasibility of
recycling natural gas back into the underground reservoirs from which they had been
extracted. With no real markets available for their country’s gas, Iranian officials pushed
the Consortium firms to consider this last option, an undertaking that could conserve gas
for future use. For their part, the companies resisted this as well, considering it
technically feasible but economically pointless as the lack of a market for Iran’s gas
meant it was, in essence, commercially valueless. Company officials went further,
pointing to the unique geology of Khuzestān’s oil fields and the higher-than-normal
amounts of gas retained underground during oil extraction. They argued that the
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exceptional web of fissures that ran through the limestone formations the companies
tapped, when combined with the comparatively restrained production practices that were
employed, were in practice an effective gas recycling program. The debate over whether
those conditions were indeed sufficient reflected the competing concerns of the
Consortium companies and the Iranian government. While company managers were
primarily focused on the commercial viability of any proposed gas project, Iranian
officials looked at gas in more expansive terms. They saw a national resource being
squandered and an untapped source of energy and wealth being burned away in
unproductive fires. These competing visions, as strongly reflective of the primary
concerns of participants as they were, were also firmly implanted in the materiality of
natural gas and the rock formations in which it resided. Far from passive, Iran’s geologic
structure was a crucial influence on the debate, helping define the terms within which
commercial and economic viability could be determined.
Due such conflicts with the Consortium companies, in the 1950s and 1960s
Iranian officials moved away from seeking close cooperation with the international firms
in their pursuit of the utilization of natural gas. Petrochemicals, an industry which used
gas as both a fuel source and a raw material, quickly emerged as a viable outlet. Largely
using materials from the Iranian national archive, Chapter 2 explores both the first major
petrochemical project in Iran and, later, the pipeline system that would be the first to
move significant quantities of gas across the country. The first major gas project to come
to fruition in Iran was a chemical fertilizer factory built near Shiraz and the gas pipeline
built to feed it and other industrial units in the area. Built in the mid- and late-1960s, in
many ways the project was a microcosm of the entire Iranian gas utilization project.
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While it was an undeniable success, it also reflected the tensions that existed within
different levels of the Iranian state. Iranian authorities were not unified in their
understanding of how natural gas could best be utilized within the country. Officials
within the national petroleum companies, focused primarily on the most efficient use of
the largest volumes of gas for the smallest possible investment, focused their attention on
supplying the region’s industrial consumers. In contrast, local authorities, eventually
enlisting the support of national offices, sought the simultaneous construction of a city
gas network aimed at smaller residential and commercial consumers, seeing it as a
potentially significant improvement to the quality of life of city residents. Though a small
pilot city network was eventually built, the conflict reflected the significant tensions that
existed within different levels of the Iranian state regarding how gas might best be used.
Indeed, over the years, the construction of Iran’s natural gas infrastructure was not
reflective of top-down decrees that were seamlessly implemented, but rather the product
of sometimes intense negotiation by all involved parties.37
Iranian ambitions for their country’s natural gas resources went well beyond
petrochemicals, however, quickly encompassing a desire to embrace a new source of
cheap and abundant energy to feed the appetite of a rapidly industrializing society.
Natural gas infrastructure was not the only major infrastructural effort undertaken in Iran
during the Cold War period and it was built alongside hydroelectric dams, airports,

Cyrus Schayegh, in his article “’Seeing Like a State’: An Essay on the Historiography of Modern Iran,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (February 2010): 37-61, has pointed to the need
for scholars of modern Iran to avoid reproducing the state’s often totalizing claims of ownership of Iranian
development. The history of natural gas in Iran clearly shows that as influential as national figures,
organizations, and directives were, the actual contours of the country’s natural gas infrastructure were also
deeply reflective of multiple levels of Iran’s government and various sectors of Iranian society.
37
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highways, and numerous other projects.38 But natural gas use was not common around
the world, even in industrialized countries, and the new fuel source promised a new level
of technological sophistication for Iranian society, evidence that Iran was finally attaining
some level of parity with the world’s wealthy nations. Beginning in the late 1950s with
canisters of propane and butane, gas quickly became a significant and highly visible
energy source in many of Iran’s urban areas, a development accelerated by the
construction of the first Iran Gas Trunkline. Built in the late 1960s to move gas from
Iran’s southern fields to the country’s northern cities and the Soviet Caucuses, IGAT-1
would eventually become the backbone of natural gas consumption in the country. As
sophisticated products of modern technology, the pipeline and its associated facilities
became monuments to development, embodying discourses that cast gas as a futuristic
energy source for a future world power.39
38

To date very little has been written on the infrastructural projects of Cold War-era Iran. While their
existence is well recognized, their importance and effects are almost universally subsumed into broader and
more generalized discussions of Iran’s changing economy during that period. The exception is Cyrus
Schayegh’s “Iran’s Karaj Dam Affair: Emerging Mass Consumerism, the Politics of Promise, and the Cold
War in the Third World,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 54, no. 3 (2012): 612-643. In
the article, Schayegh discusses the role of Tehran’s electricity demand, its connection to an emerging
culture of mass consumption, and the decision to pursue the construction of the Karaj hydroelectric dam
and elevate it as a symbol of Iran’s development.
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Driven by rising oil revenues, particularly after 1973, a booming economy, and a penchant for advanced
arms by Muhammad Rezā Shah, in the 1960s and 1970s Iran was a rapidly rising regional power. Though
the grand expectations of the Shah that Iran would become one of the world’s largest economies within
decades were never likely to come true, it had nonetheless begun to flex its muscles in places like Oman
where it helped put down the Dhofar Rebellion between 1973 and 1976. In this Iran was fulfilling both its
own ambitions and those of the United States, which, oriented around President Richard Nixon’s decision
in 1969 to entrust regional security to allies and partners, initiated extensive arms sales to the country and
actively promoted it alongside Saudi Arabia as the primary security guarantor in the Persian Gulf region.
For more on development of Iran’s security arrangements with the United States and its broader overall
relationship during the Cold War, see Roham Alvandi’s Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States
and Iran in the Cold War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). The Iranian monarch was not
passive in courting American attention, however, often exaggerating the extent of the communist foreign
threat to his regime in order to obtain greater amounts of aid. For more see April R. Summit’s “For a White
Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran,” Middle East Journal, vol. 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2004):
560-575.
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But IGAT-1 was not by and large the product of Iranian ingenuity or expertise.
Much of it was instead engineered and planned by the Iranian Management and
Engineering Group, a British firm, and built by a constellation of foreign contractors in
its southern sectors and the Soviet Union in the north. Iranian officials were involved in
every step of the process and their perspectives shaped the project in fundamental ways,
at times not always for the best. IGAT-1 had been imagined not only as a means of
delivering gas to Iran’s urban areas, but also as a spur to the country’s industrialization.
As part of that wish, the decision had been made, over the objections of IMEG, to
produce much of the needed pipe within Iran at a new pipe mill erected for that purpose.
Despite the significant investment made in the project and the employment of an
experienced American firm, the project quickly fell behind schedule, necessitating that
much of the project’s pipe be imported at considerable expense. In the end, despite
significant uncertainty regarding the design of the pipeline’s Soviet-built northern
section, trouble with the pipe mill, and a nearly year-long delay in the commencement of
operations, the main IGAT-1 pipeline was completed in late 1970. The project’s course,
however, showed just how dependent on foreign expertise the Iranian government and
the national petroleum companies were for meeting their own ambitions, a fact that
would be largely elided in contemporary articulations of the project within Iran.
Despite the significant involvement of international actors in the project, IGAT-1
was deeply reflective of official Iranian priorities and understandings for the country’s
future. Chapter 3—primarily employing NIOC and NIGC publications, particularly the
industry magazine Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran—explores official narratives
surrounding natural gas and its infrastructure in the 1960s and 1970s, analyzing the ways
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in which it was narratively intertwined with broader understandings of Iran’s future. By
drawing on their published materials, this dissertation treats the National Iranian Oil
Company, the National Iranian Gas Company, and the Ministry of Petroleum not only as
institutions responsible for the construction of Iran’s natural gas infrastructure, but also as
cultural producers that were instrumental in developing and sustaining important political
narratives of gas and development.40 Both before and after the revolution, the public
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The intersection of cultural production and Iranian politics has proven to be a rich vein for scholars of the
country. As has been the case for much of the literature on the Iran, this is particularly true with regard to
1979 revolution and later the Islamic Republic. Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi
explore how the technologies of so-called “small media”—cassette tapes with recorded sermons, posters
with revolutionary slogans, and smuggled pamphlets—were crucial to mobilizing the Iranian population in
their book Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). In their interpretive work on the revolution and
wartime Iran, Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi explore the ideological underpinnings of the Islamic
revolutionary movement and the state it helped build in Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the
Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1999). Religion and Shi’ism have often
been the lens through which scholars have explored Iranian cultural production, as is the case for Kamran
Scot Aghaie in his book The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi’i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran (Seattle, WA:
University of Washington Press, 2004) and a number of the contributors to Peter Chelkowski’s edited
volume Eternal Performance: Ta’ziyeh and Other Shiite Rituals (London: Seagull Books, 2010). Roxanne
Varzi explored the strained engagement of Iranian youth with those expressions of religious Iranian
nationalism in her work of anthropology Warring Souls: Youth, Media, and Martyrdom in Post-Revolution
Iran (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). Moving away from religious symbolism and its
reception among Iranians, in her book Soundtrack of the Revolution: The Politics of Music in Iran
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017) Nahid Siamdoust has explored how the state organs of the
Islamic Republic have used their power over the production and distribution of music to pace Iran’s social
opening by carefully modulating what is and what is not permitted. Cultural production sits at the center of
Hamid Naficy’s colossal four-volume history of Iranian cinema A Social History of Iranian Cinema, Vols.
1-4 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011-2012). Naficy explores how Iranian cinema, as an industry
and in its particular forms and styles, shaped and reflected the broader social and political transformations
of Iranian society between the late 19th century the early 21st. Media, culture, and cultural production have
been a similarly productive perspective for scholars working elsewhere in the Middle East. Notable
examples include Lisa Wedeen’s Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in
Contemporary Syria (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1999) and its exploration of humor in
Syria as an avenue of authority and resistance in the country; Marwan M. Kraidy’s view of reality
television as a site of social experimentation in Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public
Life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); the debates over nation and authenticity
documented in Jessica Winegar’s Creative Reckonings: The Politics of Art and Culture in Contemporary
Egypt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); the globalized perspective of Hisham D. Aidi in
Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 2014); and the
exploration of how media technologies shape community in the Muslim world by contributors to the edited
volume of Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson’s New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging
Public Sphere (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999, 2003).
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relations arms of these institutions produced numerous periodicals, books, and pamphlets
for circulation within their organizations and beyond. This media reported extensively on
company operations and the lifecycles of oil and gas. Through the textual and
photographic depictions of natural gas infrastructure that were disseminated in such
publications, over the years a sophisticated idiom of development and technological
modernity was created to “prove” the possibility of gas infrastructure in Iran; the
desirability of a gas-based society; and the ability of the Iranian state, working primarily
through the NIOC and NIGC, to create one.
In treating these depictions seriously as media and cultural artifacts, and attending
to how they did, and did not, change over time, it is possible to gain insight into the
policy orientations that underlay them. More than public relations fluff or dry
institutional accounts, these publications offer a window into what Sheila Jasanoff and
Sang-Hyun Kim have called sociotechnical imaginaries, “collectively held, institutionally
stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures” rooted in scientific and
technological advancement.41 Through attending to the broader context in which these
words and images operated, the multiple and intermeshing currents of social and political
thought that comprised these utterances, some overt and some less so, are revealed. Read
simultaneously as a single interlocking corpus and as diachronic series of utterances in
dialogue with each other, it becomes possible to see that natural gas was not just a means

See Sheila Jasanoff, “Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity,” in
Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power, eds. Sheila Jasanoff
and Sang-Hyun Kim, pp. 1-33 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 4. This is a revision of the
definition of a sociotechnical imaginary first proposed by Jasanoff and Kim in “Containing the Atom:
Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea,” Minerva 47, no. 2
(June 2009): 119-146.
41
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to supply a more intensely energetic future, but a fundamental expression of an evolving
and heterogeneous social vision for Iran.42
In the mid-1960s, industry publications began celebrating natural gas as enabling
“modern” lifeways of cleanliness, convenience, and American-esque domestic
femininity. Rising household gas use over the following decade reflected the quick
growth of a new consumer culture and the increasingly Euro-American lifestyles being
adopted by middle class and wealthy Iranians living in the country’s fast-growing cities.43
But for the authors of these publications, Iran’s natural gas infrastructure was also
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By drawing on the thought of M.M. Bakhtin and viewing decades worth of official publications as a
singular “novel,” understood in a broad Bakhtinian sense, it is easier to see the underlying sociotechnical
imaginary shaping each individual article or image. The contextual heteroglossia that runs through the
corpus is often most in focus only when the observer takes a step back, viewing the collection as a whole
and attending to the continual dialogism operating within it, particularly across the 1979 revolution. For
more on the basis of these theoretical positions see M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays,
trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,
1981, 2014), particularly chapter four “Discourse in the Novel.” The heteroglossia visible in the corpus
need not be understood as unintentional accretions, betraying influences that the careful reader might use to
understand, complicate, or demolish authorial intent. As Shaden M. Tageldin alerts us to in her work
Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in Egypt (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2011), polyphonic streams can be intentional and core parts of how any particular text is
intended to function. In this way, the articles and images analyzed in this dissertation are best understood as
simultaneously and intentionally communicating both the specifics of any particular subject and also
broader points about development and the Iranian state’s relationship to it.
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In her excellent work Domesticity and Consumer Culture in Iran: Interior Revolutions of the Modern Era
(New York: Routledge, 2013), Pamela Karimi has explored how Iranian households and domestic culture
changed during the Cold War period. Reflecting the promotion of consumer goods within Iran, the presence
of the American Point IV program and the adoption of their curriculum of domesticity by official
textbooks, and shifting familial norms, Iranian households underwent significant shifts during the period,
not only in interpersonal relations but also in the kinds of homes built and the arrangements of space and
functionality within them. Not all within Iran were supportive of such changes, and such shifting norms
were subsumed into revolutionary politics by the late 1970s. Consumer culture has been flashpoint for
national conflict across the Middle East, something Nancy Reynolds has explored with reference to Cairo
in A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, the Cairo Fire, and the Politics of Decolonization in Egypt
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). Though it often played out in distinct ways, the
intersection of fossil fuels, modernizing development, and culture was not unique to Iran either. Pascal
Menoret has shown how the combination of Saudi planned urban development and oil wealth has translated
into the rise of a masculine urban outlaw youth culture centered on dangerous stunt driving as a way to
reclaim alienating urban spaces. For more see Pascal Menoret Joyriding in Riyadh: Oil, Urbanism, and
Road Revolt (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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significant for its symbolic spectacle. In the late Pahlavi era, official discourse frequently
engaged in almost formulaic recitations of the size and scope of the IGAT-1 project,
hailing it as a bridge to Iran’s sovereign and technologically sophisticated future. The
immensity of Iran’s new natural gas infrastructure—the millions of cubic feet of gas
produced per day, the thousands of kilometers of traversed, the thousands of pounds per
square inch of pressure—was harnessed as proof of the state’s ability to build this new
Iran. Through a triumvirate of image, word, and statistic, natural gas energy was built to
be a fundamental legitimating factor for the regime, proof of its ability to construct a
brighter future for all Iranians.44 It was a view that championed the efforts of Iran’s elites
and erased those of the laborers who worked to build and maintain Iran’s gas
infrastructure, replacing them with heroic visions of massive steel pipes traversing
mountain ranges, gleaming purification towers rising into the sky, and the convenient
twist of a knob in the kitchen. It was fundamentally a vision that tied Iran’s state-directed
modernization programs directly to their material embodiments.
Iranian hopes for their country’s natural gas resources went significantly further.
For some, the great promise of gas energy lay not only in its ability to fuel Iran’s
continued modernization, but also in its potential to alleviate the growing air quality
problems of Iran’s urban areas. In the 1960s and 1970s, urban residents of Iran
increasingly began to take note of the growing problem of air pollution. Iranian officials
were not an exception, and for many the specter of the polluted cities of Europe and
44

The recasting of political issues as neutral technical questions has been something frequently noted by
scholars of development. Particularly influential has been James Ferguson, who in his book The AntiPolitical Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, 1994) shows how questions of resource allocation were depoliticized into seemingly technical problems with technical solutions.
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North America was a sight that threatened the fundamental validity of Iran’s modernizing
project. In response, they embraced gas all the more ferociously, seeing in it the
possibility of a cleaner future that would not necessitate a fundamental retreat from or
rethinking of developmental choices already made. In contrast to accounts that have
largely treated Iranian environmentalism as a post-revolutionary phenomenon, Chapter
4—drawing on Iranian archival documents, published materials from contemporary
Iranian experts and government ministries, and national daily publications like
Ettelā’āt—explores Iranians’ growing concern for their cities’ deteriorating air quality
and highlights the centrality of those worries to the process of industrial gasification in
Tehran and Shiraz.
Most urban residents in Iran had a particular understanding of air pollution, one
centered on the tangible experiences of existing within a smoky and smoggy atmosphere.
Iranians increasingly bemoaned the soot-filled skies of the country as the 1960s and
1970s wore on and the country’s experts worked to understand the contours and causes of
worsening air quality. What they found was a confluence of human and nonhuman
actants, the meeting of fossil fuel emissions with geology and climate. This was
particularly true for Tehran, where the concentrations of air pollutants circulating through
the city’s skies, largely fossil fuel emissions, were intensified by the presence of the
Alborz Mountains, the clear semi-arid skies, and the atmospheric inversions they helped
form. Iranian officials who sought to help alleviate worsening air quality had little
influence over mountain ranges and regional climates, but they could work to substitute
natural gas for dirtier fuels. Indeed, in the mid-1970s, with the completion of the IGAT-1
pipeline, sustained efforts were undertaken by Iranian officials to convert industrial units
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to gas in the cities of Tehran and Shiraz. The process was far from straightforward,
however, reflecting competing and ambivalent attitudes toward the project among factory
owners and the inability of the NIGC to keep its scheduling promises. Though most
industrial units in the cities had been converted by the end of the 1970s, it was only after
considerable scrambling by the NIGC to address the original plan’s inadequate gas
provision and an agreement had been struck for owners to have access to significant
financial support. More than the banal textures of a particular historical episode, the
productive resistance of factory owners reflects the fact that Iran’s modernization efforts
were not entirely shaped by governmental actors, instead being created in the interactions
between state and society.
The systems used to feed factories in Tehran and Shiraz were built as part of
broader efforts to create networks to distribute the gas transported by the IGAT-1
pipeline. Using archival documents, published oral histories, and industry publications,
Chapter 5 discusses the construction of city gas distribution systems under both the
monarchy and the Islamic Republic, highlighting both the technical choices that shaped
them and the significant revolutionary meanings that were projected onto the gas
systems. NIGC officials faced the fundamental choice of whether the gas distribution
networks they built would be low- or high-pressure. Their embrace of a high-pressure
system and the larger volumes of gas it could distribute over the objections of the foreign
consultants hired to design the system reflected a commitment to the long-term use of
natural gas energy in Iran. The NIGC, despite taking that position, was nonetheless much
slower in building residential gas systems than it was in feeding gas to factories. It further
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gave absolute priority to urban areas, almost entirely neglecting rural Iranians in the years
prior to the revolution.
In the NIGC’s hierarchy of consumers, many Iranians saw their own expectations
of receiving gas service frustrated. For them, gas came to represent a future out of reach
and a stark reminder of the yawning inequalities that marked their lives. As was often
true around the world, even with the vast sums and significant political capital expended
on them, Iranian modernization programs met with mixed success at best, foundering on
unexpected events, corruption, and unintended consequences.45 Many Iranians perceived
few, if any, benefits from the significant social and economic disruption that often
accompanied these plans, something that was increasingly contrasted with the lives of
enormous luxury that the country’s elite began to visibly enjoy in the 1960s and 1970s.
For rural residents, their inability to make use of natural gas energy, even in those areas
where pipelines passed close by, was particularly galling, evidence that the Pahlavi state
had chosen to prioritize the needs of foreign buyers over those of their own people. As
the revolutionary movement grew in the second half of the 1970s, such frustrated
ambitions became increasingly integrated into broader revolutionary themes of social and
economic justice. In contrast to much of the existing literature on the 1979 Iranian
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James C. Scott, in his book Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition
have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), has famously highlighted how many of the
most ambitious developmental plans of governments around the world have largely failed to improve the
lives of those they were supposed to help. Scott argues that four features of a state are significant: 1) an
administrative ordering of nature and society; 2) a “high-modernist” ideology paired with a hubris rooted in
science and technical progress; 3) an authoritarian state willing to use its coercive power; and 4) a civil
society too weak to resist. Despite, or perhaps because of, the strength of these states, they often failed to
take local custom and practical knowledge into account, effectively dooming their ambitions to frustration
the moment they were pursued. Iran has been no exception in this regard; indeed, in the Cold War period
Iran embodied many of the traits that Scott highlights as contributing to both a desire to undertake
significant life-altering programs and the inability to make them a success.
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revolution, this dissertation argues that it was the lack of sufficient development, rather
than its excess, that many Iranians were opposed to.46 But the lack of natural gas service
for the vast majority of Iranians was not simply one line on the list of Pahlavi
wrongdoings. With the fall of the monarchy in 1979 and the subsequent rise of the
Islamic Republic, natural gas maintained the great symbolic value it had acquired in the
prerevolutionary era. Reflecting that significance, and mirroring the politics surrounding
access to water in the country, the extension of piped natural gas networks to all Iranians
became an important expression of the Islamic Republic’s stated commitment to social
and economic justice.

While Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran: Between Two Revolutions notes the crucial factor of the country’s
modernization program and the frustrated expectations of many citizens, he argues that many Iranians were
upset because they detected a surfeit of economic development and too little political change. Other
existing literature on the 1979 Iranian revolution has largely emphasized social, (Islamic) ideological, and
political themes. Said Amir Arjomand, in his book The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in
Iran (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), sees the revolution as distinctly modern in its
inconceivability without the strong centralized state of the Pahlavi monarchy and the social transformations
of the early Cold War era. In a highly structuralist manner, Arjomand argues that the revolution was caused
by the dislocations of Iran’s social transformations being harnessed by the charisma of Khomeini to further
the long conflict between the clerical hierocracy and the centralizing Iranian state, a conflict that entered a
new and decisive phase with the attempt of Muhammad Rezā Shah to break the authority of the clerical
hierarchy and monopolize power in his own hands. Abrahamian notes the charisma of Khomeini as well in
his collection of essays Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1993), arguing that the revolution was a fundamentally populist uprising with Khomeini
as its organizing leader. Hamid Dabashi, seeing ideologies as the prime movers of history, plumbs the
depths of the “Islamic ideology” of the 1979 revolution in his book Theology of Discontent: The
Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993;
Reprint, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008), arguing that the ideology was created by
numerous actors in a dialectical relationship with “the West.” In his polemical Iran: A People Interrupted
(New York: The New Press, 2007), Dabashi further argues that the 1979 revolution was but one episode in
a longer struggle of Iranians against a colonial modernity that had been imposed on the country. Nikki R.
Keddie, in her Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Have, CT: Yale
University Press, 1981) similarly argues that the 1979 revolution was at its deepest rooted in the desire of
Iranians to shake the foreign influence that had borne down on Iran for nearly 200 years at that point. Roy
Mottahedeh’s singular The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1985), through its sublime interweaving of personal, intellectual, and social insights, argues that
the 1979 revolution was the latest expression, altered and updated in response to colonialism and the
internal conflicts of the hierarchy, of a long-running ethos sustained and defined by the Shi’i clerics.
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Reflecting that promise, publications of the NIGC and the NIOC changed,
moving away from emphasizing the landscape-conquering heft of structures like the
IGAT-1 pipeline, to more human-scale city gas networks. What did not change, however,
was the continued emphasis on the technical aspects of the system and the use of
photography and statistics to “prove” the reality of the government’s political
commitments. There was thus significant continuity in the positions of the Pahlavi
monarchy and the Islamic Republic, despite the latter’s painstaking efforts to differentiate
itself from the Pahlavi era. Officials under both governments elevated natural gas as a
symbol of the new Iran they promised to build, one that was technologically sophisticated
and, supposedly, aimed at bettering the life of Iranians. In thus emphasizing that Iran’s
discourses of entitlement were both top-down and bottom-up and remarkably similar
under both the monarchy and the Islamic Republic, this dissertation complicates notions
that certain kinds of energy systems are associated with particular forms of politics and
governance.47
Alongside Iran’s efforts during the 1970s to convert factories to gas fuel there
began a push to convert motor vehicles to gas as well. The exploratory programs
undertaken in the prerevolutionary period amounted to little with the interruption of the
1979 revolution, but under the Islamic Republic the idea flourished. Drawing on archival
documents and industry publications, Chapter 6 recounts the work of Iranian officials to
create and deploy systems to support automobile gas use. Officials considered two forms
47

In his book Carbon Democracy, Timothy Mitchell has famously argued that different forms of
government are rooted in the material properties of different fossil fuels and the labor regimes that were
thereby created: democracy in coal and authoritarianism in oil. This dissertation complicates that picture,
highlighting just how alike the politics of natural gas were under the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic
Republic despite the significant differences in their governmental structure and practices.
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of gas fuel: compressed natural gas and liquid gas. Each form had its own technical
advantages and disadvantages, characteristics that were most meaningful when
considered within the social context of Tehran’s urban areas. Iranian experts wrung their
hands about the safety of transporting liquid gas amongst the notoriously lawless drivers
of Tehran, the need to establish enough compressor stations to supply a CNG system, and
the willingness of drivers to adopt gas fuel before a truly national system of distribution
was in place. Despite such concerns, the promise of automobile gas fuel was almost too
good to pass up and it took on added significance during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.
Gas not only promised cleaner skies, but also the establishment of new industry and the
use of an abundant and inexpensive domestic fuel, considerations that bound the
possibility of gas fuel to the politics of economic sovereignty that had been sharpened by
the conflict. Gas and national development thus again became twisted together, but this
time they would ultimately be at odds. While vehicle conversion kits were successfully
designed and manufactured in Iran, their generally poor quality and difficulty of
maintenance effectively rendered the engines on which they were installed more
polluting than when they used gasoline alone.

***
Despite the at times near exclusivity of attention that Tehran has received in the
histories of modern Iran, natural gas embraced a large swath of the country, a reality that
this dissertation has sought to reflect.48 As the administrative and industrial capital of the
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Few works look at Iran from the perspective of areas other than Tehran. One of the few is Setrag
Manoukian’s City of Knowledge in Twentieth Century Iran: Shiraz, History and Poetry (London:
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country, Tehran played a significant role in both prompting the desire for a natural gas
system and shaping its eventual contours. Its particularly poor air quality further drove
considerations for gas as a potential environmental savior. But much of the gas that Iran
used, particularly in the pre-revolutionary era, was a product of Khuzestān and its
particular geologies. It was the province’s distance from Iran’s major urban centers and
the pressures and compositions of its petroleum reservoirs that drove the need for
massive pipelines and refineries. Shiraz too played an outsize role, both hosting the first
major gas project in Iran and, in many ways, setting the terms of the country’s
gasification. Nor were the two cities identical in their reception of gas, with the both
Shiraz’s local authorities and factory owners aggressively pursuing the new fuel and
those of Tehran worried more about disruptions to the existing order. In Iran’s rural areas,
it was the lack of gas that mattered, something that became bound up in broader
revolutionary discourses in the late 1970s. The history of natural gas in Iran is a national
one, but it cannot be captured from the top-down view of the national government alone.
It instead demands that attention be paid to how gas was received in different parts of the
country, and the local contexts—human and nonhuman alike—that shaped it.
The intertwining of human and nonhuman factors was particularly evident in the
issue of Iran’s urban air quality. Despite the eventual widespread adoption of gas fuels,
the continued intensification of air pollution reflected the lack of a straightforward
technical fix for Iran’s environmental challenges. Nonetheless, the efforts of Iranian
officials under both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic to convert industries
Routledge, 2012), in which he explores how residents of Shiraz, long seen as the country’s cultural capital,
employ poetry and the idea of culture to relate to their city, their country, and the history of both.
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and vehicles to gas fuel ingrained the effects of mountain ranges, arid terrain, and the
smoke of natural gas combustion in Iranian development policies. Beyond its
industrializing potential, Iranians valued gas energy as a savior from the environmental
violence their developmental policies had wrought. Modernization and notions of
environmental stewardship thus became intertwined in Iran, and the return of clear skies a
sought-after feature of the modernity many Iranians longed to build. In their pursuit,
Iranians were not passive consumers of expertise established elsewhere; they were active
members of global scientific and engineering discourses of energy and the environment,
working to both develop their own society and sway the ultimate course of fossil fuelbased civilization worldwide.49 To date, however, that vision has largely failed.

The story of natural gas in Iran is one that brings together the political,
technological, social, and environmental histories of the country. It is each of these
things, but it is also much more, for gas functioned not only as a substance of joining,
linking together seemingly disparate strands of Iranian history, but also as a coconstitutive catalyst, influencing each thread in turn. Gas thus offers itself as a powerful
and manipulable lens through which to examine Iran’s recent past. Turn it one way to
examine Iranian state building, making visible the extensive continuity between the social
49

Though such individuals have often been cast as compradors of western powers, especially by supporters
of the 1979 revolution, such a view of them is unreflective of the actual complexity with which they
engaged the industrialized world. Many longed for a more independent Iran, one not only able to better
resist the depredations of entities like the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its imperial patrons, but also one
able to exert itself around the Middle East and the world. Such men thus held positions that were
anticolonial in their particular application to Iran, but not in universalizing essence. This recursive
reproduction of colonial perspectives was not unknown in the Middle East, a crucial reality Eve M. Troutt
Powell has pointed to with regard to 19th-century Egypt in her book A Different Shade of Colonialism:
Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).
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visions animating policies under the Iranian monarchy and the Islamic Republic. Turn it
another to see Iranian scientists, engineers, and planners working to create new
understandings of their country and its needs, going far beyond the mere application of
expertise created elsewhere. Turn it yet another direction to uncover how changing
Iranian lifeways were shaped by more than ideology and religion, becoming reordered
around new technologies of natural gas energy use. With a final twist, the boundaries
between the human and natural worlds blur, revealing the extensive ways that modern
Iranian society is as much a product of mountain ranges, ancient seas, and local climates
as it is human hands. That these varied aspects of the story are interlocked is reflective of
what natural gas energy has been in Iran: a substance upon which Iranians projected and
attempted to build some of their most potent national aspirations; an ancient hydrocarbon
mixture, lifted from deep beneath the earth, transported hundreds of miles by
sophisticated technological systems to be burned by energy-hungry consumers in everincreasing quantities; and a failed environmental savior, ultimately unable to fulfill
Iranian dreams of clean urban air. A focus on gas thus allows us to go beyond the
questions of religion, ideological contestation, and Great Power meddling that have
shaped much of the scholarship on modern Iran to date, seeing how they have been coconstituted with technology and the environment.
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Chapter 1
No Gas, No Oil:
The Early Years of Iranian Natural Gas,
1935-1965

Throughout Iran’s Persian Gulf coastal regions, visual and olfactory evidence of
natural gas litters the land. In the southeastern area of Baluchestān, large mud volcanoes
rise prominently above the flat ground, the mounds of hardened white earth the result of
pressurized natural gas erupting through saltwater-bearing clay to form dark, bubbling
craters. In the province of Fars, the sulfurous smell of natural gas seepages wafts through
the air and fetid pools of black water bubble; dark brown and porous accretions of
calcium carbonate and crystalline sulfur referred to as gach-e torsh cover the ground
where gas has reacted with outcroppings of gypsum and limestone. In Khuzestān, the
heart of Iran’s petroleum industry, gas seeps, gach-e torsh, and even naturally burning
vents of gas litter the central region, providing hints of the vast quantities of wealth and
energy that lay hidden beneath the surface. In indicating the presence of underground
petroleum reservoirs, such clues did more than signal to early oil explorers promising
locations to search for the black gold that would come to be coveted the world over: they
also asserted the intertwined nature of natural gas and oil. These two substances, in many
48

ways more alike than dissimilar, would together shape Iran’s course of development in
their inability to be easily separated.50
Iranian efforts to harness natural gas began in the 1930s, with entreaties to the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that something be done about the large volumes of natural
gas the company was extracting and venting as part of its oil operations. From the
perspective of Iranian government officials, gas represented a vast and largely untapped
source of energy, wealth, and economic potential. Between the 1930s and the 1960s, they
pressed the AIOC to find economically profitable uses for it or, failing that, to recycle it
to the underground petroleum reservoirs from which it had been produced, preserving it
for exploitation in later years. For their part, officers of the AIOC largely saw gas
utilization as theoretically promising but always commercially unviable, unable to
compete with other forms of energy or suitable only for products that lacked sufficient
markets. They nonetheless explored proposals to use Iran’s natural gas to mine
magnesium and to manufacture chemicals like carbon black, ultimately concluding that
none were suitable for full implementation. This subordination of gas to oil was a
deliberate process, an unseeing of gas’s economic potential for Iran that was pursued in
an effort to protect the company’s primary mission of delivering cheap oil to foreign
customers.
Gas recycling too was seen as technically possible but economically pointless, a
view rooted not only in commercial calculations regarding the value of natural gas and
For more on the geology of Iran’s petroleum-bearing regions see National Iranian Oil Company and
Iranian Oil Operating Companies, “Present Status of Natural Gas in Iran,” in Proceedings of the Seminar
on the Development and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources: with Special Reference to the ECAFE
Region, pp. 64-82 (New York: United Nations, 1965).
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the cost of its reinjection, but also the very geologic characteristics of the rock from
which the AIOC extracted petroleum. Anglo-Iranian officials argued that because the
unique geological characteristics of Iran’s oil-bearing region caused more gas to be
naturally retained in the reservoirs than was the global norm, and that the company
refrained from aggressive production practices that would upset that balance, they had
already long undertaken a de facto program of gas recycling. More than mere rhetorical
justification on the part of a foreign semi-colonial enterprise, this combination of
economic and natural factors would eventually come to define the course of Iran’s
burgeoning relationship with its natural gas resources, representing the balancing act
between economic, political, and social imperatives at stake within the limits imposed by
Iran as a geological entity.

***
As early as the mid-1930s, officials within the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company began
to give serious and sustained attention to the large reserves of natural gas found within
their Iranian concession. Though experiments were undertaken between 1926 and 1928 to
produce benzol motor fuel from Iranian natural gas,51 exploration into gas utilization was
set aside until late 1937 when B.K.N. Wyllie, an AIOC engineer, proposed using surplus
natural gas to extract magnesium from the dolomite rich mountains north of Dezful.52 In
“Meeting Held at Britannic House on Tuesday 30th November, 1937, to Discuss the Problem of the
Utilisation of Natural Gas in Iran,” no document number, 3 December 1937, p. 1, Utilisation of Natural
Gas (44113), BP Archive, University of Warwick [hereafter Utilisation of Natural Gas].
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Memorandum from B.K.N. Wyllie, “Is the Manufacture of Magnesium from Dolomite a Possible Mode
of Utilising some of the Surplus Gas in Southern Iran?,” no document number, 10 November 1937,
attached to Memorandum from G.M. Lees to Deputy Director, Production, 11 November 1937, Utilisation
of Natural Gas.
52

50

November of that year, George Martin Lees, Chief Geologist of the AIOC, wrote that “in
addition to gas produced with our oil which is surplus to requirements[,] we have, in the
ground, proved gas fields which are among the biggest of their kind in the world.” This,
he wrote, quoting another AIOC engineer, “justified ‘a special research project, having as
its terms of reference the commercial exploitation of this enormous reserve of cheap
fuel.’”53 Despite some consideration having been made for the use of excess refinery
gases from Ābādān refinery in domestic applications in the surrounding town in 1936,54
Lees focused on potential industrial applications, stating that “the only feasible use for
our gas is as fuel for some industrial operation” like mineral extraction,55 metal and
cement production, and as a “source of acetylene” and synthetic petrol.56
Driving this interest in Iran’s natural gas were the large volumes already being
produced by Anglo-Iranian in the petroleum fields they operated. Most of this gas was
so-called associated gas, or gas that was dissolved within the oil itself. Though the
different states of oil and gas at the earth’s surface—liquid versus gaseous—have
tremendous implications for the utilization of the resources, there is in reality no sharp
distinction in the ensemble of hydrocarbons that comprise the bulk of their substance.
Created from the fossilized remains of ancient biological material that has been

Memorandum from G.M. Lees to Deputy Director, Production, “Utilisation of Natural Gas in Iran,” no
document number, 11 November 1937, p. 1, Utilisation of Natural Gas.
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J.A. Jameson, “Visit to Iran 1936: Abadan Town – Supply Services, Housing,” H2/132, 1936, p. 5, Visit
to Iran 1936: Abadan Town: Supply Services, Housing (67507), BP Archive, University of Warwick.
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Memorandum from G.M. Lees to Deputy Director, Production, “Utilisation of Natural Gas in Iran,” no
document number, 11 November 1937, p. 1-2, Utilisation of Natural Gas.
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Memorandum, “Utilisation of Fields Gas,” no document number, 30 November 1937, Utilisation of
Natural Gas.
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transformed by the heat, pressure, and anaerobic environments of the deep earth, natural
gas and crude oil are both forms of petroleum. Neither are composed of a single pure
substance, instead constituted by various organic hydrocarbons, and the difference
between them lies in the different molecular weights of the hydrocarbons that comprise
their bulk. Natural gas is composed primarily of methane and other light hydrocarbons
that are gaseous at surface level pressures and temperatures whereas crude oil contains
mostly pentane and heavier hydrocarbons that are liquid at surface conditions. Crucially,
these substances are formed via the same geological processes, resulting in petroleum
reservoirs containing both light and heavy hydrocarbons in varying concentrations.
Largely formed within sedimentary rock formations, petroleum deposits often
migrate upward within the earth, moving through tiny cracks, fissures, and gaps that exist
within the rock. Significant and exploitable petroleum reservoirs are thus most often
formed in regions where the earth has been deformed by tectonic movement and trapped
migrating petroleum beneath an impermeable layer. There oil and gas collect, often
forming a dome of the less-dense natural gas beneath which lies a column of more-dense
crude oil. While gas can be produced directly from the gas dome and without significant
quantities of oil,57 the reverse is not generally true. The creation of oil and gas in the
same deposits results in some of the hydrocarbons that comprise natural gas—primarily
methane and ethane, among others—remaining dissolved amongst the heavier
hydrocarbons of crude oil when placed under high pressures deep underground. Released
from that pressure when the oil is brought to the surface, such lighter hydrocarbons
57

This is not to say that the gas has no heavier components, as so-called natural gas liquids will often
precipitate out of gas produced in this manner upon reaching the surface.
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evaporate out of the crude and are either captured for later use or vented and flared for
disposal. To produce oil is to thus to inevitably produce natural gas as well, particularly
as the expansion of natural gas in lower pressures is often what drives oil up the wells.
The lengthy and complex geological history that gives rise to petroleum reservoirs
results in each producing field having its own characteristics, an “individuality” reflecting
the composition of the oil and gas, its natural pressurization of the reservoir, and the
potential ease of its exploitation.58 In Iran’s southwestern provinces, such factors have
come together to create one of the richest oil- and gas-producing regions in the world.
Founded in 1909 and operating primarily within the province Khuzestān, the semi-private
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, later the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and later still British
Petroleum, extracted and exported Iran’s oil to customers around the globe, in the process
becoming one of the richest and most influential oil producers in the world. From the
very beginning of its oil operations, however, the company was just as much a producer
of gas as oil, bringing to the surface all the gas dissolved in the crude they sought.
Though the AIOC only began recording associated gas production in 1933, retroactive
assessments based on the known gas:oil ratios—a measure of the amount of gas in a
given volume of oil—within their reservoirs indicated steadily rising amounts of gas
being extracted from the ground. In 1911 an estimated 50 million cubic feet of gas was
produced at the Masjid-e Sulaymān field. That number had risen to a more than 27,000
million cubic feet in 1937, primarily from the fields at Masjid-e Sulaymān and Haft Kel.
Total production in any given field could vary over time as more or less oil was lifted, but
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by the postwar years, a period when the economic potential of Iran’s associated gas
would come under greater scrutiny, more fields and gas were being produced than ever
before. By 1947 more than 80,000 million cubic feet of gas was extracted in five fields:
Masjid-e Sulaymān, Haft Kel, Naft Sefid, Gachsārān, and Āghā Jāri.59
For these reasons, George Martin Lees was not alone in taking seriously the
prospect of Iranian gas. Whether as a raw material for petrochemicals or a source of
energy for mining magnesium, concern for the fate of Iran’s natural gas reached the
highest levels of the AIOC’s leadership. On November 30, 1937 a meeting between
company leadership and production experts was held at Britannic House, AIOC
headquarters, in order to “initiate a concentration of thought and research on a problem of
the very highest importance to the Company, namely, the utilisation of the colossal and
increasing quantities of light gaseous paraffins – mainly methane – produced or available
in Iran.”60 As Lees had done, attendees focused on industrial applications for gas,
directing that a small committee of experts evaluate proposed uses like the manufacture
of magnesium and calcium carbide, transformation to other hydrocarbons, and cement
production.61 Some options, like the production of acetylene or other hydrocarbons, faced
significant technical unknowns, while others faced the headwinds of commercial

Memorandum from H.W. Lane to L.C. Rice, “Government Enquiry,” HWL/370, 4 June 1948,
Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948 (58787), BP Archive, University of Warwick
[hereafter Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948].
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viability.62 Several weeks after the Britannic House meeting, D. Comins, an AIOC
employee, reported early findings regarding the potential production of magnesium in
Iran. He stated that there was some 76 mcf/d (roughly 800,000 tons per year) of “cheap
gas fuel available for exploitation” at the Masjid-e Sulaymān and Haft Kel oil fields with
a total known reserves of some 65 million tons, twenty-five at Masjid-e Sulaymān and
forty at Haft Kel.63 The large volumes of gas were crucial to any potential scheme for
producing magnesium from the dolomite hills in the region, as Comins’s analysis
confirmed that “fuel or power costs represent a substantial percentage of the cost of
production.” He estimated not only that 30,000 tons of magnesium could be produced per
year if all the surplus gas were used, but also that “power costs per ton of Magnesium
would be much lower in Iran than in the U.K.,” even when factoring in the £6 royalty per
ton of gas that the AIOC would owe the Iranian government.64 The crucial referent for
AIOC experts was the prevailing average price of £140 per ton of magnesium in the
United Kingdom, and there was a flurry of debate over whether Comins’s original
analysis accurately reflected both the prevailing conditions within Britain65 and the
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various ways magnesium was produced around the world.66 Even more of an issue for the
AIOC was the fact that the concessionary agreement under which they operated in Iran
did not cover the search for any resources other than petroleum. As J.M. Pattinson, an
AIOC official, expressed,

You will recall that our Concession is granted for the production, refining and transport
of Petroleum and that this is very specifically stated under Article 1 thereof, and I am a
little doubtful of our position if we institute a search for a substance which is definitely
outside this definition.67

E.H.O. Elkington, the General Manager of the Company in Iraq and Iran between 1927
and 1939, responded that since the large quantities of “methane cannot at present be
converted into petroleum products,” the AIOC was considering other options. As he
wrote,

It is realised that under our Concession we have no rights to manufacture magnesium or
calcium carbide from dolomite, but if after investigation, the use of Fields gas for this
purpose can be shown to be a commercial proposition, then we should have to take it up
with the Government and come to a separate agreement with them. 68

The hurdles that thus faced the possibility of using natural gas to produce magnesium in
Iran— technical soundness, economic viability, and legal opportunity—were
representative of those that would face all such projects in the following decades.
Despite the problematic legal standing of the AIOC vis-à-vis the production of
non-petroleum commodities, throughout 1938 and into 1939 Company officials

See Memorandum W.H. Cadman to D. Comins, “New Electro-Thermal Process,” no document number,
18 January 1938 and Memorandum W.H. Cadman to D. Comins, “Magnesium Production Method,” no
document number, 19 January 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas.
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continued to search for means to utilize the increasing volumes of gas they controlled in
Iran. Standing in the way of increased utilization was, as A.C.G. Egerton,69 Chair of
Chemical Technology at the Imperial College of Science and adviser to the Company,
phrased it, a perception that gas possessed a “low convenience value.” “Energy in the
form of gas has a low convenience value because it cannot be utilized far from the wells,”
he wrote, and determining the best course of action was “a question of what best form to
put it in to get the highest ‘convenience value.’”70 To overcome this challenge, AIOC
officials like Egerton largely sought to literally or figuratively convert methane, the
predominant component of natural gas, into products that could be more easily and
economically transported to distant markets. Whether employed as feedstock or fuel
source, in this way the low “convenience value” of gas could be boiled down and
concentrated, thereby resulting in products much more amenable to utilization at points
distant from the petroleum fields. Thus, in addition to projects like the production of
magnesium with gas fuel—“the winning of metals [with gas] is important and compares
favourably with the transport of fuel oil and the production power from it at the place
where it is transported…[and] compares very favourably with the production of metals by
power provided from coal”—Egerton also proposed using Iranian gas for the potential
production of petrochemical precursors like acetylene, ethylene, methanol, formaldehyde,
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and hydrogen cyanide as well as the “liquefaction of methane for use as an aircraft
fuel.”71
Egerton’s proposals were taken seriously, and at a meeting held in AIOC
headquarters the next day it was determined that the extremely low price at which the
company could obtain Iranian gas potentially made viable projects that would not have
been economical if undertaken in the United Kingdom. The production of magnesium
continued to be seen as the most promising avenue being considered. At the time, British
demand for the metal continued to outstrip available supply and, perhaps more
importantly, shipping the product was seen as being much more efficient than trying to
transport gas long distances. “More calories could be exported in the form of magnesium
than in any other way so far suggested,” it was reported, but despite the promise of
magnesium exports, throughout the spring of 1938, other avenues of utilisation continued
to be explored by AIOC officials.72 Included was the potential for the production of
carbon black as well as helium extraction73 and cement production.74 Cement was seen as
particularly promising as the establishment of a large gas-fired cement works in Burma
had already shown that “gas firing, after preliminary difficulties have been overcome, is
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much simpler and requires less skilled attention than coal firing.”75 Cement was also a
useful commodity for the AIOC in its own operations, and it was reported the “cement
manufactured is very suitable for cementing of wells and is used by B.O.C. [Burma Oil
Company] as well as ourselves.”76 Despite this early interest in cement on the part of the
AIOC, for decades no progress was made. As late as 1955 Anglo-Iranian officials were
discussing the possibility,77 and in the end nothing would be built until the mid-1960s
when a cement plant was constructed as part of an industrial complex in Shiraz.
Evaluations of potential projects continued until the end of 1938 with the AIOC
undertaking not only economic and market evaluations but also fundamental technical
research to determine the true feasibility of proposals like the creation of acetylene78 and
“liquid hydrocarbons suitable for fuel.”79 Despite this foray into basic scientific research,
high-level company officials stressed that any endeavors undertaken must be in support
of the AIOC’s fundamental identity as a profit-seeking business. While assembled
officials agreed with two chemical advisers working for the Company who had “urged
“The Burma Cement Company Limited. General Description of the Factory at Thayetmyo, Burma.,” no
document number, 6 April 1938, p. 10-11, attached to Memorandum from P. de H. Hall, “Gas Utilisation in
Cement Manufacture in Iran,” no document number, 19 April 1938, Utilisation of Natural Gas.
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that work should be concentrated upon the problem of converting Fields gas into
acetylene” since it was “a key product capable of subsequent conversion into fuel
hydrocarbons,” not all were convinced that the efforts being put forth were entirely in the
company’s interests. It was reported that Baron John Cadman, Chairman of the AngloIranian Oil Company, had

stressed the opinion, both in relation to the utilisation of Fields gas and refinery gas, that
in conducting such research work the aspect of ultimate monetary value to the Company
must not be lost sight of, nor should ‘long distance research’ be allowed to prejudice the
prosecution of researches of more immediate commercial utility.80

The prioritization of the AIOC’s profitability with respect to Iranian natural gas,
manifested in late 1938 as a desire to “maintain a balance between immediate and longdistance research,” was a theme that would come to define the company’s relationship to
Iran and its natural gas resources.81 In the decades that would follow, the AIOC would
play a nearly continual game of finding ways to resist increasingly strident demands by
the Iranian government that something be done with the vast quantities of associated gas
the company was lifting. Animating that resistance was the simple hierarchy of concerns
articulated by Baron Cadman in the Britannic House meeting: that whatever good might
come of increased gas utilization in Iran, for the AIOC and its leadership only those
courses of action that could be directly shown to be beneficial to the Company would be
pursued. Everything else was secondary.
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***
With the coming of the Second World War, the AIOC’s efforts to find new outlets
for Iran’s gas largely came to a halt.82 By early 1944, however, work began to pick back
up, with much of it focused on the potential of using Iranian gas for the production of
petrochemicals. Foremost among those was carbon black, an industrial product composed
of ultrafine particles used as a pigment and as a reinforcing agent in rubber products.
Though production of the substance was raised as a possibility in 1938, at the time the
price of the product was considered to be far too low to be a reasonable outlet for Iran’s
gas.83 Interest among AIOC officials was reignited in early 1944 after a representative of
the Cabot Company, an American chemical manufacturer, inquired about possibility of
purchasing 50 mcf/d of Iranian natural gas to supply a potential carbon black plant to be
established in the country. While tentative discussions in late 1943 were not productive,
by early 1944 an impending post-war shortage of carbon black in the United Kingdom
had changed minds. Cabot had already attempted to find a location for their new plant in
the United States, but legal restrictions in Texas prevented the use of low-sulfur gas for
the production of carbon black. Mexico had likewise proved unsatisfactory due to an
insufficient supply of gas and the distance from expected markets. In approaching the
AIOC, Cabot offered to pay for the gas used via fixed rates or with some 25 percent of
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the value of carbon black produced.84 The low price of gas in Iran and its relative
proximity to potential markets made Iran a potentially attractive locale for Cabot, and it
was noted that
on the indication…that waste gas in Perisa [sic] might be available at a very low price
Cabot considered that on what he has learned of probable Persian costs a plant there
would be competitive in Eastern markets with plants in Texas. Markets in India, Australia
and South Africa now supplied under lend-lease would take production of small plant or
substantial portion of production of plant large enough to be economic.85

Despite Cabot’s confidence, AIOC officials felt that “there does not seem to be much
money in the project as it has been propounded to us.”86 Nonetheless, they undertook a
thorough examination of the proposal, and after studying costs of operations of American
carbon black plants, they “concluded that Iran should be in a good position to produce
carbon black and withstand somewhat greater transport charges than U.S.A. product.”87
Further, rather than selling gas to an independent manufacturer like Cabot, company
officials eventually decided that it would be “best” for the AIOC to own and operate their
own carbon black facility in Iran, paying Cabot for their designs and expertise.88 While
there was some concern within Cabot that their marketing of carbon black produced by
the AIOC would run afoul of the company’s sale quota under the Webb-Pomerene Act—
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a 1918 American law exempting some goods and their export associations from antitrust
regulations—and that their profits might be diminished should they be forced to reduce
their own production, Cabot declared to the AIOC if the company “could be assured of a
modest profit” they “would be satisfied.”89
The enquiries of the Cabot Company and others like it into the possibility of
establishing a carbon black manufactory in Iran highlighted the importance of geography
and geology to any efforts to use Iranian gas. One interested party, a company named
P.A.W., saw gas as being easier to transport than carbon black itself, and suggested
piping natural gas directly from the Pāzanān (Pazanun) oil field to a carbon black plant to
be erected in the port city of Māhshur (today Bandar-e Māhshahr).90 The AIOC
considered the proposal to be feasible should a “suitable location on [a] level site” be
found “near deep water loading” at the port.91 Better still, the AIOC determined,
considering the length of time it would take to build a pipeline and carbon black plant,
would be to wait for gas to become available at Āghā Jāri “where additional advantage
would exist in that multi-stage separation [of gas from oil] would facilitate selection of
the most suitable gas.”92 This course of action was complicated, however, by shifts in the
project’s urgency. Though the production of carbon black in Iran had originally been
conceived as a post-war project due to existing stockpiles being considered sufficient, the
U.K. War Production Department soon deemed the potential shortage far more pressing
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and asked that the establishment of plants be considered in Russia and Iran due to their
large reserves of natural gas.93 If carbon black production was to thus begin in Iran, it
became critical to choose between using the gas currently being vented into the
atmosphere at Pāzanān or the delayed but ultimately more controlled option of processed
natural gas from Āghā Jāri.
The significance of being able to choose “suitable gas” lay in the need to avoid
high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide—H2S—in any gas used to produce carbon black.
Formed by the decay of organic matter in oxygen-free environments and smelling
strongly of spoiled eggs, hydrogen sulfide is an extremely toxic, corrosive, and
flammable gas that occurs in varying quantities as part of petroleum and natural gas.
Natural gas bearing high amounts of hydrogen sulfide, so-called “sour” gas, was
potentially damaging to piping and other equipment, and waste gases from carbon black
plants using such gas would contain much higher concentrations of polluting and
hazardous sulfur oxides.94 AIOC officials considered it ideal that any gas used for carbon
black manufacture contain at most 0.1 percent H2S content by volume, an amount few
Iranian sources of gas could meet naturally. They expressed frequent concern over the
hydrogen sulfide content of available gas, and produced numerous reports on the
compositions of various gas sources were communicated. Levels varied significantly
between fields, sometimes even between gas produced in association with crude oil and
that trapped within gas domes. At Masjid-i Sulaymān, associated gas was eleven percent
93
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hydrogen sulfide and dome gas four percent, while at White Oil Springs both sources
contained almost no H2S at all.95 Pāzanān’s hydrogen sulfide levels were measured as
0.024 and 0.046 percent at two separate well heads, well within the requirements for
carbon black production.96 Āghā Jāri, however, posed a significant problem for the
envisioned carbon black scheme, for its hydrogen sulfide content was measured to be
0.29 percent, far higher than the desired level of 0.1 percent.97 Any gas produced at Āghā
Jāri would thus need to be desulfurized, and within the AIOC there continued to be
extensive debate as to which source of gas—Āghā Jāri or Pāzanān—was preferable.
While sending Pāzanān gas to a carbon black manufactory at Māhshur was
seriously considered, by the summer of 1945 it had been decided that the proper course of
action would be to site the new plant at Āghā Jāri and wait for the necessary gas
treatment facilities to be constructed as well. Not only was Māhshur “very well inside the
dust nuisance area of the Persian Gulf,” but also construction of the plant at Āghā Jāri, to
be manned by a staff of six British managers and 70 to 80 “native staff,” would require
significantly less capital outlay. AIOC officials argued that

on the assumption that the railway from Agha Jari to Mashur is definitely going ahead,
and will, presumably, be completed before the Carbon Black Plant could be operating,
the Agha Jari proposal would eliminate 40 miles of 12” pipe at an approximate cost of
£200,000, against which provision would have to be made for 30 trucks and 1 locomotive
to be added to the railway rolling stock at a cost of about £25,000.98
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Beyond the ability to piggyback on already-planned infrastructure, the physical proximity
of a plant to the Āghā Jāri field would allow any new carbon black plant to gain further
efficiency by utilizing the natural pressurization of gas lying deep beneath the earth. A
“site adjacent to the source of the gas supply,” it was noted, “would enable us to utilise
the gas pressure for power generation in accordance to our usual practice.”99 Despite the
added benefit of inexpensive power generation, the high sulfur content of the gas at Āghā
Jāri continued to bedevil AIOC plans for a carbon black plant. In May 1946 it was
reported that any gas used had “to be reasonably sulphur-free, at…0.03% hydrogen
sulphide,” a level even lower than the 0.1 percent expressed in prior years. Nor was
hydrogen sulfide the only contaminant of concern; carbon dioxide levels, particularly in
“relative proportion” to hydrogen sulfide, were not only significant but also difficult to
accurately measure. In any case, while it was expected that any carbon black plant could
be “built on conventional lines,” the “matter of gas desulphurization” continued to need
“special investigation both technically and economically.”100
In the end, the AIOC never did elect to go ahead with the construction of a carbon
black plant in Iran. Despite a continual need to find avenues for the “disposal of Fields
gas,” by the summer of 1947 it was decided that a “shortage of steel, dollars and
construction capacity in Persia would weigh against the installation of carbon black
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manufacturing in Iran in the immediate future.”101 More importantly, however, the
construction of the plant was seen as largely superfluous to the production and export of
oil, the primary task of the AIOC. “With the very large programme [for oil production]
we have in front us,” F.G.C. Morris, a managing director for the Company, wrote, “we
should not want, from the commercial standpoint alone, to divert time and effort to the
construction of a carbon black plant.” It was only for “concessional reasons, relative to
the use of gas,” or for “reason of [British] national need,” that the manufacture of carbon
black should be considered.102 A final decision was made in the spring of 1949 when it
was decided that considering the “grave limitations on the supplies of iron and steel and
other raw materials” as well as the shortage of “technical personnel,” the Company’s
“materials and manpower are best concentrated on oil projects which are more profitable
and more important.” Thus, despite the fact that the

large-scale production of chemicals and carbon black has, from time to time, been
considered by the Company, but at present it appears best from the Company’s point of
view, and, indeed, from a [British] National point of view, that the main objective of the
Company should be the production, refining and transport of more oil.103

Combined with enduring “uncertainty regarding the Company’s concessionary position
in the case of the export of chemicals,” the pursuit of carbon black was seen as both
superfluous and damaging to the AIOC’s pursuit of its primary mission.104 Manifested
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through the consideration and ultimate rejection of the production of carbon black in Iran
was the AIOC’s fundamental position regarding Iranian natural gas: that AIOC and
British national interests would dictate the extent to which gas would be utilized. Despite
its potential use as both a source of energy and as a raw material for the petrochemical
industry, Iranian natural gas was seen as a distraction and a potential drain on resources
more profitably, and importantly, dedicated to the production and export of oil.
Regardless of the fact that enormous quantities of Iran’s natural resources were being
lost, the AIOC would only consider utilizing gas in circumstances where they could be
assured both profit and a minimum of disruption to existing plans. Far from being
confined to the use of gas for the manufacture of carbon black or petrochemicals more
generally, the AIOC’s subordination of natural gas use to other concerns would strongly
shape the trajectory of Iranian gas use in the decades to come.

***
Employees of firms like Cabot and Anglo-Iranian were not the only ones
evaluating potential uses for Iran’s gas in the years after the Second World War.
Beginning shortly after the end of the war and continuing for many years, officials of the
Iranian government sought to apply sustained pressure to the AIOC in order to prompt
them to find productive outlets for the gas they produced. Going far beyond a narrow
focus on the production of petrochemicals, Iranian officials sought to quickly leverage
natural gas in any feasible manner. In February 1946, representatives from the Iranian
Ministry of Finance wrote to the AIOC to ask that the company begin work to make gas
utilization a reality, prompted by a missive from the Irrigation Company of Shushtar that
68

described a scheme whereby the company was “prepared to defray the expenses of laying
a pipe for the conveyance of oil gases from M.I.S. to Shushtar, so that they may be used
as fuel for the inhabitant instead of being wasted.” The letter went on to address the
utilization of Iranian gas more broadly, saying that

now that the war has been finished, the utilization of oil gases should, in principle, be
exposed to quick and fundamental investigations and measures. These gases may be
conveyed by pipes to neighbouring towns to be used as fuel by the inhabitants, or they
may be used in the localities of origin for the generation of electric power, which could
be conveyed to the neighbouring cities and boroughs. Finally and alternatively, the gases
may be returned to the oil wells.105

Asking that a “committee of experts…study the matter,” the Iranian Ministry of Finance
made it clear that finding ways to use or preserve Iran’s natural gas was an important
national objective for the country’s postwar years.
The centrality of natural gas to official Iranian thinking was reinforced by
consultants hired to formulate and recommend courses of action for Iran’s national
development. In the summer of 1947, the Morrison-Knudsen International Company
submitted its Report on Program for the Development of Iran, a 320-page account of the
“resources and facilities of Iran” as well as recommendations for the “practical, orderly
procedure toward improvement and development” of the country.106 An American civil
engineering and construction company with experience working on projects like the
Hoover Dam and the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, Morrison-Knudsen had been
contracted by the Iranian government in December 1946 to quickly investigate and draw
105
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up projects for potential funding from the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.107 In total the company submitted an estimated $1,250,000,000 worth of
development programs, an amount they “deemed sufficient for the present.”108 Sensitive
to the financial realities that faced the Iranian government and their need to finance the
projects via loans, however, the company also submitted two variations that costed
$500,000,000 and $250,000,000 respectively. All three of Morrison-Knudsen’s proposed
programs touched upon nearly every aspect of Iranian society, from agriculture and
industry to communications, transportation, and education. Crucial to their vision was the
provision of “more and cheaper” fuel within Iran, necessary to “stimulate its industries
and promote the comfort and health” of Iranians. In the late 1940s, Iranian industry
largely used coal, a resource in short supply in the country, or oil, a comparatively
expensive fuel. Most individual residents used “straw, weeds, or animal dung” due to a
scarcity of wood in most regions and an inability to afford the relatively expensive fossil
fuels.109 While Morrison-Knudsen proposed reducing the cost of oil fuels by largely
replacing the existing system of rail transport between Iran’s southern fields and its major
population centers farther north with a system of oil pipelines,110 they deemed the most
potential as laying within Iran’s natural gas reserves.
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As was already well-understood by the Iranian government, some 120,000,000
cubic feet of gas was being produced every day in Iran “coincident with and inseparable
from the production of petroleum.”111 Because “natural gas produced in Iran must be
used in Iran or wasted,” meaning that it could not be “stored or shipped elsewhere,”
continuing to rely on oil fuels instead of the available gas would make the country’s fuel
supply more costly, as the “true cost of the fuel will be the cost of the oil plus the value of
the equivalent amount of natural gas wasted.”112 Iranian gas, highly variable in terms of
its hydrogen sulfide content, had previously been thought of little value due to the
difficulty of purifying it economically. New purification processes, however, had
changed the equation, and the experience of the United States had shown that longdistance, high-pressure pipelines could deliver gas at competitive rates to consumers.113
Morrison-Knudsen thus envisioned a $70.83 million system that, fifteen years in the
future, would serve some 2 million people by producing, purifying, and transporting
approximately 118,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day. Collected in the oil fields of
Khuzestān, the gas would be purified close to the point of extraction before being
injected into pipelines running to cities like Dezful, Ārāk, Qom, Tehran, Isfahan, and
Shiraz.114 Though an actual system of natural gas fuel would require the construction of
pipe distribution systems in Iran’s cities and the provision of gas appliances to
consumers, Morrison-Knudsen argued that gas and the infrastructures used to move it
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would be a “tremendous stimulus to [Iranian] industry, and to the improvement of living
conditions of a large part of the population.” 115
Morrison-Knudsen’s program was adapted and adopted by the Iranian
government, forming the basis of the country’s First Seven-Year Development Plan,
ratified by the Majlis in February 1949. Though the entirety of Iran’s oil revenues was
earmarked in support of the program, the first plan was largely derailed by the need to
establish and staff the Plan Organization, the independent government department
charged with overseeing Iran’s developmental programs, and the crisis sparked by
Muhammad Mossadeq’s oil industry nationalization in 1951.116 Despite this turn of
events, the general contours of the natural gas system sketched out by Morrison-Knudsen
would endure over the following decades, sustained by continued interest in the largescale exploitation of natural gas by Iranian government officials.
Supported by the findings of consultants like Morrison-Knudsen, the Iranian
government pressured Anglo-Iranian to facilitate an effort to exploit the associated gas
that the company was producing. Anglo-Iranian officials felt that pressure and worked to
resist it by emphasizing, sometimes to the point of distortion, both the ways that the
AIOC was already making use of gas and what they understood to be the uneconomical
nature of many Iranian hopes. Noting Morrison-Knudsen’s recommendation for a crosscountry natural gas system in Iran, AIOC officials became concerned about their ability
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to avoid costly gas projects over the long term. Writing in September 1947, a Company
official worried that the

demand for a supply of gas for industrial and domestic uses in various towns in Iran will
obviously become more insistent as time goes on. Although we many hold the view that
practical issues concerning the distribution of gas in the towns and its safe use by
domestic consumers render the use of gas on a scale which would justify the piped supply
extremely doubtful, it will be difficult to continue to ignore such demands on these
grounds without practical experience to back up our arguments.117

Such projects, if undertaken, would likely be costly for the AIOC, as the

laying of trunk gas lines would be an expensive matter and one which would be
undertaken without the assurance of a substantial gas market; it is unlikely that the
Company would be able to avoid incurring expenditure in connection with them in some
form or another.118

In response to this dilemma, AIOC officials considered undertaking a small and
carefully selected project of consumer gas distribution in order to obtain the “practical
experience” necessary to argue against larger programs in the future. Proposed was a
project to supply gas to Ahvāz, a large town some forty miles from the Anglo-Iranianoperated White Oil Springs field. In September 1947 it was expected that soon
approximately 200 million cubic feet of gas would be produced per day in the field, most
of which would be burned in flares large enough to be visible from the city.119 A plan to
supply Ahvāz was attractive to AIOC officials, as there was the possibility of
piggybacking off a gas pipeline already being considered for the company’s own needs at
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Kut Abdullah, and it was felt that consumption in Ahvāz could be “accommodated in the
line without [further] capital expenditure.”120 The great difficulty of the proposal,
however, was building a distribution network. There was a great deal of uncertainty in
even so basic a question as the number of potential consumers let alone what would
actually be required in order convert existing facilities to use gas.121 Despite the proposal
being revived in November 1950,122 it was never implemented and Ahvāz would not see
gas service until the early 1970s.
Despite such resistance from Anglo-Iranian, the Iranian government continued to
apply pressure to the company and it, in turn, sought ways to best resist such efforts. In
the summer of 1948, in response to further enquiries from the Iranian government
regarding the production of natural gas and “instances of gas being utilised by [the]
Company’s installations and the amount utilised,” AIOC officials discussed how to best
frame their responses.123 At issue were so-called “flow sheets,” detailed accountings of
field and separator gas production at various pressures and the ultimate utilization or
disposal of the gas as it flowed through the production and refining facilities.124 While the
Company could submit flow sheets to the Iranian government in response to their

120

Letter from J.M. Pattinson to I.M. Jones, “Supply of Gas to Ahwaz Town,” 1.

121

Ibid., 2.

Letter from J.M. Pattinson to L.C. Rice, “Cement Manufacture and Gas Distribution in Iran,” no
document number, 23 November 1950, Iran – Cement Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of
Gas.
122

Memorandum from H.W. Lane to L.C. Rice, “Government Enquiry,” HWL/370, 4 June 1948,
Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948.
123

For examples see the attached flow sheets to Memorandum from Waters to Lane, “Natural Gas-Iranian
Government Enquiry,” DC/JFW/605, 1 June 1948, Production 15th January 1946 to 15th September 1948.
124

74

requests, it was feared that they were “very difficult to understand and would…only lead
to further enquiries,” something that employees of the AIOC sought to avoid.125
Preferable in their opinion was to report “instances of utilisation in a generalised form,”
an approach that would enable both narrow interpretations of the Iranian enquiries and
the opportunity to rectify any disagreements in the data submitted. In June 1948, for
example, an AIOC employee noted in his report on gas utilization that “dome gas
production has been excluded as not coming within the scope of the enquiry as worded”
and that
tail gas…[like that from the] topping and skimming plants at M.I.S. has also been
excluded. This gas was excluded from previous returns to the Iranian Government. Such
returns were submitted from 1934 to 1940 inclusive, and care has been taken to ensure
agreement between the figures now given and those previously submitted.126

In the end, flow diagrams were indeed withheld and AIOC officials instead quoted
figures for the “actual utilisation consumptions,” opting to manipulate the flow of
information in an effort to manage the potential responses of the Iranian government.127
Anglo-Iranian’s effort to both control access to information regarding the amounts
of gas produced and consumed and head off further enquiries from the Iranian
government was part of a larger effort on the part of the AIOC to portray the company as
utilizing Iranian natural gas to the greatest reasonable extent. The same company officials
wrote that it “should be appreciated that the method of multistage gas separation and
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crude stabilisation employed in our high pressure fields”—a process developed by the
AIOC in the Haft Kel oil field whereby the hydrocarbon gases dissolved in crude oil were
released in a staged and controlled manner in order to increase the amount of recoverable
natural gasoline128—“substantially reduced the amount of gas actually produced in these
fields and thus constitutes indirectly a utilisation of the gas contained in the crude.”129
This form of conservation was one rooted both in the geology of petroleum fields and the
choices that Anglo-Iranian officials made when lifting oil to the surface. While the
significant volumes of gas dissolved within the oil of petroleum reservoirs are
unavoidably extracted alongside any produced oil, non-dissolved natural gas can also be
lifted if aggressive production practices are employed. In the postwar years, those
aggressive practices involved the lifting of dome gas by producing too near the gas-oil
line, and, more significantly for AIOC operations, “flowing wells at such a rate that gas is
produced from produced reservoir crude [sic], resulting in a loss of natural energy and
possibly of ultimate recovery.”130 For oil to be lifted from underground reservoirs there
must be a significant difference in pressure at the surface and within a reservoir, a
pressure differential tied directly to the amount of natural gas residing within the
reservoir both in solution and within the gas dome. In other words, in gas-driven oil
wells, production is dependent on gas remaining within the ground as it is the motivating
force that drives oil up well shafts. By tapping reservoirs too near the oil-gas line or
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producing oil at too quick a rate, more natural gas is brought to the surface than is
necessary to move the oil to the surface, thereby, over the long term, reducing the amount
of oil that can be recovered from the field. In light of this, Anglo-Iranian had often
chosen to produce oil at a more measured pace, opting to preserve the ability to produce
oil over longer periods of time in place of greater short-term productivity.131
The choice to use production practices in Iranian oil fields that improved the longterm productive health of the reservoirs was something repeatedly highlighted within
AIOC correspondence. Company employees reported that by

virtue of our producing practice, both in regard to reservoir control and in regard to
individual wells, producing gas oil ratios never exceed the gas originally in solution in
the crude actually produced, in contradistinction to the majority of oil fields where
producing gas oil ratios are greatly in excess of such dissolved gas.132

“This in itself may be claimed to be a measure of gas conservation,” they wrote, as it
“follows from this that when the bulk of the recoverable crude reserves have been
produced, the bulk of the gas reservoirs will remain.”133 Indeed, Anglo-Iranian officials
reported that in 1947 the multistage gas separation and stabilization process resulted in
some 5,000 million cubic feet of associated gas, approximately 14 percent of the
otherwise expected total of 35,668 million cubic feet, remaining unproduced at Masjid-e
Sulaymān and Haft Kel. A further 12,748.26 million cubic feet of gas, roughly 36
percent, was used by the AIOC for a combination of refinery operations, “industrial fuel”
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(electricity generation, furnaces, etc.) and “domestic uses” (including fuel for “heating,
cooling, cooking” and more) at the two fields, leaving nearly 18,000 million cubic feet of
produced gas unused. This was a narrow perspective, however, as Masjid-e Sulaymān
and Heft Kel were not the only operating oil fields being operated by the AIOC in 1947,
and in 1947 the company produced another 49,410 million cubic feet of natural gas at
Naft Sefid (3,965 million cubic feet), Gachsārān (6,587 million cubic feet), and Āghā Jāri
(38,858 million cubic feet). None of the gas produced at the latter three fields was put to
productive use, meaning that some 67,329 million cubic feet of natural gas,
approximately 84 percent of the total, was flared or vented to the atmosphere for no
economic gain. In their reporting to the Iranian government, AIOC officials sought to
downplay the fact that so much unutilized gas had been produced, writing that since the
“Agha Jari, Gach Saran, and Naft Safid oilfields are still in the course of development,
figures given for utilisation of gas would only be misleading.”134
AIOC officials were well aware of just what was being lost when such gas was
not put to use. “Surplus gas production…[at] Agha Jari burnt to waste during 1947 could
have replaced Abadan’s liquid fuel consumption more than twice over,” Comins wrote,
“490,241 tons [of liquid fuel] which could have been replaced by 50 m.c.ft/day of gas.”
Looking beyond the petroleum industry, he also noted that the “Karun [River] mean
annual flow [of] about 25,000 million tons [of water],” an important part of an ongoing
irrigation project, “could be lifted 50 feet by utilising about half a million tons/year (50 to
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60 m.c.ft/day) of surplus gas production, now burnt to waste.”135 For AIOC officials,
more important than finding uses for the associated gas they were producing was
resisting the pressure the Iranian government was applying. Motivated by concerns
regarding costs and resource allocation, AIOC officials framed facts and figures of gas
production and exploitation in such a manner as to paint Anglo-Iranian as having made
reasonable efforts to use as much natural gas as was technically and economically
feasible.136 In this way, the fundamentally business choices that were made in the halls of
Britannic House and the managerial offices of Ābādān were imbued with the seeming
concreteness of fact while being nonetheless deeply reflective of the commercial
priorities of the company. In viewing natural gas largely through the lens of oil
extraction, AIOC managers subordinated it to oil and obscured its distinct economic
potential for Iran. In their view, gas was a marginally useful byproduct of the operations
undertaken in support of the company’s central oil export mission, an understanding that
rendered gas functionally invisible. Far from incidental, this deliberate unseeing of gas
was crucial to maintaining the low overhead costs needed to furnish cheap oil to foreign
markets. Company managers were theoretically amenable to the idea of gas utilization
with Iran, but only so long as it asked nothing of their company and its customers.
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***
Despite the resistance of Anglo-Iranian to an increased utilization of natural gas,
the Iranian government maintained a steady commitment to the prospect. In August 1948,
the Iranian Minister of Finance wrote to the AIOC, saying that an inspector they had
dispatched to study the question of gas utilization in Khuzestān had submitted a report on
the potential use of gas in Ābādān. In his work the inspector found that the characteristics
of Āghā Jāri’s gas rendered it particularly suitable for transportation to Ābādān for use as
fuel and, crucially, the natural pressures found in the reservoir were sufficiently high to
be able move it via pipeline to Ābādān without the added expense of building and
maintaining compressors along the line. The gas was of very high quality as it contained
an extremely low percentage of sulfur, enabling the gas to be purified at relatively little
expense. All told, the inspector estimated that the city could be supplied with some 48
million cubic feet of gas, an amount roughly equal to 475,000 tons of oil fuel per year.
More importantly, he saw the project as being an easy one to implement in ways that
went beyond the characteristics of the gas itself. While the distance between Āghā Jāri
and Ābādān was nearly 100 miles, itself not a terribly long way in the inspector’s
opinion, the 12-inch gas pipeline would run through a region “where no natural obstacles
exist” and could follow the existing track that had already been laid for oil pipes.137
In light of the inspector’s findings, the Ministry of Finance declared that because
the “scheme seems practicable and useful…it is appropriate that you [the AIOC] should
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study it as soon as possible.”138 The Ministry of Finance buttressed their request by
referring to two articles of the 1933 concession agreement between Iran and the AngloIranian Oil Company. In particular, Article 12 of the concession agreement stated that
the Company [AIOC]…shall employ all means customary and proper, to ensure economy
in and good returns from its operations, preserve the deposits of petroleum and to exploit
its Concession by methods in accordance with the latest scientific progress.139

Reinforcing their position, the Ministry also referred to Article 16 wherein the two parties
had agreed to maintain the “highest degree of efficiency and of economy in the
administration and operation of the Company in Persia.”140 In invoking the concession
agreement in this way, the Iranian government underlined the commitment that the AIOC
had made to both exploit and preserve Iran’s petroleum, a resource defined as “crude oil,
natural gases, asphalt, ozokerite” and any products derived from them,141 seeking to
pressure the company into finding ways to exploit the large volumes of associated gas
they were producing and wasting.
As it was, the AIOC had already considered using gas from Āghā Jāri at the
Ābādān refinery. In October 1946 the company’s refinery division reported that Ābādān
required more fuel than was available from excess gas separated at the refinery, a need
that was being met via the use of fuel oil. Motivating the AIOC’s consideration of the

138

Ibid., 2.

“Convention Concluded between the Imperial Government of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, Limited, at Tehran on 29th April 1933,” Article 12, paragraph A.
139

“Convention Concluded between the Imperial Government of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, Limited, at Tehran on 29th April 1933,” Article 12, paragraph I.
140

“Convention Concluded between the Imperial Government of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, Limited, at Tehran on 29th April 1933,” Definitions-“Petroleum.”
141

81

prospect was the potential to put the fuel oil then being used in the Ābādān refinery’s
operations for sale on the market.142 With Ābādān’s liquid fuel consumption having
nearly quadrupled between 1938 and 1947,143 AIOC officials estimated that by 1952 the
refinery would be consuming some 600,000 tons of fuel oil per year, an amount they
estimated could be replaced by 60 million cubic feet of gas per day. Nor were these
calculations entirely theoretical. In December 1950, in response to queries regarding the
actual need for increased fuel oil on the market, AIOC officials reported that the “oil is
wanted” and that “indications are that we shall be very tight on Fuel Oil throughout 1951
and we are, in fact, at the present time having to decline business.”144 This was an
important point, for the ability of Anglo-Iranian to sell more oil was crucial to their
willingness to truly consider the project.
In the spring of 1948, approval was given to build a gas dehydration plant in order
to test the best methods for supplying gas from Āghā Jāri to Ābādān. Questions
nonetheless remained about where such a plant might find real use. The Iranian
government had suggested placing it the Naft Sefid field in order to supply gas to Kut
Abdullāh, Ahvāz, and Bibiān, but the AIOC deemed those sites to either require too little
gas or require more steel than was available.145 Indeed, the major limit on the proposal
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was not debates over siting or feasibility, but an insufficient supply of material. Though
the company reported in late 1948 that it was indeed possible to deliver gas to Ābādān via
a 12-inch pipe, and further claimed that “Southern Area development schemes have
always included a gas line to Abadan to supply works fuel,” it also took the position that
due to an insufficient supply of line pipe the project could not be completed before the
early 1950s.146 Company officials, at a meeting with representatives of the Iranian
government in October 1948, nonetheless informed their counterparts that the refinery
was “perhaps the best outlet” for gas, and while there were as yet no concrete plans due
to the “shortage of steel and the question of making the most advantageous use of such
steel as we can get,” had “admitted…agreement in principle to establishing a scheme for
this in due time.”147 As it was, line pipe needed to be shipped from the U.K. where
production was “limited by availability of steel supplies and manufacturing capacity.”148
Despite AIOC officials believing that the pipeline would be completed by the
close of 1950,149 and continued pressure from the Iranian government to not only use gas
in the refinery but to also supply Ābādān and other nearby cities via the same pipeline,150
the project never came to fruition. By December 1950 the proposal to build a new gas
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line from Āghā Jāri to Ābādān was largely shelved in favor of modifying existing oil
pipelines to also be able to carry natural gas.151 Further, with the onset of the 1951-1953
Iranian oil nationalization crisis, all mention the of project ceased. Crucial to this episode,
however, was not whether a line between Āghā Jāri and Ābādān was ever built, but the
fundamental orientations of the Iranian government and the AIOC towards Iran’s natural
gas resources that were reflected in their respective positions. For the Iranian
government, the gas that was being produced in the Khuzestān fields had intrinsic value
that was being wasted. Officials like those working within the Ministry of Finance thus
sought to pressure Anglo-Iranian to find productive outlets for what they considered to be
an important national resource. The AIOC, in turn, while never disputing the idea that
Iran’s natural gas possessed value, continued to prioritize the functioning of its oil export
operations. In the view of company officials, replacing fuel oil consumption with gas at
the Ābādān refinery was worthwhile only in that it enabled the company to accept and
meet the demands of greater business opportunities. The reluctance of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company to embrace fully the exploitation of gas would strongly shape the history of
gas in Iran, compelling Iranian officials to assume responsibility for exploitation of their
country’s natural gas and, in the process, helping to imbue the resource with notions of
economic nationalism and sovereign development.

***
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Far from marking an end to the issue of Iranian gas utilization, the 1950s were a
crucial moment of conception for it as broader developments shook the country’s
political structures and relationships with the outside world. In the late 1940s a coalition
of diverse political groups known as the National Front was formed under the leadership
of Muhammad Mosaddeq, a politician of considerable tenure and experience. United by
an opposition to foreign influence within Iran, the group focused its efforts on the AngloIranian Oil Company and its control of the country’s petroleum resources. Despite taking
considerable profits from its operations in Iran, over the years the AIOC had consistently
failed to live up to its revenue-sharing agreements with the Iranian government and
subjected Iranian workers to low wages and poor working conditions. Rather than reform,
the National Front sought the wholesale nationalization of the Iranian oil industry as a
means of asserting the country’s independence, an articulation of economic nationalism
that reflected deep roots of opposition to foreign economic intervention going back to the
Qājār era.
Beginning with the 1813 Treaty of Gulistān that ended the first Russo-Persian
War, the nineteenth century saw the increasingly active efforts of the Russian and British
empires to shape Iranian affairs for their own respective advantages. By the last quarter
of the century, many Iranians had begun to mount increasingly fierce resistance to the
state of affairs, notching a notable success in 1873 when Nāser al-Din Shah rescinded the
concession he had granted to the British businessman Julius de Reuter that had given him
permission to build a railway between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf as well as a
seventy-year monopoly on all resource extraction in the country. More significant was
the Tobacco Protest, in which a broad swath of Iranian society came together in 1890 to
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oppose the granting of a monopoly concession to another British businessman, Gerald
Talbot, for the production, sale, and export of tobacco. Though the economic significance
of the tobacco concession was likely to be far less than that granted to Reuters nearly two
decades prior, it both threatened a significant source of income for a great number of
Iranian landowners, farmers, and shopkeepers and wrested away control of a product that
many Iranians enjoyed in their daily lives. In response to a national boycott of tobacco
that was incited by a fatwa declaring tobacco consumption unlawful so long as its
production was controlled by outsiders, the concession was eventually rescinded in early
1892, an outcome that cheered its opponents but left the Iranian government in
considerable debt to Talbot.
Much more than the earlier resistance to the Reuters concession, the Tobacco
Protest helped spur notions of economic nationalism broadly within Iran. During the
period, many Iranians began to view the presence foreign businessmen and the increasing
exposure of the Iranian economy to the global marketplace as dire threats to the country’s
independence. Among the many opponents of the concessions, Iran was seen to be on the
losing end of a series of unequal relationships that promised a seemingly unending period
of exploitation and weakness. Responding to the continued granting of sizeable
concessions by the Qājār kings in the years after the Tobacco Protest, particularly the
D’Arcy oil concession, sentiments of economic nationalism helped spur the 1905
Constitutional Revolution and its demand for the curtailment of the power of Iran’s
monarchs to make concessionary agreements. Ironically, the revolution’s turmoil and the
considerable weakening of Iran’s central government in its wake opened the door to a
stronger British and Russian presence and the division of the country into their respective
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spheres of influence in 1907. Though Iranians were not united in opposition to a foreign
presence in the country—at least some saw deepened relationships with foreign powers
as helping Iran modernize and develop in much needed ways—such events helped
cement the importance of economic nationalism in Iranian politics. Despite rising to
power with at least the tacit acceptance of the British Empire, in 1932 Rezā Shah
unilaterally canceled and sought to renegotiate the original D’Arcy concession, aiming to
extract a greater share of the profits from the APOC. Negotiating from a position of
weakness, however, Iranian officials only managed to raise their country’s share of the
profits from 16 to 20 percent in return for a 32-year extension of the concession to 1961.
Rezā Shah’s focus on petroleum would prove to be no aberration and in later decades
foreign control of the lucrative sector would continue to be a focal point of the desire of
many Iranians to break free of outside influence.152
With the forced abdication of Rezā Shah in 1941 in the wake of a combined
British and Soviet invasion of the country, Muhammad Rezā Shah ascended to the
throne. Perceived as weak and inexperienced, the early years of Muhammad Rezā Shah’s
reign were marked by considerable political turmoil and a gradual strengthening of forces
advocating for domestic control of Iran’s natural resources. With such demands
intensifying and the National Front becoming the predominant bloc in parliament, in
April 1951 the Shah named Mosaddeq to the position of Prime Minister. A bill
nationalizing Iran’s oil industry was then promptly passed and reluctantly signed by the
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king. Enormously popular within Iran, the move initiated a three-year period of conflict
with the United Kingdom and, eventually, the United States. Treating the Iranian action
as little better than theft, the British government imposed a series of economic sanctions
on Iran and prevented the sale of its oil on the world market. Though initially confident in
the indispensability of Iranian oil, the broad backing for the British boycott among the
nations of the industrialized world quickly began to cause considerable economic
difficulty in Iran, weakening Mosaddeq’s support and making him vulnerable to the
British- and American-backed 1953 coup d’état that would see his fall and the eventual
investment of considerable autocratic powers in Muhammad Rezā Shah.
Though the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry failed, in the wake of the crisis
the 1933 oil agreement signed by Rezā Shah was renegotiated and Iran gained important
new benefits. The 1954 Consortium Oil Agreement divided control of Iran’s oil industry
between the newly formed National Iranian Oil Company and a Consortium of firms that
included the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, renamed British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell,
and a number of smaller American companies. Crucial for Iran was the new 50-50 profit
sharing arrangement, by then the norm in the Middle East, that took the place of the
relatively low and easily manipulated per-barrel payments that the AIOC had been
making to the Iranian government.153 In a significant addition, the new agreement also
formalized Iran’s ownership over the country’s natural gas reserves and made explicit its
Coming in the wake of a crisis in the early 1930s that had seen the government of Rezā Shah attempt to
renegotiate the terms of its concession to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the 1933 Concession Agreement
had specified that the company’s royalty payments would be tied to the physical volume of oil produced
and dividends paid to the company’s shareholders. In the following years, the AIOC nonetheless worked to
keep both their account books closed and the Iranian government ignorant of the precise means by which
royalty calculations were made. For more see Katayoun Shafiee, Machineries of Oil: An Infrastructural
History of BP in Iran (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018), 104-111.
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right to both consume and export the resource. With this development, Iranian officials
quickly began to view gas as a potentially significant resource to be exploited, and by the
early 1960s had begun to describe expansive programs to do just that. In his opening
remarks for the Seminar on the Development and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources,
held in Tehran in early December 1964 under the auspices of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), Dr. Alinaghi Alikhāni, the
Iranian Minister of the Economy, presented natural gas as the region’s great hope for the
future. Speaking to delegates of the member nations and various inter- and nongovernmental organizations, Alikhāni warned that the booming populations of the
ECAFE countries meant that the limits of “traditional raw material resources” like fibers,
rubber, and even food were quickly being reached.154 To surpass those limits, new
sources of raw materials for industry and energy were needed. In Alikhāni’s view, natural
gas, heretofore largely unused, was poised to fulfill the ECAFE region’s growing needs.
Ambitious projects spanning thousands of miles would be needed, but so long as member
states embraced the “practical solutions” and “regional co-operation” that forums like the
1964 seminar were intended to promote, then their nascent efforts to exploit the potential
of natural gas could be maintained and expanded 155
That Alikhāni was chosen to give the symposium’s opening remarks was fitting.
Not only did Iran sit atop some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves, but by the mid-
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1960s it also stood on the cusp of launching a series of state-directed modernizing and
industrializing reforms that could conceivably be powered by the use of natural gas. Iran
was not alone in seeing great potential in natural gas use, and in the 1960s the ambitions
of the country’s officials blossomed alongside similar hopes around the world. Driven by
an explosion in the volume of the world’s proven gas reserves in the four years prior to
Alikhāni’s speech—from some 660 trillion to 1.6 quadrillion cubic feet, approximately
two-thirds of which was located in the Middle East156—states around the world began to
look to natural gas as both a raw material for the petrochemical industry and as a fuel
source. The 1964 symposium at which Alikhāni spoke itself grew out of a prior meeting
on petroleum resources that had been hosted in Tehran by the National Iranian Oil
Company and the Iranian government in September 1962, the first major discussion of
the issue at the international level.157 There, U Nyun, the Executive Secretary of ECAFE,
highlighted gas as “increasingly important to several countries of the region,” and over
fifty papers on the production, storage, transportation, or consumption of natural gas were
presented by delegations from within the ECAFE region and beyond.158 Participants
declared that the “new and substantial discoveries of natural gas in the ECAFE region, if
utilized adequately, would play a vital role in accelerating the economic development in
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the ECAFE countries,”159 and due to the “extreme importance” of finding ways to exploit
natural gas, they recommended that the U.N. Secretariat prepare a study of gas resources
and their potential uses in region, with particular attention given to potential joint
efforts.160 That work by ECAFE and the U.N. Bureau for Technical Assistance
Operations would form the basis of the 1964 summit.
A tone of urgency animated the discussion at both summits. Not only did
delegates see natural gas as having an enormous amount of potential to help their
countries, but at the time, nearly all known reserves were associated with oil deposits and
being depleted as a byproduct of oil production.161 As the NIOC and the Iranian Oil
Operating Companies noted in their joint report to the 1964 symposium,

since the solution gas is present and since it is an integral part of the oil, intimately mixed
and co-mingled with the oil, it must be produced if the oil is to be produced. In effect, ‘no
gas, no oil.’162

As the region’s largest oil and gas producer and with little progress having been made to
find economically viable uses for the country’s associated gas in the previous decades,
Iran faced the issue most acutely. In 1961, 88 percent (approximately 261,000 of 297,000
million cubic feet) of the gas produced in Iran was flared,163 a situation that persisted with
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87 percent (roughly 334,000 million cubic feet) being burned off in 1963.164 As was the
case in the late 1940s, finding economical outlets for Iran’s associated gas continued to
face significant obstacles in the early 1960s. Iran still did not possess a sufficient
industrial base or consumer distribution network to make use of significant volumes of
gas. The closest major market, Western Europe, was not a viable candidate for export.
George T. Ballou, Vice President of the Standard Oil Company of California and adviser
to the U.S. delegation, in his report to the 1964 seminar noted that

The basic problem facing utilization of the large volumes of natural gas in the great oil
producing areas of the Middle East is one of finding or developing a large market into
which the gas can be moved at cost low enough to compete with manufactured gas and
other fuels. Western Europe is already a large market for gas. But the Middle East is not
well placed to supply this area in competition with the huge natural gas reserves in North
Africa which are also pressing for market and with the newly-discovered big reserves in
The Netherlands.165

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had made this determination as well. In the early
1950s, responding to an extensive report from Bechtel International on the prospects of
supplying natural gas to Europe, company officials had considered constructing a natural
gas pipeline between southern Iran and Western Europe, aiming to deliver cheap gas to
consumers all across the region. Estimated to cost £274,000,000 and delivering some 1
billion cubic feet per day of natural gas, equivalent to some two-thirds of Europe’s daily
gas consumption in 1948, the pipeline would be connected to the existing municipal gas
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networks of European cities.166 Though gas heating and lighting became relatively
widespread in Europe during the first half of the 20th century, such systems employed socalled town or manufactured gas, largely derived from coal rather than natural gas
extracted directly from the earth. Such gas, produced in specialized facilities close to the
point of distribution, was economical only because coal was cheap and easy to transport.
Natural gas required large-diameter, long-distance pipelines for transport, and it was only
in the years after the Second World War that techniques were developed to enable their
construction through the kind of rough terrain that any pipelines from the Middle East to
Europe would need to traverse.167
Questions surrounding the plan’s technical feasibility was the only potential issue
for the project; equally significant were the geopolitical implications. Imagined as 780
miles of 34- or 36-inch pipe dotted with fifteen compressor stations of 20,000 horsepower
each, the economic feasibility of the project rested on the existence of very cheap gas—
production costs of “nil”— in Iran.168 Despite the project being deemed technically
“practicable,” there remained significant reservations. Most damning were geopolitical
risks and the attendant economic difficulties that might arise from them. Company
officials worried that the economic logic of the project might be undermined by “political
issues,” including the possibility that “embarrassing” “[land access] Royalties…will be
“Natural Gas to Europe: Economic Survey Estimate,” no document number, 30 May 1951, p. 3-4, Iran –
Cement Manufacture and Distribution and Utilisation of Gas (59791), BP Archive, University of Warwick.
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charged by the various governments over whose country the lines will pass.”169 Even
more alarming was the potential that in time

countries taking gas from the line will become more and more dependent upon regular
supplies and great disorganization and hardship could be caused if a country, relatively
near the source of supply, decided to hold the pipeline company to ransom for more
money. The time is not foreseeable when racial and political relations will be so amicable
and settled as to preclude such an event.170

Yet even more fatal to the project was the fact that the “fallacy of the scheme is that,
given a pipeline of this length and diameter, it could be used to much better advantage for
oil than for gas” in that a higher density of energy and money could be delivered to
Europe if oil was sent instead of gas.171 It was for such reasons that, in the end, the
project was never pursued, though similar proposals would be periodically floated over
the ensuing decades. Fundamentally, as was true within Iran itself, technical feasibility
was not always the primary determinant of whether natural gas projects were considered
viable. Engineering estimations were instead intertwined with political and business
decisions, in effect rendering Iran’s natural gas practically worthless for reasons that
often had little to do with what was technically feasible for it.

With vast quantities of associated natural gas being flared, largescale domestic
consumption years away from becoming a reality, and seemingly no realistic export
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prospects,172 Iranian officials working for the National Iranian Oil Company pursued the
idea of gas recycling. Referring to the reintroduction of extracted natural gas into a
petroleum reservoir, the practice enables both the boosting of petroleum reservoir
pressures—thereby increasing the amount of recoverable crude oil, something
particularly relevant toward the end of the useful life of an oil reservoir—and the
conservation of gas that would otherwise be vented or flared. For Iranian officials, either
use was better than the wasting of gas, but, as had long been the case, their ability to
promote the practice was sharply curtailed by their lack of control of the country’s oil
fields. Any Iranian efforts to make gas reinjection a reality would necessarily involve the
cooperation of companies like Anglo-Iranian. Despite this lack of control, Iranian
officials in the government and the NIOC succeeded in periodically prompting
companies like Anglo-Iranian/British Petroleum to evaluate the prospects of gas
reinjection in the decades after the Second World War.
For their part, the Consortium member companies generally opposed the prospect
as being uneconomical despite recognizing that the lack of a productive outlet for Iranian
gas meant that reinjection was the “only practical means of avoiding burning the greater
proportion of the gas [produced in Iran].”173 Anglo-Iranian itself had long studied the
prospect of reinjection. As early as the 1920s, company employees had begun to explore
172
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the idea as part of broader initiatives for the recycling back to reservoirs of excess oil and
oil products, itself motivated by desires on the part of the AIOC to reserve oil for sale in
times where global supply might be lower and prices higher.174 In order for such recycled
oil products to be reproduced in later years enough natural gas would also need to be
reinjected to prevent the overall pressure of the reservoir from dropping too low,
simultaneously “saving” the resource from “total loss to humanity.”175 Though the
benefits of gas recycling were apparent enough for the state of Texas to mandate that
high-value gases be reintroduced to reservoirs in 1935 to good effect,176 Anglo-Iranian
nonetheless continued to resist its implementation in Iran. In 1938, AIOC officials, at the
prompting of the Iranian government, once again considered the prospect of gas
reinjection, exploring the idea of reintroducing gas left over from refinery operations at
Ābādān into the Masjid-e Sulaymān and Haft Kel fields with an eye toward its future
utilization within Khuzestān. As would become common in the following years, AIOC
officials quickly focused on the difficult commercial prospects of the project, estimating
that the cost of reinjection and reproducing the gas, including royalty payments, pushed
174
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the potential sale price of the re-extracted gas too high to realistically find a market, some
33 percent higher than an equivalent amount of energy produced via hydroelectric means
that was chosen as a point of comparison. Thus, despite the plan’s technical feasibility,
the AIOC again opposed gas recycling, arguing that “there could be no possible
economic justification of repressuring for gas storage purposes.”177
Prospects for gas recycling were periodically reevaluated during the Second
World War,178 and in the postwar era the topic began to receive significant amounts of
attention from both the AIOC and the Iranian government. Concern for immediate
commercial feasibility rather than long term economic potential continued to drive
Anglo-Iranian’s approach to the question, causing its officials to again reject the prospect
of gas preservation for its own sake. Such was the position staked out in 1945 in an AIOC
report on the amount of proven recoverable crude in Iranian fields. Focused on the
Masjid-e Sulaymān oil field, the report’s author stated that

the general consensus of technical opinion at M.I.S. with regards to recycling of gas is
that…[the] efficiency of crude recovery would either remain the same or would be
somewhat reduced by gas recycling but would not be increased.
A policy of gas recycling would therefore be entirely for the purpose of
conservation. The justification of a heavy expenditure on this account may be questioned
on the grounds that gas vented to the atmosphere should be regarded as legitimate losses
in the process of production and is in fact an exceedingly small proportion of the total
losses when irrecoverable crude in the reservoir is included.179
Letter from D. Comins to Jameson, “Repressuring and Reservoir Gas Storage,” no document number,
16 February 1938, p. 2, Visit to Iran 1938, Miscellaneous Papers and Notes (67572), BP Archive,
University of Warwick.
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As with all prospects for gas utilization in Iran, AIOC officials maintained a focus on
“expenditures”—the cost of building, operating, and maintaining a system of for gas
injection. A year later, in February 1946, the point was reinforced. Responding to the
“question of [the] utilisation of gas [that] has been the subject of periodical enquiry from
the Iranian government for some years,” one AIOC employee asked

are we or are we not entitled under our Iranian Concession to burn or vent off gas
(liberated from oil in the course of producing and refining it) to atmosphere when there is
no economic method of utilising it ourselves or selling it either as gas or in liquid form,
or are we bound to return the gas at substantial cost to the underground reservoir in order
to conserve it for possible use at some uncertain date in the future?180

Anglo-Iranian officials went to great lengths to confine discussions surrounding gas
reinjection to commercial terms, seemingly feeling that any other grounds of discussion
would be a losing argument for them. This extended to treating detailed reports on
reservoir conditions as confidential for fear that data in the hands of the Iranian
government would ultimately translate into pressure to change their policies. In June
1946, AIOC officials sought to hide the fact that the gas pressure of the Masjid-e
Sulaymān oil field had fallen faster than they planned due to the “use of dome gas for
diluting gas vented to the atmosphere during the war years to obviate the necessity for
flares.”181 Though AIOC officials were themselves concerned with the excess venting of
gas and the consequent fall of reservoir pressure because of its deleterious effect on their
ability to recover oil, they nonetheless sought to divert attention from the condition of the
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reservoir, aiming to head off unwanted questions from the Iranian officials were they to
learn of the reservoir’s reduced long term productivity. As D. Comins, an AIOC
engineer, wrote,
we should…confine our report to the foregoing case – the energy side [referring to the
ability to extract oil] – on which we are on firm ground. Return of gas to the reservoir
purely as a measure of conservation of natural resources as distinct from energy, would
then become a clear cut commercial issue. To make the point that there is any risk that
return of gas might reduce oil recovery from porous limestone…is liable to lead to
speculative and unprofitable controversy in which we should be unable to support
opinion by facts or firm calculations and to a demand for a great deal more information
about the reservoir.182

While the option of repressurizing the reservoir existed, that would entail the exact use of
gas reinjection that company was seeking to avoid. Anglo-Iranian thus reiterated their
focus on short term commercial prospects a month later when it was decided that the
“conclusions promised to the I.G. [Iranian government] on recycling of gas would take
the form of a decision for or against recycle based only on economic grounds.”183
In reality, gas recycling was not a singular operation. Local conditions within
fields and wells could drastically alter the costs and economic prospects of particular
reinjection projects. In the early 1940s, AIOC employees made estimates of the costs of
gas recycling for the various fields that the company operated. Costs were tied directly to
the amount of compression force needed to prepare the gas for injection, itself determined
by the difference in pressure between the reservoir and that of the gas to be injected.
While it was generally true that the greater the difference between the pressure of the gas
after separation from the oil and the pressure of the reservoir the higher the cost, local
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conditions or economies of scale could counterbalance that phenomenon. At Masjid-e
Sulaymān, for example, they assessed that some 7 m.cu.ft./day of gas was available for
reinjection at a recommended surface pressure of 500 psi chosen to result in well
pressures of between 410 and 430 psi. The two-stage compression process was estimated
to cost £40,000 to install—roughly £5,700 per thousand cubic feet of gas that would be
injected per day—and £5,000 per year to maintain. Gas recycling at Haft Kel on the other
hand, would require a surface pressure of 1500 psi in order to inject some 71.5
m.cu.ft/day for a desired well pressure of 1160 to 1240 psi. For Haft Kel it was estimated
that installation would cost £340,000, while annual maintenance would cost £40,000.
Economies of scale would result in a slightly cheaper unit price of about £4,750 per
thousand cubic feet of gas per day. Complicating the project at Haft Kel was the fact that
different wells within the field would accept gas to be reinjected at different pressures
and require varying amounts of energy and complexity to achieve the necessary surface
injection pressure.184 Variability was characteristic of Iranian fields, and no two wells or
fields required the same surface injection pressure. Comins noted this, writing that the
“effects of gas injection upon reservoir pressures” were “entirely dependent upon local
conditions.”185 Even the effectiveness of repressurization with the aim of boosting oil
production was difficult to predict, requiring “very much more intimate knowledge of the
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conditions in the limestone” than the AIOC possessed in the postwar years.186 The
feasibility of gas recycling was thus co-determined by human factors—from AIOC
production practices to prevailing electricity prices in Iran to the availability of
equipment—and the geology of the reservoirs themselves. While Anglo-Iranian officials
worked to limit the Iranian government’s influence over the course of utilization in Iran,
they also found themselves constrained by the materiality of oil, gas, and the rocks within
which they resided.
The geological makeup of Iran’s southern oil-bearing regions was one of the most
influential factors shaping the debate over gas reinjection. Far from being an extraneous
detail, Comins’ 1946 reference to Khuzestān’s “porous limestone” instead reflected how
crucial the geology of Iran’s oil fields was in the discussions surrounding the feasibility
and desirability of gas reinjection, something that in turn formed a crucial context for
debates over whether decisions surrounding gas conservation should be made on
economic or principled grounds. Running from the northwest to the southeast along the
southern front of the Zagros Mountains, the Asmari is a long belt of sedimentary reef
rock and “by far the most important proved [oil and gas] reservoir in Iran.”187
“Fortunately from the point of view of oil exploitation,” the NIOC and Consortium
delegation to the ECAFE summit declared, while its nature as the remains of prehistoric
seas was crucial to its hydrocarbon-bearing status, the Asmari’s productivity was as much
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the result of a geologically-contingent layer of impervious rock that lay atop most of it.188
That layer of distinct rock, some 100 feet thick atop most of the Asmari, trapped the oil
and gas that had formed in place and caused enormous accumulations to form. Indeed,
Lurestān and Fārs provinces, places where the cap rock was absent, were considered by
the NIOC and the Consortium companies as poor prospects due the “lack of adequate
[cap rock] cover.”189
Nor was this layer the only geologic feature of the Asmari that made it one of the
world’s most significant regions for oil and gas production. Equally important was the
existence of a system of vertical fissures and fractures in the limestone and sandstone that
comprised the Asmari formation. Though the permeability of the Asmari limestone itself
was poor, the fracture system, “confirmed in numerous localities in Khuzestān,” enabled
an “extremely responsive flow system” during oil production, “enabling rapid
segregation of oil and gas to take place in the fissures through which the gas migrates
readily upward into the gas cap.” The end result of this process was the increased
conservation of solution gas by natural processes. As the NIOC and Consortium
delegation wrote,

it has been observed in all the well-fissured fields that the producing gas-oil ratio is up to
150 scf/stb [standard cubic feet per stock tank barrel, a measure of associated gas
produced per barrel of oil] lower than the known original solution gas-oil ratio….In the
Agha Jari Field, for example, some 115 MMscfd of gas…are being separated and
fortuitously stored in the gas cap by this natural process. This would be regarded as a
major gas injection project if it had to be effected [sic] from the surface. If producing
rates are not exceedingly high (as they are not) when compared with the rate of oil and
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gas segregation within the fissure system, the producing gas-oil ratio will continue to
decrease, resulting in considerable conservation of the gas.190

When combined with the Consortium companies’ policy to maintain a relatively slow
rate of production and thereby “produce no excess or ‘gas cap’ gas,” these “fortuitous
phenomena,” “perhaps unique to Iranian reservoirs,” “resulted and will result in the
building up of vast reserves of natural gas which will be available for future
utilization.”191
Small oil recovery repressurization programs were nonetheless begun in the late
1940s at Haft Kel and Masjid-e Sulaymān.192 By the 1960s, however, even those
relatively small operations were being questioned as largely ineffective among AIOC
officials.193 Formed in the fall of 1961 to analyze and issue recommendations on all
aspects of natural gas utilization within Iran,194 British Petroleum’s Gas Study Committee
reexamined the potential effects of gas recycling on oil production in the eight reservoirs
the company operated. With the exception of Ahvāz, all the fields were contained within
the Asmari limestone formation, and, except for Masjid-e Sulaymān and Haft Kel which
had developed secondary caps after decades of oil production, had naturally occurring
primary gas caps. The committee stated that the company’s production practices had
190
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indeed meant that associated gas was largely being produced “essentially at the original
solution gas-oil ratio,” an average of 740 cubic feet per barrel of crude, well below the
1500 and 1100 cubic feet per barrel that was the average in the United States and
Venezuela respectively. Still, as had always been the case, gas conservation was
subordinated to oil production, and the committee also reported that gas was being
produced in excess of the solution ratio at Masjid-e Sulaymān as the field was reaching
the end of its productive life.195 Committee members were nonetheless confident that
BP’s production practices and the Asmari’s fractured limestone would “result in the
retention in the reservoirs of a large fraction of the gas originally in place,” as much as 85
percent in some fields.196
Geology was an important point of emphasis for the Gas Study Committee’s
report, particularly as it was manifested in different prospects for gas recycling in
different fields. Thus, despite the fact that by the 1960s gas recycling had found success
around the world, it was “not universally beneficial to oil recovery.”197 In Iran’s Asmari
fields, the very same “extreme” system of fractures in the rock that allowed gas to more
easily accumulate in the reservoir gas cap hampered the ability for reinjected gas to drive
oil to the surface.198 The committee thus concluded that in fields with relatively poor rock
permeability like Masjid-e Sulaymān and Naft Sefid, continued or expanded gas
reinjection would hamper the natural solution gas and water pressures driving oil
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recovery in the wells.199 If the decision were taken to sacrifice future oil recovery at
Masjid-e Sulaymān in favor of gas conservation, as had been proposed by the National
Iranian Oil Company, then it would be possible to use a secondary gas cap to store some
40 million cubic feet of gas per day for “later years for development of local industry”
when “oil operations” were “declining in importance.”200 The committee had further
concerns that pressurizing the well to above its natural limits would cause natural gas to
seep from the ground, particularly in the areas near drilling operations.201 In any case,
associated gas produced at Masjid-e Sulaymān was being used in company operations,
necessitating that gas be piped from Ahvāz or Āghā Jāri at “prohibitive cost.”202
Most other fields were no more promising. At Haft Kel and Gachsārān, analyses
had found that the natural water drives of the reservoirs—meaning the natural
groundwater pressure sometimes relied upon to extract oil from reservoirs—were
superior to that of the solution gas; reinjecting gas to maintain higher pressures would
thus “lead to reduced oil recovery.”203 While too little was known about Gachsārān’s
geology to comment on its suitability for gas storage, at Haft Kel the committee
determined that if it were “decided to ignore reservoir [oil production] losses,”
approximately 80 million cubic feet of gas could be stored per day for twelve years, some
300 billion cubic feet in total, at a cost of $5.6 million for the infrastructure to transport
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gas from Ahvāz to the field. Since compressing and reinjecting Haft Kel’s own gas was
deemed to be even more expensive, the committee ultimately concluded that “surplus gas
storage [at Haft Kel] cannot be justified on technical or economic grounds.”204 Naft Sefid
was no better a prospect with a very large gas column undermining any benefit that gas
recycling could have for enhanced oil recovery. Nor was the reservoir a good candidate
for gas conservation; the field’s own gas was being used for company operations, and
though Haft Kel was within reasonable distance, the sour gas of the latter would
“contaminate” the unusually valuable sweet gas contained within the Naft Sefid
reservoir.205 Pāzanān, a field largely untapped in the 1960s, was both expensive and
potentially dangerous within which to store gas as it had an “abnormally high gas
reservoir pressure;” combined with the relatively high cost to establish a recycling
scheme the committee declared that there was “little to recommend this project.”206 Only
at Āghā Jāri, which had sufficiently high permeability and a weak natural water drive,
were the prospects of gas reinjection considered at all promising. Estimates on enhanced
oil recovery varied wildly between a 200-million-barrel loss in recoverable oil to a 500million-barrel gain at a cost of between $25 million to $30 million, though any attempt to
use the reservoir for gas conservation through full repressurization would likely damage
oil recovery.207 The four members of the Gas Study Committee thus concluded that gas
reinjection would in nearly all cases likely either ultimately damage oil recovery or have
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no measurable effect. While British Petroleum’s focus on costs was a key consideration
in their determination of whether gas should be used for enhanced oil recovery, the
geology of the fields was the limits within which the company operated. Each reservoir
may have had its own specific characteristics, but most of Iran’s fields were nonetheless
similar in their poor prospects for gas-enhanced oil recovery. Uniting the fields was the
fact that across the whole Asmari formation unusually significant pressure gradients not
only made recycling operations more expensive, but also limited just how effective gas
reinjection could be in raising reservoir pressures.208 The Gas Study Committee may have
recommended against the use of Iranian gas for boosting oil production, but their decision
was not driven entirely by the company’s own financial concerns. Instead, it reflected a
mix of their commercial interests with the materiality of Iran as a vast column of
sedimentary rock.
The commercial nature of British Petroleum was on greater display in the
committee’s evaluation of storing surplus gas for future use. The committee reiterated
their employer’s defense of flaring surplus gas, writing that it had occurred “in Iran just
as similar conditions prevail or have prevailed in many areas of the world including, in
the past, the United States.”209 In response to proposals that surplus gas be recycled to
reservoirs in order to store it for future use, the committee described the “suggestion” as
an “innovation,” as “such a proposal has never been put into effect in the oil and gas
industry” anywhere in the world.210 Unlike in their analysis of projects for returning gas
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to the ground in order to boost oil production where the committee emphasized
geological factors, their hesitancy toward the idea of gas conservation was rooted
primarily in commercial and economic concerns. “Storage of gas in underground
reservoirs is an expensive process,” they wrote, “and a long-term basis requires the use of
current income on projects for which no return will be realized for many years.”211 To
reinforce their point, the report’s authors constructed a hypothetical scenario where some
700 million cubic feet of gas per day was to be compressed and stored. Initial outlays
were expected to be $50 million and operating expenses $5 million per year plus $0.02
per thousand cubic feet when the gas was later produced, estimates they considered
“general in line with industry experience.”212 Expecting that the gas would be extracted
over a twenty year period, the committee determined that the needed sale price revenue
of $0.21 to $0.31 per thousand cubic feet was far too high for any realistic market to bear.
They thus determined that

Although surplus oil field gas can be stored without great difficulty from a technical
viewpoint, there does not seem to be any economic justification for the operation, which
is probably the reason it has never been done in the past.213

More to the point, as far as the Gas Study Committee’s members were concerned, was
that Iran’s extensive known reserves of natural gas—more than 44 trillion cubic feet at
the time of the report’s completion—and the enhanced preservation characteristics of the
Asmari rendered as economically wasteful any program for gas conservation, ultimately
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concluding that “under these conditions, the Committee recommends against large capital
investment designed primarily to save current associated gas production for future use by
reinjection.”214
According to the operating companies, then, the Asmari’s unique geological
arrangement acted as a de facto reinjection program and there seemed to be little point in
adding to it. As the delegation to the ECAFE symposium wrote,

these reserves are so large that substantial investment now, to add to them, is not
economically justifiable. The alternative to the flaring of surplus gas that could be
economic is to find uses for this gas as it is produced.215

Economics thus sat at the heart of the debate over gas reinjection in Iran, but they
revolved as much around competing ideas of what it meant to conserve gas and the ways
that the geology of the Asmari formation seemingly freed British Petroleum from needing
to concern itself with gas conservation. The “natural conservation process”216 of the
Asmari limestone formed the basis of the Consortium companies’ resistance to gas
reinjection projects and, in the end, no major gas reinjection projects, particularly for gas
conservation, were undertaken in Iran by the Consortium companies. In this way, British
Petroleum and its peers pursued a notion of “good enough” conservation, one that saw
the Asmari’s natural preservation as sufficiently effective to obviate any need to enhance
it. This stood in contrast to a consistent and decades-long Iranian desire to see their gas
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resources either conserved or put to productive use. Unable to send gas to foreign
markets or convince the Consortium firms to conserve the associated gas they produced,
Iranian efforts became focused on the construction of domestic markets and the necessary
infrastructure of pipelines and refineries to support them. Indeed, the first gas reinjection
project in Iran would not commence until 1976, years after natural gas would begin to
find significant consumption within Iran.217

***
In the years stretching between the 1930s and the 1960s, the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company’s view of Iran’s natural gas was rooted in the primacy of oil: gas was
fundamentally a byproduct and as such lacked any true intrinsic value. Its utilization or
conservation was worthwhile only in reference to the company’s ability to maintain oil
production and earn profits, a position that continually undermined efforts to develop
petrochemical and recycling outlets for the associated gas that the company was
producing. Iranian officials, in contrast, saw their country’s natural gas as embodying
tremendous economic and developmental worth, and over the years they maintained a
steady campaign to press to the AIOC to curtail the amount of gas they vented and flared.
With no true resolution, the tension between these two views would drive the course of
Iran’s natural gas for decades to come, helping to imbue the subsequent Iranian efforts to
pursue natural gas utilization with a nationalist aura.
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More than a commercial and political dispute between two interested parties,
however, the question of what to do with Iran’s natural gas resources reflected the
geology of the country’s primary petroleum-bearing region. Iranian and AIOC officials
alike grappled with the limits and possibilities created by the particular characteristics of
the Iran’s oil reservoirs and the Asmari limestone formation within which they lay.
Whether the Asmari reservoirs naturally retained enough gas to make recycling a
worthwhile investment was a decision rooted equally in both the realities of Khuzestān’s
geology and the fundamental perspectives vis-à-vis gas that existed within the AIOC and
the Iranian government. In this way, fractured rock, the folds and thrusts of tectonic
movement, and pressure gradients deep beneath the earth shaped the choices made and
the paths taken by the two organizations, sharpening the distinctions between two
fundamentally different conceptualizations of Iran’s natural gas.
With European markets beyond their reach and the Consortium companies
dragging their feet, in the 1960s Iranian officials began to focus on domestic and regional
outlets, considering it to be “a matter of national importance” to find uses for the
country’s gas resources.218 While some 60 million cubic feet continued to be used in oil
refining operations at Ābādān,219 they quickly turned to the possibility of using gas as a
source of energy. Participants at the 1964 seminar considered natural gas to be an
attractive fuel source because of its “relatively low price, smokeless flame, steady
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temperatures, automatic regulation, no need for storage facilities at the consumer stage,
no handling, [and] no ash.”220 Iran, however, simply did not have the distribution network
needed to supply natural gas to consumers and businesses, or even to transport it
anywhere outside of the southwestern region of the country. Any use of gas as a major
source of energy within the country would require significant investment and years of
effort.
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Chapter 2
Petrochemicals and Pipelines,
1955-1970

In the years between Iran’s 1953 Oil Nationalization Crisis and the early 1970s,
Iranian officials working inside government ministries and the national petroleum
companies took enormous strides in finding uses for their country’s natural gas reserves.
Leaving behind decades of fruitless discussion with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and
later the other Consortium firms, during that time huge new systems were built to
transport gas from the primary oil-producing regions of Iran’s southwest to major urban
centers like Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tehran. New petrochemical facilities were erected to
take gas and sate Iranian society’s growing industrial hunger for products like synthetic
fertilizer. Amalgams of steel, concrete, money, and expertise both domestic and foreign,
these arrangements became the basis for Iranian gas use in the following half century,
enabling both export and domestic consumption.
In the 1950s and 1960s, structures like the Shiraz Chemical Fertilizer Factory and
the natural gas pipeline that fed it became focal points of debates surrounding Iran’s gas
resources and the at times conflicting views of local and national authorities. Plans for the
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factory and its supporting infrastructures, the first major gas project in Iran, were
expansive, aimed at transforming natural gas into both a source of energy and a feedstock
for a nascent petrochemical industry. The Shiraz pipeline was thus simultaneously built
to support both local energy consumption and national industrialization through the
production of synthetic petrochemical fertilizers. But prefiguring debates that would rage
in later decades, from the moment of its conceptualization in the mid-1950s there was
continual controversy regarding the extent to which the pipeline would provide gas for
residential versus industrial consumers. Whereas authorities in the National Iranian Oil
Company and the National Iranian Gas Company prioritized large-scale consumers like
the fertilizer plant, local and provincial officials pushed for the construction of city gas
networks and the provision of natural gas energy to ordinary consumers. The latter’s
eventual but only limited success was reflective of both the importance of such figures in
shaping Iran’s gas infrastructure and the limits of their ability to affect change when
national organizations were so intimately involved in the creation of Iran’s gas
infrastructure.
For Iranian officials, the central achievement of these years was the
conceptualization and construction of the First Iran Gas Trunkline, a thousand-kilometer
pipeline built to transport refined associated gas from the Consortium-operated oil fields
in Iran’s south to the Soviet border at Āstārā. Though by volume the pipeline was
predominantly dedicated to gas export to the Soviet Union, the project was conceived and
operated primarily as a means of making possible the delivery of natural gas to Iranian
cities like Isfahan and Tehran. From the start the Trunkline was national in scope,
eventually becoming an artery for the country and bringing gas to increasingly energy114

hungry urban areas. The work of numerous ministries, the NIOC, and the newly formed
National Iranian Gas Company and thoroughly Iranian in ambition, the project’s actual
design and construction were nonetheless undertaken almost entirely by foreign
consultants and firms. Iranian gas projects were thus reflective not only of domestic
policies and ambitions, but also global political and economic forces that converged
within their materials and processes of construction. The story of Iran’s natural gas
infrastructures was thus as much one of competing priorities, unfulfilled promised, and
foreign expectations as it was one of national triumph, making the huge structures like
the Shiraz fertilizer plant and the IGAT-1 not only means by which Iranian goals of
industrialization and modernization could be achieved, but also objects that embodied the
complex swirl of forces acting upon Iranian society.

***
While officials within institutions like the National Iranian Oil Company and the
Plan Organization struggled for decades with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the
other Consortium firms in order to have their country’s natural gas resources put to
productive use, beginning in the mid-1950s they also began to take significant steps to
create their own projects for gas utilization. The first major use of gas energy in Iran,
however, was largely the product of private enterprise. In 1953 the Butane Gas Company
was founded in Tehran by Mahmud Khalili, his son Mohsen Khalili, and their associate
Esfandiār Yegānegi. Established to transport liquid gas from the refinery at Ābādān to
cities like Tehran, Butane Gas enabled for the first time the widespread use of liquid gas
in Iranian homes. Propane and butane, the two hydrocarbons that comprise the bulk of
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liquid gas, are integral to crude oil and natural gas and thus found within the very same
reservoirs. Such natural gas liquids, often a small percentage of the raw natural gas, are
generally separated out during the refining process, becoming available for sale or use in
petrochemical production lines. Though gaseous at the earth’s surface, propane and
butane are both heavier than the methane that makes up the bulk of the refined natural gas
that is distributed via pipe networks to consumers. Liquid gas’s heavier nature makes it
significantly easier to compress and possessing of a higher energy density—the amount
of energy stored in a particular volume—contributing to its ability to be kept as a liquid
within relatively simple tanks and canisters which can in turn be distributed
economically.
Despite the relative ease with which liquid gas can be distributed in comparison to
natural gas, it nonetheless requires specialized equipment to both fill the canisters and
make use of them. It was for the lack of that equipment that the bulk of the liquid gas
produced at Ābādān was flared between the start of refining in 1912 and the early 1950s,
with only a small amount being utilized by industry employees in Ābādān town and,
later, Ahvāz.221 Prior to the use of gas, most Iranian households relied on fuels like
charcoal, firewood, and dried dung,222 though the use of oil products like kerosene had
risen steadily over the first half of the twentieth century.223 Such fuels were notoriously
smoky, creating unclean and unconnected kitchens and forcing Iranians to cook their
Hasantāsh, Seyyed Gholāmhusayn and Mikāyil ‘Azimi, Tārikh-e San’at-e Gāz-e Māy’a-ye Iran
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meals in what were often the dirtiest spaces in their homes.224 Following a trip to the
United States in 1954 where they studied the American liquid gas industry and made
connections to equipment suppliers,225 Butane Gas began operations, importing much of
the equipment they needed and adhering to American standards.226 At first the company
relied on road transport, a long and arduous route,227 bringing propane and butane from
Ābādān to Tehran in a tanker truck before transferring them to canisters for distribution
just outside the city.228 From the central filling station, canisters were loaded onto
emblazoned vehicles for transport through the city for delivery at people’s homes.229
Butane Gas quickly ran into trouble, however, as few residents of Tehran were familiar
with liquid gas or the cylinders and appliances needed to make use of it. Many worried
about the possibility of explosion and refused to adopt the new fuel. Even among those
who did quickly accept it, often for use in their kitchens, there was a long learning curve
with respect to adapting existing cooking techniques to the new energy source.230 Butane
Gas responded by undertaking advertising and educational campaigns, simultaneously
seeking to convince Iranians of liquid gas’s safety while also educating them on best
practices for its use.231
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Despite these efforts, liquid gas consumption in places like Tehran grew slowly
during the first few years, and it was largely a luxury product confined to small numbers
of higher class residents.232 The new and cleaner fuel source, however, allowed Iranian
families to bring their kitchens within the confines of their homes and helped further new,
more Westernized ways of living that were beginning to be promoted by the popular
press, textbooks, and programs like Point Four.233 The turning point for Butane Gas came
in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the rapidly expanding middle classes of Tehran
increasingly adopted gas appliances.234 In response, the company moved into producing
both the canisters that they used to deliver gas to consumers as well as gas appliances like
hot water heaters and stoves, quickly becoming a household name across the country as
the industry expanded.235 The sector’s rapid growth brought competitors like Iran Gāz
and Persi Gāz, both founded in 1958, which grabbed significant market share and slices
of the public consciousness.236 Over the following two decades liquid gas consumption
grew rapidly, from some 2590 tons in 1960 to approximately 572,000 tons in 1979,237
bringing dozens of distributers into the market.238 Despite the success of the Iranian
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liquid gas energy industry in the decades after the founding of Butane Gas, the fuel would
eventually come to be largely supplanted by systems of piped natural gas, first in Iran’s
urban areas but later more widely. The use of liquid gas thus represented something of a
transitional step in Iran, providing many of the benefits of gas energy, particularly with
respect to its comparative cleanliness, without requiring the significant public investment
that natural gas networks would require.239

***
The promising success of liquid gas notwithstanding, by the late 1950s Iranian
officials were beginning to take significant steps toward greater utilization of associated
natural gas. During that period, beyond the desire to see Iranian natural resources put to
good use that had animated their thinking for decades, Iranian officials were beginning to
react to increasing demands for energy and petrochemical products in Iran. State-directed
efforts at industrialization had begun in the 1930s under Rezā Shah and began to
accelerate in the wake of the Oil Nationalization Crisis and the return of Muhammad
Rezā Shah to the throne in 1953.240 Rooted in development planning that had begun in
the late 1940s, Iran’s post-crisis industrialization plans were driven by the rapid rise in oil
revenues that had been made possible by the new 1954 Oil Consortium Agreement.
For more on the history of the Iranian liquid gas industry see Hasantāsh, Seyyed Gholāmhusayn and
Mikāyil ‘Azimi, Tārikh-e San’at-e Gāz-e Māy’a-ye Iran (Tehran: Kavir, 1394). While an excellent and
comprehensive text on the history of the industry between the 1950s and the 1990s, the book was written
under contract with the Butane Gas Company and relies heavily on the recollections of industry figures as
collected in oral interviews with authors. Tārikh-e San’at-e Gāz-e Māy’a-ye Iran nonetheless provides an
excellent window into the history of the gas sector that has proved stubbornly resistant to study. This author
has been repeatedly stymied when attempting to gain access to company records or officials.
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Under the new agreement oil revenues grew rapidly for the Iranian government, seeing a
ten-fold increase from $34.4 million in 1954-1955 to $344 million in 1958-1959. By
1970 returns would again nearly triple to nearly $1.2 billion and in 1975-1976 Iran
earned some $20 billion from foreign oil sales.241 While a significant portion of these
returns were directed toward non-developmental purposes—particularly the military,
court patronage, and an expansion of the state bureaucracy—large amounts were
nonetheless expended on infrastructure and as financing for both state-owned and private
industries.242 Overseen by the governmental Plan Organization, early efforts were
underwhelming, with the First Development Plan (1949-1951) disintegrating alongside
the collapse of Iran’s oil revenues during the Oil Crisis and the Second (1955-1962)
failing to achieve its full potential due to a lack of clear objectives, uncoordinated
investments, and steady reductions in allocations to the Plan Organization.243 Fortunes
changed under the Third (1962-1968) and Fourth Development Plans (1968-1973), when
some $3.9 billion was invested in projects like hydroelectric dams, new and modernized
port facilities, and thousands of miles of rail and roads. An additional $1.2 billion was
spent on agricultural modernization, including mechanization and the use of synthetic
fertilizers and pesticides.244 These developmental programs fostered an industrial boom
in Iran as government policy promoted the domestic production of everything from
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consumer goods like clothing and automobiles to intermediate products like steel and
machine tools.245
Iran’s rapid industrialization, rising standards of living, and significant urban
migration spurred a ravenous new appetite within the country for both energy and
petrochemical products like fertilizer and plastics.246 With the 1954 Consortium Oil
Agreement giving the NIOC exclusive rights to distribute and sell oil and natural gas
products within Iran, as well as mandating that the Consortium operating companies
make deliveries in support of those activities, Iran’s petroleum reserves were wellpositioned to meet those new demands.247 In the 1960s and 1970s, Iranian officials
pursued ambitious and complex projects aimed at supporting Iran’s growing
industrialization via programs that would see significant quantities of gas transported
hundreds of miles from Iran’s southern petroleum fields to urban centers. One of the first
such projects to be tackled was one that sought to bring associated gas from Iran’s
primary petroleum-bearing region in the southwest to Shiraz and its environs for
consumption by both industry and city residents.
An early industrial concern to be fed was a large petrochemical plant along the
Kor River in Marvdasht, some fifty kilometers northeast of the city. Built to meet the
rapid growth in domestic demand for synthetic fertilizers—“one of the most important
petrochemical products”—that had been brought about by land reform and agricultural
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development initiatives then part of the Iranian government’s modernization programs,248
the contract for construction was signed in 1958 between the Ministry of Industry and
Mines and a group of European companies including the Ensa and Entrepose (France) as
well as John Brown & Company (United Kingdom).249 Initially designed to produce
some 90,000 tons of pure diammonium nitrate fertilizer per year, the contract was later
amended in the summer of 1959 to specify 41,000 tons of diammonium nitrate, 40,000
tons of urea, and 1,000 tons of liquid ammonia, all to be produced from natural gas
feedstock supplied via pipeline from a new gas treatment plant built to supply the project
at Gachsārān.250 Inaugurated at a ceremony attended by the Shah and President of France
Charles De Gaulle in September 1963, the plant consumed some 20 million cubic feet of
gas per day in its operations, separated and treated at Gachsārān and then transported
over 320 kilometers via a 10-inch pipe to the factory.251
The Shiraz Chemical Fertilizer Factory was the first petrochemical facility built in
Iran and it found considerable success, sufficient to prompt an expansion by a contracted
Romanian firm in the early 1970s to include units for sodium carbonate and bicarbonate
production.252 For the most part, Iranian involvement in the project had been confined to
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ownership and management. Initially owned by a subsidiary of the Ministry of the
Economy, in the summer of 1964 ownership was transferred to the National Iranian
Petrochemical Industries Company by order of the Majlis and a year later to the Iran
Petrochemical Corporation , a subsidiary of the NIOC created for specifically that
purpose.253 Despite the lack of Iranian involvement in the actual design and construction
of the plant—Ensa had been in charge of designing, building, and delivering the plant’s
production equipment while John Brown and Entrepose had built the gas treatment plant
at Gachsārān, the pipeline to Shiraz, and the factory itself254—the project prompted
considerable effort on the part of the Iranian government to leverage their country’s
substantial gas reserves to jumpstart a regional fertilizer network at the heart of which
Iran would sit.

***
In a series of reports submitted to the December 1964 United Nations ECAFE
summit on natural gas that had been held in Tehran, the Iranian delegation255 made a case
that building a petrochemical industry was both economically feasible and crucial for the
“future progress and industrialization of the countries of the region,” even while
acknowledging reservations about a “lack of sufficient domestic markets and technical
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knowledge.”256 To compensate for the as-yet small domestic markets, they revived a
proposal first floated at a 1962 summit on petroleum resources257 and argued that Iran
was well positioned—through both geographic proximity and the low cost of natural
gas—to supply petrochemical products like nitrogenous fertilizers, sulfur, and carbon
black to the entirety of the ECAFE region. With its huge potential market and growing
role as a nitrogen fertilizer around the world, ammonia, “the cheapest source of nitrogen
for agriculture,” was the cornerstone of the proposal.258 Synthesized in dedicated plants
from atmospheric nitrogen and the hydrogen contained in natural gas, ammonia could
either be applied to fields directly or used to produce even more potent fertilizers.
Worldwide demand for nitrogen fertilizers had grown 50 percent in the previous seven
years, but Asia, Africa, and Latin America, despite possessing 60 percent of the world’s
arable land, were underserved and consumed only a fifth of global supplies. Rising living
standards and population growth demanded ever-increasing amounts of fertilizer that
could not be met through existing production capabilities. Drawing on the example of an
ammonia plant that supplied Central America and Europe from Trinidad, the Iranian
delegation proposed to competitively meet that growth in demand. They argued that
through the large amounts of natural gas already extracted and flared in their country,

Iranian Delegation, “Discussion Paper on Utilization of Natural Gas and its Allied Products as Raw
Materials for Fertilizer and Other Chemical Industries,” Proceedings of the Seminar on the Development
and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources: with Special Reference to the ECAFE Region, pp. 346-353 (New
York: United Nations, 1965), 349.
256

257

ECAFE, “Report on the Second Symposium of Petroleum Resources,” 18.

Iranian Delegation, “Discussion Paper on Prospects of Regional Arrangements in Natural Gas
Development and in the Establishment of Industries Based on Natural Gas,” in Proceedings of the Seminar
on the Development and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources: with Special Reference to the ECAFE
Region, pp. 429-432 (New York: United Nations, 1965), 430.
258

124

combined with the availability of inexpensive electricity in parts of southern Iran and the
potential economies of scale achieved by centralizing production in one country,
ammonia could be supplied to the ECAFE region. Member nations could, in this way,
come to a mutually beneficial relationship: consumer nations like India, Pakistan, and
Japan259 would obtain cheap fertilizer, and Iran would find both a large market for a
crucial new industry and an outlet for at least some of its natural gas. As the delegation
wrote,

The prospect for mutual cooperation, therefore, is very bright. Iran has the raw material,
technical skill and also the means of securing the necessary capital and know-how for
setting up large-scale ammonia and urea plants. Other ECAFE countries can help, to their
own benefit as well as to Iran’s, by providing the market.260

Envisioned by the Iranian delegates was a regional network at the center of which would
sit a large Iranian ammonia plant. The facility, to be constructed along the Persian Gulf
coast near the major oil- and gas-bearing regions of Iran, was to use gas supplied by the
NIOC to produce some 650,000 tons of liquid ammonia per year, rising to 2 million tons
per year over the following seven years.261 The ammonia would then be loaded onto
ocean-going tankers and shipped to local fertilizer manufactories where it could be made
into other products. Under this arrangement, buying nations would maintain some
amount of local control over their fertilizer supplies, avoid the high initial investment that
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ammonia production required,262 and even find themselves able to repurpose or export
the hydrocarbon resources that had previously been used to produce fertilizer.263
The Iranian delegation worked to imbue their proposed project with an air of
benevolence and magnanimity. They wrote that the project was reflective of the “friendly
attitudes of Iranian authorities in making available their natural gas resources and other
necessary facilities for the benefit of the entire region.”264 But while they took pains to
emphasize how their fertilizer complex could benefit Iran’s neighbors, the project was
clearly layered with Iranian ambition as well. It was a showcase for Iranian potential, one
that demonstrated a marriage of natural abundance and the ability to harness it toward
productive ends. Iranian delegates promised that “the availability of raw material and
human skill in Iran” would “contribute to the opening of new horizons for the people of
the ECAFE countries.”265 By making Iran into the region’s principal supplier of
ammonia, the delegation offered a plan that would improve the region’s economies—and
make Iran into the indispensable leader of a crucial new industry. Under the proposed
scheme, Iran would become the dominant supplier of a product that was the “difference
between famine and full stomachs,” one not easily pushed aside without significant pain
for people across the region.266 Iranian officials were so keen on the project, and so
concerned about the necessity of securing markets for their products, that the delegation
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further sweetened the deal by offering to manage and underwrite it, directly subsidizing
30 percent stakes in the projects and helping to arrange financing for the remainder.267 As
they wrote,

In order to further this programme we shall be glad to offer the necessary technical knowhow on design and operation of the conversion plants. We will be glad to arrange, if
required, if [sic] for engineering and construction. We will also be prepared to participate
in ownership of the conversion units and assist with financing arrangements.268

Iranian officials were eager, in part, because they had already identified a continued and
growing domestic need for ammonia. By supplying it via the same system, they hoped
Iranian farmers would stand to reap the windfall that cheaper fertilizers would provide.
By way of example, the delegation calculated that the price of ammonia would be 30
percent cheaper if the manufacturing plant had a capacity of 600,000 tons per year (near
to the initial annual capacity of the proposed plant) rather than 100,000.269 The only way
such production could be sustained was if a foreign market existed to absorb most of the
ammonia. Iran thus stood to benefit immensely from a project that rested entirely on the
fact that large quantities of natural gas were already being produced in the country.
Elided in the delegation’s proposal was that the Iranian petroleum industry lacked
much of the expertise needed to design and build their own projects, forcing them to hire
foreign companies and consultants. The fertilizer plant at Shiraz that inspired the regional
network was itself built by British and French contractors. They reported great difficulty
267
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in finding adequate numbers of skilled workers within Iran, saying that while “there was
some hope that retired Consortium or NIOC employees could be hired,” the contractors
would need to “scour the entire country to obtain skilled trades in sufficient numbers.”270
Promises to “arrange…for engineering and construction” for partner nations thus was not
truly an offer of engineering or construction expertise, but a more abstract managerial
ability to oversee foreign construction firms.271 Nonetheless, this proven ability to
oversee a chemical fertilizer project from conception to operation became a way for the
Iranian delegation to promote their country as a leader in the emerging field of natural
gas utilization. Transforming at least some of Iran’s then-proven reserves of 70 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas272 from waste into a productive resource would do more than
further the country’s industrialization; it would also be a step toward making Iran the
equal, or better, of any country in the world.
In the end, the regional fertilizer network envisioned by the Iranian delegates to
the 1964 ECAFE summit proved too ambitious. Though a large petrochemical fertilizer
complex was built with an eye toward the export market in the Persian Gulf port of
Bandar Shāhpur between 1967 and 1973 by a company jointly owned by the National
Petrochemical Company and Allied Chemical,273 and a second by a joint venture between
Iran National Petrochemical Company and the Mitsui Group of Japan was begun in
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1973,274 those facilities also quickly turned toward serving the domestic market.275 Thus
while in the following years Iran’s petrochemical industry would continue to expand,
Iranian gas utilization was driven primarily by a desire among Iranian officials to see gas
used as a source energy. In Shiraz, despite the prominence that the petrochemical
fertilizer plant received as the first and most notable success of the program to use natural
gas in Fārs, it was the possibility of piped natural gas being distributed as fuel to
residential and industrial consumers in the city that preoccupied local and provincial
authorities.

***
Beginning in the mid-1950s, H.E. Mehdi Farrokh, the Governor-General of Fārs,
began a campaign to have natural gas from the Consortium-operated field of Gachsārān
transported for consumption in Shiraz, the province’s largest city. Eager to advance such
a project, in the summer of 1955 Farrokh wrote to the provincial director of the U.S.
Point Four mission to Iran, asking about possible funding for such a plan. The director
demurred, suggesting that a gas distribution network would compete with “several other
projects which the peoples of Shiraz have been hoping for,” including a sewage system,
an expansion of the city water network, recreational facilities, and an increase in
electricity generation. In any case, almost none of the preparatory work needed for a gas
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network had been done, and the director wrote that an “engineering survey and economic
analysis…by a competent Engineering firm or organization” needed to be undertaken
before any “applications for financing” would be considered.276 Farrokh nonetheless
captured the attention of national officials, and in December 1955 the Plan Organization
asked the NIOC to draw upon their connections with consulting engineers and pipelaying
contractors to undertake preliminary evaluations of the possibility of using natural gas in
Fārs, something it claimed was in the “interest of the majority of the people” of the
province.277 At stake for the Plan Organization was both residential use in Shiraz—at the
time home to some 150,000 people—and industrial, specifically naming the Marvdasht
and Fasā sugar loaf factories in the city’s vicinity.
For their part, the NIOC had already begun exploring the possibility of gas
delivery to Shiraz and funding had already been set aside in the 1956 budget for an
evaluation of its prospects.278 There was a great deal of enthusiasm for the prospect of gas
delivery, enough that the NIOC, in light of their concerns for the “heavy expense” of
pipelaying and the “huge investment” that would be needed to bring gas to Fārs, asked
the office of the Prime Minister to issue an order saying that no such program should
proceed without proper evaluation and consideration.279 The NIOC had completed their
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studies by early 1957,280 and by the spring of that year the governor resumed his efforts
to procure gas for his province, decrying the delay the NIOC studies had caused and
arguing that its availability would accelerate the growth of industry in Shiraz.281 Farrokh
based his position on Shiraz’s growing energy needs, something that had begun to
outstrip the traditional coal and charcoal sources that city residents had been using. The
demand for fuel was such that considerable attention was already being given to
increasing the delivery of oil products to Shiraz, though that too would require great time
and effort. Considering the relative proximity of Fārs to Iran’s primary gas-producing
regions, however, and the way that gas was being largely discarded by the Consortium
companies, provincial authorities in a variety of ministries were strongly supportive of
plans to pipe gas to the city, believing that through the “transforming [of] people’s lives”
residents would quickly come to know the “benefits of gas use” and the establishment of
new industries would be facilitated.282
Despite the efforts of the authorities in Fārs, little progress had been made in
bringing a gas pipeline to Shiraz into being. That began to change in late 1958 with the
signing of the agreement between the NIOC and the group of European firms hired to
build the Shiraz fertilizer plant. With the Shah expressing a desire to see the project
completed as quickly as possible, in the fall of 1958 the NIOC moved to construct the
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fertilizer plant and its associated pipeline simultaneously.283 While the task of finding the
necessary foreign financing necessary for the project slowed things through the fall of
that year, much to the chagrin of Fārs’s governor,284 by February 1959 the project had
begun in earnest.285 Residents of Fārs expressed both support for and concern about the
project. The Agricultural Union of Fārs strongly backed the plan,286 while the head of the
Chamber of Commerce of Bandar Bushehr worried that the needs of the fertilizer plant
would overwhelm the region’s ports and impede existing commercial activity.287 By
February 1960, however, the NIOC had begun to resist the construction of a gas system
to serve residential consumers in Shiraz, stating that such a network was “not part of the
pipelaying plan” and “from an economic perspective” was “also not affordable.” They
would instead prioritize industry, the “major consumers” of gas that were more easily
served.288 Other Iranian officials opposed this hierarchy of consumers, with the Prime
Minister of Iran writing to the NIOC to express his opinion that with the pipeline and
fertilizer factory projects significantly underway it was time to ensure that a city gas
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network would be read as well.289 The governor of Fārs likewise wrote to the NIOC to
press that it was expected that the residents of Shiraz would be able to make use of
natural gas as soon as the pipeline from Gachsārān was ready, as had long been
planned.290
Despite the efforts of the Prime Minister and the governor of Fārs to ensure that
the residential gas service in Shiraz would begin alongside the commencement of
operations at the fertilizer plant, there would be a years-long gap between the two. While
some initial studies had been performed, their completion had been suspended due to lack
of financing.291 By April 1962 gas had begun flowing to the chemical plant, the
Marvdasht and Kavār sugar loaf factories, the Fārs cement works, and the local power
plant, successes that prompted other industrial concerns in the city to express a “desire”
for gas.292 With the start of full-scale service in 1963, Shiraz became the first Iranian city
to consume natural gas. Despite planned branch lines running to Jahrom and the Fasā
sugar loaf factory being dropped due to problems with the new gas refinery at
Gachsārān,293 the start of industrial gas service spurred a flurry of new activity regarding
broader access to the new fuel and the governor used this moment to again push for
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residential gas service in Shiraz, praising the government’s commitment to “using the
country’s natural resources for the benefit of [all] class,” and writing that they were “near
to witnessing the biggest celebrations in the history” of the province should gas be
supplied to city residents. Still, while it was “not inappropriate at this moment for the
NIOC and the Ministry of Industry and Mines” to “allocate a portion of this gas for
public consumption in Shiraz,” the city was not able to finance the 300 million rial job
themselves. He therefore requested that the Prime Minister order the Plan Organization to
help the city pay for the work, disbursements that would be repaid in installments over
the following years.294 Despite the governor arguing that without their aid local
authorities could not fulfill their “duty…to bring this plan and program of broad benefit”
into being,295 the Plan Organization refused, citing a reduction in the organization’s funds
and the impending end of the Second Development Plan later that year.296
There continued to be dissent within Shiraz itself to the idea of building a natural
gas system for the city. In the summer of 1962, the Shiraz Electrical Company wrote to
the mayor of the city to promote the superiority of electricity to gas. The company argued
that natural gas fuel was both expensive and unsafe. At the time, with some two-thirds of
Shiraz’s homes being made of mud, Shiraz Electricity contended that laying pipes to
them, in addition to the costs associated with ripping up roads and alleys and establishing
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new institutions to oversee gas service, was dangerous, particularly in the winding
alleyways of the old city. Furthermore, the company claimed, approximately a third of
the city’s homes employed house servants, members of society they claimed should not
be trusted with the dangerous and “precise technical” tasks that utilizing gas fuel
required, perhaps inadvertently underscoring visions of natural gas as a particularly
modern and sophisticated fuel. In contrast, Shiraz Electricity argued, much of the
infrastructure to support an expansion of the electrical grid was already in place, whether
or not gas service began there would always be a need for electricity anyway, and as a
source of energy it was much safer for all social classes to use.297 Others supported the
use of gas in Shiraz and Fārs but proposed different means of distribution. In July 1962,
the owner of a small liquid gas distribution company in Shiraz offered the services of his
company to begin bottling gas from the Gachsārān-Shiraz pipeline for delivery to
customers.298 While this approach would save the significant costs of creating a network
of gas lines, the NIOC pushed back against the proposal, noting that it was “not practical”
as the natural gas being transported through the line was predominantly methane whereas
the gas cylinders used in Shiraz and around the country were largely filled with propane
and butane.299
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Local authorities in Shiraz and Fārs remained committed to the use of piped
natural gas despite the resistance of the NIOC and other energy distributers in the region.
Throughout 1962, officials like the mayor of Shiraz continued to press the national
government to make gas service a reality, asking that it be made part of the upcoming
Third Development Plan and that the Ministry of Industry and Mines and the NIOC issue
a license for the city to build a gas network.300 At a meeting called by the mayor of Shiraz
in August of that year to discuss the “demand of the people for the use of gas energy” it
was reported that while the NIOC was focused on delivering gas to industrial consumers,
they were willing to consider requests for service in the remainder of the city. It was
unlikely, however, that city residents would see the expansion of city gas service in a
uniform way. It was the opinion of the assembled officials that the city’s southern
neighborhoods—with their narrow, winding alleyways and mud homes, as had been
highlighted by the Shiraz Electricity Company—were not candidates for gas service,
being far too expensive and complicated to build networks for. It was thus agreed that gas
service would be restricted to those newer areas of the city that experts had deemed as
meeting the necessary requirements for gas delivery.301
By November 1962, the NIOC had agreed to the possibility of gas service in such
neighborhoods, though there remained significant uncertainty regarding the details and
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costs of any such system.302 In response, it was decided that the Shiraz city government
would press for gas systems to be installed in those areas of the city through which the
region’s primary gas lines crossed. The NIOC, however, was still not ready to issue a
license to the city to built a gas distribution system, arguing that the lack of
knowledgeable and experienced personnel and organizations in the field of gas
distribution rendered local governments, and any other non-technical institution, unequal
to the task. Instead the company was considering issuing a contract to a European firm to
build an experimental system of 500 gas connections in Shiraz, using it as a testbed to
explore questions surrounding pipelaying, cost, and pricing.303 It would thus not be until
1966 that the experimental plan was evaluated, and it would be a further year, until
December 1967, until the first residential customers in Shiraz and the neighboring town
of Guyim began receiving gas.304 Numbers were small in the first three years of gas
service, with only 285 residential connections in 1968, a figure that grew to only 773 by
1970. Commercial units—bakeries, shops, and other places of business—rose from only
30 to 85 during the same period.305
As had been the case for industrial gas use in the city, residents of Shiraz were the
first in Iran to see piped natural gas service in their homes and businesses, and in the
following years the city came to be seen as an example for successful gas use to the rest
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of the country.306 In many ways the history of natural gas utilization in Shiraz anticipated
the story of gas in Iran’s other major cities in the 1970s, particularly in the prioritization
of major industrial consumers over the growth of city gas networks by organizations like
the NIOC as well as the choice by governing authorities to extend service first to city
neighborhoods that were technically and economically easiest to connect to the country’s
long distance transportation network. In other ways, however, Shiraz’s early experiences
differed from those of other cities. In contrast to cities that would be connected later as
part of enormous systems conceived on a national scale, residents of Shiraz first came to
use gas in large part due to the commitment of local and provincial authorities to the idea.
Shiraz’s early experience with gas utilization was thus a product not only of the city’s
relative proximity to the major oil and gas producing regions of Iran, but also because of
the early and sustained efforts by local officials to overcome the prioritization of industry
and on the part of national institutions like the NIOC.

***
By the time Shiraz’s city gas network was being completed, however, the pipeline
bringing natural gas from Gachsārān to the city was already reaching capacity.
Recognizing the “daily growth” of natural gas consumption in the city, officials began
looking for ways to increase the amount of available gas, ultimately adding equipment to
the Gachsārān refinery sufficient to boost its output to some 30 million cu. ft./day. But
with demand expected to reach 80 million cu. ft./day within ten years, eventually a new
and larger pipeline would be needed. That is exactly what happened, and by the end of
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1971 a new 16-inch line had begun operation and the existing 10-inch line converted to
transport crude oil to the future Fārs Refinery.307
Unlike with Shiraz’s original gas pipeline, the new line was not built as a regional
project, but as part of nation-spanning gas utilization and export project referred to as the
First Iran Gas Trunkline. Built in the late 1960s and opened early in the following
decade, IGAT-1 became the backbone of Iranian natural gas exploitation in the following
decades. Deeply international from its inception, the project began in the mid-1960s
when the NIOC hired the British firm Iranian Management and Engineering Group, a
subsidiary of Sir Frederick Snow and Partners, to evaluate the prospects of building a
pipeline to move associated gas from the Consortium-operated fields to Tehran. IMEG’s
report, completed in early 1966, envisioned a 28-inch pipe carrying 315 million cubic
feet of gas per day between Ābādān and Tehran.308 The initial sole focus on domestic
consumption quickly gave way to the prospects of a larger project that would combine
the transport of gas to Iranian cities as well as to the Soviet border for export; priority
would be given for delivery to Iranian cities along the pipeline’s proposed route.309 Part
of broader policy decisions to diversify Iran’s international political and economic
relations, the deal that the two countries concluded on 13 January 1966 would form the
foundation for the entire project and consequently for the use of piped natural gas across
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a large swath of Iran. The agreement stipulated that Iran would export natural gas to the
Soviet Union for fifteen years in return for the latter covering the cost of a steel mill,
machine factory, and a portion of the very pipeline that would carry gas to its border.
The steel mill, far from incidental, was central to the desire of Iranian officials to
undertake the project. As far back as 1935, Iranian officials had sought foreign assistance
for the construction of a steel mill. Long frustrated by the unwillingness of the European
and American governments to support the creation of an Iranian steel industry, a position
rooted in the belief that Iran could never hope to compete with established players in
field, by the 1960s they had turned to the Soviet Union in order to realize the “longstanding national goal.”310 Initial Soviet proposals in October 1964 offered aid in return
for oil concessions in northern Iran, but the flat refusal of the Iranian government to
consider such options311 prompted more “tempting” offers that took Iranian commodities,
primarily gas, as payment.312 Negotiations between the two countries were undertaken in
the fall of 1965 with the Iranian delegation basing its negotiating position on an earlier
French study on the subject. A deal was concluded on 5 October 1965 in which Soviet
advisers and workers would aid the Iranian National Steel Corporation to construct the
mill.313 Construction began in 1967 at a site near Isfahan, coming online with a
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production capacity of 550,000 tons per year in 1972. The mill’s success prompted plans
for its expansion to a production capacity of 1.9 million tons per year, but problems in the
supply of sufficient coal delayed them until 1983.314
At the time of the pipeline deal’s conclusion in early 1966, there remained
significant uncertainty surrounding the deal that was accompanied by a lack of consensus
within the Iranian government as to the wisdom of the plan. While some Iranian officials
were pleased with the large size of the promised Soviet steel mill and promised delivery
date of 1971 (subsequently slipping to the following year), others argued that Iran was
now beholden to the USSR for at least five years, comparing their potential predicament
to Egypt’s dependence of the Soviet Union for the Aswan Dam project.315 Despite such
reservations, IMEG was tasked by the NIOC with updating its existing pipeline plan to
account for the new export requirement. The company quickly amended its original
proposal to enlarge the pipeline and add a new segment to carry gas to the Soviet border.
According to IMEG’s new design, each day 1.6 million cubic feet of associated gas
would be collected from the oil fields at Gachsārān and Āghā Jāri and refined near
Behbahān, a small city in Iran’s south lying in between the two fields. From there, the gas
would be transported north via a 42-inch line, providing energy for the cities of Isfahan,
Kāshān, and Qom before being divided at Sāveh. One branch would then carry gas to
Tehran and the other to the Soviet border at Āstārā via Qazvin and Rasht. In addition to
the branch line leading to Shiraz to supply the growing demand for gas among industrial
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and residential consumers, the plan called for small spurs to feed the smaller towns and
villages lying along the route of the main pipeline. This iteration of IMEG’s proposal
would form the basis for the entirety of the IGAT-1 program, remaining remarkably
stable in its overall form despite almost continual turmoil surrounding the particulars of
its implementation in the following years. Indeed, this early stage was already marked by
disputes within the Iranian government over different sizes and routes for the pipeline,
with the Pahlavi Foundation, which represented the financial and business interests of the
Shah, proposing in conjunction with Bechtel a 40-inch diameter pipe, Minister of the
Economy Alinaghi Alikhāni suggesting at various times a 40- to 48-inch diameter, and
still others suggesting the pipeline’s route be altered to run through Tabriz with a separate
branch to Turkey as well rather than directly to the Soviet Union via Qazvin and Rasht.316
Such disputes were reflective of the overall complexity of the IGAT-1 program.
Far more than a single pipeline however large, the project’s fundamental viability was
tightly woven within the broader industrialization of Iranian society and the requirements
of foreign actors outside the government’s control. The project’s contours depended on a
combination of both Soviet and Iranian natural gas needs. What those would ultimately
be in Iran, however, rested upon complex interactions between broader industrialization
programs, the possibility of which rested on revenues from an oil industry that was
largely beholden to the requirements of the Consortium firms that operated it, and the
availability and price of other fuels like kerosene in the following years. Nor was the
supply of associated gas for the system a sure thing as it too was tied to a prediction in

316

Ibid., 3-4.

142

steadily increasing production within the Consortium-operated fields. Even the ability to
pay for the steel mill promised by the USSR was dependent upon the successful
completion of the pipeline project and the ability to transport natural gas to the Soviet
border; failure to deliver on schedule could necessitate other forms of payment and thus
threaten other major infrastructure projects like the construction of new roads,
manufactories, and communication systems.317
Despite the centrality of the Soviet Union to IGAT-1’s genesis, left unclear was
the extent of the country’s involvement in the actual design and construction of the
pipeline and its associated facilities. While consulting engineering firms like IMEG were
of the opinion that the project needed to be designed in its entirety by a single firm, the
original announcement of the deal had indicated that “Soviet technical and economic
assistance will be given…for the construction of parts of the pipeline” and the
“engineering of the second section [from Sāveh to Āstārā].” The USSR was further
expected to provide the gas compressors and pumps for the entirety of the main pipeline,
though IMEG was doubtful of the quality of the equipment the country could provide,
recommending that they be obtained from American or European firms instead.318 What
was agreed upon by all, however, was that the Soviet Union would not be supplying the
necessary pipe for the project because of its own shortages. American diplomats reported
that instead a “firm policy decision” had been made within the Iranian government, based
on the relative cost of importing steel versus finished pipe, to construct a mill of
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sufficient size to produce the pipe needed for the IGAT-1 project. While IMEG and the
Iranian government had already entered into discussions with the German firm
Mannesmann regarding such a project, there were significant reservations surrounding
the advisability of undertaking such a course of action, with some like the representative
of Williams Brothers, a construction firm with branches both in the United Kingdom and
Germany and future contractor on the project, arguing that the cost of building a factory
of sufficient capacity was both cost prohibitive and likely to be underutilized in the years
following the pipeline’s completion. Others like the managing director of the National
Petrochemical Company doubted the whole concept of producing large-diameter pipes in
Iran even in conjunction with a German firm, arguing that “everybody knows” that the
only country truly possessing such a capability was the United States.319 Through most of
1966, the question of how best to supply pipe for the IGAT-1 project would remain
unsettled and in the end it proved to be one of the most significant factors in the
successes and failures of the project.
All told, the entirety of the project and all its ancillary factors was thought
potentially to cost up to one billion dollars, of which only some $286 million was tied to
promised Soviet credit in work and materials.320 There was no clear plan at the time of
the initial agreement’s signing for how the Iranian government was to pay for it. The
main pipeline alone was estimated by various segments of the Iranian government to cost
somewhere in the range of $300 to $450 million,321 and there were significant other costs
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including the gathering system in the oil fields and the refinery needed to purify the
collected raw natural gas. The idea of floating national bonds had been proposed by the
Ministry of the Economy, but there were fears that if Iranians did not embrace the project
and buy them then that would be interpreted as a repudiation of the government’s
policies.322 Thus, as would be true for much of the project, the contours of the IGAT-1
project would be shaped by the need to find foreign financing, strongly influencing the
firms and nations with which the Iranian officials would engage in their efforts to bring
the program to a successful conclusion.
In March 1966, on the orders of the Shah, the Iranian parliament created the
National Iranian Gas Company in order to centralize all affairs relating to natural gas in
Iran and manage the IGAT-1 project. Through coordination with “stakeholder
organizations” like the NIOC, the Ministry of Power, and the Ministry of Industry and
Mines, the explicit goal of bringing together an office to manage the treatment,
transmission, sale, and distribution of natural was to replace the use of oil fuels to the
greatest extent possible, freeing up them up for export and revenue generation.323 The
new company was founded as a subsidiary of the NIOC, though the Prime Minister also
undertook direct oversight through his position as the head of the governing Assembly of
Shareholders. Staffed by employees transferred from the NIOC as well as foreign
consultants, the NIGC assumed responsibility for their country’s gas once it had been
separated from the crude oil alongside which it was extracted, taking charge of mid- and
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downstream operations.324 In the late 1960s their duties largely translated into negotiating
and supervising the IGAT-1 project in the form market research, feasibility studies, and
the choice of contractors for its construction.325 But IGAT-1 was so large and seen as so
crucial to the development of Iran and the plans of the Iranian government that numerous
ministries and official organizations were involved in both the negotiations and ultimate
execution of the project. To coordinate their activities a “high commission for control of
the plan” was organized to oversee the project, composed of the managing director of the
NIOC, the chief executive of the Central Bank of Iran, and the managing director of the
Plan Organization.326 Most major decisions regarding the planning and execution of the
IGAT-1 plan would be made there.

***
One of the first and most significant decisions facing Iranian officials in the
months after the signing of the January 1966 agreement with the Soviet Union was
whether or not to produce the pipes needed for the IGAT-1 project domestically, a course
of action that would necessitate the construction, for the first time, of a pipe mill
somewhere within the country. Far more than a simple question of technical or financial
maximization that American observers had alluded to when describing the project,
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whether or not Iran should invest in the mill and to what extent it could or should be
relied upon went directly to the heart of the sometimes conflicting motivations that drove
Iranian officials and their organization when it came to the IGAT-1 program. At stake
was every aspect of the project, from the pipeline’s carrying capacity to its financing
arrangements to even the extent to which the project’s own best interests would be
subordinated to the Iranian government’s broader industrialization goals.
Within a few weeks of the signing of the agreement between Iran and the Soviet
Union, officials had begun searching for a source for the pipe needed for the IGAT-1
project. They concentrated their efforts in Europe, contacting firms in Austria,327
Czechoslovakia, and Germany.328 Despite the interest of Austrian pipe producers in the
project,329 the field was quickly winnowed down to German offers to produce the pipe
within Iran even with persistent doubts on the part of some NIOC officials as to the
wisdom of relying upon a single “foreign company.”330 The idea of a producing pipes at a
mill inside Iran quickly became a powerful force and, with the Shah’s personal interest in
the matter, a “comprehensive report” on the plan’s feasibility was “studied and approved”
in late May 1966.331 By this point an American entrant, Torrance Machine and
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Engineering of Los Angeles, a small firm specializing in the construction of pipe mills
and equipment of their own design for the production of pipes, had also submitted a
proposal. On. 15 June 1966 NIOC officials assembled in the office of the Prime Minster
to discuss the competing offers. The German proposal, offered by a group comprised of
Mannesmann AG and Thyssen AG, was considered a poor prospect, requiring an
investment of $15 million to produce pipe costing a “very high” $228 per ton. The
proposal from Torrance was significantly more attractive, requiring only an $8 million
investment to be able to produce 311,000 tons of pipe per year at price of $199 per ton.
Such a price was considered to be very competitive with the average price per ton of
purchased pipe delivered to Bandar Shāhpur (now Bandar Imam Khomeini), the likely
port of entry for any foreign purchases. With the oil industry’s interest in the project, the
creation and management of the pipe mill was put under the supervision of the NIOC and
it was decided that the company and Torrance would enter into negotiations and pursue
financing through the Export-Import Bank of the United States.332
Torrance’s proposal described a mill that would utilize imported sheets of steel to
manufacture 20,000 tons of pipe18- to 42-inches in diameter per month at a site near
Ahvāz where it could take electricity from the Muhammad Rezā Shah Pahlavi Dam (now
the Dez Dam).333 The company estimated that the factory could be up and running within
nine months, producing some 10,000 tons of pipe in its first month of operation before
ramping up to full-rate production thereafter. The proposal set a target of 315,000 tons of
332
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pipe, with some 83 percent ($165) of the $199 per ton tied to the costs of steel and its
transportation to Ahvāz; the remainder went to operating costs and the wages of the 260
Iranian and 30 foreign employees. In addition to the lower costs associated with both the
initial investment and the final product price as compared to the Mannesmann-Thyssen
proposal, Torrance’s offer was deemed “more suitable” for its notably shorter timeline,
nine months from groundbreaking to initial operation as opposed to twenty-one, a quicker
ramp to full production, and the ability to produce longer sections of pipe, 65 feet rather
than 40 feet.334 The nine-month schedule was seen as very ambitious by the IMEG
evaluators, but confidence was built by Torrance’s established reputation for establishing
facilities quickly and their willingness to take a twenty percent stake in the facility.335
Mannesmann-Thyssen’s offer did have certain advantages, most notably a willingness to
extend credit for the entirety of the project as well as a willingness to supply the
necessary steel sheets directly.336 While Torrance was willing to invest twenty percent of
the expected construction costs, they were not willing to extend a line of credit to the
NIOC nor supply the raw steel from their own factories, leaving it to Iranian officials to
find both.337
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In the opinion of IMEG, however, which had been tasked with analyzing the
proposals, the entire idea of establishing a pipe mill in Iran was suspect. It was their
opinion that the

installation of a pipe making factory in Iran, from the perspective of the IGAT-1 plan is
not affordable (based on the purchase of pipe from abroad) and relying on domestically
manufactured pipes will possibly delay the work program.338

Nor were the analysts convinced that the pipe could be supplied for as low as $199 per
ton, estimating that it might be some ten to fifteen percent higher, enough to make
manufacturing the needed pipe in Iran more expensive than importing. With a domestic
and regional market of unknown but likely limited size for large-diameter pipes, an
additional investment of $2 million would be needed to transition the factory to produce
for the more robust bazaar for medium-diameter pipes after the completion of the IGAT1 project. Therefore from “the perspective of the economy of the IGAT-1 plan,” IMEG
wrote, “ordering the factory is not justified,” possibly being the cause of delays and
higher costs. Nonetheless, if one of the goals of the IGAT-1 program was the
“encouragement and advancement of industries,” as opposed to solely the transport of gas
to Iranian cities and the Soviet border, and should “the government be willing to tolerate
damage and danger to the project,” then the construction of a pipe mill in Iran could be
“justified.” Should the Iranian government wish to move forward with the pipe mill, then
IMEG estimated that an agreement would need to be reached with Torrance before the
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end of June 1966 for the mill to be able to supply the majority of the material needed for
the IGAT-1 project.339
At a meeting held amongst high-ranking Iranian officials340 on 16 June 1966, the
decision was made that the difference in price between pipe manufactured in Iran versus
purchases abroad was “marginal.” Thus, with
attention to the government’s policy on encouragement of domestic industry and the
creation of work for Iranian workers, it was decided that action be taken for the
construction in Iran of the pipe factory proposed by the Torrance Company.341

In response to this decision and the Shah’s order that “immediate action be taken for the
establishment of the proposed factory” it was decided that ownership, minus the 20
percent stake Torrance would hold, would be given to the NIOC.342 Production targets for
the new factory were adjusted as well, with the goal becoming 200,000 tons of pipe
produced in Iran. The expected remaining 100,000 tons needed for the IGAT pipelines
would be sourced abroad.343 Two days later on 18 June, the order was given for a letter of
intent to be signed between the NIOC and Torrance committing the latter to “fully
construct, install, and commission” the mill within twelve months, which was signed
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within three days, and a founding charter for the Ahvāz Pipe Mill Company be drafted
and deposited, officially committing the Iranian government to the project.344
The choice to establish a pipe mill in Iran was a crucial one for the IGAT-1
project, one that carried significant financial and scheduling risk for the program as a
whole. That the decision was made was reflective of the fact that IGAT-1 project was
never solely about the provision of energy to Iranian consumers. It was embedded in a
larger matrix of developmental ambitions on the part of Iranian officials and the
governmental organization of which they were part. From conception as part of a deal for
a steel mill to implementation through a pipe factory carrying significant risk, the yearslong unfolding of the IGAT-1 project was thus never divorced from the broader stakes of
Iranian industrialization.
Those developmental ambitions quickly manifested themselves in a debate on the
scope of the pipe mill project and the maximum size of pipes that it should be able to
produce. While IMEG’s design for primary IGAT-1 pipeline called for a maximum
diameter of 42 inches, further study of the pipe mill had found that with an extra
$400,000 investment in the factory, machinery could be purchased that would enable the
production of 48-inch diameter pipe.345 Senior Iranian leadership like Prime Minister
Hoveydā was tempted by the prospect of possessing one of the few facilities able to
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produce such large-diameter pipe346 and IMEG was again directed to evaluate the newly
altered plans. The $400,000 price tag was not inclusive of the different tooling needed to
produce such large pipes, but without firm orders for the material, the evaluators judged
that delaying the additional expense for tooling was the most prudent course of action.
Few orders were expected in the near future for the use of larger pipes was difficult for
contractors and “experience in the use of pipe above 42” diameter” was “very
limited…and the difficulties of handling it are considerable.”347 There was nonetheless
thought that Iranian development projects would need very large diameter pipe in the
future and acquiring the capability to produce such material could offer significant
efficiencies.348
Despite the worries of IMEG’s engineers regarding the advisability of expanding
the pipe mill to handle large-diameter pipes, the Soviet delegation sent to negotiate the
IGAT-1 project was pressing for the size of the main pipeline to be increased from 42 to
48 inches, offering to take the extra gas that the line would transport. Soviet experts saw a
48-inch pipeline as the most “suitable,” particularly as there was already discussion of
expanding the pipe mill. Since the original choice to use a 42-inch pipe had been rooted
in part in the amount of gas to be exported to the USSR, Iranian officials were willing to
consider the change, but their adoption of the modification would depend on
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1—The amount of investment for the government of Iran. 2—The supply of needed
sheets of metal and the possibility of installation of large 48-inch pipes that would require
importation of machinery from the West. 3—The period it would take to implement the
plan and the date of the commencement of delivery of gas to the Soviet Union.349

In any case, moving to produce 48-inch pipes would involve a considerable set of
complications, not least that another round of study and engineering would be required.
Nor was the necessary equipment for handling such large pipe present in Iran,
necessitating the purchase of new equipment from abroad. Most significantly, no matter
how much study was performed or where the equipment was obtained, the larger pipe
was harder and more expensive to work with, potentially delaying the pipeline’s
completion and putting the success of the entire project at risk.350
Delay was a significant worry for Iranian officials, and their efforts to avoid it
extended to the search for financing for the pipe mill as well. In late June 1966 it was
decided, despite the opposition of the Central Bank,351 that the original plan to obtain
financing through the Export-Import Bank of the United States would take far too long
and that working with American commercial banks was a better course of action.352 With
Torrance providing some $800,000 and the NIOC $3.2 million in cash for the mill, that
left approximately $7.5 million in needed financing.353 All told, the total cost of the
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construction of the mill itself—at this point some $11 million, including the additional
cost of the medium-pipe facilities—was a relatively small portion of the total amount
needed for the IGAT-1 project and it was felt that even private banks would be able to
accommodate the request.354
Far more significant was the cost of the steel sheets needed to supply the pipe
mill. Financing needs were expected to reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars for
the steel, and Iranian officials were already negotiating with European and Japanese firms
and governments on the matter.355 The expense of the sheeted steel meant that its
purchase could not be separated from the broader financing of the IGAT-1 project and
firms from the United Kingdom, France, and Italy quickly pushed their way to the fore of
the bidding process largely because Iranian hopes to gain access to financing from their
parent governments and the large amount of other material expected to be procured
there.356 This ran counter to previous decisions to put bids out for tender, but the
overwhelming need for financing overrode previous concerns.357 During a trip to the
three countries in June 1966, Iranian negotiators met with representatives of both private
firms and government officials, seeking not only the purchase of equipment but
significant lines of credit lasting a decade or longer. Even with IMEG estimating that the
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IGAT-1 pipelines would require 340,000 tons of pipe and hopeful that some 320,000 tons
could be produced in Ahvāz, firms in the three nations were not interested in selling steel,
preferring instead to try fruitlessly to convince the Iranian negotiators to abandon their
plans for a pipe mill and buy pipes from them instead.358
In the end, six different British, French, and Japanese firms would be contracted
to supply steel for the plant359 and by the fall of 1966 the NIOC had chosen a site for the
factory and was on the verge of purchasing it.360 But by October of that year significant
disagreements had developed between the NIOC and Torrance. The American company
had been refusing the NIOC’s request that their contract stipulate that failure on the part
of Torrance to meet specified targets would be sufficient to invoke guarantees without
going through legal or arbitration processes. While Iranian officials were concerned about
their upfront payments of $4.27 million and sought assurances of their ability to recover
it should the project go awry, they were more concerned that complications could delay
the entire IGAT-1 program and wished to be able to easily replace Torrance should
problems arise.361 Knowing that the Iranian government feared delay, Torrance resisted
their demands by extending negotiations until the lines of credit that had been made
available were about to expire and threatening to undo months of work. To avoid such an
outcome, Iranian negotiators accepted Torrance’s position and on 25 October 1966 a

358

Ibid.,, 1-8.

“Summary of Activities Accomplished of the IGAT-1 Pipeline through 2/9/1346,” no document
number, undated, p. 6); Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz.
359

360

Letter from Manuchehri to Eqbal,, 3/gl/1789, 8 Mehr 1345, p. 1; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz.

361

Report from Manuchehri to Eqbāl, 3/gl/1769, 5 Ābān 1345, p. 1-4; Tarh-e Ehdās Shāhluleh-ye Gāz.

156

contract for the construction of the Ahvāz Pipe Mill was concluded, though later
complaints to the American embassy prompted the U.S. State Department to pressure the
company to amend the contract to the NIOC’s liking.362
Despite the opposition of IMEG to the prospect of supplying IGAT-1’s pipe needs
from a domestic manufactory, by the fall of 1966 Iranian officials, driven by broader
developmental goals that extended beyond a natural gas pipeline, had fully committed to
just such a course of action. The debates and negotiations that had led to Iran’s signing of
a construction contract with Torrance were far from unconnected to those that would
shape IGAT-1 in its totality. They instead demonstrated some of the most salient factors
that would shape the project, including the importance of long term industrialization
goals in the thinking of Iranian officials and their willingness to accept significant risk to
achieve them; the deep dependence of the NIOC and other Iranian ministries on foreign
expertise, credit, and manufacturing for nearly all aspects of the project; and the
intertwining of technical and financial decision making.

***
Design and planning for the primary IGAT-1 pipeline began soon after the initial
agreement had been signed between Iran and the Soviet Union. During the spring of that
year Iranian officials worked with IMEG consultants to devise a scheme by which to best
manage what was understood to be a long and complicated process. This extended to
their own design efforts, and by May 1966 it was decided that the “work will be divided
into convenient sections,” as with a “project of this size it follows that the whole of the
362
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engineering and preparation of specifications cannot possibly be finished in a short
time.”363 Far from a mere convenience, the logical divisions chosen in these early stages
would shape the entirety of how IGAT-1 would be contracted and constructed. IMEG
determined that the pipeline project was best divided into sections related to the gas
gathering system, the main pipeline, distribution networks, and ancillary services, each
further subdivided into smaller units. The main pipeline, for example, had sections from
the then-expected collection point of Behbahān to Isfahan, Isfahan to Sāvah, and Sāveh to
Āstārā, with spurs running to Qom, Kāshān, and Tehran.364 While these sections were to
be treated and let equally, there would quickly come to be a distinction made between the
southern portion that ran between the southern gas fields and Sāveh and then a northern
portion from Sāveh to the Soviet border, one that exactly mirrored the original plan to
transport gas to Iran’s cities and the later extension of the line to carry exports to the
Soviet Union as well. In practice the southern portion of the pipeline would be given to
European firms for construction and the northern to the Soviet Union, a decision that
would have important consequences in the following years.
The extensive foreign financing that was expected to be needed for IGAT-1
exerted tremendous influence over the project’s planning because of the fact that “credit
for construction and installation can only be generated in the country of origin of the
materials involved.”365 This restricted the choice of suppliers to countries whose
I.J. Bowler, “IGAT – Note on Procedure to be adopted for the letting of construction and supply
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governments were willing and able to extend credit worth hundreds of millions of dollars
to Iran. While certain more complicated financing schemes not tied to countries of origin
were deemed possible, they were felt too difficult to be worth pursuing. Furthermore, due
to the size and complexity of the project, IMEG considered it “unlikely that any one firm
would be considered qualified for both the supply and construction of any section” of the
project and they therefore encouraged interested firms into national groups that combined
suppliers and construction contractors.366 They proposed that the NIOC request bids from
groups based in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States,
chosen because, unlike Japan which was also considered, there existed both competitive
suppliers and firms that would “qualify for acceptance on the IGAT bid.”367
In early July 1966 it was decided that IMEG, as the primary designer of the
pipeline, would inquire after its major components in the selected countries, aiming to
find the lowest possible price.368 It was considered “essential to place certain critical
material on order before installation and construction contracts can be let” as IMEG and
the NIOC had chosen an ambitious schedule for the project.369 Pipe for the Behbahān to
Isfahan and the Isfahan to Sāveh segments, for example, needed to be ordered by midJuly 1966 in order to be available for construction scheduled to begin in December 1966
and May 1967 respectively. Anticipated construction times were long as well, with the
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line from Behbahān to Isfahan expected to take nearly two years to build and Isfahan to
Sāveh nearly eighteen months. The northern portion of the line was no different, with
initial orders needing to be placed quickly for a nearly two-year period of construction
scheduled to begin August 1967. Similar timeframes for ordering and construction were
expected for all aspects of the project, from gas treatment equipment to compressors to
telecommunications. Rather than a strict sequential unfolding of the project’s
construction, IGAT-1 and its associated systems of gas gathering, treatment, and
distribution expected to be built with significant concurrency. Most portions were to
begin construction some time in 1967, a few as early as the fall of 1966, and none later
than mid-1968, all with an eye to bringing the system to life in 1970.370
Through the summer of 1966 the careful attention to scheduling was accompanied
by detailed analyses of potential vendors and contractors from the previously selected
countries. By this point the IGAT-1 system’s physical structure was beginning to come
into focus. The gathering system would encompass a network of pipes of varying size
linking the well heads to a gas treatment plant before being compressed, via the “largest
ever built” turbo compressor, and injected into the main line. As would be true for the
majority of work on the system’s southern sections, most of companies being considered
for this section were French and British.371 The pipeline was to be comprised of four
major sections: two 42-inch diameter segments from Behbahān to Isfahan and the Isfahan
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to Sāveh with spurs to Qom, Kāshān, and Isfahan; a 38-inch section from Sāveh to
Āstārā; and a 28-inch spur from Sāveh to Tehran. European firms like Williams Brothers
and Entrepose dominated the list of firms deemed potentially suitable for the construction
of the gas gathering system and the main pipeline. The latter was particularly
troublesome as there were “very few pipeline contractors with the necessary experience
in large diameter high tensile pipe” able to handle the “considerable technical problems”
that they presented. In many ways the main IGAT-1 pipeline was on the forefront of
pipeline technology and engineering, being far larger than most and expected to cross
hundreds of miles of very difficult and mountainous terrain. In the summer of 1966 only
130 miles of high-pressure gas lines of 42-inch diameter had been built in the world, and
those lengths ran over “easy country.”372 Not all of the work was expected to be given to
firms based in Western Europe. Despite the opposition of IMEG to the prospect, rooted in
perceived technical deficiencies,373 the Soviet Union remained the likely supplier of
compressors for the primary pipeline. Further, while nearly every aspect of the major
gathering, refining, and transmitting sections of the project were to be given to nonIranian companies, it was “recommended” that work on the city gate stations—the
facilities where the high pressures used to transport gas very long distances through the
primary pipeline network were released in order to make it ready for local distribution
networks that used lower pressures—for Tehran, Isfahan, Kāshān, and Qom as well as the
industrial distribution networks for those cities be given to domestic contractors with the
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cooperation of the NIGC.374 These were not the only Iranian companies that could see
benefit from the construction of the project as it was expected that

as much opportunity as possible should be taken of local manufacture for IGAT...[as
there] are a whole variety of items such as structural steel work, low pressure vessels,
tanks, plumbing components and perhaps heat exchangers and so on which with careful
attention during the design stage could be fabricated in Iran.375

All told, IMEG expected the construction costs for the IGAT-1 project to amount to
$327.4 million376 and involve numerous suppliers and contractors from around the world.
Largely unaccounted for in this analysis, however, was the Soviet Union.
Negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union were still ongoing come April
1967. Despite the extensive work that had already been undertaken in the previous year
regarding the design and planning of the IGAT-1 system, discussions regarding even the
most basic of choices like the amount of gas to be delivered were still ongoing. Soviet
and Iranian negotiators had already agreed to the delivery of 10 billion cubic meters of
gas per year to the USSR but were still discussing whether to raise that figure by an
additional 20 billion cubic meters per year, an amount that might necessitate the
construction of a second pipeline to run alongside IGAT-1.377 Nor was the route of the
main IGAT line settled, as Soviet negotiators pressed again for an alteration of the route
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to run through Zanjān and Tabriz rather than Qazvin and Āstārā. Such would be far from
a simple alteration. The shift would add approximately 295 kilometers to the distance
traveled, a decision that would stress the project’s supply of pipes as well as the
capability of the compressor stations on the line. Iranian negotiators resisted the
alteration, arguing that it would significantly delay the line’s opening in 1970. They were
more open to the idea of a second line, though they emphasized that “the construction of
a second pipeline was not just for the transmission of gas to the Soviet Union,” but also
for “future plans…that natural gas be used as fuel in the cities and villages along the
route…in the west of Iran,” demonstrating that the logics that had originally inspired the
IGAT-1 project continued to operate amongst Iranian decisionmakers.378

***
Also remaining unsettled in 1967 was the precise source of natural gas for the
pipeline. Despite Soviet efforts to push for gas prospecting in Iran’s northern regions, it
was long expected that the system would be fed with associated gas produced in the
Consortium-operated oil fields. While flared gas was believed to be capable of meeting
the original demand associated with IMEG’s purely domestic design, it was not clear
whether it would also be enough to supply the agreed upon amount to the Soviet
Union.379 IMEG’s original plan had envisioned an internal Iranian demand of some 200
million cubic feet per day in 1970 rising to 400 million in 1976, to which was added 1050
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million cubic feet per day for export.380 In order to meet the demand of some 1400
million cubic feet per day, the Consortium firms considered three potential options, all
employing associated gas from the Gachsārān, Āghā Jāri, and Mārun oil fields after it had
passed through existing and planned liquid gas separation units. Distinguishing the three
options were the number of such units at each field and, ultimately, the total volume of
gas available daily, the amount of liquid gas produced, and the total costs. In all cases the
remaining lean gas would be passed to an Iranian gas refinery for treatment and the
excess flared. Deemed most suitable was a scheme that drew most heavily from
Gachsārān, with Āghā Jāri and Mārun playing lesser roles.381
The use of associated gas from the Consortium-operated fields posed some
difficulties, for while the NIOC was legally entitled to the use of gas for domestic
consumption, any export projects required Consortium approval. Nor was the
consultants’ concern for the production of liquid gas a coincidence. While the
Consortium companies were willing to consider accommodating the needs of the project,
there were nonetheless disputes regarding Consortium desires to produce liquid gas from
the associated natural gas that was expected to be fed into the main IGAT-1 pipeline.
This did not sit easily with Iranian officials, who angrily responded that since 1954

the NIOC had desired that the Consortium members use the southern gas resources for
the production of liquid gas, and they had claimed that for lack of a sufficient market they
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would not undertake such action. Now that the [Iranian] government has found a market
they now claim it.382

IMEG supported their position, arguing that without any such oversight it would be
difficult to know the exact chemical characteristics of the gas, something that might
shorten the lifespan of the pipeline.383 Ultimately, IGAT-1’s gas gathering system was
designed so that gas produced at the wellhead was piped to natural gas liquid separation
units to remove heavier hydrocarbons like propane and butane which were in turn sent to
facilities in Bandar Māhshahr for the production of liquid gas for both export and Iran’s
domestic market. 384 The remaining gas, stripped of its heavier elements, was then
transported to a natural gas refinery at Bid Boland. Constructed as part of the IGAT
project between 1968 and 1970 by the British firm Costain & Press at a cost of $44
million,385 Bid Boland would become one of the “largest and most modern” gas refineries
in the world and the “central core of the Iranian gas industry,” dehydrating and treating
the remaining sour gas to remove the acidic hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide.386 Once
treated to specification at Bid Boland,387 the gas was then injected into the primary
IGAT-1 pipeline for transport to Iranian cities and the Soviet border.
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***
By late November 1967, some 90 percent of the project’s design work had been
completed, including the surveying, routing, and designing of the primary pipeline,
gathering system, and gas treatment facilities. Also completed was the design for the
compression system and the choice of necessary equipment, though significant alterations
had been made to this subsystem. At the urging of Soviet experts, the decision had been
made to install all the compressors at once rather than in stages as had been originally
planned, a course of action that would pose significant challenges for completing the
pipeline on schedule. Proceeding apace with the design work was the sourcing of
materials, and some $108 million worth had been ordered to be delivered to the port at
Bandar Shāhpur; from there agreements had been made with Iran’s railroad to deliver
pipe to the construction sites and steel to the Ahvāz Pipe Mill.388 A large number of
contractors had been chosen as well, most notably the French firm Entrepose for the
construction of 400 kilometers of 42-inch primary pipeline between the Zagros
Mountains and Kuh-e Namak near Sāveh, a 110 kilometer branch line to Kāshān and
Qom, and 45 kilometer spur to Isfahan; Williams Brothers Germany for 147.5 kilometers
of 16- to 42-inch pipe for the gathering system; Williams Brothers Great Britain for 169
kilometers of 42-inch pipeline through the Zagros Mountains, an extremely difficult
stretch; and Costain for the Bid Boland gas refinery. Contracts had also been concluded
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with a host of other firms for various ancillary services, including Nesbi Naqsheh
Bardāri, the first private mapping company in Iran, hired to survey the route between
Kuh-e Namak and Āstārā. Conspicuous among the hired firms was IMEG, retained for
services for the “design, engineering, logistics, management, examination, consultation,
cooperation, and planning for the Iran Gas Trunkline” as well as the 16-inch branch line
to Shirāz.389 With the exception of some important yet ultimately auxiliary services, Iran
was entirely dependent on foreign firms for the IGAT-1 program. As true as that was for
the actual construction of the line and its associated facilities, few firms were as central as
IMEG to the project. From its initial conception as an endeavor aimed at purely meeting
Iran’s growing energy needs to its adaptation for export delivery to all the scheduling,
engineering, and design work entailed in meeting those goals, IMEG was given
responsibility. As Iranian as IGAT-1 was in its motivations—from a desire to utilize a
wasted national resource to a focus on domestic energy consumers to its role as an engine
of industrialization—in terms of its actual engineering and design, the project was as
much IMEG’s as anyone’s.
Despite construction work already getting underway on the southern portion of
the line by late 1967—Williams Brothers Germany had cleared 50 kilometers of pathway
for the gathering system and Entrepose likewise for the main pipeline—negotiations
between Iran and the Soviet Union had stalled. Even with “lengthy” and “detailed”
discussions being held in both Moscow and Tehran, the expected contracts for the
construction of the line between Kuh-e Namak and Āstārā and the provision of turbo
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compressors for the pipeline’s pressurization had not yet been signed, causing Iranian
officials to open up discussions with Entrepose to take over construction of the northern
segment as well.390 As early as the spring of 1966, Iranian officials had repeatedly
impressed upon Soviet negotiators that their desired schedule for the IGAT project was
extremely tight, but as late as October 1967 Soviet delegates continued to refuse to
advance final work plans or personnel requirements. At issue was the division of work.
Early on it had been decided that NIOC, likely through the services of a third party later
decided as Entrepose, would be responsible for “a large series of auxiliary tasks” that
would accompany the construction of the line. Soviet equipment and personnel would
only be tasked with actual installation and welding of the line, by this point enlarged from
thirty-eight to forty inches in diameter.391 Delays further continued as the Soviet
representatives sought to personally review the entire route with senior Entrepose
engineers. In November 1967 negotiations almost broke down over the Iranian
delegation’s flat refusal to accept Soviet demands regarding worker housing in Iran,
including the construction of neighborhoods for workers and their families in cities like
Qazvin and Rasht, the provision of air conditioners, and various accommodations to
ensure the safety of families and “maidens.”392
With such breakdowns threatening the entire project, in the following months
negotiations were elevated to the ambassadorial level. By that point, Soviet delay had
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thrown off the scheduled contract signing by nearly two years and the original agreement
signed in January 1966 that had called upon the Soviet Union to perform advisory and
training work as well as deliver equipment was scrapped in favor of negotiating a new
one focused solely on the construction of the Sāveh-Āstārā and Sāveh-Tehran lines and
the delivery of compressors for the entirety of the main pipeline.393 By February 1968
talks were again deadlocked over costs. Iranian negotiators had offered $58.7 million
while the Soviet delegates had been asking for $63.5 million, a difference large enough to
prompt Iranian officials to begin thinking of alternative arrangements.394 At root the issue
was whether Iranian payments for the work on the pipeline’s northern section would be
tied to the amounts paid to Williams Brothers and Entrepose for their sections. Iranian
negotiators considered their offer more than generous, as the original price negotiated
with the European firms reflected their need to access credit, the expenses associated with
using it, and a ten percent profit for the firms.395 For their part, Soviet representatives
argued that the circumstances of the work were different, particularly the need to clear
forests and cross rice fields. Eventually, however, the Soviet ambassador acknowledged
that their original offer had been high due to their lack of experience in undertaking
foreign contracts and that “friends of the Soviet Union” should not “pay the penalty” for
such failings.396 The Iranians too altered their position, offering to add ancillary costs like
393
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the construction of branch roads, the transportation of equipment within Iran, and the
extra expenses associated with crossing 104 kilometers of rice fields and clearing 53
kilometers of forest to the overall contract price.397
The overriding concern for Iranian officials remained that the negotiations be
concluded quickly “since an important portion of the Fourth [Development] Plan,”
meaning the steel mill and portions of the IGAT-1 system, was slated to be undertaken
“with the cooperation of the Soviet Union.”398 There was a third obstacle to an
agreement, however: the amount of foreign exchange Iran would need pay. Throughout
the IGAT-1 planning and construction process Iranian officials had steadfastly sought to
minimize the amount of payments that would need to be made in hard currency,
preferring instead to use lines of credit wherever possible and minimize the potential risk
to the budgets of the country’s broader developmental initiatives.399 It was therefore the
preference of Iranian officials that the Soviet Union assume responsibility for the
northern portion of the line and subcontract portions of their work or, failing that, to
reduce the amount of hard currency the Iranian would be required to pay.400 Soviet
officials were unwilling to reduce the amount of foreign exchange they required, though
in March 1968 they did agree to take payment for the line’s turbo compressors—34 of
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them housed in eight stations, each generating 11,500 horsepower—in the form of
credit,401 some $50 million to be repaid in the form of natural gas.402
By the spring of 1968, however, with construction on the northern portion of the
pipeline scheduled to begin in July rather than January of that year, the entire IGAT-1
project had been delayed by some six to ten months, pushing the initial date of operation
from January to October 1970. But delays in their negotiations with the Soviet Union
were far from the only difficulty facing the IGAT-1 program. While it had been
originally expected that only 25,000 tons of pipe would need to be imported for the
project with the remainder produced by the Ahvāz Pipe Mill, delays in finalizing the
contract with Torrance had raised the import requirement to 100,000 tons. The production
machinery had only just arrived and was in the process of being installed as of March
1968, but in any case it was the opinion of Japanese experts hired to address the facility’s
problems that the factory would never produce more than 12,000 tons of pipe per month,
far less than the 20,000 tons originally expected.403 The mill’s output hit early snags as
well and it would not be until July 1968 that it could even hit its reduced production rate
of 12,000 tons of pipe per month, putting it significantly behind schedule and increasing
the foreign orders of pipe to some 242,000 tons.404 All told, the Ahvāz Pipe Mill
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Company only produced some 70,000 of the approximately 500,000 tons of pipe needed
for the IGAT-1 project, with the remainder imported from Europe and Japan at
significant extra expense.405 Imported pipes were not without defect either, however, as
“brittling” had developed “on three inches at the ends of 42” pipe supplied by Japan,”
discovered only after 54 kilometers had already been laid, putting Williams Brothers
behind schedule.406
In the end, problems with scheduling and the pipe mill pushed the IGAT-1 project
overbudget and behind schedule. Iranian officials and IMEG consultants had faced
considerable challenges with the program. Difficulties included the “lack of any kind of
stable foundation for the design,” uncertainty regarding the exact source of associated
natural gas, the need to place orders for major components without having completed the
design phase, the complicated financial arrangements of the project and the need to
reduce outlays of hard currency, and the “integration and welding” of numerous
stakeholders and contractors.407 One of the most significant was the decision to increase
the size of the 500 kilometer section of the main pipeline from a 38- to a 40-inch
diameter, a decision that greatly increased the costs of steel and pipe. At other times
events beyond the control of Iranian officials played a role, as happened with the Suez
ambiguity regarding when and how much pipe was ordered, I have chosen to accept the American
diplomat’s reporting, knowing that the ultimate figure of imported pipe was neither.
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Canal was shut due to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, pushing the price of importing steel and
pipe higher than expected.408 Considering that unlike many large projects, IGAT-1 had its
designing, materials ordering, and construction combined into a single “very compressed
plan,”409 its successful completion in 1970 was reflective of the commitment of the
Iranian government to the project.
Growing from IMEG’s initial estimate of roughly $350 million, by early 1969
IGAT-1’s total cost was estimated to have doubled to nearly $700 million dollars,410 a
figure that would ultimately stand as the project’s final tally.411 Despite the reported
anger of the Shah upon hearing this figure,412 the project was nonetheless considered a
success by those who worked on it. Sa’id Naqavi, a senior NIOC engineer working on the
project, wrote that “unlike what is common for plans similar to IGAT-1, from the
beginning…[Iranian officials] point less to aspects of economics and profits and…more
in the direction of correct implementation and timeliness.”413 The project’s significantly
higher costs initially made the domestic gas market, where prices were set higher than
those earned via export, much more important than originally envisioned for recouping
the investment. Nonetheless, in the wake of the 1973 Oil Shock and the quadrupling of
oil prices, the Iranian government successfully demanded an increase in the price that the
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Soviet Union was paying for the gas it received, going from 30.8 to 57 cents per 1000
cubic feet, and again to 76 cents in 1978. All told, between 1970 and the cessation of
exports in 1980, Iran sent some 70 billion cubic meters of gas to the Soviet Union,
earning approximately $1.2 billion.414

***
From its start in the mid-1950s through the completion of the IGAT-1 pipeline in
the early 1970s, the efforts of Iranian officials to utilize their country’s natural gas
resources encompassed a broad array of initiatives including petrochemical plants, longdistance gas transmission lines, and experimental distribution systems. Far from being a
product of only the NIOC and NIGC, the broader developmental project of gas was the
product of numerous governmental agencies. Institutions like the Ministry of the
Economy and the office of the Prime Minister were instrumental in the decision making
and negotiating processes of both national programs like IGAT-1 and regional ones like
the Shiraz Chemical Fertilizer Factory. None of Iran’s grand natural gas projects,
however, were entirely the product of Iranian institutions. Particularly for IGAT-1, where
IMEG played an essential role in nearly every aspect of the program’s conceptualization,
design, and implementation, Iran’s natural gas projects encapsulated the expertise and
effort of dozens of firms from around the world. Far more than merely demonstrating
Iran’s reliance on outside aid for its industrialization policies, objects like the IGAT-1
pipeline and its attendant systems were the physical condensation of that expertise, the
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finances of numerous banks, and the politics of numerous states from around the world.
Ownership of these infrastructural systems and the motivations for their construction
were fundamentally Iranian, born of a desire among Iranian officials to both capture and
exploit the natural and national wealth of their country and further its industrialization,
taking steps where decades of negotiation with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the
later the Consortium firms had failed. They were also more than that, a way to link the
prehistoric hydrocarbon deposits of Iran’s south to emerging urban polities hundreds of
miles away hungry to partake in an energy-intensive future.
As the story of natural gas consumption in Shiraz also demonstrated, the
dynamics of gas utilization in Iran were strongly influenced by provincial and local
actors. It was there that tensions first arose between the technically and economically
efficient prioritization of urban and industrial consumers and the political and national
claims of ordinary Iranians to the benefits of gas energy. It was only through the
sustained efforts of figures like the governor of Fars and the mayor of Shiraz over years
of time that the city finally saw Iran’s first city gas network. While national organizations
like the NIOC focused heavily on the large-scale consumers like the fertilizer plant and
other industrial units in the city, a pattern that would be repeated across much of Iran in
the 1970s in the wake of IGAT-1’s completion, there was a parallel movement to bring
the benefits of natural gas energy to a broader swath of the population. In later years, in
response the pattern of gas distribution across Iran, that same tension between the large,
nation-spanning projects that were emphasized by the Pahlavi state institutions and the
desire of small-scale Iranian consumers to use gas would be a driver of important and
revolutionary politics in Iran.
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Chapter 3
National Arteries:
Discursive Constructions of Gas in the
Late Pahlavi Era

In his 1961 book Mission for my Country, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of
Iran, wrote that the “growing role of oil and gas presents us Persians with a great
opportunity,” one that would enable Iranians to “help raise the standards of living both
here [in Iran] and all over the globe” and reassert “our national sovereignty.”415 The
Shah’s words, emphasizing the twin goals of development and national independence,
reflected the significant hopes that many Iranians projected onto their country’s
petroleum resources. Even more than oil, natural gas came to represent profound
imaginings of Iran’s future. In the decades prior to the 1979 revolution, the country’s
exploitation of natural gas and the technological systems that enabled its use became
fertile grounds for political meaning making. Imagined by some of Iran’s most influential
figures was a future powered by gas, one where Iranian industries and citizens drew
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deeply upon the natural wealth that lay trapped under their country’s earth and burned it
as fuel for an ever-intensifying modernity.
In the speeches of Iranian officials, their interviews with the press, and the pages
of publications from organizations like the Ministry of Petroleum and the National
Iranian Oil Company, an imaginative tale about Iran was narrated. It was a dramatic story
of national progress, one told through a lexicon of development that found consistent
expression in a triumvirate of image, word, and statistic.416 Political performance
underlay nearly every aspect of that imaginary. Whether it was the soaring rhetoric of
quick progress, rapid economic growth, and increased living standards; the striking
photographs of sophisticated technologies and towering constructions; or the presentation
of the numerical embodiments of the enormous distances traversed and volumes moved
by Iran’s gas system, the spectacle of gas was routinely tied to the Shah and his policies,
serving as a potent legitimator for the imperial government.417 At root, the sociotechnical
imaginary of gas that was at work within the Pahlavi government shaped what was built
and when, while at the same time revealing a vision of what Iran’s social order should
Saying that “every policy issue…has a culture,” William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani argue that
different policy positions are expressed through “media packages,” collections of “metaphors,
catchphrases, visual images, moral appeals, and other symbolic devices.” Organized around a central idea
or “frame,” packages offer “a number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and
positions in shorthand.” Regarding the policy issue at hand—whether Iranian natural gas should be used
and how—several genres of photography, particular turns of phrase, and an almost rote repetition of
important statistics served this purpose. For more see William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media
Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach,” American Journal of
Sociology 95, no. 1 (July 1989), 2-3.
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become in the modern age. Made largely invisible were those who labored to build the
vast constructions that would produce and carry Iranian gas energy. Their absence was
filled by the materiality of infrastructure itself, seemingly autonomous agglomerations of
metal and concrete birthed and directed by Iran’s political leadership and expert
classes.418
For the experts who worked in Iran’s state ministries and petroleum sector during
that time, gas was similarly more than a means to supply energy to Iranian society,
serving political ends as much as it did technical. The edifices of steel and concrete used
to capture, purify, and transport gas would be proof of the ability of the Pahlavi state to
make Iranian prosperity, marking the modernity for which the technologists aspired as
not only one of technical advancement, but also one created by Iranians for their own
purposes. Iranian officials, and the foreign experts they employed, may have been
constrained by the realities of geography and material property, but that did not stop their
decisions and the systems they built from both reflecting and influencing a politically
charged vision for Iranian society. In the sociotechnical imaginary that shaped the
engagements of Pahlavi-era officials with their country’s petroleum, gas was seen as a
way to simultaneously make and assert Iranian advancement. Petrochemicals and their
short-term rewards may have been the beginning, but their relatively meager
consumption of gas meant that other, even more ambitious, dreams of the energy source’s
Rooting her thought in Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined communities and its adoption by various
scholars housed under Science and Technology Studies, but also drawing on other thinkers as far afield as
Machiavelli, Jasanoff argues that “performances of statehood in modernity are increasingly tied to
demonstrations and to public proofs employing scientific and technological instruments.” In other words,
the performance and splendor of technological development and scientific advancement can serve as a
powerful source of legitimacy for governments and rulers. For a more detailed discussion see Jasanoff’s
“Future Imperfect,” p. 5-14.
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potential quickly became most prominent.419 Through their imaginaries of gas, the
technologists of Iran’s state organizations tied their country to a vision of national
progress that was measured in refinery capacity built, thousands of kilometers of pipeline
assembled, and millions of cubic feet of gas produced and consumed. Gas and its
infrastructure became monuments to development, highly visible and aestheticized
expressions of the state-centered modernization projects of Pahlavi Iran.420 Though
bound by the world’s physical realities, the designers of Iran’s gas system built it to
further certain political and social goals, ends that found expression not as consequences
of gas energy, but as integral and co-constitutive parts of its very implementation in Iran.

***
Official conceptions of Iran’s gas found extensive expression within the
publications of the National Iranian Oil Company. In numerous periodicals and books for
both company employees and the general public, Iranian gas projects were prominently
imagined, described, and celebrated within a broader context of nationalist
modernization. One of the most comprehensive was Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, “the
George T. Ballou, “Natural Gas in the Eastern Hemisphere—Recent Developments,” in Proceedings of
the Seminar on the Development and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources: with Special Reference to the
ECAFE Region, pp. 27-30 (New York: United Nations, 1965), 29.
419

420

The nexus of state power, developmentalist thinking, and aesthetic considerations has been explored
most notably by James C. Scott. Through a series of case studies, Scott describes a high modernist impulse
that not only seeks to make societies governmentally legible, but also aesthetically ordered. While the
pipelines and refineries that comprised Iran’s natural gas infrastructure were not the utopian cities or village
schemes that Scott focuses on they, their articulation through the official media of Iran’s state ministries
and state-owned petroleum companies nonetheless evinced much of the same preoccupation with the
“administrative ordering of nature and society” and the “self-confidence about scientific and technical
progress” (p. 4). On a broader scale, much of Iranian developmentalism both before and after the 1979
revolution, whether secular or Islamist, has demonstrated a commitment to the sorts of top-down, statedriven policies that Scott describes. For more see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
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monthly journal of the personnel of the Iranian oil industry,”421 which reported
extensively on the plans and projects of the Iranian petroleum industry between April
1962 and the 1979 revolution. Always celebratory in nature, the mostly unsigned articles
emphasized the achievements of the NIOC and its subsidiaries in areas as diverse as
petroleum reserves discovered and worker education programs initiated. A global
perspective was threaded throughout the magazine’s pages. Nāmeh not only continually
assessed Iran and its petroleum industry in relation to those of other nations, but also
published translations that described enviable qualities of industrialized societies or
explained some amazing scientific advancement. Throughout its run, the magazine
employed an implicit developmental hierarchy that cast highly industrialized EuroAmerican nations as models to emulate and developing regions as potential beneficiaries
of Iranian leadership and expertise. Particularly during the 1960s, the magazine described
the widespread use of gas energy as something expanding rapidly in the world’s wealthy
nations and all but absent in the remainder. Iran’s vast natural gas resources and the
NIOC’s efforts to harness it thus differentiated Iran from the rest of the so-called Third
World, enabling it to both catch up with the world’s wealthy nations and be a conduit of
that same modernity to other underdeveloped regions. In this way, gas, according to
Nāmeh, was the means by which Iran would both develop and prove its modernity.
The magazine published one of its earliest articulations of natural gas’s promise in
February of 1963. In an article on the then under construction Tehran oil refinery, natural
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This description of the publication appeared on the title page of the very first issue of the magazine,
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disappearing entirely in later years.
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gas was described as an important supplemental fuel and spur toward economic growth.
In the early 1960s, the NIOC was grappling with a growing rate of oil consumption that
was threatening to choke off Iran’s economic growth through endemic shortages. Iran’s
oil utilization had more than tripled in the decade between 1949 and 1959, from
approximately one million tons per year to 3.5 million tons, and working from the Third
Five-Year Development Plan, they predicted that total Iranian oil consumption would
reach 13 to 14 million tons per annum by the end of the decade.422 More than 90 percent
of oil products consumed by Iranians were produced at the huge refinery in Iran’s
southern city Ābādān at the time,423 before being loaded onto trains at Ahvāz and shipped
north.424 While distribution shortages in Iran’s central and northern provinces loomed as
the country’s oil transportation system reached saturation,425 even more worrying than the
prospect of rationing for NIOC experts were the increasingly imbalanced consumption
patterns of oil products. As was reported in Nāmeh,

Analysis of the prior situation of the consumption of the four major products [diesel,
kerosene, gasoline, and fuel oil] shows that the consumption of diesel primarily, and
kerosene secondarily, have increased more than the other major products. This rapid
increase has now made the proportion of products derived from crude oil unbalanced. In
this context, if measures are not adopted…Iranian exports from Ābādān refinery will be
fundamentally damaged.426
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Exposed here were the two basic and competing demands that the NIOC faced with
Iran’s industrialization: it was expected to provide inexpensive fuel to meet the increasing
needs of the country—“amongst the most important of duties that have been placed on
the National Iranian Oil Company”427—while also facilitating the oil exports that paid for
the government’s modernization schemes.428 To alleviate the crisis, the NIOC laid plans
to reduce its dependence on the Consortium-operated fields in southern Iran and increase
its own ability to provide oil products from outside the concession areas. Toward that
end, the NIOC chose in the early 1960s the “economical” and “technically-correct”
option of constructing a new refinery just south of Tehran to be fed by the NIOC-owned
and operated Alborz oil field in the northern outskirts of Qom, a city some 125 kilometers
south of the capital.429 First struck in 1952, the Qom field was without realistic prospects
for export, potentially allowing the NIOC to fulfill its simultaneous duties of supplying
the country’s growing energy needs while also freeing up southern oil for sale abroad.
While it would be years before the refinery, designed and built by a consortium of
European firms, would be completed,430 Nāmeh’s article signaled the budding of an
initiative for the NIOC to independently supply much of Iran’s energy needs, one that
was seen to go beyond the oil products that the new refinery was slated to produce.
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Natural gas was included too, and the discovery near Qom of the 30 billion cubic meters
of gas reserves at the Sarājeh field in 1958 was celebrated as “one of the greatest
achievements of the NIOC.”431 Nāmeh saw gas as having numerous benefits, including
that

1) the air pollution of Tehran will be reduced; 2) a cheaper fuel will be available to
consumers; 3) the life and durability of fuel-burning devices will be increased; 4) the cost
of repairing and maintaining fuel-burning devices will be lessened.”432

Work to make the gas resources into practical sources of energy had already begun, and
the article further reported that feasibility studies had determined that constructing gas
pipelines from the Sarājeh and Alborz fields to Tehran could mean significantly lower
energy costs for the region, no matter if the gas was burned directly at industrial centers
or converted into electricity at power plants. Whether that would also be true in the
surrounding cities of Qom, Sāveh, Kāshān, and Isfāhān was still being determined.433
Nāmeh’s article on the Tehran refinery demonstrated that even amidst the
construction of new oil infrastructure, natural gas was still seen as having significant
economic and environmental advantages over other fossil fuels, underlying the
importance of the resource to the NIOC’s energy imaginary. In September 1964, a year
after its piece on the Tehran refinery, the magazine made the point in even clearer terms
with an article titled “The Breadth of the Domain of Natural Gas.” Employing “large
industrial” countries like the United States as referents, Nāmeh articulated a vision of gas
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woven throughout the entirety of modern society.434 It described American uses like the
heating of chicken coops, the firing of steel and glass furnaces, and as fuel for the ovens
of industrial bakeries. Natural gas was the basis for numerous products of the chemical
industry: plastics, synthetic rubber, synthetic fabrics, fertilizers, explosives,
pharmaceuticals, and dyes. It had purified the interiors of people’s homes, for “in modern
(jadid) kitchens the use of gas-burning stoves has eliminated the smoke and filth that
accompanied older stoves and turned kitchens into clean and beautiful rooms.” Far from
being a simple turn of phrase, the aesthetics of gas were fundamental to how it was
understood in 1960s Iran. There was beauty in the cleanliness of a modern kitchen, as
there was in the spectacle of conspicuous energy consumption. Nāmeh’s article marveled
at the use of gas flames for the “ornamentation” of restaurants and shops in the United
States and the use of gas for eruptions of fire and water in Hollywood productions. For
the article’s anonymous authors, gas was not a source of energy to be hidden behind a
mask of electricity or a raw resource to be tucked away in distant factories; it was to be
celebrated as an embodiment of Iran’s national aspirations, its use both a goal and means
of Iranian modernization.435
Nāmeh’s lauding of gas was not confined to words. Media like illustration and
photography, often allied with the text of articles but not always explicitly tied to their
discussions, were also crucial means by which the NIOC’s hopes and expectations for gas
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were communicated.436 Beyond mere visual aid, such work involved choosing how a
substance that could not be seen with the naked eye would be rendered visible. Gas,
largely intangible outside extreme conditions, came to be represented by both the final
uses to which it could be put, and the technically advanced refineries and pipelines used
to produce and transport it. The NIOC publications of the Pahlavi era were marked by
this aesthetic condensation of gas, and massive assemblages of metal and expertise came
to signal the presence of gas as both physical substance and modernizing impulse.437 By
reading these images for the specific ways in which the technologies of gas were
depicted, the implicit ideas about what modernity should mean for Iran that underlie them
are also made legible.
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Drawing
on the
monumental scale
of gas energy’s
physical
infrastructure, its
techno-scientific

Figure 1

advancement, and the intimate spaces of the home, the three photographs that
accompanied Nāmeh’s 1964 article made extensive use of this visual idiom. Two
photographs flank the opening two-page spread of the article and work together to
portray gas as a clean and technically advanced source of energy. Dominating the first
page is a photograph of the Ābādān refinery’s liquid gas (gāz-e māyeh) loading point,
where road tankers would have their holds filled before beginning the long trek to Iran’s
northern cities (Figure 1).438 Like the official representations of petroleum infrastructure
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around the world, the unadorned image emphasizes the technical infrastructure of gas,
placing the
gleaming storage
tanks and ordered
delivery lines at the
front and center; in
the background, the
cracking towers and
smoky flares of the
refinery rise into a flat sky. Devoid of workers,

Figure 2

the photograph leaves the industrial apparatus to
stand alone and claim responsibility for the
availability of gas in Iranian society. Through
the medium of photography, the machinery of
gas served not just its technical function of
dispersing liquid gas to waiting tankers, but also
to remind viewers of the sophisticated
technology and expertise needed to utilize it. If

Figure 3
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gas was the emerging lifeblood of modern societies, as the article argued, then Iran had
already mastered the foundations of it. 439
Opposite the image of the refinery at Abadan lies a photograph of a smartlydressed young woman sautéing sausages over a white kitchen stove (Figure 1).440 Her
appearance—white skin, coifed hair, pressed knee-length dress, bare arms, and colorful
apron decorated with the months of the Gregorian calendar—were evocative of
contemporary notions of the prosperous domestic modernity of middle-class America.
The graceful lines and groomed appearance of the model alongside the hygienic space
she inhabited emphasized the cleanliness that gas could bring. In contrast to the imposing
infrastructure at the Ābādān refinery, most of the stove itself is cropped out, projecting a
message of invisible convenience within the home.441 “Modern” women preparing meals
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in clean domestic spaces were a common trope in Nāmeh during the 1960s.442 They
illustrated articles that discussed home gas use explicitly, as was the case for one with a
drawing of a fashionable woman cooking at her stove and a photograph of a young girl
manipulating the controls of another (Figure 2).443 Such depictions were also used to
symbolize gas energy in broader contexts. One 1965 article on the Tehran refinery used
the trope to represent liquid gas, placing it alongside images representing products like jet
fuel, fuel oil, solvents, and more (Figure 3).444 No less than the photographs of gas
energy’s machinery, these images, frequently employed to represent the everyday
benefits that the domestic consumption of gas energy could bring for Iranians,
telegraphed ideas about modernity and the NIOC’s ambitions for Iran in it. In this telling,
gas energy was not only associated with the modernity of automobiles and jet aircraft, but
also with a specific kind of domestic femininity and its labor. Encapsulated in the visual
trope of a modern woman that found repeated instantiation in publications like Nāmeh,
gas energy’s promised modernizing transformations were thus as much social as
technical or industrial. The juxtaposition of young women with sleeveless dresses and
442
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uncovered hair with refineries and pipelines bridged the distance between domestic life
and the monumental edifices of industry being erected around the country. In the same
way, the two opening images of “Breadth of the Domain of Natural Gas,” bracketing the
main text of the article between them, joined the huge industrial mechanisms of gas with
the intimate spaces of homes and metaphorically underlined the interpolation of gas
throughout a modern society.
Overleaf, the third and final photograph of the article depicts a bespectacled man
in a long white coat working amidst a crowd of
young chickens. Described as one of America’s
new gas-heated chicken coops, the technology
was praised as allowing a more cost effective
and quicker nurturing of the animals (Figure
4).445 As with the article’s first image, this
illustration emphasized the advanced nature of
gas energy, and the economic benefits that
expert mastery of it portended. But like the
Figure 4

second, it obscured the infrastructure that made gas energy accessible, again casting it as
a convenient, invisible aid. Combined, the three photographs articulate a top-down, statedirected notion of gas energy, one where the NIOC deployed its expertise to build the
monumental constructions of concrete and metal that were the foundations on which a
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new Iran of clean kitchens and precise temperature controls would be built. Proof came
through an evidentiary combination of photography and statistic that would be repeated
time and again throughout the pages of both Nāmeh and other official publications.
Alongside its images, the article deployed statistics and citations of recent developments
within the Iranian gas industry, describing the opening of a gas pipeline to Shiraz and its
related industrial area; a 356 percent increase in natural gas consumption between 1960
and 1964; and a 27 percent increase in liquid gas consumption, driven almost entirely by
demand in Tehran and other large cities, between 1962 and 1963.446 More striking,
however, was the “proof” that the article’s images provided, both that such a vision was
possible, as it was being realized in places like the United States, and that the NIOC was
already making it a reality in Iran. The photographs that Nāmeh presented in its articles
on gas were “proof” because they were presented as such. On one level, the photographs
“proved” that the installations existed as claimed, but their contextual embedding in a
NIOC magazine alongside articles describing operations related to gas also served to
“prove” that a gas-fueled modernity was possible through the work of the company and
the Iranian government.447
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The tense relationship between photographs and the truthfulness of their depictions has been a subject
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Throughout the article, Nāmeh positioned the United States as a model worth
emulating, a developmental orientation that found further expression in the words of the
NIOC’s CEO and Chairman of the Board, Dr. Manuchehr Eqbāl. Born in Mashhad in the
fall of 1909 and educated in Iran and France, Eqbāl had a long and illustrious career in
Iranian politics as a close associate of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. A professor of
medicine at Tehran University early in his career, he began his rise through government
ministries in the chaotic years following the expulsion of Reza Pahlavi in 1941,
eventually coming to serve as Iran’s Prime Minister between April 1957 and August
1960. A trusted associate of the Shah, Eqbāl spent much of his tenure overseeing and
inaugurating developmental projects within Iran, often clashing with Abu’l-Hasan
Ebtehāj, head of the Plan Organization, on the allocation of needed oil revenues. Named
executive director of the NIOC on November 7, 1963, Eqbāl would remain in that
position until his death in 1977, a period that saw the conceptualization and
implementation of Iran’s first major gas projects. While major contracting, price
negotiations, and foreign relations were conducted under the direct supervision of the
Shah during Eqbāl’s tenure, he still oversaw day-to-day operations of the NIOC and

inhabiting an uncomfortable space between naïve assumptions about unmediated access to other times and
places and, what T. Jack Thompson terms in Light on Darkness?, a fully “viewer-centered hermeneutics”
(p. 249) that equally assumes all meaning is created in the minds of viewers. A photograph gains its power
in the interplay between the image, its subject, the viewer, framing devices like text and captions, and even
“the context in which it [the image] is seen” (On Photography, 106). For more discussion of photography
see Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1981); Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973. Reprint,
New York: Picador, 1977); and T. Jack Thompson, Light on Darkness?: Missionary Photography of Africa
in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 2012).
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regularly represented the company, giving word to its ambitions through speeches and
wide-ranging interviews with the press.448
In the mid-1960s, natural gas was central to those ambitions. In an interview
given in June 1965, Eqbāl discussed a 45-day trip to the United States, France, and
Norway that he had taken with the Shah. Proposed and managed by the Pan-American
Corporation, an oil company then operating in Iran’s Persian Gulf waters, Eqbāl and the
Shah met with government and petroleum industry representatives of all three countries.
Eqbāl found his trip to be “profitable,” and expressed admiration for both the impressive
pipelines and refineries of France as well as the sophisticated administrative and technical
practices of Pan-American.449 Visits were paid to the “immense” Lacq gas field in
southern France and the gas-consuming petrochemical plants of Norway.450 Eqbal was
both impressed and upset by what he saw. He was impressed by the productive uses the
three countries had put their natural gas resources to and upset by the lack of similar
application for it in his own country, going so far as to lament the “32 million cubic
meters of gas” that Iran “wasted daily.”451
Eqbāl’s discussions of the countries he toured were more than factual reports, for
they also worked to cast the highly industrialized nations as sources of inspiration for Iran
and the NIOC. From his talk of Europe and the United States, Eqbāl quickly moved to
Ahmad Ashraf, “Eqbāl, Manuchehr,” Encyclopedia Iranica, vol. VIII, fasc. 5, pp. 515-517; available
online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/Eqbāl-manucehr (accessed online on 21 June 2018).
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painting an image of a near future where Iranians too reaped the benefits of their gas
resources. Beginning with the establishment of the National Iranian Petrochemical
Company in 1963, in accordance with the wishes of the Shah and bills passed in the
Iranian Parliament and Senate, and his declaration of the Iranian year of 1344 (19631964) to be the “Year of the Petrochemical Industry of Iran,” Eqbāl underlined the
NIOC’s plans to use the country’s gas resources to feed a chemical fertilizer industry in
southern Iran452 and thereby “send [fertilizer] to the world.”453 But his ambitions did not
end there. Drawing explicitly on the example of France, Eqbāl went on to describe an
expansion of the Iranian petrochemical industry into the realms of synthetic rubber,
plastic, nylon, and, especially, sulfur. To be sited near the active southern petroleum
fields, these manufactories rested on the same commercial logic as the regionallyoriented chemical fertilizer industry: that the combination of the area’s near-limitless
supply of inexpensive natural gas and the ease of ocean-borne transport to nearby regions
would position Iran to supply the ravenously growing demand for petrochemical products
in south and east Asia. Announcing an aspiration to compete with France to become one
of the world’s top suppliers of sulfur,454 Eqbāl underscored that the amount that could be
produced from the sour gases of Gachsārān and Kharg Island rivaled that of the Lacq
field. This hope was telling of Eqbāl’s ambitions for Iran. He may have imagined his
country following in the footsteps of those in the world’s industrialized regions, but it
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would do so as a potential competitor and rival, one positioned not only to emulate, but to
surpass.
Eqbāl’s vision for Iran went well beyond the production and export of chemical
products to embrace gas as a source of energy. Building on his scheme for a
petrochemical industry, Eqbāl expressed hope that Iran would be able to begin producing
liquid gas for both export and domestic consumption within a few years. Animating this
simple desire were the twin ambitions of economic development and Iranian selfsufficiency that animated Iran’s engagement with gas. In the early 1960s, as had been
promoted in magazines like Nāmeh, Iranians had begun to make use of liquid gas as a
source of fuel. Supplies, however, came entirely from imports and the excess of the
foreign-owned and -operated Ābādān oil refinery. Though liquid gas was an inevitable
byproduct of petroleum production, it competed with other oil products for production
priority, a reality that left Iran’s liquid gas infrastructure vulnerable to the shifting
priorities of the Consortium companies. The international majors that operated Ābādān
refinery and Iran’s southern fields had their own pressing demand—to feed foreign
markets—and often responded to domestic Iranian needs only when obliged to do so.
Eqbāl’s desire for the NIOC to produce liquid gas was thus not only a way to meet the
needs of a growing domestic market, but to also wrest control over the supply of energy
Iran needed for its own developmental ambitions.
Eqbāl’s plans were exemplary of a current of thinking within 1960s Iran that
sought to leverage international opportunities to finance and spur development within the
country. From the proposed networks of fertilizer and petrochemical plants through the
pipeline projects that would appear in the late 1960s and early 1970s, foreign markets
195

were crucial to Iranian plans for gas. But officials like Eqbāl never conceptualized their
efforts as piggybacking Iran onto projects fundamentally conceptualized and created for
international customers. Instead, from the start, their ambitions prioritized Iranian needs.
In his June 1965 press conference, Eqbāl described a “very important plan” under
evaluation that was intended to transport natural gas north from Gachsārān to the cities of
Isfahan, Kashan, Qom, and Tehran. Potentially “one of the greatest successes of the
Iranian petroleum industry,” Eqbāl anticipated gas powering “all the factories of Isfahan”
and being burned for cheap electricity in the villages that lay alongside the pipeline’s
proposed route.455 Nowhere in his description of what would come to be known as the
Iran Gas Trunkline (Shāhluleh) was the possibility of gas exports to the Soviet Union or
any other country. Eqbāl instead emphasized the potential benefits that the plan held for
both Iranian industry and citizens, its primary value not in selling Iran’s natural resources
abroad for profit, but in furthering Iranian development. When considered within the
context of Eqbāl’s words, publications like Nāmeh were doing more than reporting when
their articles stated that “the consumption of natural gas in highly-industrialized countries
grows daily,” that “in America, the importance of natural gas is now greater than that of
coal and second only to oil in supplying fuel and power,” or that the United States “had
constructed 687,000 miles of pipelines for the transportation of natural gas.”456 They
were instead positioning the American gas industry as something to be admired and,
eventually, surpassed.
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In a speech given in January 1966 to assembled government and industry officials
at the inauguration of the second oil pipeline between Ahwaz and Tehran, Eqbāl made
clear the NIOC’s ambitions to see Iran build its way into the ranks of major world
nations. Constructed to supply the then-unfinished Tehran refinery with crude oil, the line
would, in the meantime, be used to increase the NIOC’s capacity for transporting
products like liquid gas from Ābādān to the northern provinces. Referring to it as one of
the country’s “vital arteries” and hailing it as the “ultimate cause [mojeb-e nahāyat] of
honor and glory,” he declared that “another step in the direction of the nation’s economic
development” had been taken.457 Eqbāl went on to draw a connection between the ability
of a country to transport petroleum on a large scale and its standing within the world,
saying that,

With the implementation of this plan, the length of pipeline in the country assigned only
for…the supply of domestic consumption is over 3600 kilometers. Iran, in terms of its oil
and gas pipeline network, stands in the same rank as several important countries of the
world.

With his statement, Eqbāl laid bare the developmental hierarchy that underlay his
thinking, using the new pipeline as evidence that Iran was busy claiming a seat amongst
the world’s “important countries.” Eqbāl reinforced the significance of pipelines by
highlighting the NIOC’s planning for “another big and impressive step” for Iran’s
development: a cross-country (sarāsar) gas pipeline, one that would allow “1000 to 1500
million cubic feet daily” of gas that was then being “burned and wasted” to supply
“inexpensive fuel and power for cities, their rural environs [ghasabāt], and…along the
“Goshāyesh-e Khat-e Dovvom-e Luleh-ye Naft-e Ahvaz-Tehran,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol.
4, no. 8 (Dey 1344), 3.
457
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path” of the pipeline itself.458 For Eqbāl, the NIOC’s pipeline network, stretching
thousands of miles across the Iranian landscape, was a means by which Iranians could
both further their country’s development and demonstrate proof of their own
advancement.

***
Coming in the mid-1960s, Eqbāl’s words were reflective of a larger political
narrative then taking shape in Iranian society. A far-reaching program of modernization
and reform known as the White Revolution was getting underway, shifting the basis of
the Iranian monarchy’s legitimacy to new foundations. Though there were competing
understandings of what the White Revolution should be, the fundamental goal that the
Shah settled upon was a reconciliation of the reformist impulses of “modernism” and the
“tradition” that the monarchy represented. This would be accomplished by embodying
the idea of national progress in himself and his policies, thereby coopting the
“revolutionary nationalism” of the Iranian political Left and National Front.459 In this
way, the position of the monarchy could be preserved while the power base of the
traditional elites, their property holdings, was attacked with rhetoric decrying “feudalism”
and a program of land reform. This top-down “revolution,” it was hoped, would forestall
the possibility of a bloody communist revolution while also furthering the reforms the
Shah felt Iran needed in order to become the utopian “Great Civilization” he dreamt of,
one where Iranians enjoyed standards of living comparable to the highest in the world. As
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was the case for Eqbāl, the crucial referents for the Shah were the “advanced” and
“modern” societies of Europe and North America.460 While some of the most visible
aspects of the White Revolution were focused on social relations, land reform, and
education, just as important were Iran’s industrialization and mechanization, two
processes that were central to the Shah’s understanding of progress and modernity.461
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi possessed a fondness for the monumental edifices of
modern society—airports, hydroelectric dams, pipelines, advanced warplanes—and they
were crucial to his vision for Iran’s future.462 More than mere personal rhetoric, the
Shah’s preoccupation with the monumental found its way into how Iran’s ministries and
national companies described their ambitions and the steps they undertook to achieve
them. In no case was this truer than in the relationship between the NIOC and its
subsidiaries and the capacity for gas energy to unlock Iran’s industrialized potential. The
promises of figures like Eqbāl that the NIOC and the Iranian state could provide Iranians
with cheap energy were thus layered with potent political meaning. “Inexpensive fuel”
and the pipelines that carried it were figured as more than drivers of economic progress,
they were also important legitimators of Iran’s ruling hierarchy. Time and again Eqbāl
cast his country’s petroleum infrastructure not only as indicative of the country’s
development, but also as a vast monument to the benevolent leadership of the Shah.463 He
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hailed the NIOC’s role in Iran’s “rapid economic progress” but also took pains to link his
organization, the Shah, and petroleum into a structure dedicated to providing for the
welfare of Iranians. In his telling, it was the NIOC, in cooperation with the other
apparatuses of the government, that worked to heed the “managerial leadership” of the
“vigilant leader of the nation of Iran” and make real his “eloquent idea” for harnessing
the country’s petroleum resources to provide “happiness and a better life for the general
public.” As Eqbāl said,

The efforts and labor I and all the personnel of the Iranian oil industry are ever [focused]
on implementing the commendable orders [of the Shah] to make the best use of the
largest source of Iran’s natural and God-given wealth. With the extension of the
distribution network of oil and gas pipelines, the vital stuff [mādeh] of oil and its
essential derivatives will, with ease and abundance, reach the hands of our compatriots in
the farthest points of the country.464

Eqbāl’s speech ended with the cutting of a tri-color ribbon and the pressing of a button to
start the pipeline, but the sentiments he had expressed—that Iran’s petroleum reserves
were her greatest source of wealth, and that the skillful stewardship of the Shah and the
hard work of the NIOC would see it utilized for the benefit of all Iranians—would
continue to echo throughout Iranian society.
Few projects rivaled the first Iran Gas Trunkline (IGAT-1) for its centrality in the
NIOC’s imaginary of progress and development or for its importance for Iran’s
industrialization. Stretching approximately 1100 kilometers from the Bid Boland gas
refinery in Khuzestān to the Soviet border at Astara, the pipeline was conceived and built
in the late 1960s to deliver natural gas to both the Soviet Union and Iran’s northern cities.
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While the IGAT-1 project was firmly planted in the desire to transport southern gas
northward, its roots ran deeper, connecting to developmental ambitions of decades-long
standing. While the Shah, in response to pressure from American diplomats to be wary of
Soviet intentions, stated in June 1965 that the decision would be made on the “pure” basis
of economics,465 a month later Ahmad Mirfendereski, Under Secretary of the Iranian
Foreign Ministry, emphasized the deep well of feeling on the subject within Iran. On July
6, 1965, Prime Minister Amir-Abbas Hoveydā had given remarks in a press conference
that led the American Charge d’Affaires in Tehran, Stuart W. Rockwell, to believe that
an agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union for a steel mill in exchange for
Iranian gas. In remarking to Mirfendereski that he “hoped he [Hoveydā] had a long
spoon” if he wished to “sup with the devil,” Rockwell queried whether the Prime
Minister’s remarks had been a “trial balloon” to test public opinion. Rockwell reported
that
Mr. Mirfendereski replied that if this had been Mr. Hoveydā’s purpose, he would find
public reaction overwhelmingly favorable to a Soviet-built steel mill. In Iran, as in other
underdeveloped countries, a steel mill is a symbol of prestige and national independence,
and ‘the people’ want one very badly and don’t care who builds it. If Egypt and Turkey
can have a steel mill, why should not Iran?’ The people, said the Under Secretary, are
getting tired of the fact that nothing is done about a steel mill except talk about it. The
government has to take some account of this widespread feeling. The people don’t care
whether a steel mill is economic or not—they just want one.

In Mirfendereski’s view, for many Iranians, a steel mill, or the lack thereof, carried
meanings that went well beyond the economic or industrial benefits it might bring. It told

465

U.S. Embassy Tehran to Department of State, Telegram 1447, 18 June 1965; file INCO-IRON IRAN,
1964-66 Subject-Numeric File, RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National
Archives [hereafter NARA].

201

a story about their country and themselves, one that left them backward and small. As
Rockwell noted,

Throughout the conversation Mr. Mirfendereski stressed the emotional aspect of the
Iranian people’s desire for a steel mill, saying that it was not a reasoned or reasonable
thing. The lack of steel mill is one of the things that makes Iranians feel inferior and
under the thumb of foreign nations. The acquisition of a steel mill would be a sign of
independence and coming of age. Many people in the government have the same attitude
and that is why, although it has been delayed and delayed, the project for a steel mill does
not die but keeps coming closer to possibility.

Without a steel mill, Iranians felt “inferior” to other peoples of the world, left stranded
while their neighbors forged ahead. Whether or not Soviet aid came bundled with strings
and threats—and Mirfendereski noted that “the majority” felt it to be “insulting” that
American officials worried that a few hundred Soviets technicians could destabilize
Iran—the potential danger was of secondary importance to the chance to build a
functioning steel industry. Even more attractive was the prospect of obtaining a steel mill
in exchange for natural gas. As Mirfendereski said in his conversation with Rockwell,

It is likely that the Soviet offer will be much more attractive than anything the West can
come forward with, and the people will not be able to understand it if the Iranian
Government turns down an arrangement whereby Iran could acquire a steel mill in
exchange for natural gas which is now being wasted by burning.466

With the gas-for-mill accord, Iranian officials stood to fulfill their twin goals of obtaining
a long-desired steel mill and putting Iran’s flared gas to productive use. But significant as
well was Mirfendereski’s tying of the mill and its payment scheme to the wishes of the
“Iranian people” in his discussion with the American diplomat. Whether or not many
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Iranians longed for their country to possess a steel mill in any real way, and whether or
not Mirfendereski truly possessed the knowledge that they did, he nonetheless linked the
project to the political legitimacy of the Iranian government. In his telling, the ability of
the Iranian state to bring development to the country was fundamental to its acceptance,
and like fledglings ready to leave their nests, Iranians longed for the industrial
advancement that would enable them set out on their own. Gas was the engine that
promised to drive Iran’s advancement, whether articulated on Eqbāl’s developmental
hierarchy or Mirfendereski’s scale of maturity, one that would work to cement the new
modernizing legitimacy of the Iranian monarchy.

***
In January 1966, the IGAT-1 deal between Iran and the Soviet Union was
preliminarily struck and work commenced. Like the steel mill that it was constructed to
pay for, IGAT-1 and the gas it carried became key pillars in an official NIOC narrative
that linked natural gas, Iran’s development, and the country’s political leadership. As part
of that process, the pipeline itself came to be layered with meanings rooted in, but
nonetheless transcending, the materiality of its existence. That materiality began to take
shape on December 4, 1967 near Āghā Jāri, at a ceremony attended by government and
industry dignitaries. There the Shah himself spoke on the importance of the project,
described his hope for its quick completion, and cut a ribbon to set the “heavy
bulldozers” to work.”467
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Across dozens of articles published between 1967 and 1978 in Nāmeh, the NIOC
celebrated the IGAT-1 project, using it as a vehicle to make claims about what kind of
gas-energy future Iranians would enjoy. It would be a technical and quantifiable one,
where Iranian experts designed and directed a society built upon a base of advanced
technology. Central to this claims-making process was the use of numbers and statistics,
and in many articles appeared an almost formulaic recitation of the size and scope of the
project.468 One article, published a month after construction began, used an unrestrained
flow of figures to cast the project as a sophisticated technical undertaking aimed at
bringing the benefits of natural gas energy to large swaths of Iranian society. It explained
how the finished project was intended to operate, decomposing the complex system into
distinct sections and then describing them with exacting numerical detail. The pipeline
was to be 1100 kilometers from Behbahān to Āstārā, divided into a section of 610
kilometers of 42-inch diameter and 0.53-inch thick pipe from Behbahān to Sāveh/Kuh-e
Namak and a section of 495 kilometers of 40-inch diameter and 0.477-inch thick pipe
from Sāveh/Kuh-e Namak to Āstārā; an “extremely dangerous and arduous” crossing of
the Zagros Mountains began 25 kilometers outside Gachsārān where the terrain sloped
steeply from 500 to 2200 meters altitude; a second difficult section began in the Alborz
Mountains where the path went from 1650 to “a few” meters above sea level near the
Sefid Rud Dam; ten gas-burning compressor stations of 13,400 horsepower each would
468
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be required to move the gas through the pipeline at 1160 pounds per square inch for the
first 125 kilometers and 1030 thereafter; the amount of energy needed to power the
compressors was approximately equivalent to one quarter of the total output of the
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam (now the Dez Dam). The branch lines that siphoned
portions of the gas for use within Iranian cities were described in similar ways: a 16-inch
pipe to Shiraz transporting 70 million cubic feet of gas per day to the city (5 percent of
the total) and 2.4 million to the towns and villages along its path; another 16-inch line
would transport 100 million cubic feet of gas daily to Isfahan and the steel mill (6
percent); two 6-inch diameter pipes to Kashan and Qom for the transmission of 6.5
million cubic feet (0.35 percent) and 7 million cubic feet (0.4 percent) of gas daily; a 30inch diameter pipe to Tehran for 276 million cubic feet per day (20 percent); Qazvin
would receive 22.9 million cubic feet per day, Rasht 23.7 million, Bandar-e Pahlavi (now
Bandar-e Anzali) 5.9 million, Tabriz 47.5 million (a total of 4 percent for the “northern
cities”), and smaller northern towns and villages would get 1.1 million cubic feet per day
(combined with the supply for southern villages for an amount equal to 0.25 percent of
the total). A further 3 percent would be used as fuel for the compressor stations, leaving
61 percent of the gas for export to the Soviet Union.469
The gas that IGAT-1 transported became part of the numerical rhetoric employed
by the article. Nāmeh reported how the pipeline project was designed to make use of the
1.35 billion cubic feet of associated gas being produced in Iran’s Khuzestān region per
day, roughly 450 to 1000 cubic feet per barrel of oil extracted. The Āghā Jāri, Fārs, and
“Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz-e Sartāsari-ye Iran [The Design of IGAT-1],” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e
Iran, vol. 6, no. 8 (Dey 1346), 42.
469
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Mārun oil fields would be tapped first as they were “ready for utilization,” but, if
necessary, the collection network could be extended to the fields of Gachsārān, Naft
Sefid, Bibi Hakimeh, and Pāzenan, the latter on standby to offset temporary shortfalls
until planned underground storage facilities could be completed.470 Natural gas collected
by a spider’s web of small lines fanned out across the oil fields was to be sent to a
refinery at Bid Boland where heavier hydrocarbons471 would be removed before the
remainder was purified,472 dehydrated, and injected into the main pipeline. Nāmeh
highlighted the tight specifications that the gas would adhere to—83 percent methane, 12
percent ethane, 3.5 percent propane, and 1.5 percent butane at a dew point of -10 degrees
Celsius and 1060 BTUs of energy per cubic foot473—a series of figures that betrayed the
unnatural character of “natural” gas. Each day, approximately 600 million cubic feet of
processed gas (rising to 1000 million cubic feet by 1974) was to be sent to the Soviet
border alongside 200 million cubic feet (rising to 650 million cubic feet per day by 1979)
for consumption within Iran.474 More than a reporting of empty statistics, the prominent
recitation of these figures simultaneously announced the ambitious scale of the IGAT-1
project and underlined the techno-scientific expertise needed to make it a reality. The
underscoring of the extensive expertise and intervention necessary to produce the
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“natural” gas that Iranians would use worked to cement the NIOC’s claim to the technical
mastery needed to produce a gas-powered future for Iran.
Huge numbers like those describing the dimensions and carrying capacity of the
network—thousands of kilometers of pipeline, hundreds of millions of cubic feet of
gas—reinforced the monumentality of gas infrastructure that publications like Nāmeh
created with their photographs. It was a monumentality that went beyond a sense of scale
to embrace the physical embodiments of
gas infrastructure, effacing much of the
human and social factors present. In what
would become a consistent characteristic
of Nāmeh’s coverage of the IGAT-1
project, the work and presence of people
were minimized. Nāmeh portrayed the
IGAT-1 scheme as an almost autonomous
system, springing forth from the ambitions
of Iranian officials and operating with selfmanaged efficiency. At stake in the article
was not the directing of the numerous

Figure 5

organizations and thousands of people that had a hand in planning, designing, building,
and operating the pipeline. Rather, it was the command of its physical and technological
manifestation. It was the rolled steel of the pipes, the gleaming towers of the refinery at
Bid Boland, the turbines to generate compression force, and the land to be blasted,
gouged, and smoothed into submission that was the stuff of concern. The article promised
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a near future of technical mastery, one defined not by fashion or democracy or religion,
but by the ability to tame rock and metal in order to erect the “vital arteries” that would
deliver Iran’s new energy source.
Central to the NIOC’s claims was the assertion of the supposed inherently Iranian
character of the IGAT-1 project. The same article in Nāmeh that introduced the pipeline
in early 1968 scarcely mentioned the deep involvement of foreign states and firms in the
design and construction of the system,475 and despite explicitly stating it once,
downplayed the fact that 61 percent of the pipeline’s gas was destined to be exported to
the Soviet Union. Encompassing nearly three-quarters of the article’s first page, a map of
the pipeline’s route exemplified the tendency. Titled “The Route of IGAT-1 from Āghā
Jāri to Āstārā and the Branch Lines of the Cities,” the map is carefully labeled with the
collection fields, compressor stations, and the Iranian cities to be served (Figure 5).476
While it ventured no claim to accuracy, the route, drawn in white over a black
background, nonetheless approximated the eventual path of the pipeline and its branches,
symbolically linking Iranian cities to the vast natural wealth lying beneath Khuzestān.
Left conspicuously unlabeled and unacknowledged, however, was the Soviet Union,
despite its crucial role in the financing, design, and construction of the pipeline. The map
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depicts a network of pipes that linked Āghā Jāri and Āstārā but goes no further, erasing
one of the largest players in the whole project. Nāmeh, Eqbāl, and the NIOC may have
seen pipelines as a crucial measure of modern civilization, but it was equally important
that Iranians themselves lay claim to their creation. IGAT-1 was poised to bring Iran a
step closer to the modernity Eqbāl and the Shah saw as embodied in the “highlyindustrialized countries” of the world, and it would be the experts housed in organizations
like the NIOC and the Plan Organization that would lead it there. The first Iran Gas
Trunkline—measured, mapped, photographed, and described in all of its physical
imposition—would be a monument to that success.
The
rendering of
IGAT-1 as a
symbol of a
particularly
technological
Iranian modernity
continued during
the years of the

Figure 6

pipeline’s construction. In mid-1968, six months after the start of construction, when
Nāmeh provided an overview of the line’s pipelaying operations, in the process
reiterating the Shah’s “emphatic” order that gas, “this great source of fuel and energy,” be
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put to good use.477 The work that Nāmeh described not only emphasized the materiality
of the pipeline, but also its intimate connection to the terrain it traversed. From initial
surveys, to the leveling of the land, to the digging of a trench and the creation of a sandbased substrate for the pipe, the geography of Iran was a crucial feature of IGAT-1’s
story. Iran’s topography determined the pipeline’s physical manifestation in both extreme
and mundane circumstances, from the hazardous crossings of the Zagros and Alborz
mountain chains to the straight sections in Iran’s plains. A photograph illustrated this,
depicting a stretch of pipe, described by the caption as being a section of 36-inch pipe
intended to transport gas from Mārun to the refinery at Bid Boland, dipping and curving
across rough terrain before disappearing amongst dry hills, seemingly dwarfing the small
figures standing near it (Figure 6).478 The pipeline itself, its sections of pipe welded
together but not yet buried, and the landscape—scraped, gouged, and trod-upon by heavy
machinery, marked by the work of human hands yet ultimately defining the course of
their project—assert their primacy in the image. According to Nāmeh and the NIOC, this
was IGAT-1: a thing of steel and dirt and rock, a sprawling system joining northern and
southern Iran, a marriage of technology and land that proved their mastery of the former
and their ability to conquer the latter.479
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In thousands of places the IGAT-1 pipeline was forced to curve and bend, and
each one of those twists and turns was a point of risk for the line’s integrity. With failure
potentially resulting in leakages or explosions, great care and dedicated machinery were
necessary to ensure that the steel pipe sections were not compromised by the need to
bend them. Nāmeh illustrated that expert work with two uncaptioned black-and-white
photographs, the first showing a large section of pipe gripped by a specialized machine
and bent skyward, projecting above Iran’s rough terrain while an unnamed worker,
standing in one-quarter profile, manipulates its controls (Figure 6).480 Adjacent is a
second photograph, wherein a worker, covered in protective clothing and a welding
mask, works to join two sections of pipe. The welding wand and the two sections of pipe
dominate the photograph. The worker himself is marginalized, partially cropped by the
photograph’s edge (Figure 6).481 All three images, while depicting the work necessary to
build IGAT-1, nonetheless prioritize the line’s materiality. The workers depicted are
anonymized and reduced, taking roles subordinate to the pipeline and the machinery of its
construction. In this way, Nāmeh simultaneously elevated the status of the line itself and

manifesting an advanced modernity, much as was happening in regard to Iran’s natural gas pipeline in the
late 1960s. Again, see Macdonald “Containing Oil: The Pipeline in Petroculture” and Levy “The Aesthetics
of Power: High-Voltage Transmission Systems and the American Landscape.”
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reduced that of the workers who built it,482 an
assertion that what defined the IGAT-1 project,
and the Iranian future it had come to represent,
was embedded with the materiality of the line
itself. All the skill and labor and effort that
workers had put into the creation of pipes, the
preparation of the land, and the assembly of
components, was eclipsed the moment the
pipeline came into being.
Figure 7
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University Press, 2007); Bob Johnson, Carbon Nation: Fossil Fuels in the Making of American Culture
(Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2014); and Kaveh Ehsani, “Disappearing the Workers: How
Labor in the Oil Complex has been Made Invisible,” in Working for Oil: Comparative Social Histories of
Labor in the Global Oil Industry, eds. Touraj Atabaki, Elisabetta Bini, and Kaveh Ehsani, 11-34 (Cham,
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
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The diminution of
workers in the photographs of
Nāmeh’s article stands in
sharp contrast to its depiction
of NIOC leadership and the
Shah. One photograph, a
recycled image first shown
six months earlier in the pages of the magazine,483 depicts the Shah, dressed in

Figure 8

a dark suit and tie, marking the start of IGAT-1’s construction as more than a dozen
similarly-attired, clean-shaven men look on (Figure 6).484 The image hinges on the Shah
as he cuts the inaugural ribbon, rendering him identifiable as an individual and, through
the adjacent text describing the Shah’s desire to reduce the “waste” of Iran’s natural gas,
as the impetus for the entire project.485 A similar visual vocabulary animates the article’s
remaining two photographs, both also depicting besuited and clean-shaven men. One

See “Shāhānshāh Āryāmehr Ta’sisāt-e Nowin-e San’at-e Naft ra dar Khuzestān Eftetāh Kard,” Nāmehye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, vol. 6, no. 8 (Dey 1346), 7 for its first appearance.
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“Pishraft-e Sari-ye Sākhtemān-e Tarh-e Shāh Luleh-ye Gāz,” 4.
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Ibid., 4.
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image shows Eqbāl, seated beneath
photographs of the Shah and his consort, as
he met with Soviet representatives to discuss
the construction of IGAT-1’s northern half
(Figure 6),486 while the other depicts Sa’id
Naghavi, Supervisor of the IGAT project, concluding a contract with a

Figure 9

British firm for the supply of equipment for the Bid Boland refinery (Figure 7).487 Named
in the article and highlighted as individuals, both the Shah and the NIOC men are not
forced to compete with the visual gravity of the IGAT pipeline as they carried out their
work. In Nāmeh’s perspective, IGAT-1 was the product of their vision and expertise; they
decided that Iran’s natural gas should be harnessed and determined how that goal should
be won. Together, the six photographs of
Nāmeh’s article defined the IGAT-1 project,
and the modernity that the magazine
carefully embedded in the pipeline, as
determined by the materiality of the pipeline
project and the high-level leadership that
had called for its creation. In this telling, the future of Iran was fundamentally

Figure 10

one of technology and expertise, the stuff of managers and engineers and not the workers
who labored to build it.

486

Ibid., 5.
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Ibid., 6.
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The gas pipeline running from Gachsārān to Āstārā was the centerpiece of the
entire IGAT project, but the grammar of technological monumentalism that defined it in
the worldview articulated by the NIOC radiated outward to touch other all other facets of
the enterprise. Whether it was in the photographs and descriptions of the Ahvaz Pipe
Mill, built to produce the pipe needed for the IGAT line itself, or the gas refinery at Bid
Boland, the same preoccupation with size and technical sophistication manifested itself.
Natural gas and its exploitation animated the entirety of the IGAT-1 scheme and its
taming would reverberate throughout Iran as a symbolic step in the promise of
modernization, part of a conscious strategy of legitimation on the part of the Shah and his
government. Comparisons to highly developed societies were inevitable, and both NIOC
officials like Manuchehr Eqbāl and publications like Nāmeh welcomed them, going so far
as to invite Iranians to witness how quickly their nation was catching up to, and
sometimes surpassing, the “modern” countries of the world. Such was the case in one
article published in early 1969 in Nāmeh that marked the start of the Bid Boland gas
refinery’s construction. The piece framed the IGAT project, and the Bid Boland gas
refinery specifically, as points of pride for the Iranian nation, comparable to the famed oil
refinery at Abadan. As it says,

When speakers from the oil industry come, ordinary people normally imagine the
refinery at Abadan…[as] the existence of the great installations of Abadan is one of our
national glories and all Iranians honor it. But in recent years, other glorious installations
and bases (baniān-ha) of this venerable industry have been founded, including the
loading terminal at Kharg, the IGAT-1 line, and the Tehran refinery. Now, with the start
of the gas industry in Iran, another center of operations named Bid Boland, the location
for the construction of the great installations for the purification of gas, increases in
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stature (ghad bar miafzāyad) and in that same first step, will encompass the largest and
most modern purification units in the world.488

While natural gas and its infrastructure were part of a broader trend of expansion and
increased sophistication within the Iranian petroleum industry in this view, they
nonetheless stood apart as notable achievements. The gas refinery at Bid Boland not only
brought Iran to the level of advanced nations in having a gas refinery, it propelled the
country ahead of them. The refinery did not just exist, it was “the largest” and “the most
modern” too. But as with the IGAT-1 pipeline, the importance that attended being large
and modern was manifested in a quantified way. A long series of numbers proved the
greatness of the Bid Boland refinery: five purification units, to later rise to nine; 240
million cubic feet of gas refined per day; “giant” 32-meter purification towers, each
weighing 200 tons; 150,000 kilowatts of electricity consumed; and much more.489 The
familiar genres of photographs appeared here as well, with one photograph showing a
group of dignitaries inaugurating the refinery’s construction and two others depicting
massive towers and refining units dwarfing the miniscule workers that appeared near
them (Figure 8).490 As with the IGAT-1 pipeline, the significance of the Bid Boland
refinery for the NIOC went beyond its utilitarian role in the provision of natural gas in
Iran. In its numerical and photographic monumentalism, Bid Boland was not just proof of
its own existence as a piece of functioning infrastructure, but of the NIOC’s ability to
produce it, making the dream of Iranian progress a reality.
“Āghāz-e Sākhtemān-e Tasfiyeh-khāneh-ye ‘Azim-e Gāz-e Bid Boland,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e
Iran, vol. 7, no. 9 (Bahman 1347), 14.
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***
The textual and
photographic idioms
employed by Nāmeh to
describe Iran’s gas
infrastructure were
mirrored in other
petroleum industry
publications. Often book-length, these works offered broader perspectives on

Figure 11

the Iranian gas industry than did the articles of Nāmeh, but nonetheless evinced similar
preoccupations with monumentality, numerical evidence, and Iran’s political leadership.
They went so far as to deploy the same statistics
and, sometimes, even the same photographs.
Published in the mid-1970s, the NIOC’s San’at-e
Gāz-e Iran (The Iranian Gas Industry) epitomized
in its sixty colorful pages the rhetorical currents at
work. Aimed at making “visible” the “great and
brilliant phenomenon” of the White Revolution to
the Iranian public,491 the text fielded an impressive
Figure 12

array of statistics, descriptive text, and full-color

National Iranian Oil Company, San’at-e Gāz-e Iran (Tehran[?]: Enteshārāt-e Ravābat-e Omumi-ye
San’at-e Naft-e Iran, 1352), 3.
491
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photography to demonstrate the integral role of gas in the country’s ongoing economic
and industrial development. The metal and concrete of projects like the Bid Boland gas
refinery and its associated pipeline again took center stage, rising into the air and crossing
rivers (Figure 9, 10, and 11).492 They were essential in order to process and move the
huge quantities of gas needed to supply, as the publication predicted, nearly a fifth of
Iran’s energy needs by 1977,493 a prediction it
dramatized via the inclusion of graphs with
spiking trend lines (Figure 12).494 The book
described plans that would make this new
energy source available to the citizens of
Tehran,495 Shiraz,496 Mashhad,497 Ahvaz,498and
countless towns and villages,499 a new future of
“happiness and prosperity for the Iranian
people,” as Manuchehr Eqbāl stated in his
foreword, “born only [through] the steadfast
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Figure 13

will and awesome effort of the great leader of the country” and “accomplished at the
hands of the experienced and tested personnel” of the NIOC.500 Even this rare
acknowledgement of the work undertaken by NIOC employees was overshadowed by the
association drawn between Iran’s gas projects and its political and managerial leadership.
Two black-and-white photographs depict laborers, shown filling liquid gas canisters and
loading them onto the back of a truck for delivery, a number exceeded by images of the
Shah alone (Figure 13).501 The book’s final section discusses labor only in terms of
“human resources,” emphasizing the programs the NIGC had undertaken to train its
workforce and reporting aggregate figures via charted statistics.502 Discussions
surrounding the potential provision of piped gas to cities and towns followed a similar
script, emphasizing city-wide maps and photographs of urban gas gateways503 rather than
the system’s endpoints within homes and businesses. While lacking the monumentalism
depicted in the publication’s array of color photographs of the IGAT-1 system, these
discussions continued to prioritize the material aspects of gas infrastructures, linking
them into a bipolar arrangement with the country’s leadership and casting Iran’s future as
one created by its political and managerial classes.
Nor was unreality a barrier to the employment of these rhetorical techniques by
NIOC media. Projects that existed only on paper were often described in similar terms in
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Generally sited on the outskirts of urban areas, these gateways sat as intermediaries between the crosscountry network of arterial, high-pressure pipelines and the low-pressure capillaries of urban gas networks.
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books like Naft va Zendegi (Petroleum and Life), published by the NIOC in 1972 as part
of the International Book Year,504 a United Nations initiative aimed at helping close the
“serious imbalance between the developed and the developing countries” in book
production.505 The work was a compilation of four talks given by “experts of the Iranian
oil industry” at NIOC public events506 and aimed at “the lovers of study and research”
(deldādegān-e motāl’aeh va tahqiq), “academics,” “educators,” and “all the people of
Iran.”507 Addressing Iranian oil and gas in both domestic508 and international
perspectives509 and aimed at non-specialist audiences, the talks compiled in Naft va
Zendegi were lavishly supported by maps, charts, and photographs. Facts and figures
were interwoven throughout, giving what were, in many cases, descriptions of planned
but not-yet-built pipelines, refineries, and gas networks a sense of solidity they otherwise
did not yet possess. The maps and measures presented did more than describe the plans of
organizations like the NIOC and NIGC: they temporarily condensed an imagined future
into something almost tangible, providing readers a sense not only of possibility, but
inevitability.

National Iranian Oil Company, Naft va Zendegi (Tehran[?]: Enteshārāt-e Ravābat-e Omumi-ye San’at-e
Naft-e Iran, 1352), foreword by Manuchehr Eqbāl, n.p.
504
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René Maheu, “Books for All!,” UNESCO Courier (January 1972), p. 4.
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Naft va Zendegi, introductory poem “Dar Sāl-e Jahāni-ye Kitāb” by Amir Navidi, n.p.

See Jahānbakhsh Zamāniān’s “The Role of the Distribution of Energy in the Economy of Iran” (p. 5-35)
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Even books written for children traded in the same developmental vernacular.
Gāz—published in 1973 as part of the tenth anniversary of the inauguration of the White
Revolution by the Iranian
Ministry of Education
and Training as part of a
series of books aimed at
elementary school
students and printed to
the tune of 50,000
copies—explained
Figure 14

natural gas and its utility in a simple language suitable for young readers.510 Devoid of
the kinds of numerical proof that Nāmeh often employed, the book nonetheless promoted
the same monumentalism, prioritization of physical infrastructure, and elevation of Iran’s
political leadership that were the hallmarks of official discussions of gas. Gāz focused its
attention on the huge systems that refined and transported Iran’s natural gas, explaining
that prior to the creation of the IGAT-1 system “all of Iran’s natural gas disappeared” and
that “the design of IGAT-1 prevents the waste of gas.”511 It described the Bid Boland
refinery as “one of the world’s largest gas refineries” and the “center of Iran’s gas.”512 It
told a tale of the Shah traveling to the Soviet Union to make a deal with the Soviet Union
Ministry of Education and Training, Gāz; Kitāb-hā-ye Khāndani barāye Dāneshāmuzān-e Dabestān
(Tehran[?]: Vezārat-e Āmuzesh va Parvaresh, 1351).
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so that “the great wealth that had for long years gone to waste, after Iran’s White
Revolution, was placed in the service of the country’s economy and development.”513
From the cover through the five black-and-white photographs appearing in the work, the
edifices of the IGAT-1 project rose into the sky and crossed rivers, their imposing
physicality enhanced by photographic composition to the detriment of the few faceless
workers that appeared in them (Figure 14).514

***
As with Manuchehr Eqbāl’s press interviews and general-audience NIOC
publications, Gāz worked to disseminate beyond industry circles a particular
understanding of what Iran’s gas should mean for its future and its politics. Through the
end of the Shah’s era in 1979, they continued to articulate a vision of gas energy that
emphasized its technical modernity and huge scale, presenting the expansion of gas use
within Iran as a crucial step in the pursuit of a modernity on par with even the most
advanced nations of the world. It was a model of development rooted in the belief that
Iran could and should be made modern through the leadership of Iran’s upper echelons. It
was a new strategy of legitimation for the Iranian monarchy, but it was also reflective of
a preoccupation with the technological manifestations of the modern world and the
expertise needed to master them. The industry’s special status as the economic engine of
the country, its place as a major point of contact between Iran and the outside world, and
as an object of particular attention from the Shah, meant that developments within it
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reverberated far and wide within Iranian society. Influential figures like Eqbāl and the
Shah did not shy away from hailing the ability of natural gas to transform Iran. Time and
again they proclaimed its importance: lamenting the tragedy of its waste, underlining the
potential of Iran’s huge reserves, and hailing the steps taken toward its exploitation
through both their words and policies. Gas energy was Iran’s future, for it was abundant,
cheap, and clean, and perhaps more important than all, modern in a way that other fuel
sources were not.
But the sociotechnical imaginary represented by Nāmeh and other NIOC
publications was not universal. Hegemonic though it may have been in official discourse,
a differing current ran through Iranian society during the same period. Quickly becoming
intertwined with revolutionary feeling, that stream was focused more on the distribution
of gas and who would benefit from it, a perspective that interrogated issues of citizenship
and belonging through the contours of gas provision in Iran. Such views would find
increasing expression as the 1970s came to a close and would fully flower in the wake of
the 1979 revolution.
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Chapter 4
A Ghoul at the Gates:
Natural Gas and Urban Air Quality in Iran

On 27 November 1973, Lt. Gen. Mohsen Hāshemi-Nezhād, commanding officer
of Iran’s Imperial Guard, issued a memorandum to Javād Shahrestāni, the Minister of
Roads, and Gholāmrezā Nikpey, the mayor of Tehran. Hāshemi-Nezhād reported that
while descending into Mehrābād Airport on November 18, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the
Shah of Iran, had noted the clouds of smoke produced by the asphalt workshops lying to
the west of the airfield. Concerned that the pollution emitted by these factories could
affect the air quality of “all of Tehran,” the Shah ordered that “these workshops and
furnaces will change location.”515 Responding the next day via urgent letter, Nikpey
promised to oversee a reduction in the factories’ emissions and reported that he had
already gone to visit the sites that morning. Rather than move, the factory owners pledged

Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Mohsen Hāshemi-Nezhād to Javād Shahrestāni, 508-14-21-10, 6 Āzar
1352, attached to letter m/2080, 7 Āzar 1352; Tabdil-e No’-e Sukht-e Kureh-hā-ye Ājorpazi-ye Atrāf-e
Tehran beh Gāz (340-72), Shahrdāri-ye Tehran, National Archives of Iran, Tehran [hereafter Tabdil-e No’e Sukht, NLAI].
515
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to install exhaust scrubbers; switch from fuel oil to diesel;516 and, eventually, as the
owners themselves pursued in requests to the National Iranian Gas Company less than
two weeks later, to convert their facilities to use natural gas.517
This brief episode took place against a backdrop of growing concern among
Iranian elites over the worsening air quality of Iran’s urban areas. While many Iranian
commentators wrote of “the environment” (mohit-e zist) and increasingly dire threats to
it, their thinking was more often focused on a particular concern for air pollution. Seeing
the polluted cities of Europe and North America as dire warnings for Iran’s future, many
Iranians came to see environmental degradation and the air pollution that most
powerfully symbolized it as threatening the fundamental validity of their country’s
modernizing project. Iranians experienced the period between 1945 and 1980 very
differently from much of the world. While many cities in industrialized countries saw
dramatic improvements in their air quality during that period, particularly after 1970,
Iran’s urban areas experienced the opposite. The substitution of oil for coal in the world’s
wealthy nations, combined with new air quality regulations that largely began to come
into force in the 1960s, produced a substantial clearing of urban air.518 Iranian cities,
however, had seen comparatively little coal use. The widespread introduction of oil fuels
was thus experienced not as a reduction in atmospheric pollution, but as a sharp increase.

Letter from Gholāmrezā Nikpey to Lt. Gen. Mohsen Hāshemi-Nezhād, m/2080, 7 Āzar 1352; Tabdil-e
No’-e Sukht, NLAI.
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For a succinct discussion of the global history of air pollution see chapters three and four, particularly
pages 58 through 81, of J.R. McNeill’s Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the
Twentieth-Century World (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000).
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In response, during the 1960s and 1970s, Iranians working in state institutions and
the national petroleum companies began to aggressively seek ways to address the
increasingly visible air pollution that cloaked their skies. Many focused their attentions
on the capital Tehran for both its political and social significance, as well as the
particularly intense blanket of pollution that often lay above it. Iranians stressed the
human experience of living within a polluted environment, decrying the contamination
that blotted the sun, irritated the eyes, burned the lungs, and caused cancer. Residents of
Tehran remembered their city’s past, expressing nostalgia for its clear skies and mountain
vistas, contrasting their memories with rhetorical and photographic idioms of pollution
that emphasized smoke, haze, and threat. For Iranians, air pollution was as much a
sensory and aesthetic experience as one rooted in intellectual notions of contamination
and health. Its tragedy lay not only in the physical ailments that accompanied its
presence, but in the spiritual ones as well, where feelings of ugliness had replaced those
of beauty.
Tehran’s particular vulnerability to air pollution was rooted in a mix of social and
environmental factors. The city’s rapid growth and disproportionate share of Iran’s
industrial development mingled with its arid climate and location in the foothills of the
Alborz Mountains to produce comparatively strong concentrations of pollution that could
linger for days and weeks. In emphasizing Tehran’s highly visible struggles with smoke
and smog—as opposed to other pollutants like dust—Iranian experts and policymakers
were drawn to remedies that prioritized the reduction of pollutants produced by the
combustion of fossil fuels. In this they sought safe harbor not in a retreat from their
industrialization and modernization policies, but in an intensification of them through the
226

provision of natural gas fuel. Particularly for the factories and workshops that heaved
black clouds over the city, natural gas quickly became the solution of choice, a way to
replace what Iranian commentators saw as dirty oil fuels with an energy source that was
“cleaner” and would, supposedly, require a minimum of modification to existing systems
and policies.
Efforts to move Iranian industry to gas thus began in the early 1970s in the cities
of Tehran and Shiraz. It would not prove to be an easy road. Marked by significant delays
and uneven progress, the project repeatedly foundered on the shoals of cost and the need
to import most of the necessary equipment. Nonetheless, the persistence of institutions
like the National Iranian Gas Company, the municipality of Tehran, and the Fars
provincial government, often spurred by directives emanating from the office of the Shah,
assured slow progress. Factory owners played an important role, and while some were
either deeply invested in the work or wholly resistant, most were cautiously supportive,
backing the environmental goals of the initiative while also expressing reservations about
the costs of conversion and delivery volumes they felt were too low. The ultimate
contours of Iranian industry’s gasification—an alternately cooperative and combative
process that resulted in significant financial support to factory owners from the
government—was strongly shaped by this final group.519
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Cooperation between industry and state institutions on environmental issues was not unique to Iran. In
his book Age of Smoke, a work detailing the development of environmental policy in Germany and United
States, Frank Uekoetter demonstrates that such collaboration was essential to the success of policies for
smoke abatement in the two countries. In contrast to the belief that dealings between industry and
regulators are necessarily either adversarial or corrupt, Uekoetter shows that such cooperation was
instrumental for the successful implementation of smoke mitigation policies. For more see Frank Uekoetter,
The Age of Smoke: Environmental Policy in Germany and the United States, 1880-1970 (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009).
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Until the very end of the twentieth century, Iranian concern for the environment
was largely an elite phenomenon, reaching as high as the royal family in the years before
the 1979 revolution. As was true elsewhere, the environment began to be seen as a
potential area of government responsibility in Iran during the mid-1960s.520 In
prioritizing solutions that depended on the national petroleum companies, Iranian
officials and experts interwove their understandings of the potential environmental
benefits of natural gas with the rhetoric of state-directed triumph and sovereign
development so important during the Pahlavi dynasty’s final two decades. Commentators
articulated a vision of the environment that prioritized the effects of its degradation on the
health of the Iranian people as an undifferentiated whole, in the process establishing the
state and its political, managerial, and expert classes as the only avenue by which a future
of pain and ill health could be avoided. While foreign assistance was important to early
gasification efforts, they quickly came to be defined most strongly by the opinions and
perspectives of Iranian experts. Often trained in both Iran and abroad, many undertook
original research to both describe what polluted the air of their cities and define potential
solutions. Their efforts were supported by organizations like the National Iranian Oil
Company and the University of Tehran through their establishment of air quality
monitoring stations in Tehran. Iranian experts were not working in isolation. Through
their publications and participation in international conferences and symposia, many were
part of global conversations on air pollution, the environment, and natural gas. They did
Paul Warde, Libby Robin, and Sverker Sörlin note this in their intellectual history of the idea of “the
environment,” as well as the reality that from the beginning the “intrusion of the environment into politics
did not come from a marginalized position” (p. 35). For more see Paul Warde, Libby Robin, and Sverker
Sörlin, The Environment: A History of the Idea (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018).
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more than passively consume knowledge and opinion produced abroad, instead working
as part of a world-spanning effort to mitigate the environmental violence of fossil fuelbased civilization. Natural gas energy and the environmental cleanliness it promised to
bring were core parts of the modernity that Iranians imagined, not only for their own
nation, but also, ultimately, for all of humanity.

***
Though alarms had begun to sound over Iranian cities’ air quality at least a decade
earlier, widespread anxiety over the issue began to take root only in the mid-1960s. Early
commentators focused their attention on Tehran and at a meeting of government officials
held in December 1963 it was decided that commissions would be established to study
the city’s growing problem with air pollution. Despite the Supreme Council of City
Safety declaring the next month that “Tehran’s air was not fit for respiration” and two
months later that pollution had “become the cause of a drop in the average age of the
city’s residents,” little action was taken for another three years.521 In late 1966, Dr.
Jahānshāh Sāleh,522 at the time head of the University of Tehran, addressed the
meteorological and medical “experts” assembled at the Tehran Medical College for the
Air Pollution Seminar and spoke at length about the “Great Threat” of air pollution. A
521

“Tehran dar Dud Khafeh Mishavad!,” Ettelā’āt (20 Tir 1350).

Dr. Jahānshāh Sāleh was an Iranian physician, senator, and three-time Minister of Health. Born in
central Iran in 1903-1904, Sāleh was educated at the American College in Tehran and then recruited by the
Ministry of Finance for his language skills. He would later earn his medical degree at Syracuse University
before working for a number of years in New York-area hospitals. Returning to Iran in 1933-1934 with his
American wife, he became a senior medical doctor in Tehran hospitals. In 1953 he became Minster of
Health as part of the new government following the fall of Muhammad Mossadeq and head of the
University of Tehran in 1963. After his removal from the post of university leader he was tapped by the
Shah to serve in the Iranian Senate.
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longtime Cassandra on the issue of Tehran’s deteriorating air quality—ten years prior
newspapers had printed “fekr-e nān kon keh kharbozeh āb ast”523 below photographs of
him— Sāleh despaired that pollution had fallen victim to the “ten days” attention that all
major problems in Iran received. Already, he said, “if you watch Tehran’s daybreak or
dusk from a high point, instead of the clear and beautiful sky Tehran was famous for all
over the world, you will only see a black layer of smoke that makes breathing difficult.”
Declaring the smoky haze to be “one of the manifestations (mazāher) of civilization,” and
destined to increase by “however much civilization advances,” Sāleh spoke of the
“dangerous” and “deadly” pollutants the cloud contained, warning that, as had taken
place in cities like London, New York, and Pittsburgh, poor air quality was on the verge
of taking the lives of scores of people.524 He argued that “if action is not taken right now
for the prevention of the danger of smoke in Tehran and other cities, within the next ten
years smoke will carry us into the sky we will be destroyed (nābud khāhim shod)!”525 To
prevent the “affliction of people with cancer,” he said, the “sources of smoke” that fouled

The saying is an old Iranian idiom regarding the wise application of one’s time and effort. In the story
from which it is derived, two friends work side-by-side at some task requiring hard, physical labor. Each
day they go together to buy bread for lunch. One day, they decide that only one of them would go so that
the other could continue working and earn them more money. On the way to buy bread, however, the first
friend comes across a merchant selling kharbozeh (a type of melon). Tempted by their refreshing
sweetness, he uses all of their money to buy a melon before returning to his friend. Rather than being
delighted, the second friend is upset, for though kharbozeh is delicious, it would not sustain them over a
long afternoon of hard work. Expressing his displeasure, the second friend says “fekr-e nān kon keh
kharbozeh āb ast” (“think of bread because kharbozeh is water”). The idiom has come to be used to say
that some activity or pursuit is empty or inconsequential and that one should spend their time in a more
worthwhile manner.
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Tehran’s air—the “factories, asphalt works, bakeries, public baths, burning of waste,
and…automobiles”526—would need to be addressed.527
Sāleh was not alone, and other seminar participants reiterated his description of
Tehran’s air pollution and his sense that Iranian society faced an impending catastrophe.
Dr. Ātafi, the managing director of the Health Society of Tehran, warned that
the blue and beautiful sky of Tehran pollutes this city’s land. If no action is taken to
prevent an increase in the level of air pollution, it will not be long before life in this city
will be impossible.528

Seven weeks later, at the first meeting of the national Committee to Combat Air
Pollution, attended by Sāleh, government ministers, parliamentarians, and the mayor of
Tehran, the senator Dr. Sādeq Rezāzādeh Shafaq voiced the committee’s consensus that
“the city of Tehran has quickly become industrialized” and that the “smoke” of factories,
public baths, and motor vehicles had “polluted and poisoned the city’s air…[and] made
breathing intolerable.”529 Such views were not confined to expert symposia. In their
reporting on these meetings, newspapers like Ettelā’āt, a national daily, underlined such
dramatic depictions through headlines like “The Air of Tehran is Intolerable” and “The
Air of Tehran Threatens.” Other publications like Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, “the
monthly journal of the personnel of the Iranian oil industry,”530 printed articles
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introducing the concept of air pollution to their readers and advocated for its
containment.531 A 1968 story, illustrated by a two-page sketch of great clouds of smoke
pouring from factories, homes, and vehicles, compared the need to control air pollution to
the necessity of ensuring potable water.532 It too called for action, writing that while the
task would be difficult, Iranians “must not accept it as a type of pain without possibility
of remedy, and give in to it.”533
Unlike in the mid-1950s when Sāleh first began speaking about the potential
problem of air pollution, a decade later the subject received far more than “ten days”
worth of attention. Between late 1967 and the summer of 1971 more than one hundred
meetings and seminars were held on the issue of Iran’s air quality.534 During the same
period, Iranian officials began giving increasing amounts of attention to Iran’s natural
environment and they took a series of legal and administrative steps to protect various
aspects of it. In 1956 Iran’s first conservation law was enacted, providing legal protection
for threatened wildlife and establishing the Game Council of Iran to issue and control
licenses for hunting in protected regions. The focus on wildlife continued through 1967
when the Majlis passed the Game and Fish Law, creating the Game and Fish Department
in order to further establish and manage protected areas and inland fishing.535 Despite the
early focus on the conservation of land and wildlife—by September 1975 there were
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fifty-seven protected areas in the country with plans for more536—from the beginning
commentators proposed employing the state’s authority to help Iran’s air quality. The
American Clean Air Act, passed in 1963 in order to control levels of air pollution across
the United States, often inspired proposed remedies in Iran. During his speech at the 1966
seminar, Jahānshāh Sāleh claimed that the issue of air pollution had the attention of
Prime Minister Amir ‘Abbās Hoveydā, and that he had “no doubt” the government would
implement whatever proposals were made. Sāleh went on to suggest that the seminar
participants write and submit a “Clean Air” law, and that if the government “gave him the
authority” he would first tackle the large amounts of visible smoke.537 ‘Abdul Rezā
Ansāri, the Minister of the Interior during the mid-1960s, reinforced Sāleh’s claim,
saying that “the prevention of severe air pollution has the attention of the government”
and that the issue was “connected to the health of the people.”538 Advocates for state
intervention argued that it was the “duty of the government and responsible authorities”
to undertake “detailed” study and analysis in order to set forth regulations governing the
location of factories, the quality of fuel, the proper height of smokestacks, the
construction of bakeries and baths, and the regulation of gasoline- and diesel-powered
motor vehicles.539
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With the establishment of the Department of Environmental Conservation and
Enhancement as an adjunct to the Office of the Prime Minister in 1971, measures to
combat air pollution began to be institutionalized alongside broader attempts to prevent
the degradation of Iran’s natural environment. The new institution incorporated the duties
of the old Game and Fish Department supplemented by a more expansive mandate to
guard against the fouling of Iran’s environment. As with many Iranians writing about the
environmental challenges their country faced, those working within the Department of
the Environment saw pollution and environmental degradation as intimately linked to the
“progress” of human “civilization.”540 A report on the department’s planned activities
during Iran’s upcoming Fifth Development Plan541 stated that while humanity was
“shackled” to the “issue of pollution,” it was important for people to better understand the
necessity of the “protection and preservation of these precious resources [the natural
world],” something the authors felt was more important than “any other factor of their
health and joy and recreation.”542 In this Iran had advantage, as “fortunately,” they wrote,
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“in most places…[pollution] has not yet reached the horrifying level that fully
industrialized countries face.”543
The Department sought to address everything from the contamination of the
country’s fresh water supplies—“the source of sickness, poisoning, and suffering”544—to
the overuse of pesticides,545 the establishment of national parks,546 and even the
“protection of the beauty of the natural environment.”547 Most significant for the report’s
authors was air pollution, the “irritating poisonous clouds and polluted vapors” that had
developed in Iran’s urban areas, and they dedicated a significant portion of their text to
describing its sources and effects.548 But it was only in 1974, when the Majlis passed the
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, that the department was given a specific
writ to protect the quality of Iran’s air and water, handing it—in the words of two men
working in the Department of the Environment—a goal of the “preservation, restoration,
or enhancement of the quality of the ambient air in Iran for optimum social and economic
benefit.”549
While concern for air quality was folded into broader environmental initiatives,
there continued to be calls for a comprehensive air pollution law through the early
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1970s.550 That push would come to fruition in 1975 when the National Clean Air
Regulations were passed as an addendum to the Environmental Protection and
Enhancement Act. The new law empowered the Department of the Environment in areas
like “the establishment of national air quality standards, the control of the composition of
fuel and the conditions for its use in Iran” and the creation of emissions standards for
industry and motor vehicles.551 The new regulations did not prove to be as reliable as had
been hoped, however, as the work of the Department was hampered by a lack of reliable
“local data” on air quality in much of Iran, something that forced the establishment of
principles and standards “based on…general experiences” rather than observations.552 For
that reason, the Department declared that the optimum course of action would be to
protect Iran’s air quality with the “best
practicable technology to prevent emissions at the
source.”553 In Iran, that would come to mean, in
theory and in practice, gas energy.

***
That Iranians should so quickly and so
strongly turn toward gas energy was reflective of
Figure 15
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their understandings of and experiences with air pollution. “Air pollution” held a
particular and tangible meaning for Iranians during the 1960s and 1970s, one rooted in
the “smoke” of fossil fuel combustion.554 All the complexity of air pollution, its causes,
and its effects notwithstanding, Iranian commentators articulated understandings of it that
prioritized the human experience of living within a polluted atmosphere. In the summer
of 1971, Ettelā’āt wrote
In the not-so-distant past, old Tehran…had pleasant and
attractive weather. It could even be said that until four or five
years ago it was possible to feel the different climate above Seh
Rāh-ye Zendān and the gentle climate of Shemirān. But today
the domain of air pollution has reached there as well. 555

Ettelā’āt’s passage was reflective of the emphasis that
observers put on the tangible experience of air quality. The
“gentle climate” of northern Tehran, once so palpable, had
Figure 16

been erased by the spread of polluted air. “Smoke”
threatened to “suffocate” Tehran, a description that echoed

the sorts of physical sensations Iranians were beginning to experience. The article went
on to describe the “strange” and “alarming” state of the air, writing that

In San Francisco, an hour spent walking in the streets is equivalent to smoking one
unfiltered cigarette. But if you wander for an hour in Tehran, it is just as if you smoked
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two unfiltered cigarettes! This is the actual face of Tehran, a city that for most of the
provinces is a visionary (ruyāyi) one, but visionary for smoke!”556

As something that could be seen, smelled, and felt burning in the lungs, time and again
the shifting, heterogeneous, “gloomy” clouds that lay over Iran’s cities were described by
observers as “smoke” (dud). Magazines and
newspapers reinforced that understanding with
photographs of smoggy haze, smokestacks
discharging fumes, and black exhaust pouring
from motor vehicles. Underlining Ettelā’āt’s
formulation of the “domain of air pollution,”
the article was accompanied by a black-andwhite photograph of a thick haze smothering
the city. Captioned “Tehran is drowned in
smoke,” the image, taken from a vantage point
Figure 17

high above the city, showed that “the domain of air pollution” was not an
abstract notion of invisible gaseous mixtures, but a conspicuous presence in the lives of
Tehran’s residents (Figure 15).557
The visual idiom of smoke was a common presence in the reporting on Iran’s air
quality. One 1972 photograph captured a bus spewing a cloud of thick exhaust as it
traveled the city streets, threatening to choke any who, like the photographer, trailed
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behind (Figure 16).558 Similar currents of threat and danger animated many of the images
used to illustrate Iran’s growing trouble with poor air quality. One striking image, in a
1971 Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran article on the National Iranian Oil Company’s
efforts to prevent air pollution, foregrounded notions of impending peril through its
stylized composition. Shot directly into a low, haze-distorted sun and employing shades
of crimson interposed between areas of inky darkness and white brilliance, the
photograph depicts a factory’s “fumes” and “flares” coiling across the image and upward
into a pitch-black sky, the ominous mood transmuting the image from visualization into
depiction of dire threat (Figure 17).559 Nāmeh’s image employed a visual grammar for
representing air pollution— the use of smokestacks, plumes of smoke and fire, and
murky clouds that blocked eyesight—that found repeated expression in Iranian media. A
year later, as part of a piece on a symposium dedicated to air pollution, the magazine
again employed this graphical idiom, creating a sense of filth with an image of five
smokestacks belching murky smoke and soot into a sickly yellow sky that was almost
entirely obscured by ashen clouds (Figure 18).560 Through its images, Nāmeh conjured a
world defined by industry and its hazardous byproducts, one where the blue and beautiful
sky of Tehran and the “gentle climate of Shemirān” had been destroyed.
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Notions of impending danger and preoccupations with the tangible experiences of
poor air quality were combined in the attention given to air pollution’s agonizing
illnesses. In its reporting on Jahānshāh Sāleh’s
1966 speech to the Air Pollution Seminar,
Ettelā’āt highlighted that “smoke and air
pollution cause cancer;” Sāleh himself, under
the subheading “It Kills,” stressed how many
people had died from air pollution in places
like London, New York, and Pittsburgh.561 One
report, prepared in late 1967 by a group within
the NIOC and published as a “warning” to the
“responsible authorities,”562 forecast that
without significant measures Tehran’s air

Figure 18

quality would continue to deteriorate. While people had “slowly become habituated to
inhaling dirty and polluted air,” it was causing increased incidences of diseases like
pneumonia, acute swelling of the lungs, chronic bronchitis, and cancer.563 For the report’s
authors, air pollution was a complex phenomenon produced by an ensemble of specific
substances: sulfur oxides, described as having an “extremely bad effect” on the human
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respiratory system; nitrogen oxides, major contributors to haze and possessing a strong
odor; and un- and incompletely-burned hydrocarbons, compounds that react with sunlight
to create ground-level ozone, a major component of smog and a cause of respiratory
ailments like coughing, choking, and shortness of breath.564 Discussions of specific
pollutants and their effects made their way into mainstream publications as well. In July
1971, Ettelā’āt highlighted many of the same pollutants in many of the same ways,
describing carbon dioxide as an “asphyxiating” gas and one of the “most important”
pollutants affecting Tehran; sulfur oxides as destroying plant life and eroding the exterior
of buildings; nitrogen oxides as irritants for the respiratory system and a major
component of smog and haze; and benzopyran, created in the presence of incompletelycombusted hydrocarbons and reported to be a cause of heart trouble and cancer.565
Like the smoke that so captured the attention of Iranian commentators, all such
pollutants were significant byproducts of fossil fuel combustion, primarily the oil fuels
that powered Iran’s accelerating industrialization. With Iranian modernization policies
intensifying during the 1960s and 1970s, it was becoming increasingly difficult to escape
the toxic cocktail of pollutants that loomed over the country’s cities.566 Many saw air
pollution as a profound challenge for the Iranian nation as a whole, often implicitly
constructing an understanding of air pollution that prioritized the experiences of those
living in Tehran and extending it to other locales. Others understood air pollution in
profoundly local, even individual, terms. The authors of the NIOC warning on the
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contamination of Iran’s air saw pollution’s compositional complexity as causing it to be
manifested in varied ways depending on locale, season, time of day, and even people’s
differing first-hand encounters with it. Whereas a pilot might see air pollution as the
smoke and haze that obscured their view of an airfield, or a farmer might experience it as
the acid rain that killed their crops, for urban residents “polluted air” was understood in
terms of human health and physical sensation, as something that was part of a person’s
“2200 breaths per 24-hour” period and the “cause of irritation of the eyes and the
respiratory system.”567 They thus argued for a more localized approach, writing not only
that “the way of combating smoke and soot is in each country connected to particular
conditions of geography, cultural progress, [and] the state of the economy and society”
but also that “few” regions faced a knot of causes as complex as Tehran.568
The Alborz Mountains, within the southern foothills of which Tehran nestles,
featured prominently within accounts
of air pollution. When combined with
the visual grammar of smoke and
industry, the mountain chain became a
powerful exemplar of what Iranians,
and most especially the residents of
Tehran, stood on the cusp of losing. For
Figure 19

those like Dr. Ātafi, who spoke of “blue
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and beautiful sky” Tehran disappearing behind clouds of smoke and haze, the arrival and
expansion of the “domain of air pollution” in the capital had already altered for the worse
their perceptions and experiences of the city in which they lived. The sentiment found
clearest expression in visual form. In the spring of 1972, Nāmeh published a photograph
of a low-hanging cloud of smoke sitting over Tehran (Figure 18).569 Shot northward, the
image creates a studied contrast between the beauty of the snow-capped Alborz rising
into a bright blue sky and the polluted cityscape below. In the photograph, not only were
Tehran’s inhabitants enveloped by a cloud of smoke and filth, but their everyday
connection to the dramatic natural beauty that surrounded them was also contaminated.
The cover of a 1978 statistical collection from the Ministry for Environmental Protection
made the point in even starker terms through its illustration of the Alborz Mountains and
their foothills (Figure 19).570 In the scene, Mount Damavand rises above the lower peaks
to stand prominently amidst a robin’s egg-blue sky. Lower down, the clean air and
natural beauty of the mountain range gives way to a polluted industrial landscape. An
unsightly cloud of gray smoke and haze rises from smokestacks to sit between the city
and the beautiful vista of Damavand and its snows. In this telling, air pollution stands
between the residents of Tehran and Damavand, one of the most potent symbols of their
city and country, weakening their connection to the land of Iran.571 There was a deep
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aesthetic quality to the loss depicted, a harm rooted not in the physical danger or medical
effects of smoke and pollution, but in a humanistic desire to live amidst beauty. A collage
of three photographs on the back cover, two depicting industrial smokestacks and their
emissions wafting through the air, reinforced the point. The images highlighted the
ugliness of industrial landscapes with their structures of corrugated steel alongside
mounded, blasted, and heaped earth baking in the sun.572 Gone was the Tehran of
“pleasant and attractive weather,” of majestic mountains and clear skies, of the joys of
breathing and living in a city with clean air. In its place had come choking fumes,
obscuring haze, and rent earth. Air pollution thus threatened not only the physical health
of Tehran’s residents, but also their spiritual wellbeing.
The connection between the Alborz and the state of Tehran’s air was both forceful
and bidirectional, as the mountain chain exerted a powerful influence on the character
and intensity of the city’s air pollution. In 1966, Jahānshāh Sāleh, basing his opinion on
ten years of observation, noted that the mountains prevented the easy movement of air
through Tehran, enabling noxious gases and particulates to accumulate above the city.573
The author of the 1967 NIOC warning noted that even though Tehran’s winds were
highly variable, the strongest and most sustained moved from west to east; any pollutants
swept up would become trapped above the city as the mountains, lying primarily to the
north and east of the city, thwarted the movement of the air and impeded the dispersal of
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the city’s emissions. There were ways to mitigate the issue, and the report recommended,
following the advice of several consulting engineers from the United States, that the
establishment of factories and workshops to the south and west of the Tehran be
henceforth forbidden.574 But the presence of the Alborz range was not the only
environmental factor involved. The city’s overall climate also played a significant role,
and Iranian experts within both governmental ministries and the national petroleum
companies quickly began to take note. Often trained both in Iran and overseas, such
experts worked to introduce existing knowledge regarding air pollution, apply learned
techniques, and undertake and publish575 original research on the state of Iran’s air
quality. As early as 1948 the NIOC had begun to establish temporary observation points
around Tehran to monitor pollutant levels in the city.576 By 1978 six permanent
monitoring stations had been created, variously operated by ministries, universities, and
the NIOC.577 Manuchehr Olfat, an employee of the NIOC with a degree from the
Technical College of Tehran and further training in the United States, published a 1972
article in Nashriyeh-ye Anjoman-e Naft-e Iran, the journal of the Iranian Oil Society, on
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methods for the detection and measurement of air pollution.578 Olfat began by
introducing the major pollutants that plagued the world’s urban areas, but he quickly
turned to discussing his own research into their concentrations in Tehran. Basing his
work on thirty days of data collected in January 1972, he noted that concentrations of
pollutants tended to be highest at night and in the early morning. With his results, Olfat
highlighted the frequent presence and effects of one of the most significant factors
influencing Tehran’s air quality: the atmospheric inversion.579
Linked to the city’s semi-arid climate and mountainous topography, atmospheric
inversions, more than any other factor, manifested the powerful environmental context
that surrounded and interpenetrated Tehran and the lives of its residents. Inversions
develop when cold air is trapped at a low altitude by a layer of warmer air above it, a
reversal of normal conditions where warmer, less-dense air rises through cooler, moredense air. Such rising air, gathered in convective currents, carry any suspended pollutants
upward and disperse them across wide areas. Writing in the same issue of Nashriyeh as
Olfat, ‘Alirezā Moshref Razavi, an expert in meteorological engineering and weather
forecasting for the Iranian government, presented five years’ worth of observations of
atmospheric inversions in Tehran. Using equipment sited in Mehrābād between 1967 and
1971, Moshref Razavi observed inversions on roughly two-thirds to three-fourths of
days.580 Most were surface-level radiation inversions, a phenomenon connected to city’s
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climate and its frequently sunny days and cloudless nights.581 Such inversions form at
night, after the sun has heated the surface of the earth and, in turn, warmed the layer of
air adjacent to it. The absence of nighttime cloud cover allows the accumulated surface
heat to be rapidly radiated away. The temperature of the air directly above the ground
thus cools much more rapidly than the air above it, causing an atmospheric inversion to
form. Tehran’s emissions are thus trapped against the city until such inversions dissipate
or are dispersed by wind.582 Tehran’s mountainous terrain influences these events as well,
as the becalming effect of the Alborz on the city’s winds— rarely blowing with much
strength to begin with—often prevent the quick dispersal of inversions and the pollutants
they have collected. Thus while most of Tehran’s inversions disappear in the late
morning or early afternoon as the earth’s surface warms and the inversion process is
reversed, they can persist indefinitely if conditions permit.583 With inversions an
immutable fact of Tehran’s topographic and climatic contexts, Moshref Razavi argued
that if nothing was done to reduce emissions, the city risked becoming like Pittsburgh,
London, and Belgium’s Meuse Valley, all famous incidents of inversion-induced smog
that had killed hundreds.584
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Technical solutions to the country’s urban air quality crisis were proposed as soon
as the issue began to be discussed in public. Alongside proposals for air quality standards
and the mandated use of exhaust scrubbers585 and catalytic converters,586 the potential
harnessing of gas energy was seen as crucial to any effort to fight air pollution. Sāleh,
head of the University of Tehran, expressed a desire to replace Iran’s fuel oil
consumption with gas, saying that “in this country that is everywhere full of gas, why do
our factories and workshops consume fuel oil and on what principle have they not
brought gas to Tehran?”587 But even before his speech in 1966, Iranians had begun to
note to the energy source’s relative cleanliness. As early as 1961, articles in Nāmeh-ye
San’at-e Naft-e Iran noted a comparative lack of smoke as a major benefit of gas
energy,588 and over the next decade the claim would also become a recurring theme in
other NIOC publications.589 In the summer of 1971, Sa’id Shaybāni, head of the
petrochemical research group at the NIOC’s Research Center, placed gas energy at the
center of the company’s efforts to prevent air pollution.590 Speaking to an assembled
crowd of “academics, educators, and experts,” Shaybāni described air pollution as a
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“chronic complication that often befalls rich…societies with a high level of
industrialization,” one that knew “no borders” and threatened the “body and soul of
humanity.”591 Shaybāni, his speech appearing in both Nāmeh and as a standalone
publication,592 was one of the first to address the potential of gas as an aid to
environmental protection in a systematic way. Rather than focusing on the relative lack of
smoke produced by gas stoves as most others had, Shaybāni envisioned gas as having the
potential to alter the fundamental relationship of humanity with the natural world.
Shaybāni saw the natural world as a fragile and carefully articulated system, arguing that
the great “chain” of the earth’s biosphere, huddled in a narrow band at less than 3000
meters altitude, had been “ruptured” by the toxic byproducts of human activity.593 “Direct
or indirect individual responsibility for the creation and increase of air pollution is the
incontrovertible truth,” he said, and a growing population would inevitably intensify
environmental degradation if nothing was done.594
Shāhpur ‘Abdul Rezā Pahlavi, half-brother of the Shah and noted proponent of
wildlife and environmental conservation, made similar arguments in his opening remarks
to a 1975 meeting of the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
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Association595 that was held at the NIOC’s Tehran headquarters. Remarking that the
“protection of our natural environment and the quality of life of the present and future
generations” rested upon the actions of those assembled, Pahlavi argued that humanity
and the natural environment were closely intertwined, saying that while the environment
“effects our lives,” it was also true that “each aspect of [human] life” had consequences
for the environment.596 He continued, declaring that “all human resources…are mobilized
and harnessed in opposition to the needs of the environment,” including the “industrial
resources” which were “potentially considered the most important danger for the
environment” but “also supply the technology of environmental protection.”597
Pahlavi’s belief that human technical ingenuity was both a cause of and solution
to environmental degradation was not unique in Iranian society. The idea that the answer
to the challenge of air pollution was not a retreat from industry and technology but a
tighter embrace of them was one held by many. While Iranian commentators saw their
country’s deteriorating air quality and poisoned cities as the dark underbelly of the rapid
transformations taking place, they nonetheless affirmed a desire for further
industrialization and the developmental policies that drove it. While the “progress…of
the new industries did not have any other aim than providing …[for] a better life for the
people,” the author of the 1967 NIOC warning on air pollution wrote, Tehran risked
becoming like the “large cities” of Los Angeles, Chicago, and London, where air
595
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pollution had “created multiple problems and put the health of residents…in danger.”598
The metropolises of the world’s wealthy nations—with their bustling density, busy
airports, long ribbons of highway, and prosperous industries—were in this telling
refigured into tragic specters of modernity gone wrong. “There is no doubt that in our
country a rise in the standard of living of people and the industrialization of the country
that is the natural goal of the White Revolution is the wish of all patriotic people,” they
report stated, “but regard must be given by the authorities…because right now we see
that the great country of America is captive to the problem of pollution.”599
Manuchehr Eqbāl, chief executive of the NIOC, speaking in early 1972, made an
even more explicit connection between industrial civilization and pollution, saying that

humanity, who today with the aid of its own knowledge and amazing technology has set
foot beyond the earth (koreh-ye khāk) and stepped into the sweep of the cosmos, now
faces an unfavorable environment that was unsought and unwittingly gained via the same
excellent technology.600

Eqbāl argued that it was crucial to quickly address the “terrible abyss” that yawned
before Iranians, and, quoting the Shah’s words on the subject, said that “one fundamental
problem [for which] we must right now look for a solution is a problem which for us
would not be as complicated to solve as for the industrial countries, [and] that problem is
air pollution.”601 It was the failure of humanity to understand how the “needs” of modern
daily life had affected the natural environment, the head of the Oil Society of Iran said
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following Eqbāl, and “it is only when we face unwanted conditions in our own
environment do we discover the existence of such an issue” as air pollution. “Anywhere
you bring technology,” he added, “humanity has also rushed to bring as a gift new
problems for the environment.”602 But for the chief of the Oil Society of Iran,603
“technology” was also the solution, as it had been for Pahlavi. As he said, “confronting
industrial pollution is not possible except through the increase of the level of investment
and use of the latest scientific and technological innovations.”604 Animating these
comments was a fundamental belief in the possibility of a technological fix, a seamless
answer of energy substitution that demanded few, if any, changes to Iranian
developmental policies. “Technology” may have brought the problems of air pollution
and environmental degradation into being, but it also promised in newer and better and
more modern forms to be their solution as well.
More than many in Iran,605 Sa’id Shaybāni connected the issue of air pollution to
the concept of energy, saying that the “economic progress and industrial development of
a society is always accompanied by an intensification and propagation of energy
consumption” and that “the expansion of the production and consumption of energy is

602

Ibid., 14.

603

Established in the late 1950s in the wake of the Iranian Oil Nationalization Crisis of early that decade,
the Oil Society of Iran is a private organization that works to facilitate and promote Iranian research and
expertise in the scientific, technical, legal, and commercials aspects of the Iranian petroleum industries on
both domestic and international levels.
604

“Simpozium-e Āludegi-ye Havā,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, 14.

The anonymous author(s) of the NIOC warning on air pollution also drew the link, writing that “we
know that the rise in the living standards of people has a direct relationship with the production and
consumption of energy in country, and in our country the domestic consumption of oil has [risen] 270
percent within ten years.” See Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9, Hoshdāri-ye beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul, 16.
605

252

frequently joined with the creation or increase of air pollution.”606 For Shaybāni, Iran’s
long-term project to harness the “immense wealth” of its gas reserves promised to be far
more than a spur to economic growth, but as a way to fundamentally reweight the balance
between industrialization and the environment in Iran.607 Both globally608 and in Iran,
fossil fuels accounted for most of the energy consumed by people, and Shaybāni reported
that between 1958 and the mid-1960s, Iranian consumption of “oil fuels” had grown at an
average yearly rate of 11.3%—to a total of 6,102,000 tons per year,609 half of which were
consumed in and around Tehran—and would continue to do so for at least the next ten
years.610 Unique among Iranian writing on issues of air quality, Shaybāni noted that the
widespread combustion of fossil fuels had altered the world’s atmosphere in ways that
were not obvious to the casual observer. He reported that while there had been no
“tangible” change in global oxygen levels (dropping from 20.846% to 20.800%),
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels had increased sharply over the previous century, rising
some fourteen percent.611 Shaybāni dismissed such changes as insignificant and
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maintained a focus on the palpable experiences of air pollution. Reflecting that concern,
he too highlighted measures that addressed local air quality, championing the use of
natural gas above all else.612 Gas was “one of the cleanest and most-desirable” of fuels
and the key to “preventing air pollution,”613 he said, a solution that would require a
dedicated program for the production, distribution, and consumption of gas, but was
nonetheless “the simplest way of preventing air pollution.”614
Shaybāni’s conviction that natural gas energy was the “simplest” solution to air
pollution despite the huge infrastructural undertaking its use would require pointed to the
hope that Iranians placed in technological solutions to the challenge of air pollution. As
early as 1966, Dr. Ātafi of the Health Society of Tehran had declared that while it was no
longer possible to radically alter the industrialized life of Tehran’s citizens, it was instead
“possible to convert from the type of fuel that is destroying the human race…[and it is]
proposed to the government and the NIOC that in the city of Tehran, gas fuel replace oil,
diesel, gasoline, fuel oil, and coal.”615 Mohsen Shirāzi, the chief executive of design and
study of the National Iranian Gas Company, expressed similar views in late 1974. Shirāzi
too focused on fossil fuels and the tangible pollutants produced by their combustion.
Saying that the “ghoul of pollution” was banging at the “gates of…health,” he declared
612
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that the experiences of industrialized societies had shown that “only one way for the
reduction of environmental pollution has been accepted by all experts of the world…[and
that is] the use of natural gas.”616 For both Shirāzi and Shaybāni, easier than imagining a
modern society that consumed less energy or allowed environmental considerations to
constrain its industrialization was to double down on the fossil fuel use that had brought
Iran to the point of environmental catastrophe. The widespread adoption of natural gas
would thus be less an energy transition than an energy intensification,617 one rooted
deeply in the materiality of the compositions of fossil fuels themselves. The methane and
ethane that comprised the bulk of natural gas offered themselves as combustible
substances that produced less soot, less ozone, less sulfur dioxide, and less of nearly all
the pollutants that the combustion of oil-based fuels created. For officials and experts
concerned about the poisoning of Iran’s air, gas offered itself as a way to avoid such a
fate, all without having to undertake a fundamental rethinking of the country’s fossil fuelbased industrialization and development policies.

***
There was often a great deal of slippage between local and national perspectives
in Iranian discussions of air quality. No locale received more attention than Tehran, the
administrative and economic capital of the country, and the city’s quickly worsening air
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quality captured the attention of influential personages within state and state-affiliated
institutions. Many of the ideas that were formulated in response to its particular
conditions became the foundation on which policies for the entirety of the country rested.
The use of gas energy for industrial applications was no different, and one of the first and
most important manifestations of the push for Iran’s gasification was the effort to
“convert” (tabdil) furnaces and factories to the new fuel source. This did not mean,
however, that Tehran was always the first to see practical steps taken toward an
expansion of gas use, a reality dictated by the city’s location hundreds of miles north of
Iran’s primary oil and gas fields. Though the first Iran Gas Trunkline had made gas
available across a broad swath of the country by the early 1970s, including in Tehran, the
relative proximity of Shiraz to Iran’s centers of gas production meant that before factories
in the capital had started the process of converting to gas, those in Shiraz had already
begun to tackle the issue.
Beginning in the summer of 1972, a concerted effort was made by the Fars
provincial government to have a number of the factories near Shiraz switch to gas. The
endeavor was in direct response to the opinions of the Shah, who upon seeing the effects
of industry in Shiraz’s sky had ordered that all of the “smoky machinery, particularly the
brickmaking kilns,” to be converted to gas.618 Manuchehr Piruz, the governor of Fars,
wrote to the mayor of Shiraz to express hope that factory owners would “quickly”
convert their workshops in the interests of the “prevention of air pollution.” He indicated

Letter from Manuchehr Piruz to Manuchehr Eqbāl. No document number, no document date;
Mekātebāt-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Mantaqeh-ye Shiraz (293-32994), Ostāndāri-ye Fars, National
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that the National Iranian Gas Company was ready to supply not only the gas needed, but
also, significantly, any “technical guidance” that might be required.619 The promise of
expert support reflected the experiences of one company, the Brickmaking Corporation of
Shiraz, that had run into considerable hurdles in their own attempt to switch to gas fuel
three years earlier. As described in a letter to the provincial government, the company
had hired several “Italian engineers” to design and install a gas system for their factory.
Quickly, however, the intense heat of the furnaces had melted the equipment imported
from Italy at considerable expense, causing the factory to take a three million rial loss and
forcing them revert to the “old materials of oil and smoke.”620
The failure of the Brickmaking Corporation of Shiraz’s voluntary initiative
demonstrated that the task of converting Iran’s industry to use natural gas would not be
straightforward. Even the expensive importation of expertise and equipment had not
guaranteed against catastrophic breakdown and financial loss. Rather than denounce the
project as a waste, however, the owner of the company professed to be writing to warn
the others of the potential pitfalls of gas conversion, offering his story not as a protest
against the provincial government’s initiative, but as a way to help others succeed.621
Other factory owners—while broadly supportive of the effort to move to gas with some
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lamenting that Shiraz was “dense with the smoke of crude oil”622—responded by
demanding support sufficient to avoid such disasters. In response, the NIGC dispatched
an “expert” from Pakistan to evaluate the laying of gas lines in the summer of 1972. His
“promising” examination of the kilns of the Shabānkāreh company led to a request that
more specialists be sent.623 But at a meeting held in late July between the mayor of Shiraz
and the “majority of the owners of the brickmaking furnaces of Shiraz,” the offer of
expert analysis was deemed insufficient.624 Worried about the financial implications of
even a successful program to convert their factories, the owners also demanded monetary
support in the form of fee waivers and equipment grants.625 No promises regarding
financial assistance were offered, and in any case, confusion reigned on the part of the
NIGC. As late as January 1973, the company had failed to dispatch the promised
experts626 despite having once again ordered the factory owners to switch to gas.627
In Tehran, the gasification of the city’s industry was rooted in a broader effort to
curb the smoke of area asphalt producers in the 1970s. Referring to the municipality’s
duty “to curb factories, workshops… and all businesses and trades that create noise and
Letter from Sherkat-e Sahāmi-ye Ajorfeshāri-ye Shiraz to Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran Mantaqeh-ye
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disturbances or produce smoke and/or putridity (‘ofunat),” the Tehran government
ordered the factories, many “with their unsuitable and unprofessional smokestacks” to
install filters and come into compliance with the “provided specifications.”628 Even with
the Shah issuing personal order to address the smoke polluting Tehran’s air, the
importance of the asphalt producers to the region’s economy complicated matters. With
the mayor of Tehran warning that “their closing will stop asphalt work in and around the
city as well as likely stop work on the 100,000-person stadium [Āryāmehr, now Āzādi,
Stadium],”629 they were given a one-month grace period.630 The owners acquiesced, but
requested a further month’s delay as none of the necessary equipment was produced in
Iran, promising to voluntarily “stop their factories” should the revised deadline be
missed.631
The use of natural gas quickly began to be considered for Tehran’s factories,
particularly as the emissions of industries other than asphalt production began to be
tackled. With the completion of the IGAT-1 line in 1970, Tehran, like Shiraz, was seen as
a locale where gas energy could be quickly brought into use.632 Just a few weeks after the
asphalt producers were ordered to scrub their emissions, a group of spool-makers were
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instructed to reduce their emissions by coordinating with the NIGC.633 As in Shiraz,
many of Tehran’s industrialists proved to be active participants in the effort to protect the
city’s air quality. Some had made gestures towards gas energy and had already
“requested the formation of an expert committee composed of representatives from the
health ministries, social affairs and work, the economy, the steel organization, and the
capital municipality” to discuss the best way to address smoke and its harms, a proposal
the city municipality considered reasonable.634 With the Shah taking a personal interest in
the matter,635 municipal officials both maintained their pressure on factory owners and
implored the NIGC to prioritize owner requests and quickly move to provide any needed
equipment to factories sited near existing gas lines.636 In late December 1973, the mayor
of Tehran, Gholāmrezā Nikpey, personally inspected the progress of the asphalt factories
in their efforts to curb their smoke production. Arriving at 6:30am on December 20th, the
deadline given, Nikpey found uneven compliance. Three workshops had installed exhaust
filters and from them thick steam rose in place of smoke. Two others were in the process
of installing their filters while a third had stopped its work entirely. Proposing that yearly
inspections be instituted to build “confidence” that smoky emissions were not increasing,
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Nikpey further “communicated [to owners] that in addition to the installation of exhaust
filters, at the first possible opportunity they must obtain a gas connection.”637
The project of bringing gas to Shiraz’s industry made very slow progress in 1973,
little enough that the Shah was forced to reiterate his order to address the city’s air
quality. Prompted by an early-1974 report from the Ministry of the Economy on Shiraz’s
air pollution and its relationship to the furnaces on the city’s outskirts, the Shah scolded
the region’s authorities for having access to natural gas but failing to make use of it,
again saying that “the government must give the necessary attention so that all furnaces
across the country that consume fuel oil will be converted to gas.”638 Flowing through the
Ministry of the Interior, the Fars provincial government, the regional branch of the NIGC,
and then to factory owners, the Shah’s directive spurred a flurry of new activity. Some
factory owners wrote to express their satisfaction with the order and encouraged further
activity by the provincial government. Mostafā Qahremāni, chief executive of the
Brickmaking Corporation of Shiraz, the very same company that had voluntarily
attempted to switch to gas, wrote to Management and Economic Administration of Fars
to express his “satisfaction” with the order from the perspectives of both “quality of
production” and “prevention of air pollution.”639 Qahremāni noted that many of Shiraz’s
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furnaces continued to use mazut640 and that these, in particular, had drawn the Shah’s ire
during his previous trip to the city. To help address the issue, he had joined a commission
organized by the head of the Ministry of the Economy that sought to facilitate “positive
cooperation” between factory owners and the NIGC. They aimed to have gas lines laid to
factories by March 1974 and Qahremāni volunteered to have his own facilities converted
first. In response and “without any waste of time,” the NIGC dispatched equipment and
“technically-experienced officers” from Tehran, again under the leadership of a Pakistani
expert. With the cooperation of the NIGC’s local officials and via “their own obstinacy,”
the team successfully installed Qahremāni’s gas lines “during the intense cold and heavy
snow of the winter season.” By the time of writing, his factory had been using six kilns to
produce 180,000 bricks per day for ten days, and Qahremāni expressed satisfaction with
the result, writing the NIGC’s work would “liberate the country from air pollution and
provide a better natural environment.”641
While over seventy factories were operating near Shiraz at the time, the area’s
forty-two brick kilns came under special scrutiny.642 Understood to be far more polluting
than other industries, converting the fuel source of these facilities was seen as a
fundamental first step to any effort to fight air pollution in the city. Most of Shiraz’s
brickmakers were not as proactive as Qahremāni, a fact that come to light in an April
640

Mazut is a heavy, low quality form of fuel oil used primarily in power generation. Used most frequently
in the Soviet Union, the fuel pollutes heavily and is today produced in few places besides the former Soviet
sphere.
Mostafā Qahremāni to the Management of the Economic Administration of Fars, 350, 23 Esfand 1352,
attached to document 7995; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
641

642

In addition to the brickmakers there were nineteen plaster makers, one cement factory, one licorice
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letter t401-77-8-52-12, 20 Khordād 1353; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
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1974 meeting between owners and Manuchehr Piruz, the provincial governor. At the
meeting,643 Engineer Behzād, the head of the NIGC’s Shiraz branch, said that only a few
of the more than a dozen644 brickmakers in the city had converted their facilities to use
gas fuel. He offered the remainder an opportunity to conclude conversion contracts with
the NIGC, a process that demanded the owners pay for the cost of the gas network
upfront in order for necessary materials to be ordered. Rather than pay the NIGC, the
owners offered to buy and import the necessary equipment on their own, a position they
favored “from the perspective of efficiency and value.” The NIGC accepted their
counteroffer, but also issued, for the first time, a threat: failure to follow through would
see the forcible closure of those who had not complied.645 Two days later the threat was
reiterated when the provincial Office of Environmental Health sent notice that while four
of the nine owners had already concluded contracts, the remaining five had one month,
beginning the next day, to do likewise. If they did not, the commission would “pursue”
the issue, and “those factories whose names are not among the applicants for natural gas
and had not signed an agreement will straightaway be closed and their continued
operation prevented.”646

643

Also attending were representatives of the Office of Sanitary Engineering, the director of the Work and
Social Affairs Office, and the local Chamber of Commerce (otāgh-e asnāf).
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The documents give conflicting information regarding the number of brickmakers in Shiraz, with
estimates varying between a low of a dozen and a high of sixteen. Still more unclear is the number of actual
discrete kilns they operated, with the most consistent estimate being approximately forty-two.
Proceedings of meeting, no document number; 31 Farvardin 1353, pg. 1; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kurehha, NLAI.
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Letter from Javād Haqān to Managers of Brickmaking Factories, 1934, 4 Ordibehesht 1353, attached to
document 6/6321; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
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Despite the official pressure on Shiraz’s brickmakers, the project to convert their
facilities quickly ran into delays rooted not in the inaction or resistance of factory owners,
but in the NIGC’s inability to fulfill the commitments it had made. Responding to a letter
from the Work and Social Affairs Administration of Fars that demanded fuel conversions
for the “protection of the health of workers and the cleanliness of the natural
environment,”647 a July 1974 letter from the Syndicate of Ceramic Employers of Shiraz to
the provincial Economic Administration shifted blame for the lack of gas to the NIGC.
Pointing to the successful conversion of Qahremāni’s facilities, the letter writers
complained that other brickmakers had “applied” for service and had “given an amount
[of money] for the right to a gas connection,” but that the NIGC “had postponed the
laying of gas pipes” until March 1975. Demanding that the NIGC “take action,” the
syndicate deployed the language of environmentalism and social welfare that had been
used against them, writing that they stood “ready for the execution of the order [to
provide gas] that the majority of the public and their own workers consider beneficial to
have from the perspective of the absence of air pollution.”648 Though the NIGC itself
concurred, they reported that even though three facilities were “ready to make use of
natural gas” and that “the owners of nine [other] furnaces” had “requested natural gas

Letter from Shirāzi to Feruzān, Āryā, Kāzerun, Hāfez, and Golriz brickmakers, document 6060, 24 Tir
1353; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
647
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Letter from the Syndicate of Ceramic Employers of Shiraz to the Economic Administration of Fars, 18,
25 Tir 1353, attached to 12648; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha va Kucheh-ha va Khiābān-ha va Hazinehha-ye Tarh-e Mazbur (98-293-4335), Ostāndāri-ye Fars, National Archives of Iran, Fars Document Center,
Shiraz.
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networks,” “paid the cost of the networks,” and “concluded formal contracts,” they could
not promise the commencement of service in less than eight months.649
By the spring of 1974, the NIGC was in the process of laying gas pipes across
Tehran, giving priority to the “large factories” of the city.650 Nāmeh reported in the fall of
the same year that gas energy had been delivered to some of its first consumers: the
heavily-polluting brick, plaster, and lime kilns of the city.651 Brick producers were
singled out for special attention. Many workshops were built “without any attention to
notes of engineering and safety” and often used extremely cheap and dirty fuels like old
engine oil, raw crude oil, mazut, sawdust, and trash. Such kilns produced enormous
amounts of smoke, soot, and other tangible air pollutants, and in the mid-1970s it was
estimated that there were some five hundred along the route of the IGAT-1 pipeline that
“due to their inappropriate design and construction…pollute[d] intensely.” The project of
converting them to gas came “under the direct supervision of the NIGC” and by the fall
of 1974 the company was in the process of “gradually” bringing gas to the industry by
laying lines to twenty-two kilns near Tehran. Another nine had signed contracts
stipulating that they would be responsible for their own gasification.652 Fuel alterations
were not always straightforward, and it took the “studies and efforts of…specialists” to
resolve the “multiple safety and technical issues” that had prevented some of the first
Letter from Ahmad Behzād to Fars Provincial Government, pf/shz/1354, 24 Tir 1353, attached to 11310;
Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
649
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Letter from Mayor of Tehran to Ministry of the Interior, document h/52, 13 Farvardin 1353; Tabdil-e
No’-e Sukht, NLAI.
“Naqsh-e Gāz dar Tabdil-e Sukht-e Kureh-ha-ye Ājorsāzi,” Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran (Fall 1354),
11-19.
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kilns converted from becoming operational. The technical difficulties of moving to gas
fuel, the mounting costs of the conversions, and the cessation of operations that they
required, combined to render both the owners and employees of many of Tehran’s brick
kilns unenthusiastic about the project. As in Shiraz, owners “showed worry and a lack of
confidence” in the project, and doubts were significant enough to put the entire project in
jeopardy. Many worried about the cost, and despite NIGC arguments that initial
investments would be recouped via lessened fuel costs, it took a significant program of
financial assistance from the NIGC to overcome their concerns. To help alleviate the risk,
the NIGC agreed to pay for the cost of kiln conversion in “cash” and accept amortized
repayment over a thirty-month period.653
Others argued against the concerns of the factory owners by pointing to potential
benefits unrelated to the environment and the emissions of kilns. The authors of an article
on the issue in Nāmeh believed that the “importance” of the plan lay not only in the
reduction of environmental pollutants, but also in the benefit it could bring to the kilns’
production capacities. The poor design and inefficient fuel use of many kilns not only
produced of a great deal of smoke but also significant numbers of faulty bricks, estimated
as some five percent of those available on the market. The authors of the Nāmeh article
argued that via “analyses and explorations that are only possible via government
organizations,” it was possible to “raise the profitability” of kilns, and predicted that
converted workshops could reduce their loss rate by some fifty percent due to the more
precise control of temperature that gas allowed. Factory owners were not the only ones
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hesitant about potential changes in fuel supply and Nāmeh reported that the employees of
the kilns were also nervous. In contrast to the sympathy expressed for owner concerns,
however, the magazine and the NIGC were not nearly so understanding of their worries.
While the magazine recognized that workers had legitimate concerns reflective of the fact
that their pay depended on monthly output of the kilns, and the fact that the conversion
process would result in a “probable diminishment of production” for at least a period of
time, it nonetheless described them as “mostly from the illiterate classes” and “resistant
to learning the gas system even though the changes in comparison to the previous system
are insignificant.” This was reflective of the broader preoccupation with the country’s
political, managerial, and expert classes often that was often displayed by publications
like Nāmeh.654 Tellingly, no accommodations were reported as having been made by
factory owners, the NIGC, or any level of government to alleviate their worries.655
In both Tehran and Shiraz, the fundamental issue for the NIGC was that they
exercised little control over their own supply of equipment, needing to import much of it
from Europe. In particular, there was no domestic source for the gas network’s
“necessary terminals” and thus any promised start dates at best “approximately
corresponded” to when the NIGC expected to take delivery of the equipment.656 This was
not an isolated issue. Throughout the process of converting Shiraz’s industry to gas, the
promises and deadlines demanded by political and administrative leaders often ran
654

The erasure of labor was a core part of the legitimating function that gas served for the Iranian state and
its political leadership. This theme is discussed further in other chapters of this dissertation.
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Letter from Ahmad Behzād to Fars Provincial Government, 1755, 25 Shahrivar 1353; Tarh-e Gāzresāni
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headlong into such irreducible technical and economic realities. Despite the powerful
nationalist claims that had become embedded in natural gas and its technologies during
the 1960s and 1970s, Iran was simply not self-sufficient in meeting the industry’s needs.
Both the NIGC and its potential customers found themselves at the mercy of forces and
timelines largely beyond their control. Shiraz’s industrialists may have been broadly
supportive of gas energy as a potential source of environmental benefit, but many were
wary of the demands placed on them because of the great uncertainties that surrounded
the NIGC’s actual ability to provide service. Thus despite the threat of being shut
down,657 some owners expressed their wariness through a continual resistance to the
prospect of conversion, refusing “to take action for the ratification of contracts” as they
were “not ready to pay the cost of fuel conversion.”658 As their compatriots could attest,
there could be months- or even years-long delays between the signing of contracts and
the start of service, delay that seemingly promised to extend indefinitely despite the
significant investment of factory owners.
In the spring of 1975, the program’s slow pace came to the attention of national
authorities. Both the office of the Prime Minister659 and the Special Office of the Shah
wrote to the Fars provincial government to demand updates on the status of the project.660

Letter from Mahmud Nāji to Fars Provincial Government, pf/shz/2391, 27 Āzar 1353; Tarh-e Gāzresāni
beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
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Letter from the Minister of the Interior to the Provincial Government of Fars, m/9417, 25 Ābān 1354;
Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
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Letter on behalf of the Minister of the Interior to Manuchehr Piruz, m/309, 18 Farvardin 1354; and
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They commanded an “acceleration” of the conversions and complained that the governor
of Fars “had said that by the end of the year 1353 [March 1974], twelve brickmaking
furnaces would make use of natural gas while so far only 4 brickmaking furnaces had had
their fuel converted.”661 The delay prompted the Minister of the Interior to demand an
“investigation” into what had happened,662 one that came to little but succeeded in
spurring further action. In response, the NIGC organized a meeting for 21 July 1975 that
was attended by company representatives and six brickmakers. Saying that they were
under pressure from both the provincial and national government, the NIGC
representatives declared that they were ready to install gas connections as soon as the
factories reconfigured their internal systems to receive them. As it had done in Tehran, to
overcome the expected resistance of the owners, the NIGC offered, for the purposes of
the “coordination and acceleration of the work,” loans of some 1.2 million rial “in cash”
to each of the owners for the necessary conversion work.663 The loans would be repaid in
“installments” that began only when gas started flowing.664,665 This alleviated some
owner concerns, and by the end of the year the NIGC reported to the governor that four
Letter from Minister of the Interior to Manuchehr Piruz, p/4365, 4 Mordād 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh
Kureh-ha, NLAI.
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beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
662

Letter from the Minister of the Interior to the Provincial Government of Fars, m/9417, 25 Ābān 1354;
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Letter from Ahmad Behzād to Governor Piruz, document pf/shz/843, 20 Mordād 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni
beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
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The estimated cost for the system was 300,000 rial, either payable in cash at the time of signing or in
15,000 rial installments spread across eighteen months with a 30,000 rial down payment. See Letter from
NIGC to Abbās Golshen owner of the Reza Brickmaking Factory, 125, 20 Esfand 1352, attached to letter
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brickmakers were “currently making use of natural gas,” the “conversion of the internal
systems” on a further ten had been completed, and “it is therefore predicted that in the
summer of the year 1355 [summer of 1976] those furnaces that have contracts with the
NIGC666 will be able to make use of natural gas.”667 This was a significant delay,
particularly for those who had imported equipment on their own, a point the owners
repeatedly emphasized in their negotiations with state authorities.668
But there remained an even more fundamental problem for the city’s operators:
the contracts that had been concluded with the NIGC had overlooked the factories’
production histories and the amounts of energy needed to achieve them. The original
agreements had stipulated that the NIGC would provide for a maximum gas utilization of
145 cubic meters per hour.669 Those terms became a sudden point of contention in the
winter of 1975 when the Pressure Brick Corporation of Shiraz, writing that “everyone is
proud” to carry out the orders of the Shah and the provincial government, declared that
they had received their shipment of “torches” (mash’al) from the Lingel company of
Germany and requested that gas lines be installed. To match their existing output of 110
tons of bricks per 24-hour period, each furnace would needed approximately 350 cu.

In the intervening years two new brickmakers had opened for business, bringing the region’s total to
sixteen. These new businesses seem to not have contracted with the NIGC. See letter from Ahmad Behzād
to the Governor of Fars, pf/shz/21996, 3 Esfand 1354; Tarh-e Gāzresāni beh Kureh-ha, NLAI.
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m./hr., a figure that was more than double the NIGC pledge.670 Shiraz’s brickmakers
submitted an official request that gas deliveries be raised to their desired 350 cu. m./hr.,
but the NIGC declared that such modifications would require “contractual adjustment and
renewed plan[ning] for the primary gas network.” “As a result,” they wrote, “the
implementation of the plan would be delayed by [a further] nine months.” Nonetheless, at
a meeting held on 4 May 1976, it was decided that “after a complete survey of the various
technical aspects” the NIGC would “provisionally increase” the rate of consumption to
250 cu. m./hr. Any who still desired a higher rate would need to negotiate new contracts
and assume full responsibility for their own internal conversion processes.671 Again, even
with such a pledge, as late as October 1976 brickmakers were complaining that gas
delivery had still not begun.672
In Tehran, despite the early successes of industrial gasification and the attention
of the Shah and the Prime Minister to the issue,673 by September 1975 only a small
number of the city’s brick kilns had made any progress toward using gas. Delays were
significant, and many owners that had converted the internal mechanisms of their kilns
had yet to receive any gas.674 As in Shiraz, the “intense” smoke produced by brick kilns
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had brought the facilities under particular scrutiny,675 but as had also been the case in that
southern city, there proved to be a long wait between the beginnings of the fuel
conversion process and the moment when gas would become available. The cause of such
delays rested among both private factory owners and the state-owned NIGC, and while
pressure from both national and local leadership often spurred flurries of activity, it did
little to truly accelerate the process. Still, government ministries maintained their
pressure, and factory owners continued to sign contracts with the national gas company676
and install new equipment677 through the end of the 1970s.678 In August 1976 it was
reported that while all furnace owners had been “warned” that they must take action to
convert their facilities to gas and that most had complied, the “lack of a primary [gas]
network” meant that most still could not make use of the new energy source. Again, the
municipality did not rescind its orders, instructing the owners to maintain their readiness
and await service.679 As of March 1978, they were still waiting.680

this author is not aware of any comprehensive listing of Tehran’s manufacturers during the period. At this
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The project of natural gas was one driven primarily by officials within
government ministries and state-owned enterprises, but it was not one marked solely by
the overbearing power of modernizing authorities.681 The independent pursuit of gas
energy by the owners of the Brickmaking Corporation of Shiraz was reflective of a social
interest in the environment that existed separately from official concerns. A flowering of
organized social movements for environmental protection may have come to the country
decades later,682 but a current of concern for Iranians’ changing environment nonetheless
animated people who experienced the smoke and haze of pollution firsthand. The
powerful roles that state and state-owned institutions played in Iran’s petroleum
industries meant that the project of gas energy was often driven, or held hostage, by their
policies and failures, but the concerns and interests of Iranians—from early and
independent attempts to make use of gas to deep concerns for the financial demands of
energy transitions—nonetheless shaped its trajectory in significant ways. The experience
of fuel conversion among the brickmakers of Shiraz points to not only the complex
interplay between state institutions and potential consumers of natural gas, but also the
importance of going beyond questions of domination, resistance, and revolution in the
history of Pahlavi-era Iran. In Shiraz in the 1970s, some factory owners were more eager
681
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and more flexible than even the NIGC in the effort to exploit natural gas energy. Others
were more hesitant, worried about the financial cost of the move, and their caution
exerted a powerful influence on the policies that were ultimately pursued by the NIGC as
well as the final form that gasification took. In practice, the orders and initiatives of
Iran’s national government, even those emanating from the Shah directly, often found
extensive complication and delay. But such lags were not generally the result of
deliberate resistance. Just as often, they were the result of impediments created by the
unrealistic promises, ill-considered plans, and hasty decisions of state and state-affiliated
institutions.

***
Though more than a decade of work had gone into building distribution networks,
in the early 1980s gas was not yet available across wide swaths of Iran. That reality often
pushed factory owners to revert to or continue using highly polluting sources of energy,
especially in the face of oil fuel shortages caused by the destruction of Iran’s largest
refinery at Ābādān during the early days of the Iran-Iraq War. In the context of revolution
and war, the Department of Environmental Protection found its work of combatting
industrial emissions to be less welcome than it had once been. In the chaotic wake of the
revolution and the rise of the Islamic Republic, many of the environmental regulations
and policies imposed by institutions like the Department of Environmental Protection
were weakened in local courts, ignored by the Iranian public at large, or increasingly
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opposed by interested parties.683 In one instance, in September 1980, Sayyid Ahmad
Nasari, Deputy Governor of Zanjān, a city lying some 200 miles to the northwest of
Tehran, wrote to the Office of Environmental Protection of Zanjān to report that he had
received complaints that a brick kiln of several years’ presence in nearby Khodābandeh
had been closed for the reason that it “created pollution.” Nasari asked that an
“investigation” be undertaken “because the aforementioned furnace was outside the city”
and its production of bricks provided “pivotal help” to the region.684 While the
Department of Environmental Protection did not shy away from shuttering offending
kilns due to their “irredeemable destruction of the environment,”685 throughout the 1980s
and into 1990s the department seemed to make little permanent progress. In the summer
of 1994, three brickkilns in Varāmin were closed when they returned to burning crude oil
after allowing their natural gas bills to enter arrears. The head of the department’s local
office declared that “brick kilns of the township of Varāmin that make use of natural gas
fuel do not have the right to use other fuels”—especially mazut and crude oil—"unless
their gas was cut off through [the fault of] the NIGC.”686 A year later in Hamadān, in the
west of Iran, the department closed eight small kilns and declared that up to a thousand
more “threatened” the people of the province by not adhering to environmental
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regulations.687 Likewise, in the winter of 1996, the kilns of Tuyserkān were also shut688
and again in Hamadān in the spring of 1997.689
While the Islamic Republic’s regulators only had limited success in clamping
down on polluters,690 their efforts were indicative of a steady commitment to
environmental protection in at least some circles of the new government. Beginning in
the early 1990s, officials within all levels of the Iranian state began tackling the country’s
environmental issues with renewed vigor, both reviving and building upon the work
undertaken in the final decade of the Pahlavi era. In 1993, the government marked
Tehran’s continued struggle with air pollution as “a high priority environmental and
health issue.”691 That same year, as part of a burgeoning effort to combat air pollution,
the municipality of Tehran established the Air Quality Control Company to monitor
atmospheric pollutants and oversee mitigation efforts in the city. Two years later, the
Iranian parliament enacted a new Clean Air Act in an attempt to address urban air
pollution. The new legislation prompted two studies in Tehran that ran between 1995 and
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1997,692 both of which would eventually inform an air pollution control master plan that
was passed by the Iranian cabinet in 2000.693 By the 1990s, industry’s contribution to
total air pollution figures had declined. In 1997 it was estimated that industrial sources
accounted for approximately a fifth of Tehran’s total air pollution,694 most coming from
the automotive,695 cement,696 and refining industries.697 By that point, a rapid rise in
population and motor vehicle use had led the transportation sector to become the single
largest contributor of air pollution in the city.698 Still, despite increasing levels of
attention to vehicular sources of pollution, action continued to be taken to address
industrial sources. As had been true for decades, the expanded provision of natural gas
fuel would play an essential role.699 With the continued spread of Iran’s natural gas
network in the three decades after the 1988 end of the Iran-Iraq War, gas energy became
692
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available in ever larger sections of the country, something that would enable more and
more industries to embrace gas, even outside of major urban areas like Tehran.

***
Beginning in the 1960s and continuing in subsequent decades, Iranian
engagements with natural gas as a source of energy were shaped by a growing awareness
of how their society’s accelerating industrialization was undermining the quality of their
air. Air pollution meant something very tangible to Iranians, and the noxious gloom and
hazy sun of their cities came to symbolize a dangerous turn in Iran’s development.
Though spurred by the growing use of fossil fuels, the rapid worsening of the country’s
air quality was not caused by human activity alone. Intensified by inescapable and
“unfavorable”700 topographic, climactic, and atmospheric factors, particularly in Tehran,
the smoke, soot, and haze that lay suspended in the air were both unsightly stains on
beautiful panoramas and frightening specters, promising disease and death for Iran’s
people and natural world alike. The ability of natural gas to mitigate the concentrations of
those products of fuel combustion was central to its appeal. Gas seemingly offered itself
as an easy fix, a different form of fossil fuel energy that required minimal changes to
Iran’s path of modernization but nonetheless produced much less of the pollutants that
clouded sky, irritated the eyes, and burned the lungs. Gas energy’s environmental
potential thus found champions among the elite of Iranian society, up to and including the
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royal family, as it simultaneously offered continued “progress” and affirmation of
developmental choices already made.
The story of bringing natural gas to Iran’s industry was not one of easy
achievement. In contrast to the triumphalist narrative of gas energy that formed much of
the Pahlavi state’s official rhetoric, the reality was one of fitful stops and starts, delays
and controversies. Nor were the dynamics of industrial gas conversion uniform across the
country, with factory owners in Shiraz being more welcoming than those in Tehran. In all
cases, however, there was significant interaction and negotiation between industrial
consumers and the state and state-owned institutions that supplied gas and mandated its
use. While officials and experts working with or for the Iranian state were the primary
drivers of gas energy’s penetration within Iranian industry, the ultimate contours of gas
consumption reflected the desires and concerns of its industrial consumers as much as it
did any official plans and ambitions. For many industrialists, particularly the larger ones
near urban areas, the story was not one of an overbearing state imposing its
environmental will on resistant industries; rather, it was one where a largely elite but
longstanding concern for the most tangible forms of air pollution met a group of
industrialists who variously embraced, rejected, and negotiated how gas would come to
their facilities. Some factory owners dragged their feet, resisting contracts with the NIGC
even when threatened with closure. Other owners embraced gas energy with fervor,
attempting to convert their furnaces and kilns before any official effort was underway.
Most, however, were cautiously accepting but concerned over its costs, the ability of the
NIGC to deliver gas in sufficient amounts, and the subsequent financial viability of their
businesses. This last group ultimately did the most to shape how gas came to be used in
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Iran’s industries: with de facto public-private cooperation where, supported by
government monies, owners assumed responsibility for the conversion of their own
facilities while the NIGC’s obligation stopped where their network met factory gas
terminals.
The project to bring natural gas energy to Iranian industry was deeply reflective
not only of how Iranian commentators thought about environmental pollution, but also
how it was connected to their national aspirations and the future they imagined for their
country. Elite though much of the rhetoric may have been, the officials and experts who
advocated for the adoption of gas energy in order to address environmental concerns
were not the uncomplicated, gharbzadeh compradors that they have often been portrayed
as, at least not in this arena. Many embraced the potential of gas energy not in imitation
of Euro-American modernity, but in an intentional attempt to surpass it. They looked at
what had befallen the polluted cities of the industrialized world and took specific,
informed attempts to build a society that would avoid the same fate. In their eyes, air
pollution and environmental degradation threatened the entire modernizing project of the
Pahlavi state, but their answer was never to back away from pursuing Iran’s further
development. Instead, it was to intensify their embrace of it and substitute a cleaner, more
modern sources of energy for the oil fuels they saw as choking their society. In this way,
through their participation in global knowledge networks, Iranian policymakers,
engineers, and scientists positioned themselves as active participants in the construction
of a cleaner fossil fuel-based civilization not only for their own country, but also the
world. The ultimate failure of gas energy to reduce the fouling of Iran’s urban air,
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however, demonstrated the lack of a straightforward technical fix to the country’s
environmental issues.
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Chapter 5
National Capillaries:
Natural Gas Distribution, 1970-1985

In the 1970s, natural gas began to take on an increasingly central role in the lives
of urban Iranians across the country. Even considering the role of industrial gas networks
in mitigating Iran’s rapidly worsening air quality, Iranian planners never intended those
built in places like Shiraz and Tehran to stand alone. They were instead imagined as part
of larger initiatives to develop and then supply domestic markets for natural gas.
Beginning their decades-long work as part of the first Iran Gas Trunkline project in the
late 1960s, the National Iranian Gas Company was responsible for evaluating Iran’s
urban gas markets as well as overseeing the construction of any eventual natural gas
networks that would be built. Far more than was true for the main IGAT-1 pipeline and
its associated facilities, Iran’s urban gas networks were the products of the NIGC, its
employees, and their objectives. Though foreign consultants and engineers were integral
to the success of these projects, the fundamental market research and design decisions
were made by NIGC personnel, sometimes in opposition to the recommendations of
experts hired from abroad. It was their judgements that would drive the implementation
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of distribution systems within Iranian cities, from their fundamental technical
characteristics to the geographic and social priorities of construction. NIGC engineers
and managers worked to build gas systems that both reflected the contemporary realities
of Iranian cities and would be able to support their long-term hopes for widespread use of
natural gas within Iranian society. Far from straightforward, choices abounded for these
officials, and their decisions would have significant social and political effects in later
years.
By the middle of the 1970s, cities served by the IGAT-1 pipeline system like
Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz were beginning to see the slow construction of new natural
gas networks. As had been true in Shiraz a decade earlier, priority was given to industrial
consumers and the significant volumes of gas they were expected to consume. City gas
networks were not built uniformly, instead being constructed piece by piece,
neighborhood by neighborhood, with some areas receiving service years or decades
before others. Their order of precedence reflected broader decisions about the physical
and economic suitability of urban neighborhoods, supposedly objective characteristics
that in practice largely favored middle- and upper-class residents of Iran’s cities. Largely
left behind were the residents of towns and villages across Iran, even those which lay
very close to the major natural gas pipelines that had begun to tie the country together.
For the people of such areas, the lack of piped gas service became symbolic of a
perceived neglect by the national government, and late in the decade their frustrated
expectations became intertwined with the revolutionary politics of social and economic
inequality.
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Natural gas and access to it became politically potent issues during the 1979
revolution. Though the gas networks left partially completed at the end of the Pahlavi era
would become the foundations upon which expanded access to gas energy would later be
built, the monarchy’s slow connection of Iran’s residential and commercial consumers to
the national system became a significant means by which the nascent Islamic Republic
could demonstrate its commitment to economic and social justice. The intermingling of
natural gas and developmental politics thus continued in the 1980s, as the prioritization
and celebration of grand infrastructural achievements that had been the hallmark of the
Pahlavi state was seemingly reversed by the government in its emphasis on efforts to
extend gas service to towns and villages, residential neighborhoods, and other areas
where small consumers predominated. This turnabout, however, belied the significant
continuity between the pre- and post-revolutionary eras with respect to natural gas
policies. Far from the sharp break that the organs of the Islamic Republic presented it as,
both the fundamental aims and the operations of institutions like the NIGC remained
broadly similar to the pre-revolutionary era. As had been the case under the monarchy,
natural gas was portrayed as embodying a modern future of clean and convenient energy,
a crucial pillar of a prosperous and independent Iran made manifest by the actions of the
dedication of the government to Iran’s development.

***
As befitted its status as the administrative and manufacturing capital of Iran,
Tehran received significant and early attention from the NIGC. The city’s gas network
was largely devised by the employees of the national gas company, IMEG, and the
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NIOC, with the last to a much lesser extent after duties relating to gas were eventually
transferred to the NIGC.701 This was in sharp contrast to the original gas network that had
been built in Shiraz, something reflecting the different circumstances of the projects.
Whereas the Shiraz network had been built as part of a regional project primarily
intended to deliver gas to the Shiraz Chemical Fertilizer Company, Tehran’s system was
pursued as part of a national project intended to supply natural gas as a source of energy
in urban areas across a broad swath of the country. Other differences marked the project
as well. Local authorities in Tehran were not as supportive as the city’s government
balked at the large number of streets that would need to be torn up for gas pipes to be
laid. The resistance of Tehran’s city government counted for little, however, and work
commenced as the IGAT-1 pipeline and its branch to Tehran were being completed.
Early designs for the city’s gas system were developed by IMEG, which proposed a
system divided into two sections, one aimed at supplying major industrial units on the
city’s outskirts, particularly in the south and west, and another the small-scale residential
and commercial consumers within the city limits. The design called for the industrial
network to begin at the city gas network gateway, lying approximately a dozen
kilometers south of Tehran near the town of Rey. At the city gateway, the 30-inch branch
pipeline built to connect Tehran to the main IGAT-1 pipeline at Sāveh some 111
kilometers away was terminated and the very high pressures used to transport natural gas
through the main pipeline were stepped down from 1000 psi to an intermediate 300 psi.
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From there the gas would be injected into local lines to feed industrial consumers along
the roads of Khorāsān, Khāniābād, Āb’ali, and Sāveh as well as the old and new roads to
Karaj. The system would then connect at two separate points to a system of residential
networks spread throughout the city. In this way, as had been true in Shiraz in the mid1960s, natural gas distribution plans in Tehran prioritized service to large-scale industrial
consumers over the more numerous but individually less-significant residential
consumers of the city.702 There were sound technical and economic reasons for this,
including the ability to exploit relatively large volumes of gas through many fewer
connections and a desire of many Iranian officials to use gas energy to mitigate industrial
air pollution in the capital. It also reflected the more general emphasis on industry and
scale that drove Pahlavi-era natural gas policies, a perceived neglect of ordinary citizen
consumers that would influence the views of people across Iran.
Though significant aspects of IMEG’s work would become part of the city
network’s final design, particularly the spatial arrangement of the system, some of the
detailed but arguably more significant decisions would be made by Iranians officials in
the NIGC. The company’s work in Tehran was significant, combining technical,
economic, and political choices, and provided a template for their work on gas systems in
Iran’s other urban areas. One of the first major decisions made by the NIGC was
technical. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were two prevailing views regarding
the best general design for city gas networks: one favoring high gas pressures and the
other preferring low. In most countries that had made use of gas networks, notably France
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and the United States, high-pressure systems had been chosen, deemed “more
economical” than the alternative. British companies like IMEG, on the other hand, had
historically favored low-pressure systems, though in recent years they had also begun to
construct high-pressure ones as well. Such low-pressure networks generally carried gas at
two pounds per square inch, or roughly one-seventh of atmospheric pressure at sea level.
IMEG proposed just such a system for Tehran’s gas delivery network, suggesting a large
40-inch pipe running from the city gateway along the Old and New Shemirān Roads
before terminating at Tajrish Square and feeding smaller networks of pipes that fanned
out across the city. NIGC officials opposed this plan, viewing the low-pressure systems
as unnecessarily hampering the long-term prospects for the growth of gas use in Iranian
cities. The high-pressure systems they favored instead moved gas at 60 pounds per square
inch, allowing them to deliver nearly thirty times more gas through a pipe of a given
diameter. With the proven ability of high-pressure networks to deliver more gas in mind,
it was feared that if a low-pressure system was chosen for Tehran not only would it
“suffer from shortages of gas” in the future but would also set the pattern for other
Iranian cities and doom them to the same fate.703
IMEG defended their choice not on economic principles, an argument they could
not win, but on concerns for the system’s safety. They argued that a high-pressure
network was more dangerous should a leak occur, as the greater volumes of natural gas
transported could more easily cause an uncontrollable fire. NIGC officials countered by
drawing upon the experiences of foreign operators of natural gas networks, arguing that
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in a high-pressure system a break or leakage would be immediately apparent and was
thus in practice safer as compared to a low-pressure system where a leak might allow gas
to “creep” into areas surrounding the pipes. From there the released gas could migrate
and accumulate, creating explosive conditions in spaces far from the compromised pipe.
In the end, the debate between NIGC engineers and managers on the one hand and IMEG
consultants on the other became deadlocked and the choice was not made on technical,
economic, or safety concerns at all. Senior leadership in the NIGC ultimately made their
choice based on the fact that one day IMEG would leave Iran and Tehran’s gas networks
and their own engineers would remain, asking only that they “guarantee” that their
position was “correct and holds no danger for the country and the people of Tehran.”704
Despite the rejection of IMEG’s design, the final shape of Tehran’s industrial gas
network was similarly oriented around the “status and location of [the city’s] industrial
units” in a manner similar to that proposed by the British firm initially.705 Gas lines were
largely installed in the early 1970s, and by 1974 the city’s industrial outskirts were served
by three primary branches emanating from the city gas gateway. In the areas west of
Tehran, a 22-inch line stretched for 23 kilometers in a northwesterly direction, carrying
gas at 250 psi before being stepped down at the junction of the road to Sāveh to 150 psi
and terminating at Shahyād Khatam Square near to Mehrābād airport. Branching off this
line were subsidiary spurs running along the old and new roads to Karaj, the route to
Qom, and the road to Sāveh. The eastern section of the city was broadly similar, with a
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22-inch line running gas at 250 psi for 27 kilometers between the city gateway and the
suburb of Tehrānpārs and 44 kilometers of branching lines running along the Khorāsān
and Varāmin Roads in the southeast. A second smaller branch of five kilometers’ length
carried gas at 60 psi for industrial units near to Tehrānpārs. South of Tehran a single 20inch pipeline ran near to the Tehran Refinery and then directly to the Farahābād power
plant with a much smaller 8-inch spur feeding industry directly south of the city. Far from
incidental, the system was designed specifically to serve Tehran’s existing industrial
areas. Planning for the conversion of industrial units began as the network was being
constructed and first began drawing gas alongside the opening of the IGAT-1 pipeline in
October 1970.706 Experts from Pakistan were an important part of this process, being
invited in the wake of a visit by NIGC officials to the country. Senior NIGC officials
considered Pakistan’s experience with natural gas utilization to be some ten or fifteen
years ahead of their own, a product of their neighbor’s inability to pay for the services of
foreign consultants and contractors.707 With their help and driven by official concerns
over Iran’s energy mix as well as desires to mitigate the capital’s worsening air quality,
by 1974 more than two dozen manufactories were making use of gas—from the Tehran
Refinery to Farahābād power plant to cement works to tire factories to many others—
with plans to rapidly grow that number over the following few years.708 Within a few
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years the city’s industrial areas were considered fully served, and by 1977 some 120
producers were making use of natural gas in their operations.709
Construction of gas networks for Tehran’s residential neighborhoods lagged those
of the city’s industrial areas significantly. Even as the industrial system was substantially
complete and operational in 1974, official studies of city gas networks were still being
undertaken. Despite the NIOC independently building a small network near Mehrābād
airport in the Tehrānsar neighborhood in that year, the more significant plans that
organizations like the NIGC had for city residents were slated to unfold over decades of
time, with it expecting to take some ten years to reach 100,000 residential consumers in a
city of millions.710 A significant portion of that delay was rooted in the NIGC’s decision
to embrace a high-pressure network and invalidate much of IMEG’s design, a choice that
had significant effects on the subsequent work undertaken by the NIGC. Lamenting their
own reflexive turn toward Europe and North America, some NIGC officials saw the
Pakistani experience as an example, and not only sought to learn from them in the
specific case of gas network design, but also the more general lesson to undertake on
their own as much work as could be feasibly done.711 With IMEG out of the picture it
largely fell to the NIGC to undertake a comprehensive study of the potential market for
natural gas in Tehran, a task that was subsequently performed as part of broader decisions
surrounding the city’s natural gas network and its construction. Complicating matters was
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the fact that the company was unable to find maps that adequately covered the entirety of
Tehran; not even the water department had sufficiently accurate maps for the entirety of
the city. In response, the NIGC divided the city into four groups and assigned teams to
analyze the city’s potential for gas service. The teams worked from the 25-year master
plan for Tehran and coordinated their work with Tehran’s city government and the
electricity and water departments. The four divisions were not geographic, instead being
decided by size of dwelling. One team took homes of 200 square meters or smaller,
another looked at residences up to 400 square meters in size, and a third all those 400
square meters or larger. The final team surveyed potential large-volume consumers like
hotels, restaurants, government offices, baths, bakeries, hospitals, and educational
facilities. The teams undertook “door to door” surveys, in the process generating some
500 new or updated maps that marked all homes and business across the city.712
The NIGC teams quickly found, as had been the case in Shiraz, that “due to an
urban fabric [of] tight and narrow alleys, and largely unsuitable residences,” large
sections of the older parts of southern Tehran were not suitable for gas delivery.713 This
reality was reflective of the deep social inequalities of Tehran and their manifestation as
part of the city’s urban fabric. Tehran is marked by a stark north-south divide, with the
middle and upper classes largely living in the northern half of the city. In addition to the
more pleasant climate associated with the sharp rise in altitude caused by the city’s
construction in the foothills of the Alborz mountain chain, Tehran’s north is physically
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marked by its wealth: more trees and green spaces, larger homes, smaller families, and
lower housing density. In contrast, the southern areas of the city, sitting in the hot
flatlands below the mountain foothills, were populated by people of poorer and
marginalized social status, crowded into older and significantly denser housing. Though
rooted in the late nineteenth century and the nascent integration of Iran into world
markets, government policies favoring capitalist accumulation and the boom in the
country’s oil rents in the decades after the Second World War accelerated and intensified
these socio-geographic divisions as waves of rural immigrants settled in city’s south.714
To determine the order in which Tehran’s neighborhoods would receive gas
service, the NIGC employed a “mathematical template” that considered the existing level
of consumption of oil products like kerosene, the overall potential for gas consumption,
population density, and other factors. While this process did not automatically select
Tehran’s high-income areas, it did largely direct the NIGC to neighborhoods of recent
vintage. Though most such areas of the city were in Tehran’s well off northern reaches,
two low income residential suburbs in Tehran’s south—Nāziābād and Kuy-e Nohom-e
Ābān (today Kuy-e Sizdah-ye Ābān)— were chosen as first to receive gas on this basis.
Both had been built in relatively recent years, with construction in Nāziābād beginning in
1941 and Kuy-e Nohom-e Ābān in 1953. Two among a number of planned residential
developments built in the decades during and after the Second World War, the
neighborhoods were inspired by contemporary urban development in Europe and North
America and constructed along ordered lines with wide streets, detached single family
For more see Ali Madanipour’s Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis (Chichester, UK: John Wiley and
Sons, Ltd., 1998), particularly pp. 111-114.
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homes, and low-rise apartment buildings.715 In contrast to persistent rumors that they
were chosen as experimental spaces due to the social marginalization of their
inhabitants,716 the NIGC decision to prioritize these neighborhoods for gas service
reflected both the comparative ease of pipelaying in them and their relative proximity to
the Tehran gas gateway. Despite the relatively early connection of these two areas,
construction in Kuy-e Nohom-e Ābān began in 1974 and Nāziābād shortly thereafter, the
decision to favor neighborhoods exhibiting similar characteristics of new construction
and wider streets generally favored wealthier sections in the northern parts of Tehran, and
next in line were northern areas like Sahābqarānieh, Niāvarān, and Z’afarānieh.
The actual engineering of Tehran’s gas network was contracted to Sofregaz,
affiliated with the state-owned gas company Gaz de France, but even with the NIGC and
the French company working together progress was slow. This was in part because of
Sofregaz’s desire to redo the entire mapping and market analysis work that the NIGC had
already undertaken,717 but even with their eventual acquiescence to Iranian insistence
they use the existing maps, work on Iran’s residential gas network proceeded slowly as
progress on its industrial sector moved quickly. As was true in Shiraz in the mid-1960s,
ambitions were both relatively modest and rarely met. Initial plans in 1974 for Kuy-e
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Nohom-e Ābān called for approximately 3500 residential and commercial customers to
receive natural gas service. Slated to begin construction after the completion of networks
in Tehrānsar and Kuy-e Nohom-e Ābān, Nāziābād was slated to receive connections for
some 10,500 customers.718 Three years later, however, in 1977, NIOC workers had only
connected 120 of the expected 200 residential units in Tehrānsar. In Kuy-e Nohom-e
Ābān and nearby ‘Aliābād, only some 2000 units had been connected. Farther north,
distribution networks for 54,000 units were still in the design stages for most of the
neighborhoods, with only Gishā, in north central Tehran, seeing service to some 115
residents. All told, between the start of the IGAT-1 project and 1977, some 460
kilometers of gas distribution lines had been laid in Tehran to feed a few thousand
residential consumers.719
Tehran was not the only Iranian city to see new or expanded gas service in the
1970s. The NIGC was responsible for gas distribution in Iran’s other major urban areas
as well, and members of the Tehran survey teams became the “nucleus” of groups that
would undertake similar work in cities and neighborhoods around the country. Alongside
them worked a separate national group created to undertake economic evaluations and
“convince” Iran’s industrial energy consumers to utilize gas as well.720 Building on the
early industrial and residential networks that had been built in the 1960s, Shiraz saw
significantly expanded service that accompanied the opening of a new 16-inch branch
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line from the IGAT-1 system that replaced the original 10-inch line. The new line ran
some 300 kilometers between Bid Boland and the Shiraz city gateway, largely mirroring
the established pattern set by the city’s earlier system. Shiraz’s industrial sector continued
to draw significant amounts of gas with major consumers including the chemical fertilizer
plant, a power plant, cement works, sugar loaf factories, and a pasteurization unit. As had
been true with the original line, also served by this regional network was the town of
Guyim, which the NIGC treated as a testbed for the planned future gasification of some
440 towns and villages along the route of the main IGAT-1 pipeline.721 Guyim would be
the only town connected to the IGAT-1 line during the Pahlavi era,722 a fact that would
come to have significant political repercussions within Iran.
Progress within Shiraz itself had continued steadily but slowly in the intervening
years. The NIGC was still very much in the process of learning to predict and control the
balance of supply and demand for the city as well as preparing to lay gas lines along
Shiraz’s streets. While residential gas consumption had risen sharply between 1968, the
first year of operation, and 1973, going from some 130,000 cubic meters to 3.56 million,
this slow progress was reflected within the numbers of consumers, with total residential
and commercial consumers failing to reach 3000 in that same period.723 Isfahan too had
prioritized industrial consumers over residential and commercial. Construction of the
city’s industrial network had been completed quickly, taking no longer than five months
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at the beginning of 1972. As of 1974, seven industrial units were making use of gas, most
especially the Āryāmehr Steel Mill that had been so integral to the IGAT-1 program and
consumed some 15.5 million cubic feet of gas per day.724 Over the next four years the
industrial network expanded to include an additional thirteen manufactories while the
beginnings of a residential and commercial network were also laid with 887 units being
served, still a far cry from the 4300 that was the target for the looming end of the Fifth
Development Plan in 1978.725
Natural gas was also supplied via the IGAT-1 system to the Alborz Industrial
City, founded in 1967 as a “modern city” on 1100 hectares of land some 130 kilometers
northwest of Tehran and 12 kilometers south of Qazvin. Planned in accordance with the
“world’s most modern standards and principles,” the area was managed by the Alborz
Industrial City Company which was in turn owned by the Ministry of Water and
Electricity, the Ministry of the Economy, and the Bank of Industrial Development. The
city was built to foster industrial development and land and utilities were sold to
industrial concerns at bargain prices, quickly prompting the construction of “great
factories” with more in development. The NIGC accepted responsibility to supply the
city with gas in early 1971, shortly after the completion of the IGAT-1 project, aiming to
provide the “clean and inexpensive fuel and…to prevent the pollution of the air of the
industrial city.” By fall of that year, planning would begin, and by 1974 an 8-inch spur
line connecting to the Qazvin IGAT-1 compressor stations had been completed. While
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industrial consumers were already making use of gas in 1974, no action had yet been
taken to supply the residential areas of the planned city.726 Though the number of
industrial units making use of natural gas rose steadily in the following years, as late as
1977 no residential or commercial consumers had been connected to the gas network.727
Smaller areas were also beginning to be supplied by the IGAT pipeline, including the
power plant in Manjil, and industrial consumers in Kāshān,728 Ābyek, and Lushān.729

***
Though the IGAT-1 project quickly became the backbone of Iranian natural gas
exploitation after its completion in the early 1970s, even substituting for the regional
network constructed in Shiraz in the late 1960s, two smaller projects were also taking
shape during that decade. Smaller in scope than the IGAT-1 project, these systems
nonetheless exhibited many of the same traits, particularly the reliance on foreign
contractors and the prioritization of industrial consumers over residential. Despite its
relative proximity to Bid Boland and the IGAT-1 gas gathering system, Ahvāz, lying
astride the Kārun River in the middle of Iran’s southwestern oil-bearing region, would
come in the 1970s to be supplied by a separate gas system. The city was home to a
number of facilities central to Iran’s oil and gas industry, not least the Ahvāz Pipe Mill
that had played such an important and dubious role in IGAT-1 program. As was true
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across the country, the NIGC’s project to delivery gas to consumers in Ahvāz was
motivated by a desire to prevent the “waste” of the “ideal” source of energy and a need to
provide increasing amounts of fuel to residential, commercial, and industrial consumers
in addition to the same concern for air quality, particularly as was related to its brick
kilns, that had motivated industrial conversion in cities like Tehran and Shiraz.730 To
supply gas to Ahvāz, a small natural gas refinery was built seven kilometers outside the
city near the oil facilities that would feed it nearly 30 million cubic feet of gas per day via
a 12-inch line. Constructed over the course of a year, by May 1971 the system was
operational. As was true elsewhere, the overall contours of Ahvāz’s natural gas network
were shaped most strongly by the geographic spread of its industry. Once refined, the gas
traveled via a 16-inch line at 400 psi the twenty kilometers to Kut-e Abdollāh south of the
city. From there a 10-kilometer branch line carried gas to industrial consumers to the
west of the Kārun River while a second carried gas just over than thirteen kilometers to
the city’s brick kilns. A third branch, only six inches in diameter, carried gas to the
Ahvāz city gateway where its pressure was reduced to the standard 60 psi and an odorant
was added before being injected into the roughly 22 kilometers of pipe that made up the
city network. Residents began making use of gas late in the spring of 1972, and by 1974
some 23 industrial and 1070 residential consumers were consuming 3 million cubic feet
of gas per day.731 By 1977 the amount of gas consumed had risen to approximately 30
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million cubic feet per day, the vast majority by the city’s industry with relatively little
increase in residential demand.732
Far to the northeast in Iran’s Khorāsān region, near to the country’s borders with
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (now Turkmenistan), a significant regional project to
provide gas for the city of Mashhad and the Nekā power plant in Māzandarān was also
underway. Lying in the Ālādāgh Mountains, 22 kilometers west of the city of Sarkhas
and 120 kilometers northeast of Mashhad, the Khāngirān field was discovered and
deemed commercially viable by the NIOC in the 1960s. The find was of significant
importance to the company. Lying far outside the southern oil concession area, the field
was seen as both a way to supply energy to the Khorāsān region without incurring the
significant expense of transporting oil products from Khuzestān and as a source of gas
that was not dependent on the operations or decisions of the Consortium companies. With
the field estimated to have some 21.5 trillion cubic feet of gas in two primary rock
formations, one containing 3.5 trillion cubic feet of sweet gas and the other nearly 18
trillion of very sour gas, construction began in 1971 on a 16-inch pipe to bring gas at
1000 psi more than 120 kilometers from the dehydrating and refining facilities, with daily
capacities of 45 million cubic feet and 60 million cubic feet respectively, built at
Khāngirān to the Mashhad city gateway. By 1974 the gas treatment and transmission
systems had been completed and were beginning to operate. In the years prior, the NIGC
had prepared plans for the supply of natural gas to industrial, residential, and commercial
consumers in Mashhad and its surrounding areas. As had been true for distribution
Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran, “F’āliat-hā va ‘Amalkard-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran tay Durān-e
Barnāmeh-hā-ye ‘Omrāni-ye Chahārom va Panjom,” 16 Bahman 2535, 4.
732

299

systems across Iran, industrial consumes were prioritized in the construction of
Mashhad’s gas network. One 6-inch branch ran some 23 kilometers to feed a nearby
cement factory and another through the city directly to the Ābkuh sugar loaf factory.
Where the latter intersected Khājeh Rabi’ Road, pressure reduction facilities were located
in order to supply gas to the surrounding neighborhoods.733 By 1977, Mashhad’s
industrial gas network had been completed and was being fully used while those
supplying city neighborhoods were still in the process of being built, with ten industrial
units and some 700 residential and commercial consumers making use of gas.734
Supplying Mashhad was not the only use of Khāngirān’s gas that Iran’s national
petroleum companies pursued in the 1970s. As part of the Fifth Development Plan that
began in 1973, it was proposed that the Nekā power plant, then under construction in
Māzandarān, and the northern cities of Shirvān, Bojnord, Quchān, Gorgān and Gonbad-e
Kāvus be fed with natural gas from the Khāngirān field. Rather than the nearby oil
refinery that had originally been envisioned,735 Nekā would be supplied by a 30-inch
pipeline running some nearly 700 kilometers from Mashhad to the powerplant. To purify
the highly acidic gas that would be used, a refinery with a daily capacity of 22 million
cubic meters of gas was planned. Of the nearly 8 billion cubic meters of gas that the
pipeline was supposed to transport per year, some 7 billion was slated for industrial
applications like the Nekā power plant while the remainder was dedicated to residential
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and commercial consumers in the five northern cities.736 Foreign experts and contractors
were crucial to the project, with the design work for the gas treatment plant undertaken
by the British firm Davy Power Gas and its construction entrusted to three Italian
companies, Saipem, CIMI, and Technipetrol. The pipeline running between Mashhad and
Nekā was designed by Williams Brothers UK and constructed by Butler-Culvern
Construction, an American company. Construction began in 1976 but was interrupted
three years later by the revolution. The project would thus not reach initial operational
capability until 1983 and would not be fully completed until 2001.737

***
By the end of the 1970s, the NIGC had undertaken market studies and design
work in 25 cities and for some 600 industrial units.738 Approximately 9.5 billion cubic
meters of gas were exported to the Soviet Union in 1977 versus the nearly 3 billion that
had been consumed domestically. While exports had remained largely steady over the
course of the 1970s, domestic consumption had grown substantially, more than doubling
between 1973 and 1977.739 At over 1 billion cubic meters, Tehran alone accounted for
roughly one third of Iran’s domestic natural gas consumption in 1977, followed by Shiraz
and Isfahan at just over 500 million cubic meters and 450 million cubic meters
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respectively.740 Most of that consumption, nearly 80 percent in 1976 and substantially
similar amounts in other years, had gone to replace fuel oil and diesel, two oil products
used most heavily in industry.741 This reflected not only the significant amounts of
natural gas that consumers like power plants and factories could burn, but also their
prioritization in Iranian distribution schemes. Consistently across Iran, the construction of
natural gas networks prioritized connecting and servicing industrial consumers. While all
cities and towns across Iran were thus slated to see significantly expanded service as part
of the aborted Sixth Development Plan, residential and commercial consumers were
therefore asked to wait years after industrial networks were operational to be able to use
natural gas.742
By the end of the 1970s, only limited progress had been made in building gas
distribution networks able to serve non-industrial consumers, and then almost entirely in
a few urban locales. Indeed, rural areas residents were particularly underserved as the
NIGC made extremely limited investments in rural gas distribution during the five years
of the Fifth Development Plan, some 200 million rial as opposed to the nearly 96.5
billion rial spent on major new production and distribution projects during the same
period.743 In the mid and late 1970s, amid the context of growing revolutionary fervor in
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Iran, the uneven spread of access to natural gas became a significant issue for Iranians
living in areas left underserved. Inequalities of wealth and access to the fruits of Iran’s
developmental programs were keenly felt in Iranian society during the period. Land
reform measures begun in the early 1960s, primarily aimed at breaking the power of old
aristocratic families, had largely failed to create landholdings large enough for newly
empowered peasant families to maintain themselves. The damage was compounded by
policies that favored urban populations over rural, particularly the agricultural price
ceilings that suppressed agrarian earnings. Such policies—accompanied by the
simultaneous promotion of mechanized agriculture that damaged the relatively delicate
topsoil in many areas, continued efforts at nomadic settlement, and the failure to invest
significant sums in rural infrastructure and services—both undermined traditional ways
of life and failed to incorporate the majority of rural dwellers into the new economy.
Despite state investment in rural cooperatives and programs like the Literacy Corps,
many were left largely without adequate means to support themselves.
With the majority of developmental investment flowing to Iran’s urban areas and
the greatly expanded network of services offered, there was a significant migration of
landless people from the countryside into Iran’s cities. Life was often no easier for them
there, however, as there were often few major avenues for social advancement on offer.
While government import substitution policies were largely successful in helping foster
new industries, they also tended to favor politically connected families and foreign
corporations who obtained business contracts and investment through both legitimate and
corrupt means, their exorbitant profits and hoarded wealth justified as necessary spurs for
investment and economic growth. Though the new professional salaried middle classes
303

also grew rapidly during this period, few former rural dwellers had the social connections
or educations needed to joint their ranks. The traditional middle classes, largely bazaar
merchants and members of the clerical hierarchy, were similarly closed off to them.
Though some of the migrants found employ in the economy’s expanding industrial
sectors, far more were left as impoverished members of the urban poor, crowded in
inadequate housing in neglected city neighborhoods.744
Nowhere was this more true than in Tehran, which had received the lion’s share
of investment activity and had become the country’s manufacturing capital as well as its
administrative one. Thrown into sharp relief were the increasingly comfortable standards
of living of those who had benefited from the changes in Iranian society. Aside from the
lives of luxury that Iran’s social elite enjoyed, many others acquired modern living
spaces, private automobiles, state-backed insurance plans, and the ability to travel abroad
on holiday. Mainly residing in areas like Tehran’s northern neighborhoods, such people
were the primary market for the increasing amounts of consumer goods and modern
appliances produced in Iran and imported from overseas. Despite the previously
unimaginable levels of wealth found in the city by the end of the 1970s, Tehran still
lacked significant public infrastructures like a functioning sewer and mass transit system.
While it was thus true that life had improved for most Iranians in an absolute sense,
though for lower income groups standards remained well below those of industrialized
nations, over the course of the 1970s the gap between rich and poor accelerated at an
For more on land reform in postwar Iran see Eric J. Hooglund’s Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980
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even faster pace. Between inequalities in housing, employment, income, and living
standards, for many it was plain to see that there was a significant lack of regard for the
everyday needs of most Iranians on the part of their government. It was also just as clear
to those outside Tehran, especially those living in rural areas, that the capital city and its
denizens had and would continue to reap outsize benefit from Iran’s changing economy.
For many Iranians, the rising expectations they had for their lives were being increasingly
disappointed.745
The relative deprivation of such people, their inability to taste the benefits of
Iran’s vast oil revenues or partake of the material comforts of Iran’s changing economy,
became impossible to ignore in the 1970s. Popular media like newspapers and film had
long been filled with discussions of the issue, sometimes allegorical, while members of
parties like the largely suppressed communist Tudeh and Fadāiyān-e Islāmi were known
to attack foreign, particularly American, workers as both emblems and causes of Iran’s
growing social problems. Over the course of the decade, such socioeconomic issues
became a core part of Iran’s revolutionary movement. Spreading much farther than Iran’s
leftist and secular nationalist parties, the ideas, positions, and rhetoric of figures like
Ayatollāh Khomeini were suffused with ideas about the struggle between Iran’s
mostaz’afin (oppressed) classes and the wealthy and powerful mostakbarin (oppressors)
who tormented them. Though often expressed most powerfully through Twelver Shi’a
imagery and perspectives, questions of economic and social justice became the animating
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force of the revolutionary movement in Iran, coming to encompass disputes over
industrial profit sharing, housing standards, medical care, energy prices, and much
more.746
It was within this context that the efforts of the NIGC to build natural gas
distribution networks were situated. Throughout Iranian society, gas became enmeshed in
how people understood their own communities, taking on great symbolic import in ways
that ran counter to the triumphalist narratives found in articles of industry publications
and the speeches of Iranian officials. For many, gas was significant as both a source of
energy and an emblem of Iran’s developing modernity, becoming an object of interest not
only for its utility as resource, but also for what the presence of natural gas distribution
systems seemed to imply about the status of people and communities. Across the country,
Iranians petitioned their local governments and pressed representatives of the NIOC and
NIGC to be connected to their country’s growing natural gas network. Nowhere was this
truer than in the regions that lay near the passage of major gas transmission lines like
IGAT-1, and the availability of natural gas became notable topics of discussion within
their local governments.
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In the middle of June 1976, the administrative council for the county of
Sepidān—comprised of the county governor, heads of governmental offices, and the
members of the “democratic council”—gathered for their first meeting in the office of the
county governor (farmāndār). An elongated rural county at the northern end of Fars
Province, the region lay nestled in the Zagros Mountains a few dozen miles north of
Shiraz. The governor opened the meeting with a panegyric to the Shah, hailing the “quick
and progressive advancements that have taken place in all corners of our dear country
Iran under the leadership of His Imperial Majesty” before turning to matters at hand.747
Alongside discussions of other “difficulties” like poor roads and the need for a continual
supply of electricity, a call was made for the country to be supplied by piped natural gas.
The desire of residents for gas was rooted in a practical understanding of gas’s potential
as a fuel source. The area’s long and snowy winters, with “heavy snows of six to seven
meters [that] fall for more than half the year,” meant that residents suffered from “very
short supplies” of fuel and warmth during the much of that time. Traditional forms of fuel
from the town’s surroundings had become less accessible due to the Office of Natural
Resources and Forestry limits on the use firewood (hizom) and forest wood (chub-hā-ye
jangali). Believing that a major gas pipeline would cross “within at most twenty
kilometers of Ardakān,” council members proposed a “possible arrangement” with the
NIGC to lay gas pipes for the cities and villages of the county.748 The call by the council
Proceedings of the Administrative Council of the County of Sepidān, 23 Khordād 2535, attached to
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for the supply of natural gas to their region was rooted in a belief that it would help
alleviate the winter-time shortages their constituents faced. Unlike other forms of fuel
that were either restricted by government decree or subject to the difficulties of
transportation along poor roads, gas pipes could operate year-round, providing warmth at
the twist of a knob or the opening of a valve. Natural gas as a source of energy, for all the
symbolism it had been imbued with, bore that meaningful weight because it was, at root,
a robust form of energy. Of equal significance in the Sepidān council’s statement,
however, was their observation that natural gas pipelines would be passing within close
proximity to their region. The assumption that underlay their words, that a small branch
off the main line for their towns and villages was relatively insignificant undertaking, was
one that would be expressed time and again in such areas. Whether true or not, it was a
belief that came to take on great political import, becoming intertwined not only with
revolutionary politics, but the very idea of what it meant to be an Iranian citizen.
In May 1978, at a meeting between the county governor and the Kāzerun county
board, a conflict over natural gas and the right of Iranians to make use of it began to
brew. The county board, headed by one Abdullāh Hushdārān, noted that the IGAT-1
pipeline would pass within five kilometers of Kāzerun city, situated roughly sixty miles
west of Shiraz. Because of that proximity, they requested that the creation of a center for
gas transmission and distribution for the city become part of the larger project.749 In
contrast to the Sepidān council that had praised the “advancements” of the Shah in 1976,
by 1978 the mood within Fārs province had begun to change, and local leaders like
Proceedings of the Kāzerun County Board, no. 58, 30 Ordibehesht 2537, attached to Memo 1087, 17
Khordād 2537, p. 1; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun.
749

308

Hushdārān had begun to criticize the developmental polices of the Shah’s government. In
late June of that year, Hushdārān used an article published in Kayhān, a national daily, to
send a veiled but nonetheless pointed message to Manuchehr Āzemun, the governor of
Fars province. The article, titled “The Roots of the Chaos in Qom and Tabriz and the
Political Vacuum in Iran,” described a report issued by the Group for the Study of the
Problems of Iran (Gruh-e Barrasi-ye Masā’al-e Iran) that analyzed the Shah’s
developmental revolution and the extent to which Iranians had accepted it. Hushdārān
had attached a copy of the article and highlighted a section where it was argued that while
the Shah had pursued real reforms in the country, they were often invisible to the public.
Referring to his highlights, Hushdārān noted that these points were “the same thing” he
had brought up in a previous, confidential, letter. He then went on to “beg” that the
governor pay heed to the list of complaints of his community, central to which was that
action be taken on gas lines for the city of Kāzerun.750 Unlike previous requests for
access to Iran’s natural gas network, Hushdārān’s remarks went beyond the practicalities
of the matter to embrace the politics of it. For years officials from the government and the
national gas and oil companies had been promising that natural gas would be the energy
source of Iran’s future. Hushdārān argued that like Iranians across the country, the
residents of Kāzerun were eager to see evidence of their country’s advancements in their
daily lives, but that they were becoming increasingly impatient with what seemed like a
lack of progress. For people like Hushdārān and those he claimed to represent, the end of
the 1970s became a moment when they began to demand that the future finally be made
Letter from Abdullāh Hushdārān to Manuchehr Āzemun, Document 364, 2 Tir 2537; Omur Marbut be
Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun.
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real. For them, piped natural gas had moved from being an aspirational hope to an
unfulfilled promise.
The efforts of Hushdārān and the Kāzerun county board to bring natural gas to
their region found only limited success. In a meeting of the board in late August 1978,
Hāj Ahmad ‘Abāri, a board representative, asked that the governor take action regarding
the laying of gas pipes because the chief executive of the NIGC had “promised” (va’deh
farmudand) that natural gas pipes would be laid for Kāzerun “at the proper time.”751
Frustrations boiled over several weeks later when one member openly denounced the
priorities of the NIGC in a board meeting. Noting once again that “gas pipes have been
laid within seven kilometers of Kāzerun,” he demanded that the “authorities in the
matter” not be “indifferent” to the city’s people. Why should the people of Shiraz have
access to this resource and those of Kāzerun not, for he argued that

all Iranians have a right to equally (mosāvi) and justly (ādelāneh) make use of the
developmental benefits of this property (molkat). Why is piped gas (gāz-e lulehkeshi), at
a minimum, to be consumed in one city, and in another like Kāzerun, because pipes have
not been laid, people must consume liquid gas at an expensive price incomparable to
piped? This very issue (jariyānāt) is, and will be, the cause of people’s unhappiness
(nārāzi) and they will become burdened (oghdeh-dār mishavand) by these various
discriminations (tab’aizāt-e gunāgun). Whatever correspondence they send, entreaties
they make, [or] moans they give, no one listens…[and] people are upset and unhappy
because Kāzerun is not intended to be part of the project of laying gas pipes.752

The ability to consume natural gas carried significance far beyond whatever practical
advantages it might have had. The residents of Kāzerun felt themselves to be
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discriminated against and rendered second-class by the actions of the NIGC. As Iranians,
they expected to be able to take full advantage of the “developmental benefits” of Iran’s
modernization policies; to be denied such services was not merely the misfortune of
geography, but unjust, and seemingly willful, discrimination. As the board member
asked, “how is it that it is possible for the NIGC to lay pipes from the gas production
region to Āstārā,753 but for a distance of seven kilometers they bring excuses and
objections?”754
The dissatisfaction of the residents of Fārs province was rooted not in the
complete inability to obtain gas energy, for they could and did use canisters of liquid gas,
but in the differences between technologies of distribution. They desired to consume gas
delivered to their homes via pipes linked to the national gas network, not via canisters
hauled in the back of trucks. The people of Kāzerun complained that canisters of gas
were much more expensive, and those of Sepidān longed for the reliability of supply that
piped gas could provide their snowy homes. As with the story of gas told by official
publications like Nāmeh, their notions of what gas could and should be were tied
intimately to the technologies that enabled its use. Rather than a story of monumental
“arteries” measured in thousands of kilometers and hundreds of millions of cubic feet of
gas transported, their concerns were spoken in the vernacular of the system’s capillaries,
the threads of pipe that moved gas the final few meters to their homes. For those like the
members of the Kāzerun county board, to be denied access to the national gas network
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was to be cut off from the blood of the Iranian nation, rendered inferior to those whose
communities were vitalized by it. Their anger lay not in the idea of a natural gas future,
but in the reality of being denied it.
The residents of Kāzerun and Sepidān never did receive the answers they sought
from the Shah’s government. Several weeks after the outburst at the board meeting, the
response of the NIGC was relayed to members of the provincial government.
Acknowledging the considerable effort that had been made to secure gas lines, the letter
declared that

gas delivery (gāzresani) to the various cities and points that exist along the route of the
cross-country natural gas pipeline [IGAT-1] must be qualified on technical and economic
criteria and principles. The passage of regional gas pipes does not alone justify gas
delivery. Therefore, as soon as gas delivery to the county of Kāzerun can be justified
from the perspective of conformity with [those] criteria, the necessary action will be
taken.755

Repeated attempts by local officials to press the NIGC further over the next two months
only met with frustration,756 and by early 1979, members of the Kāzerun county board
seem to have accepted the finality of the decision. Acceptance did not mean appreciation,
however, and Hushdārān vented his anger at a board meeting held on 10 January 1979.
After reading the letter that had laid out the NIGC’s position on the subject, he spoke,
saying

Letter from Ahmad Behzād to Javād Imāmi, Document 4094, 23 Mehr 1357, attached to Letter 5195, 26
Dey 1357, attached to letter 29839/22, 15 Farvardin 1358; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e
Kāzerun.
755

See Letter from Javād Imāmi to NIGC-Fars Region, Document 21022/22, 16 Mehr 1357; Letter from
Javād Imāmi to NIGC-Fars Region, Document 23300/22, 8 Ābān 1357; Ahmad Behzād to NIGC-Fars
Region, Document 26820/22, 6 Āzar 1357; Letter from Javād Imāmi to NIGC-Fars Region, Document
26494/22, 7 Āzar 1357; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun.
756

312

for years in this country the law of the jungle operated and was enforced, and the people
were strangled and suffocated by the injustice and oppression of the governments of the
time. But the height of unfairness, and counter to human principles, is that the gas that is
one of our natural and national resources is for us forbidden (harām)…but for foreigners
overseas (khārejiān-e māvarā behār) and others who are thousands of kilometers distant
from Iran’s borders, it is lawful (halāl). With complete indifference (bā kamāl-e bie’atenāi), [they] lay a pipe within five kilometers of this city in the direction of
Gachsārān and Āstārā so they can put cheap gas (gāz bā qeymat-e nāzel) at their disposal
and provide for their welfare.757

In Hushdārān’s view, being denied the ability to participate in the exploitation of Iran’s
natural gas was one of the harshest injustices perpetrated by his government. He
considered it the right of Iranians to partake of the “natural and national resources” that
lay within their country and believed that their welfare should be prioritized over that of
“foreigners.” Though both Hushdārān and the officials of the Iranian government wanted
“Iran” to benefit from the construction of the IGAT-1 pipeline, they did not agree on a
single definition of what “Iran” was to mean. In their efforts to find productive uses for
Iran’s gas, NIOC officials prioritized large-scale industrial applications like the chemical
fertilizer factory at Shiraz and the pipeline to the Soviet Union. As was shown in their
rhetorical constructions of gas over the years, their “Iran” was a monumental one, a
rapidly industrializing country of advanced technology, vast distances, and huge scales.
But such monuments to the expertise of government technocrats meant little to
Hushdārān and his fellow residents. Their “Iran” encompassed their homes, their
community, and they themselves, none of which were benefitting from the wealth that lay
under its soil as they felt they should. They, as Iranians, were the true owners of the
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country’s gas, and the fact that it could come so close yet still be inaccessible while
foreigners at far remove made use of it was a fundamental injustice. As Hushdārān said,

But we who are the original owners of this God-given wealth, plea that the people of this
city are ready to render a claim to a branch [of the pipeline] and fulfill any other
conditions. They answer that the laying of the cross-country gas pipe does not alone
justify the laying of pipes to deliver gas to the city of Kāzerun. …Consider [that] the
workers (ommāl) of the autocratic (khudkāmeh) government are prepared for a county of
200,000 people to face hardship (mazifeh) and discomfort (nārāhati) for the protection of
the interests of foreigners and several gas distribution and sale companies. …There are no
rules and regulations for this extortion and injustice because the plunderers were all
companions, but the stretching of one strand of gas pipe five kilometers wants technical
and economic principles. But the day of reckoning (ruz-e hesāb) approaches and the time
has come that the wealth of Iran be for Iranians.758

For Hushdārān, the prioritization of the needs of foreigners was nothing less than an act
of willful plunder. Neither distance nor difficulty seemed to be an obstacle for sending
gas to them, but a litany of excuses cloaked in the rhetoric of “technical and economic”
expertise was brought forth by officials to avoid providing it for the people of Kāzerun.
This struck at the heart of the government’s legitimacy in Hushdārān’s eyes, and
speaking amidst an intensifying revolution, he declared that the failure of the Shah’s
government to meet the needs of Iranians like those in Kāzerun would eventually lead to
a “day of reckoning.” One way or another, the vast wealth that lay under the earth whould
be for the “Iran” of residential homes and provincial towns, not that of advanced
chemical plants and foreign exchange.

***
When Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fled his government’s fall in early 1979,
Abdullāh Hushdārān would see his prediction come true. The county board that provided
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him his public voice would be dissolved with the rise of the Islamic Republic,759 but his
concern that the “wealth of Iran be for Iranians” continued to echo within the new
government. In few arenas was this more the case than Iran’s petroleum sector, and the
ability of ordinary Iranians to make use of their country’s gas reserves became an
important pillar of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic. As had been true under the Shah,
such pillars were in large part raised through the official publications of institutions like
the Ministry of Petroleum. Pitched for both specialized groups and general audiences of
all ages, these books, magazines, and pamphlets articulated a vision for gas energy that
resembled that of the Shah’s era in many ways. But just as Hushdārān had foreseen,
rather than erecting new monuments that reveled in the epic scope and size of Iran’s
arterial gas infrastructure, the Islamic Republic instead created new rhetorical markers
that, while remaining rooted in the politics of the numbers and materiality of gas, gave
symbolic priority to the capillaries that fed the homes and businesses of all Iranians.
Published in the spring of 1985 by the Ministry of Petroleum’s Department of
Public Relations and Islamic Guidance, the pamphlet “The National Iranian Gas
Company in the Service of the Oppressed” (Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz dar Khedmat-e
Mostaz’afin) was a seven-page, black-and-white pamphlet that epitomized the early
Islamic Republic’s articulation of what gas energy should mean for Iran. Beginning with
an ode to God and praise for the “prophetic leadership (rahbari-ye payāmbarguneh) of
our great Imām [Khomeini],” the pamphlet went on to state that a duty had been placed
“on the shoulders of the Muslim nation of Iran” to bring “dignity” to the “oppressed of
Letter from Abdullāh Hushdārān to the Governor of Kāzerun County, Document 2, 19 Farvardin 1358,
attached to Memo 1945/2, 2 Ordibehesht 1358; Omur Marbut be Anjoman-e Shahrestān-e Kāzerun.
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the world.”760 While on one level this rhetoric was merely reiterating a significant
political theme of Iran’s revolution, it nonetheless formed a key organizing principle for
the narratives that institutions like the Ministry of Petroleum constructed around gas
energy during the early Islamic Republic. They cast themselves as part of a “government
of servants (dolat-e khedmatgozār),” one whose success, made possible by its
“committed workers,” in bringing the “blessing of gas for many fellow urban and rural
countrymen” scarcely needed introduction.761 Yet describe it they did, and the remainder
of the pamphlet was dedicated to explaining, for the “encouragement” of the company’s
workers and the “satisfaction” of public, the NIGC’s accomplishments in supplying
natural gas to the people of Iran.
Central to the piece’s strategy was a comparison between activities of the NIGC
before and after the revolution, seeking to demonstrate to Iranian readers that the Islamic
Republic, as Hushdārān had demanded, prioritized their wellbeing over that of foreigners.
As it says,
The National Iranian Gas Company…was created under the previous regime with the
goal of extortion for the eastern superpower [the Soviet Union] and the protection of
global imperialism. During the years [13]49 [1970] to [13]58 [1979], a total of
approximately 70 billion cubic meters of natural gas was exported to the Soviet Union at
a meager price (qaymat-e nāchiz). With the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the
severing (gosasteh shodan) of the binds of tyranny, colonialism, and exploitation, gas,
this great blessing of God, and its expansive industry, in both concept and actuality, was
placed in the service of the people of our homeland…[with] the cutting of the export of
gas to the Soviet Union as the first change [made].762

Ravābat-e Omumi va Ershād-e Islami-ye Vezārat-e Naft, Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz dar Khedmat-e
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In stark contrast to previous claims that the gas exports would be simultaneously
advantageous to Iran’s citizens and foreign partners, under the Islamic Republic the
interests of the two parties were posed as being at odds. In this new view, it was
unconscionable that so much effort could be spent to transport gas thousands of
kilometers to foreign markets while so many Iranians, like those living in Sepidān and
Kāzerun, were left wanting. In reality, however, the decade-long cessation of exports to
the Soviet Union that began in April 1980 was rooted more in an inability of the new
government and the Soviet Union to agree on a suitable price than any principled
opposition to the shipments.763 In any case and much more significantly, a much larger
distribution program was needed to provide natural gas to residential and commercial
consumers. Claiming allegiance to the broader policies of the Islamic Republic and the
Ministry of Petroleum, the NIGC sought to both substitute gas for “middle distillate
fuels” like kerosene and diesel and expand delivery to “industries, power plants, cities,
and major centers of consumption where the supply of liquid fuel faces difficulties.”764
Some success had already been achieved in bringing the “great blessing” of gas to more
Iranians, and the pamphlet emphasized that the NIGC had already increased the
consumption of natural gas in Iran from 9.6 million cubic meters in 1979 to 26.1 million
at the time of publication in 1984.765
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Despite its claims that a new era had
arrived for Iranian gas, the NIGC continued
to rely on much of the same legitimating
criteria as it had before the revolution. Like
the NIOC articles in Nāmeh-ye San’at-e
Naft-e Iran so often did, the basis of the
NIGC’s claims to mastery and expertise was
deeply rooted in the recitation of numbers
and statistics. The cutting of exports to the
USSR and the increase in daily consumption
were just the beginning, as the NIGC’s pamphlet went on to list five other key

Figure 20

statistics measuring its post-revolution success: five cities were connected to the gas
network before the revolution, and 23 after; one village was connected before, and 48
after; there were 50,000 gas connections before, and 310,000 after; 27,000 customers at
the end of the Shah’s era, 257,000 by 1985; and 270 industrial units used gas before the
revolution, and 602 after.766 Presented in a table, such statistics did more than merely
assert that under the Islamic Republic the NIGC cared more for the people of Iran. Posed
side by side, they prompted readers to reflect that the new era was 260,000 gas
connections, 230,000 customers, and 18 cities better than the old. Future plans were
delivered in the same way: 255,000 meters of pipe were in the process of being laid to
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supply nearly 28,000 residential and commercial connections in a further ten cities.767 As
had also been exhibited by official publications during the Pahlavi years, this was a
politics of numbers, a way to give the imprimatur of fact and rationality to the
fundamentally political claims the pamphlet was advancing.
The pamphlet’s photographs too demonstrated significant continuity with prerevolutionary themes and tropes. As with Nāmeh’s images of the Shah and his ministers,
dignitaries were a common subject of the NIGC’s post-revolutionary publications, and
Gāz dar Khedmat-e Mostaz’afin was no exception. One image in the work depicts a
familiar scene: a crowd of men, all with beards and without ties, have assembled around
three figures grasping the handle of a large lever (Figure 20).768 The caption describes the
scene as
“Hojjat al-Islam [Abbas Vaez] Tabasi, representative of the Imam [Khomeini] and
Custodian (towliyat) of Āstān-e Quds Razavi and Engineer Dāvidi Shamsi at the
inauguration ceremony for the gas delivery network of Chenārān.769

In their grooming and their sartorial choices these men may have distinguished
themselves from their supposedly gharbzadeh monarchical forebears, but their presence
at such inauguration ceremonies nonetheless made similar claims regarding the
relationship of the country’s leadership to gas energy. It was a representatives of Iran’s
new leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who was opening a new flow of gas, symbolically
claiming ownership over the provision of its benefits.
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But there was a crucial difference
between the photograph of Hojjat al-Islam
Tabasi and those published during the Shah’s
era: the choice of location. Rather than a large
refinery or huge cross-country pipeline, the
image depicts the inauguration of a small
city’s gas network. It was a shift in subject
from the monumental complexes of gas
production and transmission to the residential
and commercial distribution networks that sat
Figure 21

alongside Iranians as they went about their
everyday lives. This change of subject was also represented within the pamphlet’s
remaining two photographs. On the cover is an image—reproduced later in the piece with
the caption “gas delivery, a basic step on the path of fuel supply”770—that depicts an
assembly of pipes and gauges situated in rural setting (Figure 21).771 There are no people
shown in the black-and-white photograph, allowing the mechanism of gas to dominate
the image’s foreground. Behind, a cluster of low buildings and trees squat before a small
mountain. A very similar photo appears a few pages later, where a knot of pipes and
gauges, perhaps the same as those shown earlier, stand above a caption describing it as a
“section of the gas delivery network of Nurābād of Mamasani” (Figure 22).772
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Together the three photographs mark a shift toward the small end of Iran’s gas
system, a move away from the monumental edifices of the Shah’s era to the human-scale
benefits that it could bring for Iranians. Technology was highlighted and celebrated all
the same, but on a different scale. What the NIGC’s new pamphlet hailed was not that
which towered over people, dwarfing them with its awesome scale and enduring heft, but
the modest pipes that delivered gas to people’s home and the gauges that measured gas in
thousands of cubic feet rather than billions. All the huge physical infrastructure of the
Shah’s era was still there, forming the foundations of the gas system now operated by the
Islamic Republic, but it was deemphasized,
ceding place in a vision of Iran’s future that
emphasized the needs of small consumers in
their everyday lives. It was a modernizing
vision all the same, one still built on the
indigenous mastery of sophisticated
technological systems, but now pitched at a
human scale.
The emphasis on human scale extended
to a greater recognition of the workers who
built Iran’s gas network. While the pamphlet’s

Figure 22

photographs continued to emphasize Iran’s political and managerial leadership, its text
did much more to acknowledge the contributions of those who labored to build and
maintain the system, hailing the “committed workers” who undertook their “day-and321

night activities” to extend Iran’s gas system to new communities.773 Despite this
recognition, the pamphlet’s content continued to cast Iran’s gas network as a system
primarily defined by its materiality and association with the political leadership. If gas
was the fuel of Iran’s future, and the piece promised that more was to come, then that
future would continue to be one imagined through the work of engineers and managers.
Explicit comparison between the achievements of Iran’s natural gas industry
before and after the revolution became a staple of both the public literature of the NIGC
and the Ministry of the Petroleum in years after the revolution and their own internal
documents.774 Another 1985 publication from the Ministry of Petroleum reinforced the
seemingly new prioritization of domestic consumers of Iranian natural gas over foreign.
“Before the governance of the Islamic Republic,” the office of public relations wrote,
“when Iran was the arena of invasion of international colonialists and plunderers, this
valuable substance [natural gas]…was looted” and it was “put at the disposal of the
eastern superpower” for a “negligible price.” But “with the victory of the Islamic
Revolution and the eviction of the eastern and western colonialists and the start of the
revision of the mistaken policies of the Pahlavi puppet regime, the export of gas to the
Soviet Union was also halted” and this “stuff of energy” would be redirected for use
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within the country so that the “deprived people of our homeland could also enjoy welfare
and comfort.”775
The highly charged rhetoric notwithstanding, there was significant truth to the
claims of the new government. In the wake of the revolution the NIGC was committed to
expediting the extension of natural gas service to some 97 percent of Iranian cities plus
more than 1200 villages and 7000 medium and large industrial units.776 In practical terms
the major aim of the Islamic Republic’s new distribution projects was the replacement of
oil fuels and liquid gas to the greatest extent possible. Building on the “demonstrative and
very incomplete” urban gas networks of the Pahlavi era, the Islamic Republic expanded
access to gas at a rapid and accelerating clip. Between the spring of 1978 and the fall of
1984, the number of residential and commercial gas connections had grown nearly ninefold. In addition to the additional eighteen cities that had begun to see gas networks built
within them, the number of villages served had grown from one to approximately fifty.777
All told, in that period, the NIGC and its domestic contractors had laid nearly 3500
kilometers of pipe for natural gas distribution systems, more than half that total in the
previous two years, and as of 1984, there were also a further twenty cities in the early
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stages of receiving gas networks and another seventy undergoing market research and
system design.778

***
Despite the revolution and the altered rhetorical emphases of Iranian state
institutions that it prompted, what was not in question was the sociotechnical imaginary
that placed natural gas energy at the center of a “modern” Iran. Iranians, both elite and
not, monarchist and revolutionary, embraced gas energy as the means by which their
country could become sovereign, modern, and clean. The desire of people like Abdullāh
Hushdārān to make use of piped natural gas was reflective of both the politics of access
and the technical characteristics of natural gas as a source of energy. Natural gas was
seen as superior to both oil products and liquid gas. It was understood to be more
convenient, less expensive, and more modern. To be denied the ability to use natural gas,
particularly in a region where it passed so close at hand through enormous pipelines that
stretched to the borders of faraway lands, was, in essence, to be denied their full rights as
Iranians. The provision of natural gas to all Iranians for that reason became part of the
new Islamic Republic’s commitment to economic justice.
The National Iranian Gas Company’s emphasis on the distribution of natural gas
to small consumers under the Islamic Republic did not wholly erase their accompanying
work to expand service to industrial consumers, but the latter was largely deemphasized
within the public materials of government ministries and the national petroleum
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companies.779 This was true in spite of the fact that industrial applications and power
generation accounted for the vast majority of gas consumption in the country. Indeed, in
1984 some 97 percent of all gas consumed within Iran, approximately 25.3 million cubic
meters per day, went to fuel either industrial production or electricity generation.780 There
was significant stability in the goals and plans of Iran’s gas industry between the late
Pahlavi and early Islamic Republican eras. Beyond a straightforward and inevitable
building on what had come before, the fulfillment of projects like the Khangirān-Nekā
pipeline and the commitment of the NIGC to the continued expansion of industrial gas
use demonstrated that the new government’s orientation toward domestic natural gas
utilization was, but one of acceleration, expansion, and intensification. Even the postrevolutionary publications of institutions like the NIGC and the Ministry of Petroleum
that sought to contrast the achievements of the two regimes so strongly in the arena of
natural gas exploitation displayed marked continuity with those of the 1960s and 1970s.
It was not true that the new emphasis on small-scale consumers and the distribution
networks that supplied them wholly eclipsed the depictions of nation-spanning pipelines
and towering refineries that had marked the Pahlavi era. Depicted again were the
landscape-conquering gas pipelines, their scale and sophistication stretching into the
distance, rendering the anonymous workers comparatively small and subordinate. In this
way, the sociotechnical imaginary that shaped Pahlavi-era approaches to gas remained
influential after the revolution. Through materials like this, those working for the
In Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran: Shesh Sāl B’ad az Piruzi-ye Enqelāb-e Islāmi, for example, it was
given only a single paragraph. See p. 39-40 of the book.
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Ministry of Petroleum articulated a desire to distinguish themselves and their work and
their aims from those of the Pahlavi dynasty. Nonetheless, through their rhetorical and
artistic choices, they re-inscribed the fundamental principles of the imagined natural gas
future that had been articulated thirty years earlier: a view of gas energy that prioritized
its technical elements, independently created; was preoccupied with large, quantifiable
scale; and cast the energy source as a blessing for the people of Iran, made possible by
the efforts of the ruling regime.
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Chapter 6
Gas Energy and Motor Vehicles in Iran,
1970-1995

Quoted in an article published on 31 December 1989 in Ettelā’āt, Amir ‘Azadi,
director of the Traffic Organization of Tehran, noted that “Tehran’s air pollution is a
problem that in recent years has been considered repeatedly and with various
explanations,” but that while experts had “offered solutions…the problem still remains in
force and each day finds wider and more worrisome dimensions.”781 Though the
conversion of Iran’s industrial sector to the use of gas energy had been underway for
nearly two decades by this point, ‘Azadi’s statement pointed to the reality that the effort
had largely failed to bring about a significant improvement in Tehran’s air quality. While
the success of efforts to convert energy-intensive and polluting sectors like cement and
brick production to gas seemed to promise a future of cleaner skies for cities like Tehran,
the thick blanket of smog and haze that continued to cover Iran’s urban areas pointed to
the growing significance of another source of many of the same pollutants they had
worked so hard to fight: the exhaust of motor vehicles. Driven by the rapidly increasing
“Otomobil-hā-ye Shakhsi Sāli 1,300,000 Ton-e <<Mono’oksid Karbon>> va Chand Gāz-e Sami-ye
Digar ra Vāred-e Havā-ye Tehran Mikonnand,” Ettelā’āt (10 Dey 1368).
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numbers of automobiles on their nation’s roads, Iranians working in government
ministries, the national petroleum companies, and local and provincial administrations
launched an equally ambitious, but initially much less successful, project to similarly
bring gas energy to the country’s transportation sector.
The provision of gas energy to Iran’s motor vehicles required traveling a long and
fraught road, one much less clear than the largely contemporary effort to bring gas to the
country’s manufactories. It would not be until the late 1990s that Iran vehicles but be
using the new fuel in any significant numbers. Despite the long delay, the decisions made
in the 1970s by Iranian experts working in the context of the Pahlavi state and its
development policies laid many of the foundations that would be built upon by those
working under the Islamic Republic. Despite the careful erasure of Pahlavi policies by
those working under the Islamic Republic, there existed significant continuity in the
kinds of programs that intended to convert taxis and city buses in cities like Tehran and
Shiraz to the use of gas fuel. Though many such efforts received significant support from
state institutions and influential members of Iranian society, for decades they failed to
expand beyond their pilot stages, foundering on unresolved technical issues and a lack of
clarity on what, exactly, “gas fuel” meant. Unlike with the supply of natural gas energy to
Iran’s factories and workshops, there was great controversy over the exact form—
compressed natural gas or liquid gas—that gas fuel should take. Drawing on the
experiences of other nations, anecdote, photography, and calculation, whether of real or
imagined scenarios, debaters clashed over the best system of gas fuel for their country.
For decades the various merits of both were analyzed and dissected, and many programs
were begun that used one form of fuel or the other. More than an argument over the
328

technical merits of the two fuels, the debates reflected differing views of the social
contexts within which vehicular gas fuel would function. Different forms of gas fuel
demanded different systems of infrastructure, and debates over their merits turned on
questions of cost, complexity, and most significantly, safety.
With motor vehicles becoming an increasingly significant source of air pollution
in Iranian urban areas after the late 1960s, converting cars and buses to use gas was seen
as a desperately needed way to fight against a rising tide of pollution. Air pollution and
its mitigation were core concerns of those who advocated for gas fuel use in the
transportation sector. Through their anxieties they reiterated much of the same
preoccupation with the most tangible aspects of air pollution—smoke and smog chief
among them—that had animated champions of industrial gas use. Gas promised to help
alleviate air quality concerns in the same way: by substituting one fossil fuel with
another, cleaner, more “modern” form of fossilized carbon. In this way, as had been the
case with industrial gas use, the experts and officials that promoted gas energy sought to
simultaneously advance Iran’s development as an energy intensive fossil fuel-based
society while also mitigating some of its most violent effects on human health and the
natural world.
The sustained pursuit of gas fuel was rooted in the materiality of fossil fuels and
their properties of combustion, but its successes and failures as an environmental aid
were determined more by the social and technological contexts in which it was burned. In
Iran, environmental motivations quickly became intertwined with nationalist ones as
well, particularly after the revolution and the onset of the Iran-Iraq War. With Iran’s
ability to both produce and import fuels like gasoline and diesel hampered by conflict, the
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extensive availability of domestic gas energy took on an added attractiveness as a
domestic fuel source able to step into the breach. More fundamentally, the use of gas in
automobiles represented an area of opportunity for Iranian industrialization. Though
foreign firms were heavily involved in early attempts to gasify Iranian vehicles, many
within the country saw the ability to produce both the gas fuel and the necessary
conversions kits—the sets of equipment used to transform a gasoline-powered vehicle
into one able to accept gas fuel as well—as an important drivers of Iranian industrial
development. But while the domestic production of conversions kits was celebrated as an
expression of Iranian independence, it would also eventually proven to be something at
odds with the environmental motivations underlying the push for gas fuel. Ultimately, the
failure of experts and officials to significantly improve Iran’s urban air quality despite the
successes of their fuel conversion programs demonstrated that gas energy would not be
the easy technical fix to environmental problems that many Iranians hoped it would be.

***
In early 1975, Mohsen Shirāzi¸ the chief executive of design and study of the
National Iranian Gas Company, as part of his broader analysis of the role of natural gas in
fighting air pollution, both noted the significance of motor vehicle emissions to Iran’s
struggle with poor air quality and proposed that gas fuel be employed to counteract that
contribution. Repeating statistics used frequently by Iranians writing on the subject of air
quality, Shirāzi reported that on average each of Tehran’s 600,000 vehicles traveled thirty
kilometers a day and produced some sixty grams of “damaging materials,” altogether
more than a thousand tons per day. “Fortunately,” Shirāzi also wrote, Iran was endowed
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with “abundant” and “inexpensive” natural gas resources that could be used in motor
vehicles. While the conversion of automobiles to make use of gas fuel as their primary
energy source was a possibility, there were also less aggressive options. Shirāzi argued
that Iran was a pioneer in the experimental mixing of liquid gas with diesel—at the time
of writing the system had been tested on ten buses in Tehran and was expected to be
rolled out to a thousand more—and he claimed the relatively easy and inexpensive
approach could reduce a converted engine’s emissions by roughly half.782
In actuality, Shirāzi’s description of Iranian buses using a combination of diesel
and liquid gas glossed over what had been a contentious episode in the history of the
United Bus Company of Tehran.783 In the mid-1960s, the NIGC had purchased a
thousand “torque toppers”— supplementary devices installed on diesel engines to boost
their power via the injection of liquid gas into the motor’s fuel—from an American
company for installation on Tehran’s buses.784 It was hoped that a new 80-20 mix of
diesel fuel and liquid gas would enable city’s buses to “better burn diesel and curb their
smoke” and more easily navigate Tehran’s streets.785 There were significant reservations
regarding the technical soundness of the plan, but over the objections of both the
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municipality of Tehran and the United Bus Company itself,786 the buses were modified
by the NIGC and put into service using temporary fueling stations in the Nārmak and
Nāziābād neighborhoods.787
Many of the concerns that people held regarding the complexity and reliability of
the modified buses proved to be well founded, and “technical complications” eventually
caused some of the private suppliers of parts to withdraw from the project. More
significant were the worries surrounding the safety of using torque toppers on city streets,
concerns that were sharpened by the relative ease with which a small incident could
become catastrophic. In one instance, a modified bus had seen its newly installed torque
topper damaged and its reserves of liquid gas spilled when the vehicle’s bottom and tank
of liquid gas scraped across a set of train tracks running along one of Tehran’s southern
streets. Had the bus been stopped, officials fretted, something as small as a “spark from a
purveyor of [roasted] corn” could have caused a deadly explosion in the middle of a busy
city street. The dispute raged and soon the Shah was forced to involve himself. After an
“inspection” of the project, he decreed that if a bus’s diesel engine was powerful enough
and in good enough repair, then a torque topper was not necessary. On the Shah’s orders,
the existing program was scrapped in favor of one that would see torque toppers installed
at a more gradual and careful pace. Under the new approach, much of the United Bus
Company’s fleet would eventually receive the new equipment, and they put their
strengthened engines to good use operating in the famously hilly city while also emitting
Letter from Taqi Mossadeqi to Lt. Gen. Fāzeli, document 1-56/3384/g, 10 Esfand 2535; Kharid-e
Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz.
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fewer pollutants.788 Unlike what would come later, however, this early use of liquid gas
by the United Bus Company explicitly positioned the new fuel as an supplement to rather
than a wholesale replacement of diesel. Liquid gas was thus layered upon an existing
energy system and charged with the specific goals of increased vehicular performance
and lowered emissions. This dual fuel arrangement, whereby both gas- and oil-based
fuels were used in the same vehicle, sometimes simultaneously sometimes alternately,
would become a hallmark of Iranian efforts to bring gas energy to the transportation
sector.
Spurred by the toll environmental pollution was taking on Iranians, vehicular use
of gas energy was nonetheless animated by the same desire to both accelerate Iran’s
industrialization and mitigate its downsides that was concurrently driving the move
toward natural gas use in factories and workshops. Writing in the mid-1970s, Muhammad
‘Ali Mostofizādeh, head of the Office of Standards and Regulations at the NIGC,
published one of the earliest and most comprehensive analyses of Iranian vehicular gas
use. Possessing a degree in Petrochemical Engineering from the Technical University of
Abadan, earned in the mid-1950s, and a twenty-year veteran of the Ābādān Oil Refinery
and the NIGC,789 Mostofizādeh evinced an understanding of the relationship between
civilization, industrialization, and the natural environment much like that described by
It is not entirely clear whether the incident described by the chief executive of Tehran’s bus company
actually happened or is a description of his concerns. Nonetheless, what matters most is that fear of these
sorts of incidents was animating opposition to the new buses within certain circles. See letter from Major
General Husayn Razm-Ārā, Deputy to the Mayor of the Capital and Chief Executive of the United Bus
Company of Tehran, to Feyli, Deputy Prime Minister and Supervisor of the Environmental Protection
Organization, p. 1, document z,h-655, 12 Bahman 2536; attached to letter 22717; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye
Gāzsuz.
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Shirāzi and Shaybāni in their discussions of industrial air pollution. He wrote that
pollution, particularly that of gasoline-burning engines, had “today endangered most of
our cities” and that the “progress of civilization and technology and the development of
industry that has a need for the consumption of energy” had “brought forth air that is
harmful for respiration of humanity, animals, and even plants.” Like other many other
Iranian commentators, Mostofizādeh did not advocate for gas energy purely for its
environmental benefits. He also saw gas energy as being a potential economic boon,
writing that the use of gas fuel in motor vehicles “did not only possess benefits and
advantages from the view of economics…but also provided effective help for the
cleaning of the environment.”790
Using the United States as a warning of the dangers of unchecked air pollution,791
Mostofizādeh argued that the existing programs for converting industry to use gas energy
were insufficient for addressing Iran’s air quality problems. He wrote that “right now in
Tehran and the majority of the cities along the route of the [IGAT-1] gas line, most
industries and powerplants have been converted to gas,”792 but the “rapid expansion of
the number of vehicles, especially in Tehran”—rising from roughly 347,000 to 660,000
vehicles between 1970 and 1974—made further action necessary.793 Around the world,
various methods of controlling vehicular emissions had been tried, but despite the success
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of catalytic converters and tighter manufacturing standards, Mostofizādeh believed the
“most suitable and practical path for confronting this problem” remained “the conversion
of the fuel of vehicles to gas.”794 He reported that gas-fueled engines had been found to
consistently produce less pollutants than those powered by gasoline, even when the latter
had been modified with pollution-control mechanisms. He illustrated his argument with
vivid rhetoric, echoing the preoccupation with the tangible forms of air pollution that so
animated observers of Iran’s deteriorating air quality. As he wrote,
If 3 pieces of filter paper…are placed in front of the exhaust of three different types of
vehicles, the first of which would be for an uncontrolled gasoline engine, it would
become completely black; the second of which would be for a controlled gasoline engine
that has a catalyst [catalytic converter] embedded in its exhaust…for the absorption of
harmful substances, the color [of the filter paper] would be dark gray; and the third one,
which is held in front of the exhaust for a gas-burning engine would remain completely
white.795

With his illustration, Mostofizādeh highlighted just how powerful gas fuel could be for
fighting air pollution. Two crucial questions nonetheless remained: what would a gas fuel
system look like in practice and what form would be best suited for a city like Tehran?
In the 1970s, the three forms of gas energy available for use in motor vehicles
were liquid gas, liquified natural gas, and compressed natural gas. Focused on Tehran,
Mostofizādeh evaluated each option in turn, exploring how their particular advantages
and drawbacks were attenuated or mitigated in that particular urban context. According to
Mostofizādeh, liquified natural gas was still in an experimental state and there were no
existing systems in practical use anywhere in the world, making it an impractical
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choice.796 Liquid gas, while it had the advantages of being easier to handle and requiring
less investment in both conversion devices and fueling stations than compressed natural
gas, was nonetheless a poor option because “the amount of production of this gas is not
enough in Iran to provide fuel for all vehicles” and “its price…is relatively expensive—if
not more expensive than gasoline then no cheaper.”797 There also remained lingering
safety concerns for liquid gas, as people feared its heavier-than-air nature and potential to
pool around vehicles and explode. Compressed natural gas, on the other hand, had many
of the advantages of liquid gas while also being able to make use of the network of
natural gas pipes already beginning to be built in the city. Like a liquid gas system,
installing a CNG system on a vehicle did not necessitate the removal of the existing
gasoline engine. Modifications were also relatively simple. Mostofizādeh described ten
major components to such systems, but fundamentally all that was needed was a tank to
store the compressed gas, a gas-air mixer to enable combustion within the existing motor,
and a means by which the operator could switch between gas and gasoline.798 Beyond the
functioning of motor vehicles themselves, one of the primary advantages of CNG was
that any area connected to the city gas network could easily host a fueling station. The
natural gas transported through the city’s networks of pipes could be compressed and
pumped into cylinders for consumers’ vehicles, eliminating the need for the separate
production facilities and transport tankers that the other two forms required. CNG was a
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proven system as well, and Mostofizādeh cited the “more than 100,000” such vehicles
that traveled the roads of Italy and the “more than 30,000” that did so in California.799
But while Mostofizādeh promoted CNG as the best option for Tehran, he
recognized that the lack of piped gas networks in other Iranian cities made the choice
much less feasible outside the capital. For other areas he recommended the use of liquid
gas, claiming that the use of dual fuel vehicles burning both gas and gasoline would help
mitigate the inevitable fragmentation of the fuel supply that such a policy would create.
Under Mostofizādeh’s plan, while travel within urban areas could eventually be powered
by gas energy, movement between cities would remain dependent on the existing oil fuel
infrastructure that supplied gasoline and diesel to the country.800 In effect, Mostofizādeh
was advocating of for a policy that would require the maintenance of not one or two
systems of fuel supply, but three. Mostofizādeh believed the environmental benefits of
gas energy to be so great as to be worth nearly any cost to the efficiency of Iran’s fuel
infrastructure. But only in urban areas. As had been true for many others, Mostofizādeh’s
perspective was one that prioritized the environment of Iran’s cities, deeming the tangible
smog and smoke of the country’s urban areas to be of greater priority than the air quality
of the towns and villages that sat in between. His vision focused not on the totality of
emissions, but on the ways in which they eddied and collected in particular areas. This
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understanding of pollution was deeply social in nature, rooted not only in the material
realities of fossil fuels and the byproducts of their combustion, but also in the
agglomerations of humanity that gave meaning to poor air quality with their suffering.
Mostofizādeh selection of CNG as Tehran’s best option was also rooted in his
deep concerns for the potential danger of gas as a fuel. The density of Tehran was critical
for Mostofizādeh’s understanding of the hazards of gas fuel’s different forms, and he
rejected the use of liquified natural gas and liquid gas in Tehran in part because of how
their mechanics of distribution would interact with the urban space. Both systems would
require fuel to be distributed around the city by a fleet of tanker trucks, something
Mostofizādeh argued would make Tehran’s notoriously bad traffic worse and pose a risk
for deadly explosions in the event of accidents.801 Compressed natural gas, on the other
hand, did not pose this same hazard. By drawing upon gas that had been transported by a
network of underground pipes, there would be no need for tankers full of highly
flammable material to traverse Tehran’s streets and put residents in danger. The danger
that Mostofizādeh pointed to was one that existed within and was exacerbated by the
capital and its unruly traffic. Just as the urban setting demanded gas fuel as a means to
mitigate the growing danger of air pollution, it also militated against particular forms of
it. In Mostofizādeh’s view, the social fabric within which any new gas fuel infrastructure
would be embedded was as important as the material and functional potential of the new
technologies. Different contexts could enable different solutions. In other Iranian cities,
smaller in size and not as overwhelmed by traffic as Tehran, Mostofizādeh judged the
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urban fabric to be sufficiently different that the risk of transporting liquid gas by tanker
was low enough to be worth the potential environmental benefits.
The safety of gas fuel was a significant worry for many Iranians, and in what
would become a major theme in the literature on gas vehicles, Mostofizādeh went on to
expend considerable effort reassuring readers that having a tank of compressed natural
gas in their automobile was not akin to sitting on a bomb. While continuing to emphasize
the environmental and automotive benefits of gas fuel, Mostofizādeh claimed that
“automobile CNG systems are much safer and less dangerous than other fuels,” a
statement he recognized that people found hard to believe because gas “has the
possibility of explosion and is kept under great pressure in the tank of an automobile.”802
Punctuating his argument with numerical evidence, Mostofizādeh described a system that
was engineered well above the minimums needed to control and burn compressed natural
gas: storage tanks built to withstand 10,000 psi holding gas at 2,400 psi; flexible piping
also built to withstand 10,000 psi; safety valves made to trigger at 3,600 psi; and many
more. He told of placing storage tanks in the trunk, behind and attached to the rear seats,
mitigating their risk of damage during an accident. Employing the evidence of narrative,
Mostofizādeh wrote of a test undertaken where a gas-powered automobile was hoisted
forty feet in the air and dropped, destroying the car but leaving the gas system “without
the smallest flaw.” He told of an incident of a gas tank surviving unscathed in an accident
that saw it ripped from its mounts and flung across the road.803 Fundamentally,
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Mostofizādeh’s argument was rooted in the “proof” of engineering schematics and
loosely connected but vivid anecdotes. In formulating his claims in such a way,
Mostofizādeh utilized the evidentiary force of numbers in much the same way as official
discussions of Iranian gas energy more broadly. The systems that Mostofizādeh described
did not exist, at least not in Iran, and to declare CNG to be “much safer” than gasoline
was to substitute expectation for reality. Rather than by luck or chance, Mostofizādeh
claimed with his numbers, the tanks of gas at the heart of his stories had survived by
rigorous and repeatable design.
Mostofizādeh’s opinions were built on research and planning already begun by
the NIGC. As part of broader efforts to improve urban air quality through the use of gas
energy, “in cooperation” with organizations like the Environmental Protection
Organization and the University of Tehran, the NIGC had analyzed “comprehensive
programs for the fuel conversion of several kinds of diesel and gasoline vehicles.”804
After also settling on compressed natural gas being the best option for Tehran, the NIGC
had signed contracts with an Italian and an American firm to begin pilot efforts to
“familiarize public opinion with gas fuel” and its “welcome advantages” in the city.
Toward that end, an experimental program to convert two thousand automobiles was
conceived. Three-quarters of the vehicles modified would be taxis as they traveled
approximately three hundred kilometers a day rather than the thirty that personal vehicles
averaged. Five fueling stations were to be established. At each station, natural gas from
the city’s gas network would be compressed and stored in fifty-eight large tanks before
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being dispensed into cars from four fueling pumps.805 With land for the fueling stations in
the process of being purchased and orders being placed for the vehicle equipment, it was
hoped that by the end of the summer of 1976 the first of the two thousand automobiles
would be able to use gas fuel.806 In the end, however, the NIGC’s program in Tehran did
not come to fruition. While the system of fuel distribution performed well during tests,807
it was eventually decided that the conversion of two thousand automobiles to gas was
insufficient to make any real contribution to controlling Tehran’s air quality problems.
With that, the experiment was suspended, and the ordered equipment was shipped south
to Shiraz, another city beginning to experiment with gas.808
In October 1975, around the time of Mostofizādeh’s writing, Manuchehr Piruz,
the governor of Fars Province, sent a letter to the chief executive of the NIGC in which
he expressed enthusiasm for the company’s program to bring gas fuel to Tehran’s
automobiles. Saying that a “number of Tehran’s taxis and, probably, buses will be
converted to gas-burning for free,” something that would “certainly” have “a
considerable effect” on the quality of the city’s air, he requested that the “good national
project” be implemented in Shiraz as well. As a city where “one thousand seventy-five
Fueling stations were to be placed on Ārāmgāh Road, near the homes of many taxi drivers, on the road
to the southern suburb of Rey where many also lived, in Shahyād Square for the taxis and residents of the
west and the airport service vehicles, along Āb’ali Road across from Tehran Pārs Street, and at the
intersection Shāhānshāhi Highway and Pahlavi Boulevard. See Mastufizādeh, “Tabdil-e Sukht-e Vasāyat-e
Naqlieh be Gāz,” 18.
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taxis and forty-five buses and approximately 80 minibuses” were “at work”809 and as a
domestic and international “tourist” destination in need of protection,810 Shiraz was seen
by Piruz as being a natural candidate for the program once it completed its work in the
country’s capital.811 In Shiraz, while many agreed that gas vehicles and their reduced
emissions would benefit the city, there was considerable disagreement as to whether
liquid or compressed natural gas should be used. In negotiations held on 14 November
1975 between the provincial government and the Environmental Protection Organization,
a plan took shape with the aim of converting the city’s public vehicles to use gas. The
agreement, “inseparably part of the plan for the clearing of the air of Shiraz,” decreed that
one thousand taxis and one hundred buses would be converted to use liquid gas. In
support, the provincial government would provide three plots of land appropriate for
fueling stations in the city and would work with the Environmental Protection
Organization to obtain a customs exemption for needed equipment. The NIGC was called
upon to provide the liquid gas and all three institutions would share the cost of the
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project.812 Agreeing to the request, the NIGC promised a supply of liquid gas priced at
3.6 rial per kilogram and the aid of their “experts” for the “installation” of fueling stations
around the city.813 The plan was to begin small, with a single vehicle converted to be dual
fuel, though even with such modest beginnings, the effort stumbled before even it even
truly began. While the plan’s credit needs were submitted to the Planning and Budget
Organization “under the special protection of the Queen of Iran” and on the “orders of the
Prime Minister,”814 little action815 was taken over the following six months. With no
progress made despite the repeated attempts of officials in Fars to spur the national
authorities, by the summer of 1976, the same year that the experiment in Tehran was
terminated, Shiraz’s project was “suspended” despite the “promising” operation of the
single converted taxi.816
While the first Shiraz plan called for the use of liquid gas, the NIGC itself favored
an approach that would convert a thousand taxis to use compressed natural gas supplied
from two CNG refueling stations. Contracted to the American firm Dual Fuel Co., the
NIGC’s plan quickly foundered as well.817 While Shiraz’s existing network of natural gas
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piping was tapped to supply the new fueling stations, its operating pressures were too
high for the compression equipment, a development that necessitated the use of
regulators that added to the complexity and cost of the system’s operation. Even worse
were the poorly designed and excessively heavy conversion kits supplied by the
contractor. Deemed both unsafe and unsuited to the light motor vehicles that employed
them, the deficient kits dealt a mortal blow to consumer confidence in the project, leading
to its cancelation in 1976 as well.818 Even the infusion of equipment from Tehran’s
terminated program819 failed to revive the project.

***
Iran’s state institutions and national petroleum companies were not the only
organizations interested in the effort to bring gas energy to the country’s transportation
sector. As was true in many sectors of the Iranian economy during the 1970s, private
firms, both inside Iran and overseas, quickly took note of the new initiatives and began
promoting their own involvement in the hopes of procuring lucrative contracts from a
state flush with oil revenues.820 In December 1975, the chief executive of the Jonub Gāz
Company, a small firm that distributed liquid gas in the region of Shiraz, wrote to the
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governor of Fars offering his company’s services in support of the Shah’s “excellent
goals” of bettering the city’s air quality through the conversion of taxis to gas fuel.821
Despite following up with another letter several months later, his offer was not accepted.
Much more involved was a January 1976 proposal from the Instituut voor
Wegtransportmiddelen (Institute of Road Transport) of the Dutch TNO research
organization.822 Writing that two of their employees had noted in the “public media” that
Iranian cities were considering the “conversion of cars and buses to gaseous fuels” during
a visit to Tehran, the writers offered TNO’s services as experts in the field.823 Invoking
the “worries” that Iranian authorities held for the cleanliness of their country’s air and the
“full attention of his Majesty the Shah” in the subject, the authors proposed a pilot study
for the conversion of taxis and buses in Shiraz. Explicitly rejecting the compressed
natural gas that the NIGC had been using in Tehran,824 TNO proposed the use of liquid
gas in both taxis and buses. Presenting arguments and goals remarkably similar to the
torque topper program experimented with a decade prior, TNO saw liquid gas as offering
several advantages over the incumbent oil fuels for Shiraz’s diesel buses, claiming that
they could be much more powerful and produce less noise and pollution than it could
Letter from ‘Abulnabizādeh to Governor Piruz, document 120, 8 Dey 1354; attached to letter 24772;
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821
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with diesel alone. There were trade-offs, increased fuel consumption and volume chief
among them, and TNO predicted that the weight of the vehicles would increase by some
two hundred kilograms.825
Beginning with the relatively easy conversion of automobiles and seemingly
ignorant of the experimental projects already undertaken in Iran, the authors suggested a
single “prototype [taxi] conversion carried out by TNO” followed by fifty further
conversions undertaken by Iranian workers under the supervision of Dutch experts at a
cost of roughly 7930 rial. A single “good garage…equipped with an LPG filling station”
would be enough for the initial experiment, though broader conversion programs would
require many more. Fuel would be supplied by the NIGC making deliveries with its own
trucks, a system similar to what already existed in the Netherlands.826 Adding the ability
to burn gas to the diesel engines of buses was a more complicated task, and TNO
proposed that it first undertake experiments at its Dutch facilities before “completing the
prototype vehicle in Iran with tanks, etc.” and “delivering all components necessary for
the conversion” of ten more buses. “Rough” costs for the total project, understood as
being modifications to a thousand taxis and two hundred buses, were estimated to be 13
million rial including the salaries of Iranian workers; costs could be brought down if the
vehicles were built to be dual fuel from the beginning rather than being modified later.827
Even though TNO also pledged to transfer their own expertise and teach Iranian workers

825

Ibid, Attachment 2 and Appendix 4.

826

Ibid., 2-3.

827

Ibid., 3-4.

346

how to perform the modifications,828 their proposal was never accepted by Iranian
authorities of Fars and Shiraz despite repeated entreaties.829
TNO’s proposal was an exemplar of many of the engineering and financial tradeoffs that such projects grappled with in Iran. One of the most significant was a concerted
1974 to 1978 effort in Tehran to create a system of city buses fueled exclusively by gas.
Set in motion by a royal order to study a proposal from the Butane Gas Company for gaspowered buses in the spring of 1974, the project was organized as a collaborative effort
between the United Bus Company of Tehran, the NIGC, the Butane Gas Company, and
several Iranian universities.830 While experts within Iranian universities undertook their
own research, Iranian officials also explicitly looked abroad to learn from other countries,
cities, universities, “specialized institutes,” and the manufacturers of various gas
motors.831 Tokyo was one of the most important referents for those involved, going so far
as to capture the attention of the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister, as it was a city
where “buses and taxis…use gas instead of consuming gasoline…[and] the level of air
pollution of the city” had been “tangibly reduced.”832 While the Foreign Minister
overstated the extent to which Tokyo’s buses were using gas—at the time only a few
828
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were being used on an experimental basis833—there were still some thirty thousand taxis
in the city employing liquid gas as a fuel source.834 The experiences of other locales were
studied as well. In early 1978 it was noted that modified buses were in use for athlete
transportation at the Munich Olympics, and were being tested in both the United
Kingdom and Austria.835 Nonetheless, as Maj. Gen. Husayn Razm-Ārā, a mayoral deputy
and chief executive of the United Bus Company of Tehran, noted a month later, “in no
country in the world were gas-powered buses in practical use.”836 While that statement
was technically true by the end of the 1970s, the implication that buses fueled by liquid
gas were purely experimental was not. In the early 1950s, the city of Chicago had ordered
some five hundred propane-fueled buses after a period of experimentation beginning in
1949.837 Motivated by the relative inexpensiveness of propane when compared to diesel
at the time,838 by the early 1960s the Chicago Transit Authority was employing some
1500 propane-powered buses on their transit lines.839 By the mid-1970s, however, the
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Chicago fleet had been entirely phased out as new diesel buses were significantly more
economical.840
Chicago’s early embrace notwithstanding, the use of gas-powered buses by mass
transit systems was not common during the mid-20th century. It thus remained true that
Iranians faced deep uncertainties in their pursuit of this new undertaking. Though
countries and firms around the world claimed some experience in building such systems,
without a set of common international standards to draw upon, Iranian officials were
imagining much of their new system from scratch. Chief among the decisions to be made
were both the form of gas fuel to be used as well as the expected workload of the buses
and, consequently, the necessary size of the fleet.841 While many were enthusiastic about
the prospect of gas fuel, there was a deep well of concern for the potential costs of
building a new system of public transit. Taqi Mossadeqi, the Chief Executive of the
NIGC, expressed frustration that earlier episodes like the use of torque toppers had not
been seized upon, forcing the city to confront a greater and more expensive
undertaking.842 Others worried about the cost of gas fuel, at the time significantly more
than diesel, and the precise fuel consumption of different models of buses was scrutinized
closely.843 Still more feared the costs of modification for the vehicles. The mayor of
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Tehran, while writing that the “consumption of gas, whether natural or liquid, is in every
sense preferable to the consumption of diesel or gasoline,” harbored significant
reservations regarding the proposed course of action. He worried that Iranian
manufacturers like Iran National and Leyland were continuing to produce gasoline- and
diesel-powered vehicles that would soon have to be modified at significant expense. The
municipality consequently proposed that the Ministry of Industry and Mines as well as
the Ministry of Commerce obligate the companies to produce only dual fuel vehicles,
saying that it was “not correct” for “permission to be given for the production and
importation of diesel- and gasoline-burning vehicles” only for the municipality to turn
around and deny licenses until gas systems were installed844 “at great cost.”845 This was
not an idle concern. By the late 1970s, nearly two thousand buses city buses were
operating on Tehran’s streets846 and the municipality was planning to add a thousand
more in the following three years.847 For that reason, in early 1977 the purchase of new
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buses was “forbidden” until the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had “inquired of all the
producer countries about the possibility of deals for gas buses.”848
Though there were reservations as to the total cost and the need for sufficient
fueling stations,849 the United Bus Company of Tehran eventually moved to test the
performance and operations of gas-fueled buses. Unlike the taxis that had been slated to
make use of CNG,850 Tehran’s buses would double down on the liquid gas that was
already employed by their torque toppers. While the first test took place in May 1974,851
more comprehensive and better recorded experiments were conducted several years later.
Taking possession of a Mercedes-Benz 305 City Bus on 14 April 1977,852 Tehran’s bus
company began a roughly four-month testing regime on several of the city’s existing bus
lines.853 Powered by butane and accommodating forty-four seated passengers or sixty-one
standing riders, during its first test on a warm spring the day the bus wound its way
between Seyyed Khandān and Darband along the hilly streets of north Tehran, carrying a
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total of 105 passengers some forty-five kilometers.854 The bus performed well, and the
Technical Office of the United Bus Company reported “no major troubles” with the
vehicle, though there were complaints that its windows were sealed, standard in Europe,
but potentially uncomfortable for passengers in Tehran’s warmer climate. The bus had
other advantages, including that its engine possessed “significant pull,” low “oil
consumption,” and stayed clean of soot for longer. There was also less noise and
vibration from by the engine, and most importantly, it did not produce nearly as much
“smoke.”855 There were also disadvantages. Some were minor, like the smell of gas near
the vehicle’s rear, the use of a manual transmission that the drivers did not care for, and
mudguards that interfered with the ability to attach winter chains to the tires. Others were
much more serious. The liquid gas that the bus used was relatively expensive, and while
the engine produced less smoke, carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide than comparable
diesel engines, if it was not tuned properly it produced much more of the particularly
poisonous and smog-forming nitrogen oxides. As had so preoccupied Mostofizādeh, most
worrying to those evaluating the trials was the issue of safety. They underlined refueling
as a particularly dangerous moment, and while they could keep one bus under “complete
control,” they worried that as more were brought into service alongside an increasing
number of fueling stations there would be a concomitant loss in the ability to maintain
safe refueling practices. Despite these issues, they nonetheless recommended that if the
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identified issues could be addressed then a sufficient number of new buses should be
purchased to serve the city’s Tajrish bus line.856
With the initial tests deemed successful, a meeting was held in April 1977 to
make final decisions regarding the purchase of the gas-fueled buses. Attended by
government ministers, the mayor of Tehran, the head of the NIGC, representatives of the
United Bus Company of Tehran, and others, the assembled group charged the city’s bus
company with the “creation of a better system of city transportation” in order that “people
will be encouraged to reduce their use of personal automobiles as much as possible.”857
While those assembled confirmed that new buses would burn liquid gas, there
nonetheless remained significant question marks surrounding the price at which the
NIGC would deliver gas, the extent to which the buses might help Tehran’s air quality,
and the details of their day to day operations. It was thus decided that since such vehicles
were
in a state of experimentation and study in most of the world’s nations, and their
disadvantages and difficulties were not yet fixed…only 60 gas-powered buses, meaning
20 yearly, would be purchased for experimentation. After the acquisition of enough
experience and the attainment of a satisfactory result, an order will be placed for a greater
number.858

Despite worries about the cost of converting any new diesel buses purchased, it was also
decided to reverse the ban on the purchase of new diesel-fueled buses and fulfill the
city’s remaining transit needs promptly. With each bus estimated to be the equivalent of
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seventy passenger cars, even the attenuated environmental benefits of diesel in
comparison to gas were deemed to be helpful to the goals of a “reduction of air pollution”
and an “improvement in the state of traffic” in Tehran.859
Over the following year, officials within the Tehran municipality and the city bus
company met frequently with the representatives of Mercedes-Benz and other
manufacturers, weighing carefully the specifications of different models.860 As maker of
the buses subject to early tests, Mercedes-Benz remained the frontrunner, despite the
efforts of representatives from MAN SE of West Germany repeatedly trying and failing
to win the contract with promises of quick delivery, long warranties, and the presence of
“German specialists” for the “teaching and guidance” of Iranian technicians.861 By
November 1977, Mercedes-Benz’s lead had been assured and engineers from the United
Bus Company met with representatives of Mercedes-Benz and the Iran National
Company—an Iranian firm that in addition to producing the ubiquitous Paykān passenger
car also made buses and trucks under license from the West German manufacturer—to
work out some of the finer details of the new vehicles, everything from the precise
position of springs to the manner in which passenger seats would be attached.862
Nonetheless, while work proceeded apace, there remained concern surrounding
the new fuel systems within the United Bus Company. Company employees worried that
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the slow adoption of liquid gas fuel for buses around the world was indicative of serious
safety issues, something they particularly feared in a city famous for a “lack of regard for
regulations by drivers” fueling “frequent accidents.”863 Others balked at what an already
overburdened public transit system would be required to implement in order to properly
support the new gas-fueled buses. Maj. Gen. Husayn Razm-Ārā, deputy to the mayor of
Tehran and chief executive of the United Bus Company of Tehran, wrote that

in no [other] country does the number of buses centralized on each garage exceed two
hundred, where under the existing conditions [in Tehran] approximately 500 to 600 buses
are based at each garage…[and] the number of garages and repair shops must be
increased as soon as possible. With this, the allocation of an available repair shop for the
service and repair of gas-powered buses was not feasible and a new repair shop adequate
for the repair and service of gas-powered buses must be prepared and its personnel
recruited and trained.

Tehran’s bus service was already having trouble meeting the public’s demand for
adequate service despite already running a nearly unsustainable number of buses. RazmĀrā wrote of the “frequent complaints” they received regarding the number of buses in
service and stated that the company was already “obligated” to put a “significant”
number of new buses in operation and replace some three hundred that had surpassed
their legal lifespan.864 Nonetheless, he supported the small initial purchase of MercedesBenz buses, declared his organization “absolutely ready” for the issuance of orders to
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fight air pollution through the use of gas-fuel buses,865 and wrote that “the time had
come” for the purchase of a second set of twenty buses employing the new fuel.866

***
Despite nearly a decade of planning and experimentation by a wide array of actors
and institutions, with the coming of the 1979 revolution and the Iran-Iraq War shortly
thereafter, the early promise of Iran’s programs for vehicular gas fuel went largely
unfulfilled during those chaotic years. Still, with the production of both natural and liquid
gases expected to increase after the war, initiatives for the gasification of Iran’s
transportation sector began to take on new life in the mid-1980s.867 Despite the
revolutionary change in government and the new Islamic Republic’s systematic
distancing of itself and its policies from its predecessor, there was significant continuity
between the projects of the 1970s and those that took shape in the 1980s and 1990s. In
some cases, the very same programs were revived. Such was the case in 1982, when the
NIGC’s Shiraz compressed natural gas-powered taxis project was restarted under the
leadership of Taghi Ebtekar.868 Blaming the failure of the initial effort on the greed of the
865

Ibid., 1-2.

Letter from Maj. Gen. Husayn Razm-Ārā to Feyli, p. 2, document z,h-655, 12 Bahman 2536; attached to
letter 22717; Kharid-e Otobus-ha-ye Gāzsuz.
866

See Chapter 6 of Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani’s book Energy Policy in Iran: Domestic Choices and
International Implications (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).
867

868

Ebtekar, a mechanical engineer trained first at the University of Tehran (B.S., 1958) and later the
Worcester Polytechnic Institute (M.S., 1964) and the University of Pennsylvania (PhD ME, 1967), focused
much of his work on the intersection of motor vehicle fuel and environmental protection throughout his
long career. Onetime director of the Environmental Protection Organization, at the time of his appointment
to head the Shiraz CNG project he was an associate professor at the University of Tehran. As a researcher,
Ebtekar possesses a meaningful presence in English-language publications. As such, I have chosen to
maintain the transliterated spelling of his name (rather than Taqi Ebtekār) as it appears on his published
papers and in the proceedings of international conferences.

356

American contractor Dual Fuel Company and their prioritization of short-term profits
over long-term sustainability, Ebtekar saw regaining consumer confidence as key to the
project’s ultimate success, and he ordered the importation of new lightweight Italian
conversion kits to use in place of the heavy and poorly designed kits of the original
program.869 While Ebtekar’s approach was effective and the Shiraz CNG program was
successfully reconstituted, at only one-tenth of the cost of the original effort,870 in the end
it had still only converted 1300 taxis by the mid-1990s.871 A 1985 pilot project to convert
taxis was launched in the northeastern city of Mashhad stumbled in similar fashion. Its
growth rate was even slower than in Shiraz and by 1993 only six hundred of the proposed
three thousand gasoline-powered taxis had been converted and only one of the three
fueling stations installed.872 In general, during the 1980s there failed to be much progress
toward the use of gas fuel by Iranian automobiles as many of the new and revived
programs launched in the 1980s remained similarly small in scope and largely failed to
generate significant momentum.
Disagreement remained over the best choice of gas fuel—compressed natural gas
or liquid gas— as well. While the initiatives in Shiraz and Mashhad, under the direction
of the NIGC and the Ministry of Petroleum, focused on the use of CNG, there remained a
contingent, largely centered in the by-then nationalized Iran Gāz Company, that
advocated for the use of liquid gas. Founded in the late 1950s by two Danish companies
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and an Iranian industrialist by the name of Habib Sābet, the Iran Gāz Company became
one of the largest suppliers of liquid gas in Iran over the course of the next several
decades. Famous for their yellow cylinders of gas, the company began by serving the
Khuzestān region from a filling station near the refinery at Ābādān before expanding to
the Tehran market a decade later. Along with other liquid gas companies during the
Pahlavi era, Iran Gāz both built and supplied numerous consumer markets with butane
and propane. Nationalized in the wake of the 1979 revolution due to Sābet’s Bahā’i faith
and the controlling interest of the Danish companies, Iran Gāz soon became part of the
National Iranian Liquid Gas Company in the mid-1980s.873
Iran Gāz was interested in creating and supplying a market for liquid gas in motor
vehicles. Speaking to the Taxicab Organization of the City of Tehran in June 1983,
Engineer Eshrāqi of the company laid out a new program for converting Iran’s motor
vehicle fleet. Many of the justifications he articulated echoed those of the Pahlavi era,
among the most important being “to help with solving the problem of air pollution” as
“vehicles have been one of the important polluters of the environment” and “gasoline
vehicles…create approximately 60% of all environmental pollutants.”874 Like the
Pahlavi-era experts who focused their attention on aerial pollutants that were most
tangible to urban inhabitants, Eshrāqi emphasized the carbon monoxide, unburned
hydrocarbons, nitrous oxides, and soot that formed smog and caused the eyes to water
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and the lungs to burn. Gas promised to reduce those figures, and Eshrāqi, illustrating his
claim in the same numerical and statistical style so strongly associated with officials
discussions of gas energy in Iran, constructed a hypothetical scenario wherein 20,000
taxis were converted from gasoline to liquid gas, thereby reducing the daily production of
carbon monoxide by one hundred tons, unburned hydrocarbons by four tons, and nitrous
oxides by two and a half tons.875
Additional potential benefits abounded, included the ability “to help with the
problem of automobile noise,”876 an “increase in the useful life of [vehicle] motors,”877
and the ability to use the great domestic availability of gas fuels. Reviving the powerful
economic nationalism that spurred much of the Pahlavi push for the harnessing of the
country’s natural gas resources during the 1960s and 1970s, Eshrāqi emphasized Iran’s
ability to produce gas fuels domestically, naming three primary sources: the “production
from natural gas liquids associated with crude oil,” which netted about one kilogram of
propane-butane mix per barrel of crude; the “production of liquid gas from the refining of
oil” at refineries in Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Kermanshah, and Shiraz; and the “production
of liquid gas from petrochemical operations.”878 While reminiscent of justifications first
posed prior to the revolution, economic motivations for vehicular gas fuel took on added
importance under the early Islamic Republic. In 1979 it had been estimated that the
growth in consumption of middle distillate fuels, especially gasoline, in Iran would
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necessitate the addition of 100,000 barrels per day of new refinery capacity every two
years.879 The onset of the “Imposed War [Iran-Iraq War]” in September 1980, however,
had spurred the “development of fuel difficulties” in Iran, “caused by the stopping of
work of some refineries,”880 notably the almost complete destruction of the enormous
Ābādān Refinery along Khuzestān’s Iraqi border. This had caused a “lack of conformity
between the pattern of consumption of fuel” and “the pattern of its production” in the
country. Not only did gas promise to fill the breach, but it was also poised to do so in a
far more economical manner. With liquid gas some twenty rial cheaper than gasoline at
the time, Eshrāqi again dreamed up a numerical example, calculating that the conversion
of 22,000 taxis in Tehran burning thirty-five liters of gasoline a day would save 15.4
million rial daily or 5.55 billion rial yearly, money that was “worthy of attention” because
of the “current economic war” that was being waged between Iran and the United
States.881 Even more than the impulses of sovereignty and development that had driven
Pahlavi decisionmakers, it was the war, “with those wide military, political, and
economic dimensions” that “emphasized the necessity of the greater and better use of
domestic facilities” like gas.882 In Eshrāqi’s view, plans to replace gasoline and diesel
with gas fuel may have long been the “subject of study and examination,” but until the
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coming of the Islamic Republic and the circumstances it found itself in “nowhere has
there been the opportunity for a plan to reach the level of practice.”883
Unlike Mostofizādeh and the NIGC who envisioned the use of CNG within
Tehran, Eshrāqi sought to promote liquid gas for motor vehicle use. As one of the
country’s largest distributors of liquid gas for domestic and commercial use, Iran Gāz
would have been well positioned to support and benefit from any expanded use of liquid
gas as fuel. In his analysis, Eshrāqi did not shy away from not only advocating for liquid
gas as fuel, but also the specific infrastructural formulations that were most aligned with
Iran Gāz’s capabilities. Eshrāqi described two potential systems for modifying
automobiles and supplying them with liquid gas. The first would create a system that
mirrored what was already in use for oil fuels, involving the installation of fixed tanks in
automobiles that would be filled at dedicated fueling stations. Eshrāqi considered this
option to be needlessly complex and expensive, writing that the installation of permanent
tanks on vehicles would necessitate a prolonged and expensive undertaking to build the
needed network of fueling stations. Arguing from hypothetical example as well, Eshrāqi
calculated that 200,000 gas vehicles in Tehran would require one hundred stations, each
costing roughly six million rial to build; eighty tankers, each also costing some six
million rial, would deliver 350-ton loads of liquid gas for storage in some 200,000 fixed
cylinders produced at four thousand rial each. In total, he estimated that the fixed cylinder
option would require 1.88 billion rial and five years to implement. He further argued that
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it would be difficult to convince consumers to make use of gas fuel before a substantial
number of fueling stations had been built.
Eshrāqi favored a second option, one that played to the existing expertise of the
Iran Gāz company. In this scenario, vehicles would make use of removable cylinders of
gas. Consumers would connect filled canisters of gas to their vehicles and when they
were empty exchange them for new full cylinders, much like was already done to supply
gas appliances in Iran’s urban areas. Using the eleven-kilogram cylinders that Iran Gāz
already produced and filled at dedicated facilities, delivering fuel around the city would
be “exactly like the distribution of cylinders to homes and businesses” and could leverage
the existing system of distribution that Iran Gāz and other companies already operated.
Eshrāqi claimed that option would use 300,000 cylinders each costing approximately
1300 rial, thirty-five tankers to transport liquid gas from refineries to facilities for filling
the canisters, and 120 small trucks to move cylinders from the filling facilities to
distribution centers within the city itself. Total cost was calculated to be 700 million rial,
or roughly thirty-nine percent of the cost of the fixed-cylinder option Eshrāqi had
described earlier. Rather than the five years to implement that the first option was
estimated to take, Eshrāqi claimed that the removeable-cylinder plan could be built
within three months by using the gasoline filling stations already existent in Tehran.884
Despite nearly a decade passing since the first efforts of the 1970s, Eshrāqi’s
words make clear just how much work remained to be done if gas was to be made a
practicable fuel for Iranian automobiles. Aside from the choice between liquid and
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compressed natural gas and the concomitant need to build associated infrastructure, there
were also open questions regarding the precise design of an automobile’s gas fuel system.
Working to establish their own experimental laboratory and workshop to support research
activities,885 Iran Gāz was in the process of testing three distinct carburetor designs,
attempting to balance the desire to produce the equipment domestically, maximize the
engine power,886 and mitigate any adverse effects of using gas fuel that might arise.887 In
a striking parallel to the work undertaken prior to the 1979 revolution, Eshrāqi reported
that Iran Gāz was ready to undertake wider studies involving hundreds of converted taxis
in Tehran under the “supervision” of experts from the NIGC.888 This proposal was an
almost identical one to the studies undertaken in the last decade of the Pahlavi state
where between one and a few thousand motor vehicles were slated to be given gas
equipment on an experimental basis. Half a decade after the revolution, Iranian experts
were still conducting pilot studies involving relatively small numbers of vehicles, still
debating whether CNG or liquid gas was preferable, and even still explaining the
potential benefits of using gas fuel in motor vehicles.
A year after Eshrāqi’s speech was published, in the introduction to a book on
liquid gas translated into Persian, the Research and Training Section of Iran Gāz further
advocated for the use of liquid gas in motor vehicles. Repeating word for word much of
Eshrāqi’s speech, the text extolled the ease with which liquid gas equipment could be
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installed on automobiles. It reiterated the extent that the Iran Gāz Company’s gas
ganisters and ancillary equipment had been standardized around the country and the
importance of harnessing that infrastructure to support a system of gas fuel involving
removeable cylinders. The booklet went further still, describing the progress the company
had made in selecting a suitable carburetor, predicting that in less than a year Iran Gāz
would have the ability to produce “one hundred percent in Iran” two to three thousand of
the devices per year.” There was great ambition in this claim. For many years Italy,
Japan, and the United States had been the only real producers of the technology needed to
employ gas fuel in motor vehicles. Though other nations would develop their own
industries in the late 1990s,889 had Iran Gāz’s work come to fruition then Iran would have
been one of the few nations to possess the ability to supply their needs domestically. Iran
Gāz further claimed significant improvement over existing equipment, declaring that
their new carburetors would mitigate much of the power loss associated with gas fuel,
limiting it to only five percent of the “ideal” operation of a gasoline-fueled engine.890 As
was true for many before and after the 1979 revolution, for the authors of the text gas
energy functioned not only as a way to help further Iran’s development and
industrialization, but as a space to assert Iranian ambitions for independence and selfsufficiency. For years foreign firms had been deeply involved in the project to power
Iran’s transportation sector with gas energy, a reality that the employees of Iran Gāz
Sonia Yeh, “An Empirical Analysis on the Adoption of Alternative Fuel Vehicles,” Energy Policy, vol.
35 (2007), 5867.
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implicitly chafed against. In response, they sought to build an Iran where not only was
gasoline no longer imported, but the equipment that would make such a scenario true
would be produced domestically as well.
The advocacy of the Iran Gāz Company extended to publications targeted toward
everyday consumers. In the mid-1980s the company released a booklet that asked and
answered, in “simple language” suitable for a general audience, questions about the
utility, cost, and safety of gas automobiles.891 Beginning with an explanation of the
differences between liquid gas and CNG, the booklet claimed that there was little
functional discrepancy between forms of fuel; nonetheless, the anonymous authors said,
only liquid gas would be considered in the following sections as they considered it the
most practical solution. Iran Gāz’s choice was not rooted in the technical operation of
motor vehicles, but in the infrastructural context in which they would operate. As had
been made increasingly clear over the course of Iran Gāz’s publications, the company
was committed to a system employing liquid gas not because of its material or technical
properties as a fuel, but in large part because the company was already a national leader
in bottling and distributing liquid gas. Their famous yellow-colored canisters were a
common sight in Iran, and from Iran Gāz’s perspective, building upon their existing
networks seemed to make a great deal of sense. But there were, perhaps, other contextual
motives. Both the Pahlavi state and the new Islamic Republic had made the extension of
residential and commercial natural gas lines an important goal of their developmental
policies. While a truly countrywide network was still many years away, the creation of
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these new gas networks would inevitably supplant the system of canistered liquid gas use
of which Iran Gāz was an integral part. If, however, liquid gas could be made a standard
fuel of Iran’s motor vehicle fleet, then the company could shift to new pastures as it was
slowly squeezed out of its existing markets.
Despite writing that around the world people had been experimenting with using
gas in vehicles for nearly fifty years at that point, the authors made no mention of the
Pahlavi-era programs that had existed in Iran. The booklet instead cast vehicular gas use
as something that had been taking form outside of Iran’s borders, in countries like West
Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States. At the time of writing, it reported
that there were some four million gas-powered vehicles on the world’s roads and in some
countries like Spain and Japan the “overwhelming” majority of public vehicles made use
of gas fuel.892 The booklet articulated many familiar benefits, including being an “aid to
the solving of the problem of air pollution,” reducing noise pollution,893 and reducing the
wear and tear on vehicles.894 Seemingly most important for its authors, however, was the
“prevention of the importation of fuels like gasoline and diesel,” particularly because
“one of our major fuel products…are the liquid and natural gases,” and the “prevention of
their export to foreign countries.”895 Together with the comparative inexpense of liquid
gas in comparison to gasoline896 the authors argued that moving to gas would be a “very
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efficient measure” in the “economic war” Iran was embroiled in.897 From its beginnings
in the 1950s, the use of Iran’s natural gas resources had carried strong notions of national
independence, a way for Iranians to take control of their own industrialization and
development. But during the 1980s, as the Iran-Iraq War ground on and the Islamic
Republic’s relationships with world grew increasingly strained, those same notions of
sovereignty took on extra weight as Iranians fought not only for the course of their
country’s future development, but also for its survival in the present. Gas would come
from Iran’s earth and the “gas-burning equipment,” previously expected to be obtained
abroad, were, “God willing,” now expected to be produced “using the experiences of the
majority of countries involved” in a factory owned by Iran Gāz.898
For any new program of gas fuel to make a significant difference would require
the support of a broad swath of the Iranian public. Most of Iran Gāz’s booklet was
dedicated to convincing readers that liquid gas was both a reliable and a safe source of
energy for their automobiles. Basing their claim on a long discussion of research
undertaken in Chicago during the late 1960s, readers were assured that gas would not
cause any damage to their engines so long as they properly maintained and tuned them.899
The ease of conversion, in as little as an hour, and inexpensive nature of liquid gas were
again emphasized, and the authors were careful to acknowledge that questions of
comparative expense and practical driving range were greatly affected by both how the
questions were framed and by a large array of variables that were difficult to control.
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Defining equivalence between liquid gas and oil fuels was not easy given their differing
energy densities and physical states at the earth’s surface and the booklet’s authors
ultimately settled on one defined by the functional measure of vehicular range, specifying
each kilogram of liquid gas to be equivalent to an average of 1.6 liters of gasoline.
Determining how far a motor vehicle could travel was itself far from straightforward,
however, being also dependent on vehicular weight, number of passengers, traffic
conditions, speed, and many other variables.900 As was often true, however, that did not
prevent the authors from reinforcing many of their claims with carefully calculated and
numerically impressive statistics that were ultimately rooted in little more than imagined
and idealized scenarios. Still, as with the statistical and numerical evidence deployed by
Iranian officials during the Pahlavi era, figures like the 72 billion rial that Iranians would
save per year if two million automobiles were converted to use gas provided an
imprimatur of scientific truth to the claims being advanced.901
A major portion of Iran Gāz’s booklet was dedicated to assuring readers that
liquid gas was safe to use in their vehicles. Responding to a question about whether the
“presence of a gas capsule in an automobile [is] dangerous,” the authors wrote that “we
must ask whether you feel that the use of a gas capsule inside your own apartment within
a few meters of your bedroom is dangerous.” By the middle of the 1980s, the use of
canistered liquid gas was common in Iran’s urban areas. Building on people’s acceptance
of that system of energy distribution, the authors argued that nearly all gas-related
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accidents were the fault of user error or delayed maintenance, writing that “if we study
the reasons for various fires that are the consequence of a gas leak…we find [that] the
wear and tear on the stove, the [connecting hose], or the regulator, or the gas valve being
left open by the consumer” were the primary culprits.902 The booklet went further yet,
saying that “with courage” it could be argued that liquid gas fuel was safer than gasoline.
Supporting the claim was the reproduction in full of two newspaper reports, both
appearing in Kayhān, a major national daily, on two separate traffic accidents. The first
took place on 23 October 1983 in Rey, when a speeding Volvo hit three parked cars due
to the “incaution of the driver.” The resulting
fire, fueled by the gasoline held in the tanks
of all four vehicles, was successfully
extinguished, but not before it fully consumed
one of the Paykāns that had been struck.903
The other told a more harrowing tale, one
where a woman “burned amidst the flames”
in front of “hundreds of people” under the
Seyyed Khandān bridge in Tehran after a
Nissan struck another Paykān.904
With these stories of mortal threat,
Figure 23
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Iran Gāz sought to position liquid gas as a safer alternative to gasoline. Did not, however,
the authors imagined readers asking, the “presence of a capsule of gas create fire or an
explosion at the moment of a crash?”905 By way of response, they asked rhetorically if
readers thought a canister of three millimeters’ thickness was easier to damage than the
0.8 millimeter thickness of an average gasoline tank. The authors argued that the threat of
fire and explosion is measurably less than with gasoline vehicles, writing that “it has been
proven in accidents of police cars and taxis” that the use of gas could save lives. In
support, the booklets’ authors told of an article in the July 1980 issue of Butane-Propane
News in which it was reported that the Organization for the Research of Vehicles and
Roads had declared the use of propane safe in automobiles. They also reported that some
“research in Holland” also confirmed the safety of propane use in motor vehicles and,
most significantly, they narrated how the use of liquid gas had saved the lives of people
involved in traffic accidents. They reported how a large truck had struck a parked police
vehicle in “Norristown,” severely injuring two officers and utterly destroying the rear of
the car. A dual fuel vehicle with an empty gasoline tank, the gas fuel powering the police
vehicle had not burned and the lives of the two officers were saved. The booklet quoted
the Norristown police chief as saying that the “tank of propane gas that endured a strong
blow during the accident experienced no damage and no leak.” Shortly thereafter a
second police vehicle crashed during rainy weather in Norristown and again the propane
tank suffered no damage. Similarly, in another unspecified town, a propane-powered taxi
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had been hit from behind. Once again the vehicle’s rear section was damaged and once
again the propane tank remained unharmed.906
The booklet reinforced its vivid descriptions of the three accidents with
photographs of their aftermaths. The three black and white photos meditate on the
smashed and twisted metal of the cars, with their trunk doors bent skyward and wheels
askew. Conspicuously absent is any evidence of fire or flame, and nestled amidst the
extensive destruction the viewer is able to see the intact gas cylinders (Figure 23).907
Pitched to a non-expert audience, Iran Gāz’s booklet evinces a deep concern for forms of
evidence that could move people to accept gas fuel as safe. Readers are confronted with
terrible accounts of people being burned alive in gasoline fires, and comforting reports of
others saved by the sturdy resilience of gas canisters. In this telling, the crumpled metal
of damaged vehicles suddenly become not dramatic evidence of danger, but soothing
proof of safety. The rhetorical inversion of danger and protection deftly repositioned gas
fuel not as an alarming newcomer to the automotive lives of Iranians, but as a safer
alternative to a dangerous and deadly gasoline fuel poised to maim and kill without
warning. It was gasoline that was the real killer, not the humble gas canister dutifully
providing warmth and cooking flame in the home and propulsion on the road.
The remainder of Iran Gāz’s booklet reiterated much of what had been described
in previous publications, including questions of cost, different methods of liquid gas fuel
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delivery, and the overall functionality of a converted motor vehicle.908 Despite the
company’s apparent eagerness to restart the process of converting Iran’s automobiles to
use gas energy, it would be many more years until significant progress was made. The
issue did not disappear, however, and over the next decade the idea periodically
reappeared as a potential solution to both the problem of deteriorating air quality and the
issue of gasoline shortages. The increasing contribution of automobile exhaust to the
problem continued to be highlighted in the national press. Alongside proposals to expand
the urban mass transit systems, particularly the creation of a metro in Tehran, and the
rationalization of traffic management,909 gas use continued to be seen as central to any
long-term solution. One 1985 book celebrating the post-revolutionary accomplishments
of the NIGC described the work of the national company to further the “uses of liquid
and natural gas” in “high density” portions of the country where the “smoke from the
burning of oil products is the cause of intense air pollution.” Promised were
“experimental” plans whereby “approximately three thousand automobiles in Tehran,
Mashhad, Shiraz, and Ahwaz” would be converted to use gas, and in “future years” the
plan would be expanded in Tehran and other urban regions.910
But it would not be until nearly ten years later, in the mid-1990s, that any further
progress would be made. By then, interest in the ability of gas to mitigate air pollution
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had only grown, as by the mid-1990s motor vehicle sources accounted for some seventy
percent of atmospheric pollutants in Tehran.911 Combined with the national independence
gas energy symbolized, the era saw a surge in new programs. Though sometimes grander
in ambition, many of the proposals put forth at that time were still profoundly similar to
the programs of the 1970s. In September 1993, for example, Ettelā’āt reported that
“about 9 thousand automobiles have been gasified by the Self-Sufficiency Jihad
Organization” of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps using “kits…constructed
domestically.” Prior to the program’s start, eighteen “experts and engineers” undertook
nine months of study on “foreign examples” of CNG fuel systems to foster “domestic
expertise” that was in turn used to design and produce kits within Iran. As he was quoted
in Ettelā’āt, the program’s director expressed motivations for their work that could have
been uttered three decades earlier under a different government: to improve the air
quality of Iran’s cities and prevent the waste of the country’s natural and national
resources.912
Even at such a late stage there remained no real consensus on the best form for
gas fuel. At the same time that Ettelā’āt was describing the use of compressed natural gas
by Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization in 1993, Taghi Ebtekar was recommending that
20,000 taxis be converted to liquid gas in Tehran, to be followed later by the conversion
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of the city’s buses.913 That same year, the National Iranian Liquid Gas Company
published a handbook stipulating the requirements and standardized criteria for liquid gas
fuel systems and their methods of installation on automobiles, particularly taxis and
personal vehicles. The committee of ten industry “experts” sought to pay heed to both
“international standards” and the “climactic and social conditions of our country [Iran],”
hoping to address the “phenomenon of air pollution and its undesirable effects on the
natural environment.”914 The document addressed gas fuel systems in great detail,
defining minimum standards for everything from the fuel tank and its potential locations
in a vehicle,915 to the tolerances of fuel filters,916 the operation of valves,917 and the
material of pipes and hoses.918 Much as with the programs to convert vehicles, the
technical system described by the experts and engineers of the committee did not differ in
its fundamentals from those described some two decades earlier. What was different was
that in the 1990s as part of a larger push for environmental regulation these projects often
found better footing and successfully converted greater numbers of automobiles.
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Iranian use of natural gas vehicles began to accelerate in the mid-1990s and grew
rapidly in the first two decades of the 21st century. By the 2010s Iran had become a global
leader in the use of natural gas vehicles, with some 4.07 million traveling the country’s
roads in 2015,919 The expansion of gas fuel use in motor vehicles was a product of both
the early attention paid to the potential of gas in the sector as well as the same twin
ambitions that motivated push for industrial gas consumption: concern for urban air
quality and a commitment to harnessing gas energy as a means for asserting Iranian
sovereignty and independent national development. Though that period saw the rapid
growth of such technology around the world—not only in Japan and the nations of North
American and Europe, but also in places like Argentina, Brazil, India, China, and
Pakistan920—the Iranian embrace of vehicular gas fuel was rooted not in an imitation of
other countries, but in a deep-seated engagement that first found expression in the 1960s.
Over the following decades and across the caesura of the 1979 revolution, Iranians inside
the national petroleum companies, government ministries, provincial administrations, and
private companies pursued the new fuel source to both alleviate worsening environmental
problems and make use of one of Iran’s great natural and national resources. It was a
pursuit grounded both in the materiality of gas fuel and its manner of combustion—
producing less of the tangible pollutants that so concerned Iranian observers during the
period—and in the fundamentally political projects that expressed desires for national
sovereignty and developmental independence.
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Early programs to deploy natural gas vehicles in the 1970s were heavily
dependent on foreign firms and imported technology. With a few exceptions, the general
cessation of meaningful scientific research in Iran in the first decade after the revolution
did not spare the work being done on automotive gas fuel. As part of a broader revival of
work in the sciences and engineering in the mid-1990s,921 and continuing at an everincreasing pace in the decades that followed,922 Iranian experts began to once again
undertake significant research in the design and production of gas fuel technology. The
experts that developed the 1993 standards for liquid gas-fueled motor vehicles in Iran
may have been guided by the “international standards” that had grown up around such
technology, but they were also building upon foundations that had been laid by Iranians
at a time when those requirements had been much less settled. In this way, the use of gas
fuel in Iranian motor vehicles reflected the interplay between domestic and foreign
knowledge and expertise that surrounded the use of gas energy more broadly in the
country: one that saw Iranians not merely or only learning from experts and experiences
abroad, but also engaging in their own research, undertaking their own planning, and
pursuing gas on their own terms.
Throughout the second half of the 20th century and into the 21st, the belief that the
widespread adoption of automotive gas energy would produce great benefits in the
broader quest to tame Iran’s urban air quality crisis was commonplace among advocates
for the technology. Though the conviction animated much of the rhetoric and practical
See Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Iran’s New Scientific Community,” in Contemporary Iran: Economy,
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effort that surrounded the adoption of gas energy in the Iranian transportation sector, in
the end the extensive adoption of dual fuel vehicles—Iran has led or nearly led the world
in the number of gas vehicles on its roads for more than a decade now923—largely failed
to halt the further environmental deterioration of the country’s urban skies. The
commitment of the many Iranian experts and officials to designing and producing gas
fuel technology inside Iran, central to the larger national gas energy project of which
automotive gas fuel was part, ultimately resulted in the use of conversion kits that were
notably more polluting than those made in other countries. The deficiencies of the
equipment, rooted in obsolete and inefficient designs, were so great as to sometimes
render gas fuel even more polluting than the gasoline it replaced as equipment aged and
maintenance was skipped or improperly performed.924
For decades, advocates of gas fuel inside government ministries, the national
petroleum companies, provincial governments, and private industry had advocated gas as
a straightforward solution to the issue of air pollution. Gas was a way to simultaneously
allow the continued growth of Iranian automobile use while also mitigating some of its
worst effects. As with the project to supply natural gas to industrial consumers, the push
for gas energy in the automotive sector embedded ideas of clean air and environmental
stewardship in the developmental programs of both the Pahlavi state and the Islamic
Republic. This environmental consciousness was rooted in the same preoccupation with
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the most tangible forms of air pollution that animated the drive for the use of natural gas
energy by major industrial consumers. Even when complemented with other measures,
however—the expansion of public transit, particularly the construction of the Tehran
metro system, and increasingly draconian traffic regulations—the use of automotive gas
fuel failed to meaningfully slow the pollution of Iranian skies. The ability of gas energy
to fulfill the environmental claims of its most ardent advocates in Iran thus found deeply
uneven expression, largely successful in reducing the prevalence of industrial pollutants
in the skies above Iran’s cities but actively counterproductive when it came to those
emanating from automotive sources. In the end, priority was given to the desire to further
assert Iran’s economic sovereignty through the domestic manufacture of gas fuel
technology, effectively sacrificing the dream of a clear sky for a vision of a
technologically independent Iran. Despite the potential of both compressed natural and
liquid gas to produce less of the pollutants that blanketed Iran’s urban areas, the new fuel
systems failed to be the answer to air pollution that its champions hoped. The simple fact
was that all the environmental benefits of gas fuel and the technologies used to harness it
could not overcome the social contexts within which they were embedded. Gas fuel
systems needed to be maintained and replaced as they aged, something that proved to be
difficult for Iranian authorities to demand and enforce. Even more fundamentally, while
gas fuel may have reduced the emissions of any vehicle that used them, the rapid and
continued growth of motor vehicle use in cities like Tehran rendered such gains
inconsequential. In end, gas energy was simply not the technical fix to environmental
problems that its advocates had hoped it would be.
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Conclusion

In 2005, faced with intensifying international sanctions over its controversial
nuclear program, the Iranian government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad began an
accelerated push to convert large numbers of Iranian automobiles into dual-fuel motor
vehicles able to use both gasoline and compressed natural gas. This scheme to address a
critical vulnerability in the Iranian economy was not sudden, nor was it motivated solely
by the country’s confrontation with world powers. It was instead the latest manifestation
of a long series of policies dating back nearly seventy years to the reign of the first
Pahlavi monarch, Rezā Shah Pahlavi. Since the mid-1930s, officials working for the
Iranian government and the national petroleum companies had undertaken a series of
intensifying efforts to transform the country’s natural gas reserves from valueless waste
into a cornerstone of Iranian society. From initial and largely failed ideas to create a
petrochemical industry in the 1930s and 1940s to the rapid expansion of city natural gas
distribution networks in the 1980s and 1990s, they had overseen the largely successful
construction of a new system for the production and distribution of energy in Iran.
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Beginning in the early 1960s, a new sociotechnical imaginary surrounding natural
gas began to coalesce. It was one that placed gas energy at the center of a new
technologically sophisticated Iranian society then under construction. Advocates for its
use saw gas as being Iran’s bridge to the future, an abundant, inexpensive, and above all
domestic source of energy able to fuel ambitions for Iran’s rapid industrialization and
growing geopolitical independence. While such gaseous aspirations were fully Iranian,
the work of designing and building the systems that made natural gas use possible was
not. The construction of Iran’s gas system was international from the start, dependent on
foreign expertise and abilities. That reality did not stop organizations like the NIGC and
the Ministry of Petroleum from erecting a public image that largely elided the significant
involvement of non-Iranians. Using photographs of monumental structures and
impressive figures of size and scope, they instead built an understanding that established
the country’s new gas systems as an expression of the Pahlavi state’s ability to harness
modern science and technology as well as its commitment to the welfare of the Iranian
people. But not all Iranians believed that commitment to be true. With the completion of
the IGAT-1 pipeline project in the 1970s and the slow provision of natural gas to
residential consumers, those who went without, largely rural or residing in older
neighborhoods, saw the lack of gas as a statement of their sudden position as secondclass citizens.
The frustrated expectations of Iranians became part of the growing revolutionary
movement, a dissatisfaction rooted tellingly not in the fact of change but in its intolerably
slow pace. Reflecting those desires, early on the Islamic Republic had committed itself to
bringing gas to all Iranians and, rhetorically at least, giving precedence to the small
380

residential and commercial consumers that had been largely bypassed by Pahlavi gas
distribution programs. That commitment was maintained for decades, and by the early
2010s, Iran’s natural gas system had expanded greatly, supplying from both associated
and non-associated sources more than 220 billion cubic meters of gas per year for
domestic consumption, some 35 times more than had been carried by the original IGAT-1
line. Feeding Iran were a dozen gas refineries and dehydration units all over Iran, their
output carried by eleven major gas pipelines with a cumulative length of 35,000
kilometers. From the few thousand gas consumers of the early 1970s, by the early 2010s
there were some 16.3 million gas connections in 920 cities and 12,504 villages plus 69
power plants, all supplied via 236,000 kilometers of distribution pipe. Residential users
and power plants had become the greatest consumers of gas, at some 40 billion cubic
meters per year each, followed by non-petrochemical industries at 25 billion cubic meters
per year, with petrochemicals themselves accounting for some 20 billion cubic meters per
year. All told some 55 million Iranians had access to piped natural gas in 2012, 96
percent of the urban population and 54 percent of the rural.925 All the crucial differences
between the Pahlavi monarchy and Islamic Republic notwithstanding, the latter’s triumph
with respect to natural gas distribution was built upon the foundations laid under the
former regime. More to the point, the fundamental sociotechnical imaginary that underlay
the project was not only maintained but celebrated. When it came to natural gas, even in
the tasks of political legitimacy for which it was harnessed, the two governments were
more alike than dissimilar.
For more see Chapter 1 of Elham Hassanzadeh’s Iran’s Natural Gas Industry in the Post-Revolutionary
Period: Optimism, Scepticism, and Potential (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014).
925
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But the successful construction of Iran’s vast natural gas system was nonetheless
accompanied by significant failure. Iranian pursuits of natural gas utilization were rooted
in the AIOC’s unproductive disposal of associated gas and desires for the country’s
national and natural wealth to be put to good use. Despite such underpinnings, significant
volumes of associated gas continue to be flared in Iran. In 2011 that amounted to some 30
percent of all gas produced at onshore oil fields and 80 percent at offshore, a total of 11.4
billion cubic meters, third highest in the world after Russia and Nigeria.926 More notable
was the absolute failure of industrial and vehicular fuel conversion to produce clean
urban air. Despite the substantial completion of the industrial conversion process by the
late 1970s and the increasing adoption of CNG-powered automobiles over the following
decades, cities like Tehran continue to have some of the worst air quality in the world.
Any improvements made in the amount of soot and smoke by individual fossil fuel users
were overwhelmed by rapid population growth, poor urban planning, and intensified
automobile dependence.

***
This dissertation tells the story of how natural gas came to play its essential role
in Iranian society, joining Iran-as-state, Iran-as-society, and Iran-as-geology, addressing
the entanglements of human and nonhuman factors that have shaped the development of
the country. In particular, it studies how the physical properties of its vast resources of
fossil fuels and their attendant infrastructural assemblages have both reflected and
influenced competing notions of progress, modernity, prosperity, and the environment. In
926

Ibid., 35-36.
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going beyond accounts of modern Iran that center questions of religion, ideological
contestation, and Great Power meddling, this dissertation interrogates the role of
hydrocarbons, geology, and air pollutants as nonhuman factors in the country’s history.
By bridging the perspectives of national officials, local authorities, industrialists, and
everyday users of gas, as well as spanning the caesura of the 1979 Iranian revolution, it
highlights how natural gas energy and the environment became intertwined influences on
a developing society. Between the mid-20th century and the early 21st, Iranians, both elite
and not, monarchist and revolutionary, embraced gas energy as the means by which their
country could become sovereign, modern, and clean. The new energy source would be
both the fuel by which the nation would develop and the means by which it would avoid
the polluted fate that had seemingly captured much of the industrialized world. Many
Iranians, even the Pahlavi officials long-derided as gharbzadeh compradors, embraced
the potential of gas energy not in imitation of Euro-American modernity, but in an
intentional attempt to surpass it. They looked at what had befallen the polluted cities of
Europe and North America and took specific attempts to try and avoid their fate.
But there would be no tale of easy triumph. The saga of natural gas in Iran
demonstrates that technical fixes to environmental issues are often deeply fraught and
possibly do not exist. Iranians under two regimes embraced and pursued gas energy as a
way to fight the slow poisoning of their air, and despite gas now accounting for some
two-thirds of the country’s energy mix, the air quality of cities like Tehran is as bad as it
has ever been. There are complex reasons for this—geopolitics, topography,
contradictory and mutually-exclusive policies and demands from various social groups—
and that is exactly the point. While rooted in the particulars of Iranian history, the ways
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that natural gas energy was made into Iran’s promised but ultimately failed
environmental savior are equally visible in discourses surrounding “clean” energy in the
region and around the world. As various technologies for carbon capture and green
energy production push their way to the fore as potential solutions to climate change,
countries like Iran that have already undertaken widespread experiments in energy
transition offer a cautionary lesson. Simply put, any attempt to address our global climate
crisis cannot begin and end with these technologies. If we are to address and survive a
shifting global climate, we must also understand how people, especially those living in
ecologically stressed developing societies like Iran, experience both their environments
and the energy technologies around which they organize their lives. Failure to do so risks
repeating the pitfall of Iran’s encounter with air pollution.

384

Bibliography

Archives, Document Collections, and Libraries
British Petroleum Archive, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom.
Central Library of the Ministry of Energy, Tehran, Iran.
Documents and Publications Center of the Plan and Budget Organization of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Tehran, Iran.
Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies, Tehran, Iran.
Iran Petroleum Museum and Document Center, Tehran, Iran.
Majlis Library, Museum, and Document Center, Tehran, Iran.
National Iranian Oil Company Information Center and Central Library, Tehran, Iran.
National Library and Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Fars Document Center, Shiraz, Iran.
Provincial Government of Fars
National Archive of Iran, Tehran, Iran.
Governorate of Zanjān.
Municipality of Tehran.
Presidential Files.
Provincial Government of Fars.
Provincial Government of Khuzestān.
National Library of Iran, Tehran, Iran.
U.S. National Archives at College Park, Department of State, RG 59.

Periodicals in Persian
Ettelā’āt
Nāmeh-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran
Nashriyeh-ye Anjoman-e Naft-e Iran

Periodicals in English
Japan Quarterly
UNESCO Courier

385

Published Sources in Persian
Hozeh-ye Shomāreh-ye 9. Hoshdāri beh Maghāmāt-e Mas’ul dar Movarrad-e Āludegi-ye
Havā-ye Tehran. Tehran: n.p., 1346.
Mastufizādeh, ‘Ali. “Tabdil-e Sukht-e Vasāyat-e Naqlieh be Gāz.” Nashriyeh-ye
Anjoman-e Naft-e Iran, no. 62 (4th Quarter 2534): 9-19.
Modiriat-e Mohandesi va Tarh-ha, Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Māy’a-ye Iran. Moqarrāt va
Zavābet-e Sākht va Nasb-e Sistem-ha-ye Gāz-e Māye’-ye Vasāt-e Naqlieh-e
Motori. N.p.: Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Māye’-ye Iran, 1372.
Moshref Razavi, ‘Alirezā. “Tasir-e Inverzhun dar Tarākam-e Āludegi-ye Havā va Vaz’-e
Inverzhun-e Tehran.” Nashriyeh-ye Anjoman-e Naft-e Iran, no. 47 (Khordād
1351): 16-37.
Olfat, Manuchehr. “Āludehkonandeh-ha-ye Mohem-e Havā – Tashkhis va Sonjesh-e
Anhā.” Nashriyeh-ye Anjoman-e Naft-e Iran, no. 47 (Khordād 1351): 9-15.
Ravābat-e Omumi va Ershād-e Islami-ye Vezārat-e Naft. Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz dar
Khedmat-e Mostaz’afin. Tehran[?]: Enteshārāt-e Ravābet-e Omumi va Ershād-e
Islami-ye Vezārat-e Naft, 1363.
Ravābat-e Omumi va Ershād-e Islami-ye Vezārat-e Naft-e Jomhuri-ye Islāmi-ye Iran.
Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran Shesh Sal b’ad az Piruzi-ye Enqelāb-e Islāmi. N.p.:
Ravābat-e Omumi va Ershād-e Vezārat-e Naft-e Jomhuri-ye Islāmi-ye Iran, 1364.
Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist. Āmār-e Āludegi-ye Havā-ye Tehran, Seh Māheh-ye
Sevvom-e Sāl-e 1357. Tehran[?]: Enteshārāt-e Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist,
1357[?].
Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist. Barnāmeh-ye Hefāzat-e Mohit-e Zist dar Durān-e
Barnāmeh-ye ‘Omrāni-ye Panjom-e Keshvar. N.p.: Sāzmān-e Hefāzat-e Mohit-e
Zist, n.d. [early 1970s?].
Shaybāni, Sa’id. Mas’aleh-ye Āludegi-ye Havā va Barnāmeh-hā-ye Sherkat-e Melli-ye
Naft-e Iran dar in Zamineh. Tehran[?]: Ravābat-e Omumi-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran,
1350.
Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran. San’at-e Gāz-e Iran. [Tehran?]: Enteshārāt-e Ravābet-e
Omumi-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, 1352.
Sherkat-e Melli-ye Naft-e Iran. Naft va Zendegi. Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Ravābat-e Omumiye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, 1352.
Sherkat-e Sahāmi-ye Kudshimiāi-ye Iran. Kārkhāneh-ye Shimiāi-ye Shiraz. Tehran:
Enteshārāt-e Omur-e Ravābat-e ‘Omumi-ye San’at-e Naft-e Iran, 1353.
Shirāzi, Mohsen. San’at-e Gāz-e Iran: Az Āghāz tā Āstāneh-ye Enqelāb. Interview by
Golāmrezā Afkhami. Bethesda, MD: Foundation for Iranian Studies, 1999.
Available online at https://fis-iran.org/fa/resources/development-series/gas
(accessed 20 April 2020).
Vāhed-e Mohandesi-ye Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), Dāyereh-ye Tahqiq va Āmuzesh.
Tabdil-e Sukht-e Envāh-ye Otomobil-ha-ye Benzini va Gāzoili be Gāz. N.p.:
Vāhed-e Mohandesi-ye Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), 1363(?).
Vāhed-e Mohandesi-ye Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), Markaz-e Tahqiqāt va Āmuzesh.
Āshnāi-ye Mokhtasari bā Koliāt-e Gāzsuz Kardan-e Otomobil-ha. N.p.: Sherkat-e
Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), 1363/1364(?).
386

Vāhed-e Mohandesi-ye Sherkat-e Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh). Matn-e Sokhanrāni-ye Āghāye Mohandes Ashrāqi dar Avalin Seminār-e Barrasi-ye Prozheh-ye
Gāzsuzkardan-e Khodro-ha dar Iran. Tehran: Vāhed-e Mohandesi-ye Sherkat-e
Iran Gāz (Melli Shodeh), 1362.
Vezārat-e Āmuzesh va Parvaresh. Gāz. Kitāb-hā-ye Khāndani barāye Dāneshāmuzān-e
Dabestān. Tehran[?]: Vezārat-e Āmuzesh va Parvaresh, 1351.

Published Sources in English
Arthur D. Little, Inc. and Chicago Transit Authority. Comparative Economics of Propane
and Diesel Buses: Report to Chicago Transit Authority. Chicago, IL: Little, 1960.
Atash, Farhad. “The Deterioration of Urban Environments in Developing Countries:
Mitigating the Air Pollution Crisis in Tehran, Iran.” In Cities 24, no. 6 (2007):
399-409.
Badakhshan, A., S. Shaibani, and M. Olfat. “Techniques and Experiences of
Measurement and Observation of Major Atmospheric Pollutants in Iran. The
Bulletin of the Iranian Petroleum Institute, no. 54 (1st Quarter 1974): 13-20.
Ebtekar, Taghi. “Environmental Impact of Alternative Fuel on Tehran Air Pollution.” In
Proceedings of the 30th Intersociety Energy Conversion Conference, vol. 2, 31-36.
New York: The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1995.
Ebtekar, Taghi. “The Prospect for Alternative Fuel Vehicles in Iran: An Environmental
Assessment.” In Proceedings of the 28th Intersociety Energy Conversion
Engineering Conference, vol. 2, 893-897. Washington, D.C.: American Chemical
Society, 1993.
Ebtekar, Taghi. “Reconstruction of Shiraz CNG Project.” In International Congress
Exhibition on the Use of Methane in the Transportation Sector, 211-213.
Bologna, Italy: Fedormentano, 1986.
Eskandar, Firouz. “Environmental and Nature Conservation in Iran.” Environmental
Conservation, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 33-42.
Gibson, H.S. “Multistage Stabilization of Crude.” Transactions of the AIME, vol. 136,
no. 1 (December 1940): 25-36.
Global Environment Facility. Tehran Transport Emissions Reduction Project.
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1993.
International Engineering Company, Morrison-Knudsen International Company, Inc.
Report on Program for the Development of Iran. San Francisco: n.p., 1947.
Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza. Mission for my Country. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1961.
United Nations. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Proceedings of the
Second Symposium on the Development of Petroleum Resources of Asia and the
Far East. Vol. 1 & 2. New York: United Nations, 1963.
United Nations. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, United Nations,
Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations. Proceedings of the Seminar on the
Development and Utilization of Natural Gas Resources. New York: United
Nations, 1965.
387

Zerbonia, R. and B. Soraya. “Air Pollution Control in Iran.” Journal of the Air Pollution
Control Association, vol. 28, no. 4 (1978): 334-3347.

Secondary Literature in Persian
Ardekāni, Husayn Mahbubi. Tārikh-e Moassesāt-e Tamaddoni-ye Jadid dar Iran. Vol. 3.
2nd ed. Tehran: Enteshārāt-e Dāneshgāh-e Tehran, 1376.
‘Araqi, Hamid Reza. Bist Sāl ba Gāz. Tehran: Shāpikān, 1390.
Bujārzādeh, Majid and ‘Ali Bahādar. Gāz Enerzhi-ye Pāk bā Nim-e Qarn-e Talāsh:
Panjāhomin Sāl-e Tasis-e Sherkat-e Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran. Tehran: Sherkat-e
Melli-ye Gāz-e Iran – Ravābat-e ‘Omumi, 1395.
Hasantāsh, Seyyed Gholāmhusayn and Mikāyil ‘Azimi. Tārikh-e San’at-e Gāz-e Māy’aye Iran. Tehran: Kavir, 1394.
Tālebi, Hāmed, ‘Aisi Hojjat, and Muhammad Farziān. “Kuy-hā-ye Maskuni-ye Kutāh-ye
Moratabeh-ye Tehran dar Dureh-ye Pahlavi-ye Dovvom,” Contemporary
Architecture of Iran (Spring 1393), available online at
http://www.caoi.ir/en/study/976-پھلوی-دوران-در-تھران-مسکونی-ھای-کوی.html
(accessed on 2 July 2019).
Razāqi, Ibrāhim. Eqtesād-e Iran. Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1367.

Secondary Literature in English
Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008.
———. Iran: Between Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1982.
———. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1993.
Afary, Janet. Sexual Politics in Modern Iran. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2009.
Aghaie, Kamran Scot. The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi’i Symbols and Rituals in Modern
Iran. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2004.
Aidi, Hisham D. Rebel Music: Race, Empire, and the New Muslim Youth Culture (New
York: Vintage Books, 2014).
Al-e Ahmad. Gharbzadegi. Tehran: Nashr-e Jāmeh-ye Darān, 1384.
———. Occidentosis: A Plague from the West. Translated by R. Campbell. Berkeley,
CA: Mizan Press, 1984.
Alvandi, Roham. Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold
War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Amin, Camron Michael. The Making of the Modern Iranian Woman: Gender, State
Policy, and Popular Culture, 1865-1946. Gainesville, FL: University Press of
Florida, 2002.
Anand, Nikhil. Hydraulic City: Water and the Infrastructures of Citizenship in Mumbai.
388

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017.
Ansari, Ali M. “The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah,
‘Modernization’ and the Consolidation of Power.” Middle Eastern Studies, vol.
37, no. 3 (July 2001): 1-24.
———. The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2012.
Ansari, Nastaran and Abbas Seifi. “A System Dynamics Model for Analyzing Energy
Consumption and CO2 Emission in Iranian Cement Industry under Various
Production and Export Scenarios.” Energy Policy 58 (2013): 75-89.
Arjomand, Said Amir. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Atabaki, Touraj, Elisabetta Bini, and Kaveh Ehsani, eds. Working for Oil: Comparative
Social Histories of Labor in the Global Oil Industry. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2018.
Atabaki, Touraj and Erik J. Zürcher. Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under
Atatürk and Reza Shah. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2004.
Atash, Farhad. “The Deterioration of Urban Environments in Developing Countries:
Mitigating the Air Pollution Crisis in Tehran, Iran.” Cities 95, no. 6 (2007): 399409.
Babb, Sarah. Managing Mexico: Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Bakhtin, M.M. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Translated by Caryl Emerson
and Michael Holquist. Edited by Michael Holquist. Austin, TX: University of
Texas Press, 1981, 2014.
Baldwin, George B. Planning and Development in Iran. Baltimore, MD: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1967.
Banani, Amin. The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1961.
Barak, On. On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2013.
———. Powering Empire: How Coal Made the Middle East and Sparked Global
Carbonization. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2020.
———. “Three Watersheds in the History of Energy.” Comparative Studies of South
Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 34, no. 3 (2014): 440-453.
Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. Translated by Richard
Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981.
Bennett, Jane. “The Agency of Assemblages and the North American Blackout.” Public
Culture vol. 17, no. 3 (2005): 445-465.
———. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2010.
Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of
Nativism. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996.
Bostock, Frances and Geoffrey Jones. Planning and Power in Iran: Ebtehaj and
Economic Development under the Shah. London: Frank Cass and Company
Limited, 1989.
389

Boyer, Dominic. Energopolitics: Wind and Power in the Anthropocene. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2019.
Burke III, Edmund. “The Deep History of the Middle Eastern Environment, 1500 BCE –
1500 CE.” In The Environment and World History. Edited by Edmund Burke III
and Kenneth Pomeranz. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009.
Butane-Propane News Incorporated. Propane in America: The First 100 Years, 19122012. Arcadia, CA: Butane-Propane News Incorporated, 2012.
Carey, Jane Perry Clark. “Iran and Control of Its Oil Resources.” Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 89, no. 1 (March 1974): 147-174.
Castaneda, Christopher James. Regulated Enterprise: Natural Gas Pipelines and
Northeastern Markets, 1938-1954. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1993.
Chelkowski, Peter, ed. Eternal Performance: Ta’ziyeh and Other Shiite Rituals. London:
Seagull Books, 2010.
Chelkowski, Peter and Hamid Dabashi. Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in
the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
Clawson, Patrick. “Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution.” Iranian
Studies, vol. 26, no. 3-4 (Summer/Fall 1993): 235-250.
Cronin, Stephanie. The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah,
1921-1941. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Cronon, William. Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West. New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1991.
———. “The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature.”
Environmental History, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 1996): 7-28.
Dabashi, Hamid. Iran: A People Interrupted. New York: The New Press, 2007.
———. Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution
in Iran. New York: New York University Press, 1993. Reprint, New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008.
Daftary, Farhad. “Development Planning in Iran: A Historical Survey.” Iranian Studies,
vol. 6, no. 4 (Autumn 1973): 176-228.
Daggett, Cara New. The Birth of Energy: Fossil Fuels, Thermodynamics, and the Politics
of Work. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2019.
Davis, Diana. “Potential Forests: Degradation Narratives, Science, and Environmental
Policy in Protectorate Morocco, 1912-1956.” Environmental History, Vol. 10, no.
2 (2005): 211-238.
Davis, Diana and Edmund Burke III, eds. Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East
and North Africa. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2011.
De Chatel, Francesca. “The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising:
Untangling the Triggers of the Revolution.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, no. 4
(2014): 521-535.
Derr, Jennifer. The Lived Nile: Environment, Disease, and Material Colonial Economy in
Egypt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019.
Doostdar, Alireza. The Iranian Metaphysicals: Exploration in Science, Islam, and the
Uncanny. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018.
Drogin, I. “Carbon Black.” Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association, vol. 18, no.
4 (1968): 216-228.
390

Ehsani, Kaveh. “Disappearing the Workers: How Labor in the Oil Complex has been
Made Invisible.” In Working for Oil: Comparative Social Histories of Labor in
the Global Oil Industry, edited by Touraj Atabaki, Elisabetta Bini, Kaveh Ehsani,
11-34. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
———. “Social Engineering and the Contradictions of Modernization in Khuzestan’s
Company Towns: A Look at Abadan and Masjed-Soleyman.” International
Review of Social History, vol. 28 (2003): 361-399.
Eickelman, Dale F. and Jon W. Anderson. New Media in the Muslim World: The
Emerging Public Sphere (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999, 2003.
Ekbladh, David. The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an
American World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
El Shakry, Omnia S. The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial
and Postcolonial Egypt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
Elshakry, Marwa. Reading Darwin in Arabic, 1860-1950. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press, 2013.
English, Paul Ward. “Qanats and Lifeworlds in Iranian Plateau Villages.” In
Transformations of Middle Eastern Natural Environments: Legacies and Lessons.
Edited by Jeff Albert, Magnus Bernhardsson, and Roger Kenna. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1998.
Escobar, Arturo. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third
World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 2012.
Fadaee, Simin. Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society. New
York: Routledge, 2012.
Fahmy, Khaled. All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern
Egypt. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2003.
Ferguson, James. The Anti-Political Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota
Press, 1990, 1994.
Fredericks, Rosalind. Garbage Citizenship: Vital Infrastructures of Labor in Dakar,
Senegal. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018.
Gamson, William A. and Andre Modigliani. “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on
Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach.” American Journal of Sociology 95,
no. 1 (July 1989): 1-37.
Gheissari, Ali. Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century. Austin, TX: University of Texas
Press, 1998.
Ghosh, Amitav. “Petrofiction: The Oil Encounter and the Novel.” The New Republic (2
March 1992): 29-34.
Graham, Stephen. Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructures Fails. New York: Routledge,
2010.
Graham, Stephen and Nigel Thrift. “Out of Order: Understanding Repair and
Maintenance.” Theory, Culture, and Society, Vol. 24, no. 3 (2007): 1-25.
Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America.
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.
Grigas, Agnia. The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2017.
391

Gupta, Akhil. “An Anthropology of Electricity from the Global South.” Cultural
Anthropology, vol. 30, no. 4 (2015): 555-568.
Haraway, Donna. “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in
the Late Twentieth Century.” Socialist Review, no. 80 (1985): 65-108.
Harvey, Penny and Hannah Knox. Roads: An Anthropology of Infrastructure and
Expertise. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015.
Hashemian, S.A., N. Mansouri, and M.A. Morady. “Investigating the Impacts of
Retrofitted CNG Vehicles on Air Pollutant Emissions in Tehran.” International
Journal of Environmental Research, vol. 7, no. 3 (2013): 669-678.
Hassanzadeh, Elham. Iran’s Natural Gas Industry in the Post-Revolutionary Period:
Optimism, Scepticism, and Potential. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Hecht, Gabrielle. The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after
World War II. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998.
Hein, Carola and Mohamad Sedighi. “Iran’s Global Petroleumscape: The Role of Oil in
Shaping Khuzestan and Tehran.” Architectural Theory Review, vol. 21, no. 3
(2017): 349-374.
Hooglund, Eric J. Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980. Austin, TX: University of
Texas Press, 1982.
Hosseini, Vahid and Hossein Shahbazi. “Urban Air Pollution in Iran.” Iranian Studies 49,
no. 6 (2016): 1029-1046.
Howe, Cymene. Ecologics: Wind and Power in the Anthropocene. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2019.
Husain, Faisal. “In the Bellies of the Marshes: Water and Power in the Countryside of
Ottoman Baghdad.” Environmental History, vol. 19, no. 4 (October 2014): 638664.
Jahanbegloo, Ramin. Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity. Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2004.
Jasanoff, Sheila. “Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of
Modernity.” In Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the
Fabrication of Power, edited by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, 1-33.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015.
Jasanoff, Sheila and Sang-Hyun Kim. “Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries
and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea.” Minerva 47, no. 2
(June 2009): 119-146.
Johnson, Bob. Carbon Nation: Fossil Fuels in the Making of American Culture.
Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2014.
Jones, Toby Craig. Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.
———. Running Dry: Essays on Energy, Water, and Environmental Crisis. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2015.
Kakaee, Amir-Hasan and Amin Paykani. “Research and Development of Natural-Gas
Fueled Engines in Iran.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 26 (2013):
805-821.
Karbassi, A.R., M. Abbasspour, M.S. Sekhavatjou, F. Zaviyar, and M. Saeedi. “Potential
for Reducing Air Pollution from Oil Refineries.” Environmental Monitoring and
392

Assessment 145, no. 1-3 (2008): 159-166.
Karimi, Pamela. Domesticity and Consumer Culture in Iran: Interior Revolutions of the
Modern Era. New York: Routledge, 2013.
Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. Conceiving Citizens: Women and the Politics of Motherhood.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011.
———. “Dressing Up (or Down): Veils, Hats, and Consumer Fashion in Iran.” In AntiVeiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and the Politics of
Dress. Edited by Stephanie Cronin, 149-162. New York: Routledge, 2014.
———. Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1999..
Keddie, Nikki. Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran. New Haven,
CT: Yale University, Press, 1981.
Khan, Muhammad Imran, Tabassum Yasmin, and Abdul Shakoor. “Technical Overview
of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) as a Transportation Fuel.” Renewable and
Sustainable Energy Review 51 (2015): 785-797.
Khosrokhavar, Farhad. “Iran’s New Scientific Community.” In Contemporary Iran:
Economy, Society, Politics. Edited by Ali Gheissar. 211-244. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009.
Kohn, Eduardo. How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013.
Koyagi, Mikiya. “Drivers across the Desert: Infrastructure and Sikh Migrants in the IndoIranian Borderlands, 1919-31.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the
Middle East, vol. 29, no. 3 (2019): 375-388.
———. “The Vernacular Journey: Railway Travelers in Early Pahlavi Iran, 1925-50.”
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 47 (2015): 745-763.
Kraidy, Marwan. Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Krane, Jim. Energy Kingdoms: Oil and Political Survival in the Persian Gulf. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2019.
Kuhn, Maximilian. “Enabling the Iranian Gas Export Option: The Destiny of Iranian
Energy Relations in a Tripolar Struggle over Energy Security and Geopolitics.”
PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2012.
Larkin, Brian. “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure.” Annual Review of
Anthropology, Vol. 42 (2013): 327-343.
———. Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008.
Latham, Michael E. Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation
Building” in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina
Press, 2000.
Latour, Bruno. Aramis, or the Love of Technology. Translated by Catherine Porter.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
———. The Pasteurization of France. Translated by Alan Sheridan and John Law.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
Lemanksi, Charlotte. “Infrastructural Citizenship: (De)Constructing State-Society
Relations.” International Development Planning Review, vol. 42, no. 2 (2020):
393

115-125.
———. “Infrastructural Citizenship: The Everyday Citizenships of Adapting and/or
Destroying Public Infrastructure in Cape Town, South Africa.” Transactions of
the Institute of British Geographers (2019): 1-17.
Levy, Eugene. “The Aesthetics of Power: High-Voltage Transmission Systems and the
American Landscape.” Technology and Culture, vol. 38, no. 3 (July 1997): 575607.
Limbert, Mondana E. In the Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani
Town. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010.
Lotfalian, Mazyar. Islam, Technoscientific Identities, and the Culture of Curiosity.
Dallas, TX: University Press of America, Inc., 2004.
Macdonald, Graeme. “Containing Oil: The Pipeline in Petroculture.” In Petrocultures:
Oil, Politics, Culture. Edited by Sheena Wilson, Adam Carlson, and Imre
Szeman. 36-77. Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017.
Madanipour, Ali. Tehran: The Making of a Metropolis. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and
Sons, Ltd. 1998.
Majd, Mohammad Gholi. Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and Ulama in Iran.
Gainesville, FL: University of Florida of Press, 2000.
Manoukian, Setrag. City of Knowledge in Twentieth Century Iran: Shiraz, History and
Poetry. New York: Routledge, 2012.
Marashi, Afshin. Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870-1940. Seattle,
WA: University of Washington, 2008.
Mashayekhi, Azadeh. “The 1968 Tehran Master Plan and the Politics of Planning
Development in Iran (1945-1979).” Planning Perspectives (2018).
McNeill, J.R. Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the TwentiethCentury World. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000.
Melamid, A. “Industrial Activities.” The Cambridge History of Iran, edited by W.B.
Fisher, 517-551. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
Menoret, Pascal. Joyriding in Riyadh: Oil, Urbanism, and Road Revolt. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Mikhail, Alan. The Animal in Ottoman Egypt. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2014.
———. Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
———. Under Osman’s Tree: The Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Environmental History.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017.
Milani, Abbas. Lost Wisdom: Rethinking Modernity in Iran. Washington, D.C.: Mage
Publishers, 2004.
Mirseppasi, Ali. Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating
Modernity in Iran. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
———. Iran’s Troubled Modernity: Debating Ahmad Fardid’s Legacy. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2019.
———. Political Islam, Iran, and the Englightenment: Philosophies of Hope and
Despair. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Mitchell, Timothy. Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. London:
394

Verso, 2011.
———. Colonising Egypt. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988.
———. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2002.
Mitchell, Valérie. Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East. Baltimore,
MD: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.
Mossavar-Rahmani, Bijan. Energy Policy in Iran: Domestic Choices and International
Implications. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.
Mossavar-Rahmani, Bijan and Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani. The OPEC Natural Gas
Dilemma. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.
Mottahedeh, Roy. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1985.
Naficy, Hamid. A Social History of Iranian Cinema, Vols. 1 – 4. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2011-2012.
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. Land Reform and Social Change in Iran. Salt Lake City, UT:
University of Utah Press, 1987.
———. Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties
of Iranian Modernity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005.
Nassehi, Ramin. “Domesticating Cold War Economic Ideas: The Rise of Iranian
Developmentalism in the 1950s and 1960s.” In The Age of Aryamehr: Late
Pahlavi Iran and its Global Entanglements. Edited by Roham Alvandi. London:
Gingko Library, 2018.
Perovic, Jeronim, ed. Cold War Energy: A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas.
Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
Pesaran, Evaleila. Iran’s Struggle for Economic Independence: Reform and CounterReform in the Post-Revolutionary Era. London: Routledge, 2011.
Pickering, Andrew. The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science. Chicago, IL:
The University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Pomeranz, Kenneth. The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the
Modern World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Porter, Theodore M. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public
Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Rajaee, Farhang. Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran. Austin,
TX: University of Texas Press, 2007.
Reynolds, Nancy. A City Consumed: Urban Commerce, the Cairo Fire, and the Politics
of Decolonization in Egypt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.
Rostow, W.W. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
Saheb, Tahereh. “Air Pollution Governance in Iran: Inhibiting Factors.” PhD diss.
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 2015.
Santiago, Myrna I. The Ecology of Oil: Environment, Labor, and the Mexican
Revolution, 1900-1938. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Schayegh, Cyrus. “’Seeing Like a State’: An Essay on the Historiography of Modern
Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (February
2010): 37-61.
395

———. Who is Knowledgeable is Strong: Science, Class, and the Formation of Modern
Iranian Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009.
Schwenkel, Christina. “Spectacular Infrastructure and Its Breakdown in Socialist
Vietnam.” American Ethnologist, Vol. 42, no. 3 (2015): 520-234.
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
Shafiee, Katayoun. Machineries of Oil: An Infrastructural History of BP in Iran.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018.
Shamir, Ronen. Current Flow: The Electrification of Palestine. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2013.
Shokr, Ahmad. “Hydropolitics, Economy, and the Aswan High Dam in Mid-Century
Egypt.” The Arab Studies Journal, Vo. 17, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 9-31.
Siamdoust, Nahid. Soundtrack of the Revolution: The Politics of Music in Iran. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2017.
Sontag, Susan. On Photography. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973. Reprint,
New York: Picador, 1977.
Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle and Ali Mohammadi. Small Media, Big Revolution:
Communication, Culture, and the Iranian Revolution. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1994.
Star, Susan Leigh. “The Ethnography of Infrastructure.” American Behavioral Scientist,
Vol. 43, no. 3 (1999): 377-391.
Stern, Jonathan P. Soviet Natural Gas Development to 1990: The Implications for the
CMEA and the West. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980.
Stevens, Paul. “Pipelines or Pipedreams? Lessons from the History of Arab Transit
Pipelines.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 224-241.
Summit, April R. “For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran.”
Middle East Journal, vol. 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2004): 560-575.
Szeman, Imre and Dominic Boyer, eds. Energy Humanities: An Anthology. Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017.
Tageldin, Shaden M. Disarming Words: Empire and the Seduction of Translation in
Egypt. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011.
Thompson, Elizabeth. Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and
Gender in French Syria and Lebanon. New York: Columbia University Press,
2000.
Thompson, T. Jack. Light on Darkness?: Missionary Photography of Africa in the
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012.
Troutt Powell, Eve M. A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the
Mastery of the Sudan. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003.
Uekoetter, Frank. The Age of Smoke: Environmental Policy in Germany and the United
States, 1880-1970. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009.
Vafa-Arani, Hamed, Salman Jahani, Hossein Dashti, Jafar Heydari, and Saeed Moazen.
“A System Dynamics Modeling for Urban Air Pollution: A Case Study of Tehran,
Iran.” Transportation Research 31, Part D (2014): 21-36.
Varzi, Roxanne. Warring Souls: Youth, Media, and Martyrdom in Post-Revolution Iran.
396

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.
Victor, David G., Amy M. Jaffe, and Mark H. Hayes. Natural Gas and Geopolitics:
From 1970 to 2040. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Vitalis, Robert. America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
von Schnitzler, Antina. Democracy’s Infrastructure: Techno-Politics and Protest after
Apartheid. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.
Walker, Brett L. Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan. Seattle,
WA: University of Washington Press, 2010.
Warde, Paul, Libby Robin, and Sverker Sörlin. The Environment: A History of the Idea.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018.
Wedeen, Lisa. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in
Contemporary Syria. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1999.
White, Sam. “The Little Ice Age Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: A Conjuncture in Middle
East Environmental History.” In Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the
Middle East and North Africa. Edited by Alan Mikhail, 71-90. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Wilson, Sheena, Adam Carlson, and Imre Szeman, eds. Petrocultures: Oil, Politics,
Culture. Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017.
Winegar, Jessica. Creative Reckonings: The Politics of Art and Culture in Contemporary
Egypt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.
Winner, Langdon. “Do Artifacts have Politics?” Daedalus, vol. 109, no. 1 (Winter 1980):
121-136.
———. “Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and
the Philosophy of Technology.” Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 18,
no. 3 (Summer 1993): 362-378.
Wittfogel, Karl. Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1957.
Wright, Andrea Grace. “Migratory Pipelines: Labor and Oil in the Arabian Sea.” PhD
diss., University of Michigan, 2015.
Yeh, Sonia. “An Empirical Analysis on the Adoption of Alternative Fuel Vehicles: The
Case of Natural Gas Vehicles.” Energy Policy 35 (2007): 5865-5875.
Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Free
Press, 1991.
———. The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World. New
York: The Penguin Press, 2011.

397

